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Preface 
The initial subject of my doctorate was female genital mutilation. However, I quickly 
came to the conclusion that others had already thoroughly handled this matter, and 
done a far better job than I ever could have; not only for material reasons, but because 
as a man and an outsider it would be extremely difficult for me to gain the confidence of 
the persons concerned. Yet, my perusal of the literature made it clear that cultural 
context is very important in relation to the subject, and to any moral problem. Through 
the concepts of virtue and value, I became acquainted with the historical importance of 
Hermann Lotze with regards to axiology. In studying his work, I became convinced of 
the importance of anthropology and interculturalism in understanding the entirety of 
ethical problems. 
However, Lotze is a somewhat forgotten figure in the history of philosophy. This is 
regrettable because although his anthropology is now outdated, Lotze had a huge 
impact on contemporary thought. This discovery provided me with the incentive to 
investigate the life and works of this nineteenth century philosopher. My former 
professor in Ethics, Ronald Commers, provided the theoretical onset by highlighting the 
Lotze’s historical importance in the emotive trend of ethics. 
The shared lives of human beings have always spurred moral reflection. Why 
shouldn’t these ideas be worked out in a scientific way, even in their normative facet? It 
surprised me that discussions take place all the time, but that, on an academic level, 
those involved take great care not to present their conclusions as scientific. Instead, 
they make a firm distinction between science and moral valuation. This appears to be a 
somewhat schizophrenic situation. To resolve this tension, scientific methods must be 
applied, rationalisation practised, facts invoked, and mythological justifications 
abandoned. This was already being put into practice in the academic world, even 
clergymen were using this method (to a certain extent) in order to defend their 
viewpoints against non-believer. It is time to grant scientific status to ethics. By going 
 vi 
beyond Hermann Lotze and his morality based on God and the sentiments of man, an 
attempt is made at doing so.  
My philosophical studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel gave me the necessary tools 
to tackle the problems linked to such a venture. There, I studied moral sciences and 
sociology. Of the latter discipline I only completed the two introductory years, called 
‛the candidacy“ in Belgian higher education parlance. Nevertheless, I received a 
thorough introduction to anthropology and social methods. Via optional courses I also 
studied some economic subjects, such as ‛The History of Economic Thinking“, taught by 
Professor Frantzen. This enabled me to write about economic issues. During the 
preparation of this doctorate, at the University of Ghent, I completed my education in 
anthropology, and ethnographic and qualitative research under Professor Hendrik 
Pinxten, my promoter, and I also received an introduction to Oriental studies under 
Professor Balangadhara. Furthermore, I followed ‛Banking and Finance“ with Professor 
Vander Vennet, which came in handy with the case study on Islamic banking included 
in this thesis. I am very grateful to them all, as well as my instructors at the Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel. 
At the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, where I followed an advanced study of Applied 
Ethics, I learned to cope with ethical problems and to find morally acceptable solutions 
in different fields. The seminars were very instructive. I would like to thank Professor 
Luk Bouckaert for introducing me to the Brown model as a method for ethical 
deliberation, and Professor Paul Schotsmans for an introduction to bioethics. Dr. 
Yvonne Denier, who was a departmental assistant during my studies in Leuven, allowed 
me to use her opinion piece on prenatal diagnosis.  
I am grateful to Professor Robert Rubens for informing me that at the Doctor Guislain 
Museum in Ghent an interesting syllabus, prepared by Professor Doctor Guislain 
himself, and dated from Lotze’s time, still existed. In it a reference is made of Lotze 
towards the concept ‘instinct’. I accosted the Professor on the occasion of a class about 
magic, philosophy, and science: ‛The History of the Medical Progress“, to learn more 
about the state of affairs in the medical sciences in the 19th century. The class was 
organized by the Het Davidsfonds organized the class. The same institution also 
organised ‛The Europeans and their values: What We Think and Feel“, given by 
Professor Jan Kerkhofs. This class provided me with interesting information about 
recent research concerning values, both theoretical and empirical. 
As a layman in the Russian language, I am also grateful to Dr. Niels W. Bokhove who 
was so kind as to give me some information about the Russian publications about Lotze, 
as well as his own works, along with some translations of Lotze’s works  
Finally I wish to express my gratitude to Amarasraddha Dharmacharini and Trisha 
Rose Jacobs for revising the text, respectively the first part and the part from ‘5. And 
Beyond’ on. 
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Preface 
The initial subject of my doctorate was female genital mutilation. However, I quickly 
came to the conclusion that others had already thoroughly handled this matter, and 
done a far better job than I ever could have; not only for material reasons, but because 
as a man and an outsider it would be extremely difficult for me to gain the confidence of 
the persons concerned. Yet, my perusal of the literature made it clear that cultural 
context is very important in relation to the subject, and to any moral problem. Through 
the concepts of virtue and value, I became acquainted with the historical importance of 
Hermann Lotze with regards to axiology. In studying his work, I became convinced of 
the importance of anthropology and interculturalism in understanding the entirety of 
ethical problems. 
However, Lotze is a somewhat forgotten figure in the history of philosophy. This is 
regrettable because although his anthropology is now outdated, Lotze had a huge 
impact on contemporary thought. This discovery provided me with the incentive to 
investigate the life and works of this nineteenth century philosopher. My former 
professor in Ethics, Ronald Commers, provided the theoretical onset by highlighting the 
Lotze’s historical importance in the emotive trend of ethics. 
The shared lives of human beings have always spurred moral reflection. Why 
shouldn’t these ideas be worked out in a scientific way, even in their normative facet? It 
surprised me that discussions take place all the time, but that, on an academic level, 
those involved take great care not to present their conclusions as scientific. Instead, 
they make a firm distinction between science and moral valuation. This appears to be a 
somewhat schizophrenic situation. To resolve this tension, scientific methods must be 
applied, rationalisation practised, facts invoked, and mythological justifications 
abandoned. This was already being put into practice in the academic world, even 
clergymen were using this method (to a certain extent) in order to defend their 
viewpoints against non-believer. It is time to grant scientific status to ethics. By going 
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beyond Hermann Lotze and his morality based on God and the sentiments of man, an 
attempt is made at doing so.  
My philosophical studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel gave me the necessary tools to 
tackle the problems linked to such a venture. There, I studied moral sciences and 
sociology. Of the latter discipline I only completed the two introductory years, called 
‛the candidacy“ in Belgian higher education parlance. Nevertheless, I received a 
thorough introduction to anthropology and social methods. Via optional courses I also 
studied some economic subjects, such as ‛The History of Economic Thinking“, taught by 
Professor Frantzen. This enabled me to write about economic issues. During the 
preparation of this doctorate, at the University of Ghent, I completed my education in 
anthropology, and ethnographic and qualitative research under Professor Hendrik 
Pinxten, my promoter, and I also received an introduction to Oriental studies under 
Professor Balangadhara. Furthermore, I followed ‛Banking and Finance“ with Professor 
Vander Vennet, which came in handy with the case study on Islamic banking included 
in this thesis. I am very grateful to them all, as well as my instructors at the Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel. 
At the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, where I followed an advanced study of Applied 
Ethics, I learned to cope with ethical problems and to find morally acceptable solutions 
in different fields. The seminars were very instructive. I would like to thank Professor 
Luk Bouckaert for introducing me to the Brown model as a method for ethical 
deliberation, and Professor Paul Schotsmans for an introduction to bioethics. Dr. 
Yvonne Denier, who was a departmental assistant during my studies in Leuven, allowed 
me to use her opinion piece on prenatal diagnosis.  
I am grateful to Professor Robert Rubens for informing me that at the Doctor Guislain 
Museum in Ghent an interesting syllabus, prepared by Professor Doctor Guislain 
himself, and dated from Lotze’s time, still existed. In it a reference is made of Lotze 
towards the concept ‘instinct’. I accosted the Professor on the occasion of a class about 
magic, philosophy, and science: ‛The History of the Medical Progress“, to learn more 
about the state of affairs in the medical sciences in the 19th century. The class was 
organized by the Het Davidsfonds organized the class. The same institution also 
organised ‛The Europeans and their values: What We Think and Feel“, given by 
Professor Jan Kerkhofs. This class provided me with interesting information about 
recent research concerning values, both theoretical and empirical. 
As a layman in the Russian language, I am also grateful to Dr. Niels W. Bokhove who 
was so kind as to give me some information about the Russian publications about Lotze, 
as well as his own works, along with some translations of Lotze’s works  
Finally I wish to express my gratitude to Amarasraddha Dharmacharini and Trisha 
Rose Jacobs for revising the text, respectively the first part and the part from ‘5. And 
Beyond’ on. 
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Chapter 1.  
Purpose 
The main purpose is to demonstrate first that Lotze’s anthropology and, by extension, 
his weltanschauung is a mental construction, rationally designed and like a building risen 
on the foundations of science, but independently from it; and that another, although 
not any, building could have been raised. That other building, which is used here to 
compare, is based on some epistemological viewpoints and the paradigms of today’s 
science. One of the viewpoints is the well-known razor of Ockham. 
 
 
The razor of Ockham (1280/90–1349) states that the number of entities should not 
be multiplied beyond necessity (entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem). In 
other words, the explanation of facts should make as few assumptions as possible, 
‘shaving off’ those which do add anything extra to the theory. 
 
1 
A second element of comparison, connected to the first, has to do with the concept 
‘certitude’. 
Kant made the distinction between phenomenon (Erscheinung) and noumenon (Ding 
an sich). Nothing can be said about the things observed independent of the observer 
(Dinge an sich) because only the phenomenon or the constructions of the mind 
(Erscheinungen), corresponding to the innate possibilities of the mind, are known by the 
 
                                                     
1 The framed text does not add anything new to the text and is only intended as illustration. 
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subject. However, the possibilities of the mind also allow man to ask questions of a 
transcendent nature and to construct answers beyond the phenomenon constructed on 
account of experience. So empirical knowledge is supplemented with concepts of God. 
Therefore God cannot be known with the same certitude as empirical things and so at 
first Kant also excluded God from knowledge, but afterwards he reintroduced the 
concept as a necessary truth for practical reasons. Kant is not followed totally, for God is 
considered as indispensable from a practical point of view and because his categories 
are actually nouminal and thus unknowable. Kant's definition of the categories leads to 
a contradiction. His categories belong to the nouminal world, which is unknowable2. 
Thus they cannot be found by introspection or transcendental reflection. A better 
option is to include the categories to the phenomenal world, which at the same time 
places them in the cultural sphere. This corresponds with ethnographic data and makes 
them contingent. 
The distinction between the knowable phenomenon and the unknowable noumenon 
generated idealism, an epistemological position which asserts that ontologically only 
the objects of the mind exist. Although Lotze did not go as far as Fichte3, who 
formulated the solipsistic statement that even the external world is but a construction 
of the mind, he is also characterised as an idealist. Nevertheless, Lotze takes a more 
shaded position. He does not deny the external world, on the contrary, he accepts it and 
even against Kant’s warning, describes it, but in an ideological way by replacing 
material things with immaterial ones, as imaginary points and interactions and coming 
very close to today’s physics. Apart from that, all Neo-Kantians, of whom Lotze is a 
prominent representative, make statements about the unknowable external world. 
But all in all Lotze takes a special position as his purpose is to conciliate science with 
faith. Therefore he has to accept empirical data and experience. Lotze’s description of 
scientific knowledge sometimes creates the appearance of a pragmatic approach. No 
wonder that one of his pupils, William James, was a designer of pragmatism, although 
James was not concerned with the metaphysical presuppositions of Lotze. He describes 
pragmatism as among other things, as ‘The attitude of looking away from first things, 
principles, ‘categories’, supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, 
consequences, facts.’4 With ‘supposed necessities’ he could have had his former teacher 
in mind.  
 
                                                     
2 Rorty, 1983:148-155. 
3 Lotze states that Fichte founded his ideas by a more aesthetic than logic reflection. (Lotze,1887:92). 
4 James, 1906:5. 
Purpose  
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Lotze was not only a figure of transition5 but also a very prominent Neo-Kantian. This 
means that his anthropology had an important historic influence and deserves 
attention. So, some attention is paid to provide evidence for that. 
First of all the study positions itself in the anthropological discipline. Then Lotze is 
introduced on the basis of some biographical notes. The historical context is also 
approached in an attempt to understand Lotze’s thinking well; and a synopsis of his 
publications in chronological order to trace the development and content of his 
anthropology, which is the point here. Because the importance of Lotze as a Neo-
Kantian matters, material evidence and evidence of content is gathered. The material 
evidence is related to the amount of translations, reprints, secondary literature, 
doctoral dissertations, and so on; evidence in content is shown by tracing some 
influences on important thinkers, during his life time and during the first quarter of the 
twentieth century. Thereafter he disappears from the foreground. Some causes for that 
are mentioned. Lotze’s anthropology will also be compared with a contemporary one. 
Finally in the ethic era and going beyond Lotze an attempt is made to develop and 
defend a scientific conception of ethics, supplemented with some case studies. 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 ‘For Lotze might fairly have been described as the one remaining link of connexion between the 
great epoch of systematic speculation in Germany and the more recent age of detailed, scientific 
research.’ (Adamson, 1885a:100). 
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Chapter 2.  
Lotze’s anthropology 
2.1 Situating the study within the discipline of anthropology 
Strictly speaking Lotze’s anthropology cannot be understood as anthropology, although 
it presents itself as such. Yet Lotze did not perceive anthropology as a discipline but 
rather as a dimension in which the problem of reality can be stated in a meaningful way, 
because man is where the phenomenon is located6. 
When a study is based on a faith position, it is theology and not anthropology7, even 
if it would be presented as an insurmountable logical consequence, which is in itself 
questionable. Therefore the study has to be situated within the history of 
anthropological theory, and apart from a present day interest it thus first of all has a 
historical significance. It could perhaps be labelled as a pre-scientific theory. Anyhow, 
wherever the beginning of anthropology as a science is situated, whether in the time of 
the books of travels of sea-captains, or the evolutionistic and colonialistic theories of 
Tylor, Morgan and Frazer, or the American anthropology of Boas, the common 
denominator remains, namely an attempt to create an acceptable image of man. The 
method, which has also developed, is in the end the only criterion for demarcating what 
is scientific. But, scientific or not, ‘Microcosmos’ by Lotze presents itself as an 
anthropology and in a first phase present-day qualitative anthropological research has 
to respect the position of its object, which is also the subject. 
 
                                                     
6 Orth, 1997 :122. 
7 Pinxten & De Munter, 2006 :201. 
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Lotze was not the only philosopher interested in anthropology. A considerable 
amount of literature, presenting itself as anthropological, saw the light in the mid-19th 
century. The names of Fichte, Waitz, Wundt, Lazarus and Steinthal, are associated with 
that movement8. The names of Tylor and Lubbock, two influential classical and cultural 
evolutionists9, also became known in Germany. ‘To these was joined the new science of 
Sociology, created by Comte in France, the study of humanity or human society, in 
opposition to Psychology’.10 
One of the striking features of the 18th century11 was the rise of positivism, together with 
the arising of a new middle class, the bourgeoisie. But also conservative attitudes in a 
number of guises saw the light, namely negative utterances as to positivism, 
materialism and atheism, even the sciences as such. In particular a new theology came 
forward. Newton’s God as clockmaker was turned down and revived adherence to 
paranormal theories such as divine intervention, miracles and divine punishments were 
preached.  
These elements are found in the writings of Lotze, but always defending science, 
though subordinated to metaphysical findings, elaborated on a speculative basis. 
Although Lotze was in the first place a scientist and a protestant thinker, nationalism 
was not absent. He even wrote a romantic novel in his youth, ‘Die Deutschen’ (The 
Germans). The emotional sides of romanticism were not able to deny the primacy of 
Cartesian thought in Lotze’s thinking; on the contrary that dualism plays a fundamental 
part in it. It was even one of the elements which compelled some of his critics to label 
Lotze as an eclecticus. In any case he was a figure of transition. 
As for racism, which in the élan of nationalism loomed up, it was wasted on Lotze.  
In the social sciences positivism was introduced by August Comte (1798-1857) and 
Saint-Simon (1760-1825), two figures of a previous generation. Their findings of a fixed 
pattern in social history and predictions of future developments, does not match Lotze’s 
point of view. In ‘Microcosmos’ he deals with social aspects in the history of man, but he 
explains that consequent generations do not know each other well enough to generate 
human made knowledge of trends in history. 
So far nothing has be found, in Lotze’s writings, on Marxism. He must have been 
aware of it, so this absence can be interpreted as a rejection. Of course as a protestant he 
does not agree with Marx’s atheism, and he defends the existing political order. 
 
                                                     
8 Merz,1976,Vol.4 :212. 
9 Erickson, 2001 :45. 
10 Merz,1976,Vol.4:213. 
11 Erickson, 2001:37-39. 
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The interest of the study is not only historical, but also of importance to present day 
anthropology, not only as a comparison with modern theory, but also because of the 
accent Hermann Lotze placed on the epistemological aspect. It makes a great difference 
if man is considered as having great certainty about his role, destiny and knowledge, or 
if man is aware of his restraint capacities in knowledge and possibilities. The religious 
inhabitant of the planet who believes in the special purpose a God has created him and 
who acts daily in this conviction is different in respect of a lot of aspects of his life. A 
Muslim living in a Western society and devoid of the compelling force of the Islamic 
rule, which he would be subjected to in an Islamic state, has the opportunity to define 
for himself whether or not to follow the prescriptions of one of the Islamic schools or 
the Qur’an or if he intends to follow the civil rights of the country12, in the case he is 
confronted with a contradiction between the two. 
Lotze’s anthropology is not anthropology of religion but religious anthropology. It 
could also be called a philosophical one, but because in the end all metaphysical 
reflection is directed onto God, his anthropology can be characterized as religious. Lotze 
himself considered his anthropology as philosophical and hence as anthropology tout 
court. According to Milkov Lotze launched that philosophical discipline13. 
As the mythological interpretations are not part of the explanations but object of 
investigation in science, Lotze’s anthropology will be compared with a non-religious 
viewpoint. His anthropology is an attempt to reconcile the achievements of science with 
religion, in this case protestant religion. However, if mechanical science can be 
integrated in religion, contemporary science cannot. There is a fundamental 
incompatibility between science and religion14. Although outside of science, man is free 
to integrate its findings into a religious whole. That is exactly the way in which Lotze’s 
thinking is approached here, next to the historical significance. 
Religion is defined by Anthony F.C. Wallace15 as ‘belief and ritual concerned with 
supernatural things, powers, and forces’.  
The research is mainly qualitative, apart from some quantitative data such as the 
number of reprints and translations of Lotze’s work, in order to establish their 
 
                                                     
12 Beck, 2008 : 234. 
13 Milkov, 2000:139. 
14 Oreye, 2001 ; Gosselin, 1995. 
15 Cited in: Kottak, 1997:336. According to Professor Balagangadhara in his doctoral thesis 
Comparative Science of Cultures and the Universality of Religion: An Essay on Worlds without Views and Views 
without the World (Ghent University) it is impossible to define religion in a way all religions would be 
included, because of their diversity. But in the present study that is not a problem because religion 
is here restricted to Protestantism. 
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importance. But the importance of his thinking is primarily scrutinized in a qualitative 
way. That is also the case for the comparison with a contemporary vision on man. The 
quantitative as well as the qualitative facet of methodology adopted is motivated by the 
clause stating that the ‘choice of research practices depends upon the questions that are 
asked, and the questions depend on the context’16.  
The main difference between qualitative and quantitative approach is that the 
former makes use of non metric givens, but of words and texts17, next to the differences 
in approach and theory. 
Exceptionally in these study is that methodology is not only adopted, but that at the 
same time a source of a new historical development in methodology itself is found, 
namely the phenomenological approach. Lotze’s image of man leads to Husserl’s 
methodology. Phenomenology was an influential method in Anthropology but is 
outdated because it implements a Western view on non-Western cultures, and thus does 
not respect the intuitions of the culture studied. 
One of the difficulties in this research is to bring to the fore the significances as meant 
by the persons at stake, in the first place Lotze. As an interactive approach, customary 
in anthropological research, is not possible, it is important to pay attention to the 
opinions of Lotze’s contemporaries, fellow-thinkers and pupils as well as his opponents, 
in order to interpret the historical data. Moreover they are to be translated in 
contemporary terms. Differences in meaning of words between a language some 150 
years ago and today must not be underestimated, as the meaning develops in a different 
world of experience. But they must not be overestimated either, because of the 
relatively durable construction of a language. The same can be said of the cultural 
intuitions, expressing ‘the non-discursive or immediate notions which are underlying 
the level of rational discourse18’. Therefore illustrations are introduced. The latter is 
done by following Lotze’s train of thought from time to time. It gives a more striking 
image of his activity. But in the end the significance has to be interpreted. And, 
interpreting is also disturbing, as criticizing is rearranging, and thus changing the 
original message, which does not mean that the result of that activity does not clarify 
the subject. 
The sources for research consist of writings of Lotze and commentaries of others, 
completed with data to re-create the context, which is important for understanding the 
whole. Also Lotze’s correspondence can be relevant. No sources available must be 
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neglected19. The writings are to be placed in their original context, as far as possible. For 
instance the experience of time was different. Imagine a world in which no Internet, 
TGV or airplane is available, but the fastest vehicle is a coach or perhaps already a train. 
Not a globalized world was at the centre of attention, but the village or a city of a more 
restricted size. Coloured people were only known indirectly by pictures or directly by 
but a few travellers.  But above all, thoughts are important here. Another example is 
more striking: secularisation is only beginning. Especially in the villages religion is still 
omnipresent. On the other hand changes occur, with a quest for a new identity or the 
conflict between different identities, particularly in the cities. Are you a materialist, a 
spiritualist or do you believe in God? Are you a protestant or a catholic? Identity is not 
only an individual matter, there is also group identity and community identity20. All 
these identities can be in conflict with each other in a dynamic setting and especially 
when contradictions loom. 
The title of this doctoral thesis mentions ‘a comparative approach’. Concretely, it means 
that it will end in an explicit comparison with an image of man of today. In this way 
three objectives are obtained. Firstly the contrast with another image of man will put 
Lotze’s one more clearly. Secondly the inevitable conceptions of the researcher and the 
tradition in which he operates as well as the ethical implications are more evident. 
Finally similarities can be detected. All that must add a dimension to the research. As 
Pinxten stated, ‘if anthropology is to be a science, it will be comparative’21.  
The choice for one particular image of man, gives some opportunities to elucidate 
Loze’s thinking, but also includes restrictions. Only those oppositions or similarities are 
described which are directly evident from the contrasting image, which is also a 
Western one. For instance the typical Western perspective on the cosmos as a whole, 
the so called God’s Eye View22, is absent in the comparison. The ultimate goal of 
comparison is to establish universal theories, the ideal goal of any science. The universal 
aspect in the present research is represented by the human need for certainty. Certainty 
is given by religion and religious answers, but also by a materialistic world-view, even 
found in the reduction of life to energy/matter23. 
 
                                                     
19 For instance the author of this doctoral dissertation has read a richly illustrated history of the 19th 
century (Rebo International, 20022) in order to have not only an abstract knowledge of that history, 
but also to have the possibility to represent himself de visu life in that century, linked to its history. 
20 Verstraete & Pinxten, 1998 : 15. 
21 Pinxten, 1997:2. 
22 Koyré (1957) cited in Pinxten, 1997:90. 
23 In ‘Het verschijnsel mens’ (‘The Phenomenon Man’) by André Brossé, the whole world and all 
knowledge is represented as dependent on the physical fact of energy/matter, although not 
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But because awareness is another universal aspect of man, each universal that is 
determined risks to annihilate itself, because once in the social consciousness man is 
able to act in the opposite way as determined by the so far unconscious motive of 
behaviour24. When the human community is aware that it looks for certainty, it may also 
question that fact and deny it. Only, is it possible to live without any certainty?  
Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote a book on that subject25. Although nobody can be sure of 
whatsoever, certainty is a necessity in life. First of all it is practically, but for all it is 
theoretically impossible to maintain incertainty always and everywhere. Knowledge 
would be utopian26. To anthroplogy it is important to know if certainty or incertainty is 
part of the worldview and if it is culturally imbedded.  
Another (universal) motive of man is the search for truth. Epistemologically it leads 
to a questioning of the knowability of nature. As Rawls said knowledge is not a mirror of 
nature. For Lotze the truth can be traced by reasoning, but the access to it is limited by 
the possibilities of the mind. For the pragmatist James, a pupil of Lotze, truth is 
established by successful actions. It is difficult, if not impossible, to deny the need for 
certainty.  
The choice of certainty as a universal can be criticised because it is a priori or because 
it is to general. As the concepts awareness and the search for truth, the concept of 
certainty is very general, but it still has the capacity to explain things. In other words it 
is a workable concept. As to the possible critique that it is a priori, is it really so? Of 
course it does not only appear from the present research and is mostly due to personal 
experience, and past literature and it is also ‘in the air’, but considering that the two 
images are very similar (in case Western), supplemented with the consideration that 
personal experience and so on is also a posteriori, and that eventually the candidate for 
universality can be confronted afterward with the intuitions of other cultures, the 
concept can (in the meantime) be maintained. There is no question of structuralism or 
phenomenologism, and falsification is always possible. 
Was Lotze an important thinker and did he have a great historical influence? What 
did that influende consisted of? Does he still have any importance today? He attempted 
to establish anthropology on mainly speculative grounds, but some of his ideas can be 
found in present day anthropology. That alone is reason enough to pay attention to his 
work. 
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2.2 Some biographical notes 
The biographical background27 is not unimportant in the case of Lotze, because his dual 
approach, namely the physical and the philosophical one, is due to the special 
circumstances of his life and his preference for romantic literature. He also remained 
loyal to his first insights, which were rooted in the questions introduced by his teachers, 
although he already struggled with some before entering the university, the mind-body 
problem for instance. In a letter to Heinrich Kämmel28, a friend of his, dated July 17, 
1833, the year before he entered university, he wrote that body and mind are connected 
with one another and that the body is but a loving, mental union of the visible, to trim 
the invisible mind. In the same letter29 he speaks of the scientific world as of minor 
importance vis-à-vis the moral one. 
Rudolf Hermann Lotze, mostly cited as Hermann Lotze30, was born in Bautzen, 
Saxony, May 21, 1817, as the third child of his family. His father, Karl Friedrich Lotze 
(1783-1829), a military physician, already died at the age of 46. His mother, Christiana 
Caroline Noack, was the daughter of the director of a private school in Dresden.  
In Zittau, where the family moved to in 1819, he attended from 1828 on, the 
gymnasium. In that period he wrote a youthful romantic novel ‘Die Deutschen’ (The 
Germans). In 1840 another literary work was published: ‘Gedichte’ (Poems). That literary 
interest was responsible for the romantic aspect of his teleological world-view. In Zittau 
he also received an excellent training in Latin. He had an enduring love of the classic 
authors and later on (1857) he translated Sophocles’ Antigone. At the gymnasium in 
Zittau a lifelong friendship commenced with the philologist Moritz Haupt, who 
introduced him to the publisher Salomo Hirzel and his circle. 
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From 1834 onwards, at the age of 17, he entered the University of Leipzig as a medical 
student. However, he preferred philosophy. Due to the financial situation of his family a 
more realistic option forced itself upon him. The two points of interest will nevertheless 
last the whole of his career. His college days took place from the summer of 1834 to the 
winter of 1837-38. Not without any importance for Lotze is that his professor of 
philosophy, C. H. Weisse, gave a lecture in 1837, calling for more attention to the 
philosophy of Kant. Later, on Lotze became a major figure in Neo-Kantianism. 
He received his scientific education of mathematics and physiology from E. H. Weber 
and physics from W. Volckman en G. T. Fechner. Fechner who was a lecturer in physics 
since 1824, became a professor in 1834, the year Lotze began his academic studies. 
Fechner imparted to his pupil the significance of quantitative experiments and 
mathematic processing of empirical data31. This education will lead to Lotze’s 
mechanistic view on science32. He received his introduction in anthropology from 
Johann Christian August Heinroth, a psychiatrist who was interested in philosophy and 
theology. 
Before Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), known as the father of experimental psychology, 
Fechner33 already collected empirical material to gain insight into the relation between 
body and mind34. He was no longer satisfied with purely speculative theories. Although 
the experimentations in question took place after Lotze had finished his academic 
education, the fact illustrates the spirit in which Fechner taught. The body-mind 
problem will be dealt with by Lotze within a causal model. 
It was his inclination to aesthetics and his artistic interests which led him to 
philosophy. At the university under Christian Hermann Weisse (1801-1866), who 
belongs to the early romantic period, but who also recommended Kant, Lotze loses 
himself in the study of the works of Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich von Schelling and Georg 
Hegel. His scientific mind however led him to reject their ideas and methods. Hegel’s 
dialectics were not acceptable to him, and he developed an opposing theory of logic. 
The speculative medical theories of Schelling did not fit Lotze’s mechanistic view on 
medicine; and Fichte’s idealism was too subjective. 
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Abstraction made of his earlier interests, most of the philosophical problems Lotze 
would struggle with, are reducible to the work of Weisse, although he approached them 
critically. He looked for genuine answers in the field where physical and mental 
phenomenon came together. 
In March 1838, Lotze earned a doctoral degree35 in philosophy with a dissertation on 
Descartes and Leibniz, and in July of the same year also in medicine with a critical study 
of the medical science of his time. From 1838 to 1839 he had a medical practice in Zittau, 
but already in the same year he became a lector in medical sciences at the University of 
Leipzig and the year after he became a lecturer in philosophy. As usual in Germany and 
other German-speaking European countries36, he wrote his ‘Habilitationschrift’ 
(Dissertation for habilitation), which qualified him to be admitted as a professor at a 
university, namely Leipzig In 1839 he became professor of medicine or physiology, as it 
was called then, and in 1840 of philosophy. In Leipzig he was a member of the so called 
‘Freitagskränzches’, founded by the bookseller Karl Reimer, and  frequented by Weisse, 
Hirzel and Haupt. It took place at Fechner’s house. 
From 1842 till 1844 he took over the chair of philosophy in Leipzig from Herbart. In 
1843 he was appointed to be an extraordinary and in 1844 ordinary professor of 
Philosophy at the university of Göttingen, also as the successor of Herbart. Herbart will 
also have an influence. He is cited frequently by Lotze, but often criticised as well. 
The same year he married the daughter of a clergyman, Ferdinande Hoffmann. They 
had four sons. 
His numerous publications and their dissemination made him famous, so that he 
received a lot of offers from other universities37. He will only answer positively to the 
offer from Berlin, at the insistance of Eduard Zeller38, who taught philosophy there since 
1872, and of Hermann von Helmholtz, the famous physician. In April 1881 he moved to 
Berlin to teach there as a successor of Harms39, until his death on the 7 of July of the 
same year.  
Already during his studies he had to content with heart trouble. It was the cause of 
his death in combination with a pulmonary infection. During his life Lotze was often 
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affected by illness and nausea. He frequently travelled to Wiesbaden for a cure. He only 
taught one semester in Berlin. Wilhelm Dilthey was his successor40. 
Lotze was buried in Göttingen with his wife. 
Lotze was a figure of transition41 in a period in Germany largely dominated by 
romanticism on the one hand and materialism on the other, but also a period in which 
the analytic philosophy and phenomenology began, with Lotze at the centre. He was 
jointly responsible for the decline of Hegelianism and absolutist idealism42. The 
intellectual world of German’s middle class was indisputably caught by a materialistic 
philosophy. They saw the material world in opposition to an idealistic and spiritual 
conception of life43. 
Cartesian dualism, to which Lotze adhered, is close to spiritism. It is in fact spiritism, 
which must not be confused with spiritualism. But in his last years Lotze vehemently 
countered irrationalism and spiritism to promote reason, truth and science44. 
Kraushaar describes Lotze as ‘shy, reserved and tinged with a gentle melancholy – a 
lonely man of endless patience and pathetic sincerity’.45 
2.3 The historical context 
The aim of this outline is to situate Lotze historically in order to better understand his 
ideas. Therefor only historical items related to his work and ideas are covered. 
Lotze’s youth took place in the romantic period, his maturation in the upcoming era 
of Realism and the expanding of Materialism46. 
Apparently Lotze was not interested in politics or in public attention. He appealed 
essentially to his peers. Without endorsing the negative connotation, Russell’s assertion 
that post-Hegelian philosophy was mostly academic47 can be confirmed. The impolite 
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attacks on opponents as found in Fichte’s and Schelling’s writings are completely absent 
in Lotze’s works. He acts as a sober and accurate scientist. On the other hand the 
absence of political statements, particularly at the beginning of his career, is perhaps 
very significant. But also later on, when in politics a quieter period broached, Lotze’s 
political utterances were very general and moderate. In 1876 he was even made a Privy 
Counsellor48. 
The University of Göttingen was founded by King Georg August of Hanover, and was 
still under the jurisdiction of his descendents. Ernst August (1771-1851), who reigned 
over Hanover from 1837 till 1851, and his son Ernst August (1819-1878) till 1866, were 
very conservative and unpopular. Their reign came to an end in 1866, with the 
annexation of Hanover by Prussia. The history of the Seven from Göttingen (‘Göttinger 
Sieben’)49 characterizes the political sphere at that time.  
The opposition between the royal-patriarchal and the constitutional system became 
evident during the events of 1837, when seven professors of the University of Göttingen 
protested against the abolition of the constitution by the new monarch in 1833. 
Although the historians Dahlman and Gervinus; the docent constitutional law, Albrecht; 
the Germanists Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm; the Orientalist Ewals; the physician Weber, 
did not have any connection with the Liberals, and did not have revolutionary 
intentions, their paper passed as quick as lightening from one hand to another, spread 
over Germany and met with a wide response in French and English newspapers. The 
students, coming from different regions of Germany played a huge part in the spreading 
of rumours and of copies of the paper. The students filled the streets and neglected their 
courses. They cheered the seven dismissed professors and were present when Dahlman 
and the brothers Grimm, who where expelled from Hanover, were led across the border. 
Herbart, the predecessor of Lotze in Göttingen, on the other hand felt that the 
university must not be engaged in politics. 
Those in power were aware of revolutionary reactions. Censorship, immediate and 
visible interventions as well as the stake of police force and the army were the means by 
which the restorative realisations were defend against progressive engagements. The 
intervention concerning the ‘Seven from Göttingen’ was all in all relatively restraint in 
comparison to the repercussions of the French Revolution of February 1848. The 
‘Revolution of March’ (‘Märzrevolution’) in Germany, Austria and Italy, undermined 
Metternich’s new order. Such a political sphere was not conducive to an open political 
 
                                                     
48 ‘A privy council is a body that advises the head of state of a nation on how to exercise their 
executive authority, typically, but non always, in the context of a monarchic government.’ 
(<Wikipedia.org>, ‛Privy council“, 31.10.2008). 
49 Kück, 1934; Blanke, 1988. 
The Anthropology of Hermann Lotze 
28 
engagement, especially knowing that the University of Göttingen was directly 
dependent on the King. 
The conservative writings of Burke, de Bonal and de Maistre represented a trend 
which was opposed to the Enlightenment and which favoured the return of the Ancient 
Regime. After the French Revolution and the defeat of Napoleon their thought spread 
over Europe, and can also account for every success in promoting the romantic feelings. 
Even Lotze’s success is related to it, although he was a protestant and cannot be 
identified with them. The nostalgia for the feudal, Christian world-order was above all a 
matter of Catholic nobility. They turned against the bourgeoisie at a time when the 
irreversibility of the historic events was not yet evident. In Germany for instance the 
highest positions, certainly in the army, were reserved for the nobility. The Catholic 
Church also stuck to the prerogatives of a state religion for a long time, witnessed by the 
papal encyclic Mirari vos (1832), and Quanta cura (1864), as well as the so called Syllabus, 
an appendix to the Quanta cura.50 The Romantic Movement joined the trend, although it 
did not overlap it. By all accounts socialism and sociology also have romantic 
predecessors. Lotze’s romanticism had a literary origin. 
Next to the conflict between late absolutism and the upcoming democratic trends, 
Germany, like Italy, was marked by a strive for unification. The conservative Otto von 
Bismarck played an important role in the establishment of the German Empire.  After 
the victory over France in 1871 King Wilhelm of Prussia became Emperor Wilhelm I, 
Bismarck successively became Minister-President and Chancellor of the Empire. It was 
the latter who stipulated the line of action till 1890. 
Economically Germany was an agricultural country with an upcoming industry, but 
not as well developed as in the United Kingdom. This situation had an influence on 
economic thinking51. The British philosophers and economic theorists (the Classic 
School: Adam Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill) were promoters of free trade 
and founded their theories on deductive reasoning, but their German colleagues 
(Historical School: Friedrich List, Wilhelm Roscher and Bruno Hildebrand) stressed the 
historical aspect of economic development due to a general German trend, but also 
because of the necessity for protective measures in the first period of an economic 
transition52. Their methods were inductive and focused on industrial periods of 
development and on measures to protect and support that development. Economic 
value theories, the material with which we are concerned here because of the historical 
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role Lotze played in axiology, were not developed in the dynamic economic vision of the 
German researchers, but in the static search for laws of nature by the British thinkers. 
Values were seen as universal elements, as they still are by many people nowadays. 
Because values were first theorized in economic thinking some attention has to be paid 
to its characteristics as precursor of the axiology established by Lotze.  
Economic value theory53 goes back to mercantilism, with Sir William Petty (1623-
1687). Prices of goods oscillate around a natural level, defined by labour and ground, and 
incorporated in the goods. That theory was adopted by the physiocrat Richard Cantillon 
(1680(?)-1734). It was Etienne Bonnet de Condillac (1715-1780) who spoke of utility and 
scarcity as the mechanism for price formation, preparing the neoclassic subjectivist 
value theory. So, value theories came within the scope of the academic sphere of 
interest via economics for the first time. 
The labour oriented economic value theory was adopted by Karl Marx (1818-1883), a 
contemporary but not an intellectual companion of the religious Lotze. For the sake of 
completeness however, the political setting of that time manifests, sketched in outline, 
a threefold aspect, namely the conservative feudal remainings, the progressive liberals 
and the social movement. The nobility were still landowners, or had important 
functions in the army and government administration. The commonalty became more 
and more socially important and lost its ‘Biedermeier’-image. And Bismarck tried to 
take the wind out of the socialists’ sails by establishing a social insurance program 
funded by payroll taxes. But that was in 1889, eight years after Lotze’s death. 
In the wake of nationalism and the strive after unification in Germany and Italy anti-
Semitism also loomed up again. 
Emancipation of women was not yet under discussion in Germany. Only in some 
states of America, women obtained the right to vote, but only in the last decennium of 
the century. It was in Finland in 1906 that the first European women obtained the right 
to vote54. In 1895 the theologian Otto Ritschl, an acquaintance of Lotze’s, wrote that 
women, because of their strong natural inclination to sentiments, were not fit for 
sciences as this requires rational devotion. It was not a typical protestant opinion but a 
large disseminated one55. Nevertheless a letter was found in the inheritance of Lotze in 
which the gifted mathematician Kowalewskaja (1850-1891), the daughter of a Russian 
general, was allowed to do a doctorate at Göttingen at the time when Lotze was Dean of 
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the Philosophical Faculty56, a nice example of tolerance and consistent scientific 
attitude. 
In the field of philosophy of science, the mechanical worldview, originating frm the 
17th century, the period known as that of the ‘Scientific Revolution’57, dominated in 
matters of the inorganic world. It was anti-animistic, but on the whole it retained the 
providential intervention of God. For Newton (1643-1727) God’s intervention was 
necessary to be able to understand the world and through intervention God 
simultaneously manifests himself. In Germany in the second half of the 19th century 
however Feuerbach (‘Essence of Christianity’, 1841) and Strauss (‘Life of Jesus Critically 
Examined’, 1835-1836) attacked religion in their anti-Hegelian revolt.   
The non-natural sciences were designated by the term ‘Geisteswissenschaften’ in 
German, and by the term ‘humanities’ in English. The two terms do not denote exactly 
the same however. In the 19th century science was identified with natural science, which 
appropriates a social-intellectual legitimation completely separated from philosophy, 
and was even in contradiction with the latter58. 
But in the field of medicine59 Schelling (1775-1854) took a prominent place in 
Germany with his philosophy of nature, an anti-mechanic worldview. His speculative 
approach gave rise to a romantic medical thinking and neglected empirical research. He 
studied the parallelism between the micro- and macrocosmos again. He spoke of ‘ens 
mori’, affections that entered the body. He belonged to the last uprise of speculative 
medicine. In 1827 Alexander von Humboldt had already attacked speculative 
‘Naturphilosophie’60 (philosophy of nature). Lotze will criticise the romantic vitalistic 
speculations in medicine and defend a mechanistic view, as prepared by Descartes with 
his man as machine (‘homme-machine’). Descartes too was interested in physiology. His 
research in optics and neurophysiology was remarkable61. Notable is also that Lotze’s 
doctoral dissertation for philosophy had, among others, Descartes as theme. 
Not only physics but also psychology underwent a transition and became a science. 
The widespread opinion that the activities and contents of the mind could never be 
measured, and would remain subjective, was contradicted in the early 1800s by Ernst H. 
Weber (1795-1878) and Gustav Fechner (1801-1887), two teachers of Lotze. They related 
physical stimuli with mental experiences. Among other things Weber studied the two-
point threshold, a case of measuring the smallest distance noticeable to touch at various 
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parts of the body. He ascertained that the smallest threshold (1 mm) was situated on the 
tongue, the largest (60 mm) on the back. Gustav Fechner, a colleague of Wundt’s, studied 
medicine at Leipzig, where Weber was teaching. He perfected Weber’s law, by stating 
that the perceived difference of weight is not absolute, but depends in fact on the height 
of the weights compared. The recognizable difference is expressed as a fraction (1/40), 
regardless of the weights concerned. Fechner changed the law in a logarithmic formula. 
Lotze too will make a contribution towards psychology, namely by establishing his 
theory of Local Signs, which describes the formation of spatial awareness, by means of 
the sensations of eye muscle movement in combination with spatial movement of the 
body. The ‘local signs’ are marks which accompany the sensations produced through 
stimulation of the sensory nerves of the organ. 
Science was in tutelage of the natural sciences and of mathematics. The pantometric 
thinking was omnipresent and in correspondence with Descartes’ ‘res extensa’. He used 
the term to denote the physical world, which is measurable; and ‘res cogitans’ to denote 
the spiritual aspect of the human being. 
In physics the atomic theory was not yet generally accepted, because there was no 
direct experimental proof. Bertholet, Mach and Ostwald rejected the theory. In 1858 
Stanislo Cannizzaro had already made the distinction between the concepts of molecule 
and atom, by making a critical examination of the method to determine the atomic 
weights and by giving the exact use of the method. 
All these realisations fit into a more general tendency, prepared by Schleiermacher 
(1768-1834), an influential protestant theologian, who defended the independence of 
science from faith. In this way God is beyond the reach of science, proof, argumentation 
and discursive thinking62. And indeed science developed more and more in a positivistic, 
materialistic way, whereas philosophy was idealistic or romantic. Some Neo-Kantian 
will try to reconcile both, and especially Lotze will realize the task, founded on Kant’s 
‘Kritik der Urteilskraft’ (Critique of Judgement). 
Until the first half of the 19th century various influences and constructive 
philosophical ideas saw the light. Most of the academic philosophers restricted 
themselves to activities in partial questions or historical or philosophical critiques, 
performed in a spirit of free inquiry, but not able to oppose the overpowering influence 
of certain dominant ideas which, mainly through the literature of the great classical 
period, swayed the German intellect63. Even the necessity of philosophy was questioned. 
Neither science nor religion felt any need for such speculation. ‘In the years 1830 and 
1870 philosophy was wholly on the defensive in German thought. It was only after 1870 
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that philosophers found some security again.64’ In opposition to the other Western 
philosophical traditions, Logic took a prominent place in Germany, beginning with 
Leibniz and transmitted by the influential Wolff, and it was also Logic that incited a 
revaluation of philosophy. 
The periode between the earlier and the later idealistic school can be called a period 
of transition. Lotze in Germany, Comte in France and Mill and the Utilitarians in 
England prepared in their own way the changes in thought at the end of the 19th and the 
beginning of the 20th century. Materialism and pessimism in Germany, positivism and 
social philosophy in France, and naturalism and agnosticism in England were the best-
known types of philosophical thought65. The currents of thought preparing a new era 
were represented by Lotze and some Neo-Kantians in Germany, Renouvier in France and 
T. H. Green and Henry Sidgwick in England. The latter were less popular.66 
However, materialism was not restricted to the implicit form within science, but also 
explicit in the writings of Ludwig Büchner (1824-1899)67, Hermann Ulrici (1806-1884), 
Karl Vogt (1817-1895)68, Jacob Moleschott (1822-1893)69, and Heinrich Czolbe (1819-
1873)70,71. Also Feuerbach can be mentioned here72. In turning down the a priori 
approach, the materialists adhered to a psychological interpretation of logic and 
mathematics, as mental products73. The interest in philosophy of religion is to be 
connected with upcoming atheism. For Merz this interest is no longer a question of the 
opposition between science and belief, but between belief and unbelief74. 
For William James75 Lotze and Fechner were the sole original thinkers to oppose 
materialism76, while Fechner was not even a professional philosopher. Büchner77, who 
 
                                                     
64 Sluga, 1980:10. 
65 Merz,1976,Vol.4 :746. 
66 Merz,1976,Vol.4:747-748. 
67 Kraft und Stoff, 1855. 
68 Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft: Eine Streitschrift gegen den Hofrat Rudolph Wagner in Göttingen, 1855. 
69 Die Lehre der Nahrungsmittel, 1850. 
70 Czolbe wrote a pamphlet adressed to Lotze: Entstehung des Selbstbewußtseins. Eine Antwort an Herrn 
Professor Lotze (1856) 
71 Lotze will criticise Czolbe’s psychologism (Sluga, 1980:19). 
72 Merz,1976,Vol.4:693. 
73 The brains produce thoughts in the same way as the kidneys urine. 
74 Merz,1976,Vol.4:609. 
75 ‘In Germany the Hegelian impetus had spent itself, and, apart from historical scholarship, nothing 
but the materialistic controversy remained, with such men as Büchner and Ulrici as its champions. 
Lotze and Fechner were the sole original thinkers, and Fechner was not a professional philosopher 
at all’ (James, 1977:8). 
76 Merz states that Lotze took a leading part in the criticism of materialism.(1976,Vol.4:693. 
Lotze’s anthropology 
 33 
founded the ‘German association of free thinkers’ (Deutschen Freidenkerbund) in 1881, also 
propagate Darwin’s theory of evolution in Germany78. He published ‘Darwin’s Theory of 
the Transformation of Species and the First Origin of the World of Organisms’ (Die 
Darwinsche Theorie von der Verwandlung der Arten und die erste Entstehung der 
Organismenwelt) in 1868. Although Darwin’s ‘On the origin of Species’ came out in 1859, it 
took some time before his ideas were fully accepted in the academic world. Lotze did 
know his evolution theory, he spoke of it during his course of lectures. Although he did 
not criticise them, he emphasised the spiritual origin of man. According to Wentscher79 
Lotze accepted that in the lower species there must have been changes in the germs, 
accompanied by the ability to survive and procreate. Even now varieties come into 
existence. But he also put that, for the higher organisms, such ‘illegitimate’ forms were 
never observed. His statements are very cautious. On the one hand he does not 
contradict scientific data, on the other hand he attempts to save as much as possible of 
the religious premises. Merz80 remarked that Lotze did not do full justice to the 
philosophical ideas contained in Darwinism or that he did not rightly estimate the 
importance of it. He termed Lotze as pre-evolutionary. Moreover for Lotze the validity 
of a statement is not dependent upon historical but on logical evidence81. 
The idea of social evolution had come into existence at the end of the 19th century. In 
Italy Carlo Cattaneo and Giuseppe Ferrari developed a social positivistic theory, founded 
on Saint-Simon. The German social-positivists however were influenced by Feuerbach. 
Ernst Laas and Friedrich Jodl are to be mentioned82, and also the anti-semite Eugen 
Dühring, who underwent some influences from August Comte; Herbert Spencer, of 
course, but in a more speculative manner; and the geologist Charles Lyell, the 
immediate precursor of Charles Darwin83. 
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2.4 Synopsis of Lotze’s publications in chronological order 
The division of periods is mainly based on Max Wentscher84. It corresponds roughly 
with that of Orth85. Although Lotze was true to his first insights his whole live, some 
developments are nevertheless discernable.  
This account contains only the necessary information to outline the development of 
Lotze’s thinking, supplemented with some brief clarifications where necessary.  
Occasionally the text will anticipate further developments. 
2.4.1 First works 
2.4.1.1 ‘Futurae biologicae principiis philosophices’ (1838) 
‘On the Philosophical Principles of the Future Biology’ (1838) (De futurae biologiae 
principibus philosophicis) is Lotze’s thesis to become a Doctor of Medical Sciences, after he 
already obtained that grade in philosophy in the same year, with a dissertation on 
Descartes and Leibniz. As was usual it was redacted in Latin. 
He accused the vagueness of German medical philosophy, by giving a clear definition 
of mechanical science86. He questioned the foundations of the then medical science, and 
ascertained an excess of data and theories, without general consensus about their 
validity, and no more about their consequences. Vague relations, strange explanations 
of arbitrary observations were quite common. Science until that time was dominated by 
a fierce collection of medical data, denominations, comparisons and classifications. The 
speculative approach was the rule and there was a shortage of solid theories. 
In a letter (1837) addressed to Ernst Apelt, a friend of Lotze’s, when he was still a 
student, he complained already about the manuals of medicine, which only contain 
incoherent, pure empirical facts87. 
The transition from philosophy of nature to science of nature was happening, and for 
Lotze theory, hypotheses and experiments were fundamental in medical science. 
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Diagnosis and therapy were central to this, something evident now, but not in his time. 
Medical manuals also clearly show the tentative dialogue between empirical material, 
whether or not sufficiently checked, and the first constructions of theory, in which the 
conjecturing character is prominent, at least to the more informed reader of today. The 
concept ‘instinct’ for instance encompassed a lot of unexplained biological processes, 
and the mechanistic view was turned down88. 
 
 
 
FIRST WORKS: 
 
‘Futurae biologicae principiis philosophices’ (1838) 
‘De summis continuorum’ 1840 
‘Metaphysics’ (1841) 
‘General Pathology and Therapy as Mechanical Science of Nature (1842) 
‘Logic’ (1843) 
In Rudiger Wagner’s Dictionary of Physiology: 
‘Live and Vital Power’ (1843) 
‘Instinct’ (1844) 
 
 
Instead of Darwin’s principles, the understandable astonishment about the complicated 
and ingenious construction of life was prominent. The ‘intelligent design’ is not a new, 
but an outstripped and abandoned scientific paradigm89. The scientific descriptions of 
Lotze are confined to the purely mechanistic, and his teleological contemplations are 
but a method to interpret the scientific findings in a weltanschauung. 
2.4.1.2 ‘De summis continuorum’ (1839) 
‘De summis continuorum’ (1839) is Lotze’s thesis to become a Doctor of Philosophy. A 
mathematical problem is treated; and it deals with infinite series whose elements are 
themselves obtained from a limited process90. For the mathematicians, Lotze speaks 
about the summation of infinitely increasing series, characterized by the fact that they 
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depend on each other, and which must be replaced by an elementary method of 
summation91. Of interest are, according to Wentscher92 the four accompanying theses. 
The first concerns geometric method, the second philosophy of nature, the third 
philosophy of history and culture, and the fourth: aesthetics. Wentscher also states that 
the second thesis contains the rejection of the concept ‘forces’ (Kräfte), and that these 
introduced a development which was ended by Kirchhoff and Mach.  
2.4.1.3 ‘Metaphysics’ (1841) 
The publications, ‘Metaphysics’ (1841) (Metaphysik), called the ‘Little Metaphysic’ (Kleine 
Metaphysik) and ‘Logic’ (1843) (Logik) remained unnoticed by the public. Lotze first 
became known by the general public through publications on physical and mental 
problems of the human organism. 
The work is purely ontological and deals with three sections: reality, appearance and 
validity of knowledge93.  
In ‘Metaphysics’ he tried to reconcile the mechanistic conception, which he defended 
against the vitalistic one, with religion; and he had to throw himself into the duel 
between the idealists, with Fichte, Schelling and Hegel on the one side, and the realists, 
with Herbart on the other94. He emphasized the merits of the idealists, but fought 
against their transposition of the dialectical method, thus the logical concepts of reality. 
Thinking and reality are two distinct matters. This position is due to the realistic feature 
of science, which is in search of general laws, in accordance with causal interpretations. 
Teleology does not form part of science, because teleology does not explain anything, 
but puts forward the causal coherence of things as a means to realise it. Mechanistic 
interpretations are reserved for science, the organic world included; teleological ones 
for metaphysics. The mechanistic interpretation however is but a means, not the 
moving principle of phenomenon. The purely causal explanations are not appropriate to 
account for the validity of the physical laws or for life as such. Besides this is in 
accordance with Kant95. 
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Against Hegelian speculative idealism96, Lotze puts what he calls teleological idealism. 
The goal and highest sense of the world is not the pan logical, dialectical self-realisation 
of Hegel; and not the unified worldview of Schelling and Fichte also based on one sole 
idea. On the contrary, the substance of the world and the beginning of metaphysics is 
ethical. ‘The essence of reality, the truly Real, is an ethical ideal, a moral conception.’97 
The moral good is the highest goal, justified by itself, because of its intrinsic value. 
Later, Emmanuel Levinas (1905-1995) too will found metaphysics on ethics, however not 
ethics in itself, but as an appeal from the countenance of the other, which he presents as 
a new way to escape from being98. Levinas ethical appeal is also linked to the Jewish 
election and revelation99. More recently allied post-modern narratives are delivered by 
Gianni Vattimo100. 
On the epistemological level, knowledge is subjective101, so the mind becomes the 
subject of choices and can distinguish between good and evil. It submits the material of 
science to a judgement. However, the subjectivity of the categories of knowledge is not 
unique, but has a general validity. 
In ‘Metaphysics’ the concept of God, as foundation for his ethical, teleological 
idealism, and the concept of freedom are not yet introduced, although they already 
formed an essential part of his world-view. According to Wentscher102, it is because 
Lotze had not yet set right the foundations of these two elements of his thinking. 
Therefore it was better not to discuss them in order to avoid a dispute on a debatable 
and controversial item. Moreover he would not have had the cut and dried answers at 
that time, especially concerning the relative place of both conceptions. Nevertheless, by 
assigning to the mechanical the means to realise goals and not the goals themselves103, 
he left the possibility of a further treatment open. Also the treatment of the idea of God 
is prepared, for the supreme good, present in the ‘Little Metaphysics’ is in want of an 
innate power, the real substance of the world. That substance cannot be materialistic, 
nor a factum, in the sense of Herbart. Therefore one must speak of asemblance of 
substance. There is no fixed essence of being as last background or as substance in itself. 
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The substantial background of being is outside. What is, is what it is made for; it is 
rooted in the coherence of things and is constituted by it. That very abstract point of 
view prepares the later developed concept of infinity as the metaphysical basis for the 
concept of God. The good is as substance of the world its active principle and from the 
coherence of things, which originate from it, an insight in being can be obtained. The 
‘universal substance’ is the uniting principle in the plurality, the latter established by 
the sciences104. 
In ‘Little Metaphysic’ of 1841, there is no trace of the further developed train of thought, 
and as Wentscher puts it, Lotze will not refer back to the special expositions and 
foundations of it, but the conviction of the only true reality of the moral good in the 
world will remain105. 
 
 
THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM 
 
 
The strict distinction between mind and body leads to an unsolvable 
problem. How can the interaction between mind and body be explained? 
 
Occasionalism (Malebranche): The coordination between mind and body is 
not due to an interaction between the two, but to the will of God in every 
instance. 
 
Pre-established harmony (Leibniz): The seeming causal interaction is due 
to a programming in advance by God. For Leibniz all substances are 
windowless monads. 
 
Practical solution (Lotze): There is no valid explanation in the mechanical 
world-view, but there is apparently an interaction. 
 
Explanatory gap (Denett): There is no strict distinction between mind and 
body, but the concepts for mental activities differ fundamentally from 
those for physical ones 
 
 
                                                     
104 Merz,1976,Vol.4 :660. 
105 Wentscher, 1925:83. 
Lotze’s anthropology 
 39 
2.4.1.4 ‘General Pathology and Therapy as Mechanistic Science of Nature’ 
(1842) 
Between ‘Metaphysics’ and ‘Logic’, ‘General Pathology and Therapy as Mechanistic 
Science of Nature’ (1842) (Allgemeine Pathologie und Therapie als mechanische 
Naturwissenschaften) was published. It has purpose of reformation in the field of medical 
science. Lotze states that living nature also has to be conceived as a causal process; and 
that the mind is one of the causes of physical change. For the first time he deals with the 
subject of free will, to avoid determinism. 
The organic had to be studied in the same way as the inorganic phenomenon. The 
vitalistic explanations106 eare banned. All activities of the organism, including the ill 
ones, rest on physical laws107. ‛(T)he life sciences and psychology were at the time 
dominated by obscure notions of ‘polarity’, organic gravitation’, ‘vital oscillation’ and 
the like.“108 For Lotze even a ‘life force’ supposes a mechanic framework to exercise its 
force. He ‘rejected vitalism, in any of its forms, more radically than anyone before’.109 
To bridge the gap between mind and body, he introduced a physical power, with 
changing intensity, situated in the central nervous system, a solution similar to 
Descartes pineal gland, although it has to be situated in Lotze’s idealistic conceptions. 
According to Wentscher110, Lotze did not yet have a clear opinion about the causal 
relation between mind and body; and he would be more inclined to the parallellistic 
solution of the theory of occasionalism than to a real interaction, although he does not 
explicitly affiliate himself with occasionalism.  
The free and conscious actions of human beings are individually different, unique 
and purposeful; the reflexes on the contrary are products of the Creator. They are all 
finished and complete mechanisms, impeded by God. This statement of Lotze contains 
yet the beginning of the line of thought, which later forms the foundation of his concept 
of God. In the mechanic functioning he will see the regular coherence of the world, an 
intelligent design. 
His dualistic point of view is accountable for the gap between mental and physical 
activities, although there is evidently a causality between both. The theory of specific 
stimuli responding to specific representations is rejected; as well as the stimulation in 
the opposite direction toward the muscles. The mind will (or will not) initiate a 
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movement, but is not the engine-driver. A materialistic interpretation is thus excluded. 
These reflections however are not yet fully elaborated and still subordinated to the 
main goal of the book, the defence of a mechanistic approach in the field of the organic 
phenomenon. 
2.4.1.5 ‘Logic’ (1843) 
‘Logic’ (1843), also called ‘Little Logic’, as well as ‘Metaphysic’ was published while Lotze 
was a junior lecturer at Leipzig. They already contain the foundations of his later work, 
but were not yet summed up in a systematic way. 
At that time, the term ‘logic’ had a larger significance than nowadays in that it also 
encompassed epistemological questions111. Lotze’s purpose is not to establish the rules 
of thinking, but to examine their origin and explanation in accordance with the other 
mental activities. How to apply the general mechanic rules to science as a whole? Logic 
is also the replenishment of metaphysics. Its object is to deal with of the same data, but 
from another point of view. The logical forms do not say anything about the ground of 
the matter.  
Lotze, in a critical manner, deals with two important opinions about logic, namely 
that of Herbart and of Hegel. He agrees with Herbart that the logical forms go back to 
the activities of thinking, but he does not accept Herbart’s facticity, namely his 
psychological interpretation. For Herbart the logical forms only have a value and 
significance as expressions of psychological mechanisms. Lotze on the contrary states 
clearly that the validity of logical propositions do not depend on man, but on rules 
detached from man. It is this conception of logic that will influence Frege and so the 
Anglo-Saxon thinking. But, for Lotze the beginning of logic lies in ethics, although he 
does not go further into the matter here. Although Lotze took some ideas from Herbart, 
he was not a Herbartian, as some of his critics believed112. 
So, Lotze criticizes the specific elaboration of the psychological treatment of logic by 
Herbart. The validity of significations, judgments and syllogisms cannot be reduced to 
the simple conjunction of consistent or the disjunction of inconsistent ideas. Nor can he 
agree with Hegel, who, in his opinion, identified reality with thinking. Logic and 
metaphysics cannot be mixed. Reality and thinking must remain separate.  
Lotze places himself in the tradition of Kant’s Critics, especially his concept of the 
spontaneity of thinking, in opposition to the receptivity of the senses. Thinking 
constructs reality. The phenomena of the senses are submitted to the mechanisms of 
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representation, which procure only the material for the acquisition of knowledge. The 
human mind stands not at the center of things, but somewhere on a ramification of 
reality. The building up of knowledge is a gradual process, and it would be absurd to 
think that there is an exact concordance between the trials of the mind and reality. In 
this respect Lotze is really a Neo-Kantian and a critic of the Hegelian way. The roots for 
James’ pragmatism are also found here; and in Richard Rorty’s rejection of the ‘mirror of 
nature’ it is still present113. 
With regard to the Aristotelian theory of abstraction, Lotze turns down the process of 
abstraction as a diminution of joint features, in favour of a theory of internal cohesion 
by which a special feature is replaced by a more general one. Referring to the latter the 
logical decision-making must not use the rule of implication, but has to take the 
contents into account. The thesis ‘Socrates is mortal’ does not depend on the more 
general thesis that ‘all men are mortal’, but on the intrinsic feature of mortality of man. 
Lotze is not a pure idealist, but certainly not a realist either. He must be situated 
somewhere in between, because he recognizes the subjective and formal character of 
thinking, but also thinks that there is a close relation to reality. This opinion is more 
explicit in ‘Little Logic’ than in his 1874 ‘Logic’114. He speaks of ideas which have a 
character of their own, distinct from reality, but coloured by the same reality. This 
coloration must be found in metaphysical presumptions (Vorraussetzungen) made by the 
mind before reality. The ideas have a place of their own. On the one hand they are 
distinct from the succession and combinations of psychological experiences, put 
forward by the laws of mind; on the other hand the forms of thinking are not identical 
with the fundamental presumptions of ratio in front of the character of reality. 
Beyer distinguished two meanings in Lotze’s concept of the idea115; firstly a content of 
a representation which is perceived in an ideal way and secondly their properties which 
are also perceived in an ideal way. Put differently, the logical activity of the mind can be 
seen as a sequence of phases to order the experienced material in such a way that a 
coherent whole of knowledge appears. But direct access to reality is not possible. It is 
only a means to accord psychic experiences, the representations, with the 
presumptions. 
The epistemological explanations in later works on logic will be more systematic, 
maintaining the grounds, but less explicit. 
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2.4.1.6 ‘Live and Vital Power’ (1843) 
The first period in the classification of Wentscher is closed with three minor writings, 
which did not pass unnoticed however, namely a paper on ‘The ontology of Herbert’116, 
and two articles in Rudiger Wagner’s Dictionary of Physiology, ‘Life and Vital Power’ 
(Leben, Lebenskraft) and ‘Instinct’ (Instinkt). Wagner was a colleague of Lotze in Göttingen. 
Lotze criticises the so called absolute position of Herbart by which knowledge 
emanates, because the coherence found in nature depends in fact on arbitrary thinking. 
For Lotze the final and sufficient explanation of being has to be brought about by 
starting from what has to be (Seinsollende) valuable. Therein lies the highest sense of the 
world. 
‘Life and Vital Power’ (1843) (Leben, Lebenskraft) is edited in Rudiger Wagner’s 
‘Dictionary of Physiology’ (Handwörterbuch der Physiologies), (vol. 1), which was published 
from 1842 onwards. An important subject in it, was the question about the status of the 
inner life of man, next to the results of minute observations, measurements, and 
experiments. 
Lotze adopted, as already known, a dualistic position. Soul and body are two 
substantial principles and their relation was not very clear or definable. But, and that is 
essential for Lotze, both worked together to generate a higher life of organised beings. 
To study the observable processes only mechanistic models may be adopted. Vital 
forces cannot be introduced in the study of nature. Even if they should exist, they would 
be useless for a physiologist, who has to restrict his activity to the mechanistic physical 
and chemical processes, according to the laws of the distinct disciplines117. 
For Lotze the subjectivistic absolutazing of the notion of force was an 
anthropomorphic fallacy. It is theory and observation which are complementary to each 
other, and which founds science, because theory without observation is speculation. Of 
course the mechanism Lotze defends is restricted to science. 
In ‘Life and Vital Power’ it is once again evident that Lotze is not a pure idealist when 
he dissociates himself from Hegel, who conceives the ideas as very abstract and as active 
in nature as a whole. For Lotze the ideas are only active as thoughts, thus via human 
beings. The connection between a human organism and the soul creates the possibility 
to add new goals and means to achieve them.  
Lotze points out the unscientific character of the notion of vital force. The organism 
is but a certain combination of pure mechanic processes, which correspond with a 
certain natural efficiency. The life of these organisms is made op of events as a whole, 
developed by the body. It has to be considered as a concourse of lifeless activities. 
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However, the mechanistic view on life may not be extended to the first origins of the 
world, because the world is neither the result of an accident, nor can it be conceived as 
an ordered whole emerging from chaos. The first explanation is put forward by 
contemporary materialists; the second goes back to the opinions of ancient Greek 
philosophers. It is not surprising that it was a materialist, namely Bücher, who provided 
another explanation for the complexity of life than the insufficient one of pure chance, 
by introducing Darwin in Germany. 
At the end of ‘Life and Vital Power’ Lotze presents a résumé of the objectives of 
psychology. It has to give an insight into the phenomenon of physical life and an 
interpretation of the significance of things as a whole; a description of the physical and 
mechanical conditions of the soul; the universally valid mechanisms of psychological 
life, but also a theory of individual psychological entities; and finally a confrontation of 
the ideas related to the destiny of the soul in things as a whole. 
These goals will remain throughout all Lotze’s writings, however much he is aware 
that he is not able to sufficiently resolve every problem connected to it. 
The contribution of Lotze to the physiological dictionary was well-known among the 
medical students, while his work on metaphysics and logic remained in the background. 
To the external world he was at first a defender of the mechanistic, and thus 
materialistic scientific image against vitalism, in the first place, while later on he 
became known as its critic and opponent118. His critique on vitalism was after all 
slashing. That does not alter the fact that he saw a higher idea of creation behind the 
mechanistic explanations119. 
2.4.1.7 ‘Instinct’ (1844) 
‘Instinct’ (1844) (Instinkt) in Rudiger Wagner’s Dictionary of Physiology (Vol. 2), goes 
further into the matter of automatic passing activities of the body, that is to say 
activities without the mediation of the striving part of the soul. Here a theme of the 
‘General Pathology’ of 1842 is more elaborated upon. Instinctive actions of animals are 
kept alive by certain representations. But Lotze specifies that according to the state of 
affairs in science in his days, it is not yet possible to define why specific species are 
focused on specific goals. He advances the cautious hypothesis of innate ideas.  
J. Guislain, professor of medicine at the University of Ghent, cites Lotze’s ideas on 
instinct in his ‘La Nature’ (Nature) two years later120. The soul does not intervene in all 
voluntary activities; often she cannot even stop them once started. Examples are 
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coughing and sneezing. There has been an abuse of the concept of voluntariness by 
invoking it to explain a lot of sensorial activities, which were but impulsions directed by 
an instinctive force.  
The biologist Konrad Lorenz (1903 – 1989)121, criticizing the definition of instinct of 
his contemporary colleagues, conceives instinct in a way similar to Lotze’s, although he 
makes the distinction between an unconditioned reflex and instinct. Instinct is not 
learned in dialogue with the environment as his colleagues thought, it cannot be 
changed by experience, and it is not the result of a maturation, but a kind of program, 
which is triggered by certain conditions in the environment, but which also can 
explode, although in an inadequate way, when these conditions are not present. About 
hundred years after Lotze established that it is not yet possible to define why species are 
focused on specific goals, Lorenz brought the answer.  
2.4.2 First Period 
During the first period the subject of Lotze’s writings was prompted by his academic 
mandate both in the field of philosophy and of medicine, linked up with his double 
education. He brought the two disciplines together, with respect for their individual 
qualities. Moreover he became largely known through his work in the field of physical 
and mental problems of the human organism. 
Because these works were published when materialism was prominent in Germany, 
they were associated with the opposition against the Hegelian camp and the claim for 
an independent empirical philosophy, sufficient as foundation for the interpretation of 
the phenomenon. Unintentionally he furthered materialism in Germany122. Even Fichte 
was misled. In addition he suffered under the lack of interest from the fossilized faculty 
of theology, compensated by the marks of sympathy of jurists, physiologists and 
philologists. For the philosophers however he was a physiologist and for the 
physiologists a philosopher. 
In ‘The Soul and Life of the Soul’ psychology was approached in a philosophical 
manner; and in ‘Psychology of Medicine or Physiology of the Soul’ (1852) (Medizinische 
Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele) a philosophical deepening of medicine was 
prominent. Also worth mentioning is the amplified reprint of the ‘General Pathology 
and Therapy as Mechanical Science of Nature’ (1842).  Purely philosophical was the 
approach in two minor editions, namely ‘On the Notion of Beauty’ (1845) (Über den 
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Begriff der Schönheit) and ‘On the Conditions of Beauty in Art’ (1847) (Über den 
Bedingungen der Kunstschönheit) 
Also Orth123 distinguished the first period as focusing on medical sciences and 
psychology, supplemented with aesthetic treaties; and he recalled that the effect on his 
contemporaries was one-sided. 
2.4.2.1 ‘The Soul and Life of the Soul’ (1846)  
‘The Soul and Life of the Soul’ (1846) (Seele und Seelenleben) was edited in the third 
volume of Rudiger Wagner’s Dictionary of Physiology. As usual Lotze begins with a clear 
description of the subject matter of which he will treat and with indicating the 
problems at stake. He asks himself what it means to speak about the soul as a special 
entity. The answer is threefold. Firstly there are phenomena of consciousness that are 
not comparable with those of the outside world; secondly the conscious contents form a 
unity; and thirdly there is an active principle that has to be viewed in connection with 
freedom. In Kant’s tradition he accepts that the latter cannot be proved, but he states 
that freedom has to be accepted on ethical grounds124. The soul is not a purely scientific 
problem, as are the other objects of inquiry. Our special relation to the soul is not 
reducible to the empirical or the metaphysical; nor to the descriptable or the 
explainable.  
In ‘The Soul and Life of the Soul’ the soul is no longer considered as being located in a 
specific place in the body, because that is improbable in respect of the knowledge of the 
structure of the central organs, and it is no longer necessary either. Lotze maintains 
however the separation between mind and body and their interaction, so that he has to 
explain the possibility of a causal relation between the two. The interaction was already 
dealt with in ‘General Pathology’ of 1842 and the ‘Life and Vital Power’ of 1843, but new 
is that Lotze, in connection to the body-mind interaction, also problematisizes the 
interaction between physical substances. Why should the gap between mind and body 
be a problem if the gaps in the physical world are not? This position is made possible 
from his idealistic viewpoint, because he rejects Herbart’s ‘realism’, which leans upon a 
concept of substance in the things themselves. Occasionalism is no longer retained, 
because it does not allow a causal explanation. 
In the last chapter, namely ‘Aphorisms about psychological theories’ (Aphorismen über 
psychologische Theorien), his idealistic fundamental insights are reformulated. Form and 
value of being are founded on what is and what has to be (sein soll) at the same time, 
 
                                                     
123 Orth, 1986:20-21. 
124 Merz, 1976, Vol.3:267. 
The Anthropology of Hermann Lotze 
46 
following an intrinsic value. The truly real is what has value125. What also has to be 
explaind is the development of history. Lotze’s view is thus not static and, in spite of the 
rejection of Hegel’s dialectic model, Lotze accepts the idea of progress, after all an idea 
stemming from Enlightenment.  
In this ethical world-order human beings take a prominent place as animate 
organism. He interacts with the world by observing it and acting on it, and he is a 
microcosm. The real is related to the ideal only in a teleological sense, not in a 
Spinozistical identity of both, so that nature, on the human level and on the level of the 
world, does not generate the images of the supernatural, but constitutes a means to 
reach it. The soul is substantially autonomous, next to the psychic-material world and 
between the two there is a causal relation, an interaction by which the soul can come 
into connection with the environment. Thanks to the organism as a means the soul can 
reach her goals. 
‘The Soul and Life of the Soul’ thus contains the explanation of Lotze’s views. The 
mechanistic philosophy of science is reaffirmed, but with a clear demarcation of 
knowledge, so that the autonomy and integrity of the life of the soul is preserved. The 
physical and psychological events are rooted in consciousness, but fundamentally 
differing from it. The sameness of consciousness is an argument for the soul as a special 
principle next to the physical one. However strong his psychology on free-will, it is not 
founded on an interpretation of the soul as a peculiarly free vivacity, which is a 
supposition that is not based on experience. On the other hand, it is not the sensory 
nerves which are experiencing, but the soul experiences as a result of the state of the 
sensory nerves. Likewise the differences in experience are not caused by structural 
differences of the sensory nerves, but by different qualities of the state of the nerves. 
Moreover structural differences in the sensory nerves are not empirically ascertained. 
Still in the same context, special awareness is also designated to the soul. Lotze’s theory 
of local signs (Lokal ziechen) explains its functioning. 
2.4.2.2 ‘General Physiology of the Corporal Life’ (1851) 
In ‘General Physiology of the Corporal Life’ (1851) (Allgemeine Physiologie des körperlichen 
Lebens) the relation between the mind and the nervous system is treated systematically. 
Lotze takes up the defence of the mechanical philosophy of science again, because it is 
the only possibility to intervene effectively in the course of natural events. His 
mechanical viewpoint on science is clearly defined as the subordination of the 
particular to general laws. Medicine needs that approach. And again Lotze gave vent to 
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the ideas of workable forces, instincts, vital forces and the like, which do not explain 
anything and do not reach any means to intervene successfully in the processes of 
nature126. 
On the other hand the mechanical model, as a system of interactions, is workable and 
generates useful laws. Lotze does not have the intention to defend the mechanical view 
as such but only to introduce it in in his teleological thinking. Espacially the idea of 
creation stays untouched as final foundation of the whole reality, and thanks to the 
discovered laws of nature mankind contributes to the further development of that 
creation.  
 
 
 
FIRST PERIOD: 
 
‘The soul and life of the soul’ (1846) 
‘General Pathology and Therapy as Mechanical Science of Nature’ (amplified 
reprint, 1848) 
‘General Physiology of the Corporal Life’ (1851) 
‘Medical Psychology or Physiology of the Soul’ (1852) 
 
‘On the Notion of Beauty’ (1845) 
‘On the Conditions of Beauty in Art’ (1847) 
‘ Herbart’s Ontology’ (1847) 
 
 
As to the difference between the organic and inorganic phenomena, Lotze neither finds 
it in the material substance of living bodies, nor in the differencing of laws. Even the 
argument that live cannot be imitated is not decisive, because quite a lot of the 
nonliving things cannot be imitated either. It is only in the ordering of the 
circumstances (Anordnung der Umstände) that the forces of life rest. That is a very 
modern concept. 
The living subject is essentially a higher developed system of means for the use of a 
spiritual existence. By these he rejects the philosophy of nature of that time, namely the 
psycho-physical parallelism, which saw in the material forms of life symbols of 
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consciousness, in which the events are a repetition of the former but as translated into 
another language. 
As to the relation between mind and body Lotze chooses what he calls a ‘practical 
occasionalism’. It means that the separation is maintained, but practically there is a 
causal relation. That way the interaction between mind and body remains accessible to 
science. The mind has to be seen as an immaterial principle, but its action on the body is 
purely mechanical, described by the laws of the psycho-physical mechanisms. Lotze did 
not bring any fundamental answer to the body-mind relation in science. 
Lotze who was educated in mathematics and exact thinking counter-acted Schelling's 
absolute force of nature. The laws describing the particles of matter in the inorganic 
world also apply to the organic one. Lotze’s position against Schelling must be 
understood in the right context however. He did not criticise Schelling’s vitalism as an 
attempt to explain the Absolute, but only its misuse in science127. To put it more clearly, 
according to Lotze within the chaos of observable facts, the human mind firstly discerns 
all laws, but it is the valuation which makes it possible to solve the world problem and 
also ‘the problem of nature in the sense anticipated by Schelling.’128 
If the Aristotelian final causes or the vital forces are active, it is through the laws of 
nature. The science of the inorganic as well as of the organic world has to do with 
mechanical law. As a consequence, the laws have to be expanded to also encompass the 
phenomena of life and mind. 
2.4.2.3 ‘Medical Psychology or Physiology of the Soul’ (1852) 
The title ‘Medical Psychology’ does not mean that the content deals with a psychology 
for physicians or with psychological illnesses, but with normal psychology, with 
spiritual life. Orth qualifies the term ‘physiology’ as a metaphor129.  
For the first time, in ‘Medical Psychology or Physiology of the Soul’ (1852) 
(Medizinische Psychologie des körperlichen Lebens), Lotze clearly puts, although not yet as 
elaborate as later in the ‘Microcosmos’, that all that happens finally finds its ground in 
the Absolute, the essence of God. In his writings it becomes increasinly clear that a 
world on its own is impossible. Materialism and atheism are thus not acceptable. And 
whazt also becomes increasingly clear is the foundation of his religious overall picture. 
Apart from some elucidations and reformulations concerning physiological matters, the 
elaboration of his vision on life is striking, especially in connection with his exposition 
of the coming into being and the perishing of the soul.  
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Because body and soul are independent entities, an immortal souul is possible. 
Nevertheless he also retains the possibility of the death of the soul, and he believes its 
survival to be due to ethical-religious considerations; that is to say depending on the 
realisation of values of the spiritual life, so high that it deserves to continue to live. In 
his exposition of the coming into existence of the soul, the cohesion between the soul 
and the highest idea, that is the deity, becomes even more obvious. Because of the 
essential difference between the soul and the body, the soul cannot come into existence 
from matter, but it can be founded on the fact of its action on matter. The whole course 
of nature is not an autonomous event, detached from the general substance of the 
Absolute. No action passes from object to object, without first referring back to the 
general foundation of the world, which connects the two. It is a spiritual concept by 
which matter is secondary and depending on the spiritual. On the individual level the 
body is an organised material expedient. Moreover matter is not an object of experience 
but a hypothesis. Man can only perceive some complexes of sensual data130.  
Lotze’s ‘Medical Psychology’ brought his dualistic view about the relation between 
soul and body, supplemented by a ‘practical’ causal model, to the immediate attention of 
the materialists131. Two years later a ‘Meeting of German Physicians’ (German 
Naturforscher-Versammlung) took place in Göttingen, and the problem of materialism was 
attended to. Wagner defended a dualistic concept of nature which allowed a mechanical 
as well as a spiritual view. A manifold of literature saw the light as a result of the 
controversies. Karl Vogt stigmatized Lotze’s position expressed in Rudiger Wagner's 
‘Dictionary of Physiology’ (Handwörterbuch der Physiologie) as dualistic and untenable. He 
spoke of a genuine substance of the soul (Seelensubstanz) characteristic to Göttingen. He 
opened a long-term campaign, which became known as the conflict of materialism 
(Materialismusstreit)132. The opposition materialism – idealism will expand considerably. 
The Russian philosopher, Lew Michaelowitsch Lopatin (1855-1920), who was stigmatised 
by Lenin as a reactionair, was a frenetic opponent of materialism and will base his ideas 
on Leibniz and Lotze133. 
2.4.2.4 ‘On the notion of Beauty’ (1845) 
The two following works could also be classified within the second period if the 
criterion had been that Lotze abandons the mixture of physiological, psychological and 
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philosophical elements to restrict himself to philosophy. But the second period is 
reserved for ‘Microcosmos’, as an overall picture of man and the world. 
In ‘On the notion of Beauty’ (1845) (Über den Begriff der Schönheit) Lotze presents a 
theoretical foundation of aesthetics, by explaining that reality is subordinated to 
valuable ends. In the whole world a realisation of a purpose is present. Therefore three 
elements are necessary: first of all the valuable sense of thoughts; secondly the chain of 
causality; and finally general laws. The latter are indifferent to both of the former, but 
the incidental is indirectly an expansion (Seitenverbreitung) that connects up with the 
highest thoughts. It forms a free delight of beauty that exceeds the indispensable. 
The reduction of reality to mere being, to a world of general laws, is an unbearable 
thought. The truly valuable and beautiful is rooted in the world-ground. Through an 
aesthetic-intuitive experience Lotze gets his teleological viewpoint. It is ‘a silent 
possession of the human mind, which reveals itself only in favoured moments and 
favoured individuals.’134 
2.4.2.5 ‘On the conditions of Beauty in Art’ (1847) 
‘On the conditions of Beauty in Art’ (1847) (Über die Bedingungen der Kunstschönheit) 
contains practical applications of his basic aesthetic principles in different fields of art. 
2.4.3 Second Period 
In the second period, dominated by the publication of his magnum opum, ‘Microsmos: 
An Essay Concerning Man and his Relation to the World’ (1865-1864) (Mikrokosmos: Ideeen 
zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit: Versuch einer Anthropologie), Lotze set 
out to bring together the results of former research in a global anthropological view of 
the world. In the same period he published the ‘Polemic Pamphlets’ (1857) 
(Streitschriften) in which he replies to the spread rumour that he was a defender of 
materialism. In 1868 the second period is closed with the ‘History of Aesthetics in 
Germany’ (Geschichte der Ästhetik in Deutschland)  
Orth135 places the second period depending on the refutation of the misapprehension 
about the significance of lotze’s writings. Not only because of the apparent defensive 
character of the ‘Polemic Pamphlets’, but also because initially Lotze did not have the 
intention to produce ‘Microcosm’ as a magnum opus. Indeed Lotze had some difficulty 
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in situating the ambiguous concept of anthropology, the original keyworth of a title 
suggested by his publisher. It is only later that the conception of a microcosm came 
forward and that Lotze saw ‘Microcosmos’ as a monumental work instead of an 
occasional treaty.  
2.4.3.1 ‘Microcosmos: An Essay Concerning Man and his Relation to the World’ 
(1856 - 1864)  
‘Microcosmos: An Essay Concerning Man and his Relation to the World’ (1856-1857) 
(Mikrokosmos: Ideeen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit, Versuch einer 
Anthropoligie) was a successful and popular exposition about human nature and the 
significance of human existence. It encompassed three volumes. The first dealt with the 
body, the soul and life; the second with man, mind and the way of the world; the third 
with history, progress and the coherence of things. In this work Lotze outlines an image 
of mankind in which all aspects of human reality (body, soul, life and history) are 
treated. Here mechanism appears as a potential vision on things, but it can only become 
prominent by a metaphysical perspective which takes into account the existence of God. 
The small world of human existence is presented and founded on its acting ensemble 
with nature, but also as an imperturbable value as autonomous spiritual, moral and 
religious being. 
Lotze distinguished the world of forms from the world of values136, which he always 
identifies with the realm of goals. The ‘reconciliation between idealism and scientific 
realism rested on his conviction that the apparent conflict between them arises from a 
misunderstanding of idealism.’137 Here he has Hegel’s idealism in mind. 
 
 
SECOND PERIOD: 
 
‘Microcosmos: An Essay Concerning Man and his Relation to the World’ 
  I. The Body, the Soul, Life (1856) 
  II. Man, Mind, the Way of the World (1858) 
  III. History, Progress, Coherence of Things (1864) 
‘Polemic Pamphlets’ (1857) 
‘History of Aesthetics in Germany’ (1868) 
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Halfway the 19th century the ‘Materialismusstreit’ broke out, as already stated, and found 
its expression in the accessible and much read ‘Force and Matter’ (Kraft und Stoff) of 
Ludwig Büchner. ‘Microcosmos’ is an answer to this movement138, as well as an 
extensive description of Lotze's opinions. 
‘Microcosmos’ is discussed more extensively further on because of its importance for 
Lotze’s anthropology, but also because of the huge response it met worldwide. 
 
 
The word microcosm comes from the Greek ‘μικρος κοσμος’, which means little 
world. In Western philosophy the concept refers to the little world of man, in 
which the whole world is reflected. There is analogy between the two. 
 
 
2.4.3.2 ‘Polemic Pamphlets’ (1857) 
Previously was explained that Lotze was generally known as a physiologist who fought 
against vitalism and was a successful scientist. Nevertheless he had already given an 
account of his true intentions in the ‘Metaphysics’ and ‘Logic’. In ‘General Physiology of 
the Corporal Life’ he had promised to go further into the matter of the borderland 
between aesthetics and physiology; and in ‘Medical Psychology’ he had clearly stated 
that his opinions did not match those of Hegel’s idealism, but neither those of Herbart’s 
realism, nor were they materialistic. Every thing has its place in the realisation of an 
idea and the sense of every thing must be found in the highest idea, the idea of 
goodness. In spite of this assertions, the public still interpreted his work as being 
opposed to the camp around Hegelianism and in favour of materialism and empirism, 
which gained ground in Germany. Therefore Lotze published the ‘Polemic Pamphlets’. 
The first volume of the ‘Polemic Pamphlets’ (1857) (Streitschriften. Erstes Heft: In Bezug 
auf Prof. I. H. Fichtes Anthropologie) was, as the German sub-title suggests, directed against 
Fichte’s anthropology, in defence of his own anthropology. But, only one volume saw 
the light. It contained the explanation of some ideas from ‘Microcomos’, and therefore it 
contributes to a better understanding of Lotze’s thinking, but it did not bring any new 
insights. It also informs us on Lotze’s motives and on his position with respect to his 
predecessors and contemporaries. The subjects were respectively the atom theory, life 
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versus mechanism, interaction between body and soul, and the seat of the soul. It is a 
model of decorous and dignified polemic139. 
2.4.3.3 ‘History of Aesthetics in Germany’ (1868) 
In 1868 the ‘History of Aesthetics in Germany’ (Geschichte der Ästhetik in Deutschland) 
came out. It offers a detailed summary of German aesthetics. But, in it little is found on 
the prevailing criticism of that time. For all attention is paid to the constructive ideas 
which find expression in aesthetics140. It is criticised for its deficiency in decision, 
definiteness and simplicity. A French writer, Henri Fr. Amiel, labeled it as follows: ‘les 
Allemands entassent les fagots du bûcher, les Français apportent les étincelles’141 (The Germans 
pile up the faggot of the pyre, the Frenchmen bring along the sparks, H.V.). 
Nevertheless this work is very interesting for understanding the development of 
aesthetic thought from Hegel to Lotze, via Weisse. After all it places the aesthetic 
appreciation in the context of a larger whole, the harmony of the world and the highest 
principle. The impression of the beautiful then stands in the middle of the True and the 
Good142. Therefore some critics are wrong, because they do not take into account the 
special character of Lotze’s aesthetics143. 
2.4.4 Third Period and posthumous editions 
At the university his readings encompassed a large field. Yearly he treated on 
psychology, logic and a synopsis of philosophy, entitled Encyclopädie der Philosophie 
(Encyclopaedia of Philosophy). At longer intervals he also deals with metaphysics, 
philosophy of nature, with art and with of religion. He rarely taught history of 
philosophy and ethics144.  
At the end of his career, he collected the subject-matter of tuition in the ‘System of 
Philosophy’ (System der Philosophie). Logik came out in 1874 and was reviewed in 1880. 
The second part, Metaphysik, saw the light in 1879. The third part planned, concerning 
practical philosophy, philosophy of art and of religion, never came out.  
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2.4.4.1 ‘System of Philosophy’ (1874-1879) 
‘System of Philosophy’ (1874-1879) (System der Philosphie) is a further working out of the 
themes of ‘Microcosmos’ in the different disciplines. ‘Logic’ is enlarged with the 
treatment of applied logic; ‘Metaphysics’ with an application of ontological principles to 
cosmological and psychological problems. The section ‘Rational Theology’ was dropped 
and worked out in his ‘Outlines of Philosophy of Religion’145. 
The different parts of the ‘System of Philosophy: I. Logic’146 (1874) (System der 
Philosphie: I. Logik) are about thinking (von Denken); about investigation (vom 
Untersuchen), and about knowledge (vom Erkennen). The first part is a systematic 
presentation of the logical forms of thinking and repeats the main ideas of the edition of 
1843; the second presents applied logic. It is a less systematic approach of de different 
ways by which the vague and concrete experiences are put in accordance with the ideal 
logical forms of conjunction that is the inductive aspect. The third part, ‘About 
Knowledge’, is a free discussion of the fundamental problems which come forward by 
explaining the activities of the mind. Also de founding of knowledge and the forms of 
relation between the logical ideal and the art of reality come into view. Here Lotze also 
adopts the historical method by which he presents his own opinion in opposition to 
those of the past. 
It was Lotze’s intention ‘to present the totality of (his) beliefs in a systematic form, 
enabling the reader to form a judgement of extent to which they not merely harmonize 
with each other, but serve to combine the isolated areas of our definite knowledge (…) 
into a comprehensive world view.’147 
 
 
THIRD PERIOD AND POSTHUMOUS EDITIONS: 
 
‘System of Philosophy’ 
I. Logic in Three Books: of Thought, of Investigation, and of Knowledge 
(1874) 
II. Metaphysic in Three Books: Ontology, Cosmology, and Psychology 
(1879) 
 
‘Dictated Portions of Lectures’ 
I. Outlines of Psychology (1881) 
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II. Outlines of Practical Philosophy (1882) 
III. Outlines of Philosophy of Religion (1882) 
IV. Outlines of Philosophy of Nature (1882) 
V. Outlines of German Philosophy since Kant (1882) 
VI. Outlines of Logic and of Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (1883) 
VII. Outlines of Metaphysics (1883) 
VIII. Outlines of Aesthetics (1884) 
 
‘The Principles of Ethics’ (1882) 
 
‘Little Writings’ (1885-1891) 
 
 
Also the ‘System of Philosophy: II. Metaphysics’ (1879) (System der Philosophie: II. 
Metaphysik) is constituted of three parts: ontology, cosmology and psychology. It does 
not provide new insights but it is important because it offers a more elaborate and 
mature formulation of his thin king than the edition of 1841 on metaphysics. The 
fundamental conception however remains the same. ‘In both the fundamental 
conception is that of ethical or teleological idealism – the view of the sum total of things 
as the unfolding of a plan, of which the significance is spiritual, of which the distinctive 
traits are the general laws of order and connexion in nature, and of which the 
manifestation is the varied realm of things.148’ 
In the approximately thirteen years from Lotze’s first publications, Hegel has almost 
entirely disappeared in Germany, so it was no longer adequate for Lotze to explain his 
position in relation to Hegel. And, the references have gradually have disappeared.149 
2.4.4.2 ‘Dictated Portions of Lectures’ 
The first edition of ‘Dictated Portions of Lectures’ contains the lectures of the summer 
semester of 1865 on psychology. Dr. Robert Lotze, the son of Hermann Lotze, placed 
them ad the disposal of the students who had attended the lectures of his father in 
Berlin during the summer sessions of 1881. Because of their success also outside the 
academic world, Hirzel, who already provided earlier editions of Lotze’s work and who 
was an acquaintance of the Lotze’s, undertook the edition of all the dictated portions of 
lectures. Professor Rehnisch from Göttingen redacted the writings.  
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They give a global and relatively complete overview of Lotze’s academic activity and 
a condensed insight in his opinions. They also contain the necessary educational 
information for his students. For instance, in his lectures on Logic Lotze gives both his 
own view on Logic as well as the classical, Aristotelian subject-matter of tuition. Eight 
editions saw the light between 1881 and 1884. 
  
 
‘Outlines of Psychology’ (1881) (Grundzüge der Psychologie) 
‘Outlines of Practical Philosophy’ (1882) (Grundzüge der Praktischen Philosophie) 
‘Outlines of Philosophy of Religion’ (1882) (Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie) 
‘Outlines of Philosophy of Nature’ (1882) (Grundzüge der Naturphilosophie) 
‘Outlines of German Philosophy since Kant’ (1882) (Grundzüge der deutschen 
Philosophie seit Kant) 
‘Outlines of Logic and of Encyclopaedia of Philosophy’ (1883) (Grundzüge der Logik 
und Encyklopädie der Philosophie) 
‘Outlines of Metaphysics’ (1883) (Grundzüge der Metaphysik) 
‘Outlines of Aesthetics’ (1884) (Grundzüge der Äesthetik) 
 
 
 
‘Outlines of Logic and of Encyclopaedia of Philosophy’ comprises both logic and an 
encyclopaedia in one edition, because the encyclopaedia describes the general meaning 
and significance of the physical world, and thus constitutes a completion of the Logic, 
which can only describe the method of cause/effect and hypothesis/experiment, and 
thus is only focused on the mechanical150. In his logic Lotze deals with mathematical 
problems in connection with logical questions. For instance when he describes the 
functioning of hypotheses he mentions fiction as a special form of hypotheses which 
exist in mathematics. For instance, curved lines will be taken for refracted ones in order 
to describe them151. Mathematics is always very close to Logic. The logical part of the 
edition ends with a mixture of statistical application and voting practice. 
2.4.4.3 ‘Little Writings’ 
Finally ‘Little Writings’ (1885-1891) (Kleine Schriften) which were published between 1885 
and 1891 contains essays and book reviews.  
 
                                                     
150 Lotze, 1885:63. 
151 Lotze, 1885 :87. 
Lotze’s anthropology 
 57 
One of these reviews is very interesting, namely that of Heinrich Czolbe’s ‘Neue 
Darstellung des Sensualismus’. Because Lotze’s ‘General Pathology’ was considered as a 
defence of the naturalistic view on science, the materialist Czolbe was influenced by the 
assertion that all natural processes could be explained in a mechanical manner. 
However, he did not accept Lotze’s viewpoint that the mechanical sciences were to be 
supplemented with metaphysical considerations. He developed his ‘sensualism’, which 
means the total exclusion of the supra-sensual152. He rejected Aristotelian logic, a priori, 
and intuition. Lotze’s argumentation against Czolbe is Kantian. There is a difference 
between intuition and thought and the suprasensual is necessary to place the manifold 
into a whole, and therefore also science cannot function without a priori notions. The 
mere accumulation of sensory items does not constitute a scientific theory. Knowledge 
arises from sense data, but in combination with a supra-sensual content. It is created in 
the mind and does not come to us ready made as materialists think. 
2.5 Lotze’s anthropology 
2.5.1 In General 
2.5.1.1 Introduction 
Lotze belongs to the movement which intents to go back to Kant. In this respect, some 
choices obviously had to be made, and some general principles of Kant, such as the 
knowability of the things in themselves (Ding an sich), were pashed aside.  
The attention for teleology automatically brought Lotze closer more to the ‘Critique 
of Judgment’ (Kritik der Urteilskraft) than to the other two critiques of Kant. For in it the 
principle of efficiency is indicated as the principle of the reflecting judgment153.  
Lotze avoided two extreme positions, namely an idealism that reduces the world to 
one sole principle, as was the case for Hegel154, and a realism that opted for a real world 
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separated from the observing subject155, as was the case for Herbart. He favored the 
Cartesian dualism with separation between mind en body. 
Some authors suggest that Lotze was not aware of the results of his thinking at the 
moment he started its elaboration. They assert that the conclusions were implicit in the 
premises he putted and that he reached his teleological, cosmological viewpoint by 
accident. That’s real nonsense. It neglects his conscious efforts of Lotze. Their objection 
is due either to the skilful construction of his explanations or to the fact that he was 
misunderstood in the beginning of his career. 
The cultural climate in Germany, the evident cases of repression regarding 
materialists, the not so evident auto censorship, but above all Lotze’s erudition, are 
indications that he knew very well what he was doing. It does not diminish his merits. 
On the contrary it enhances the value of his intellectual capacities and his opinions. 
Moreover, although it is difficult, even impossible, to look inside somebody’s mind, it is 
very plausible that Lotze was sincere in his opinions. Not only his publications, but 
especially his letters exhibit an enduring consistency and coherence. 
Two viewpoints are relevant to understand Lotze’s thinking. First of all his 
epistemological starting point is that there are forms of perception and thoughts which 
shape man’s knowledge. As a Neo-Kantian he accepts Kant’s Copernican revolution. 
According to Kant, it is the representation that makes the object possible, rather than 
the object the representations156; and the point is not the existence of the innate 
physical conditions, but the necessary mental structures.  
Secondly Lotze states that there must be some relations between the data of 
observation and observation itself. These relations are not logically necessary, but come 
foreward through a logic coherent reasoning. Thanks to the sciences and the daily 
experiences, these relations become clear. 
Although Lotze can be seen as a system builder, he dors not think it is possible to 
design a self-contained philosophical unity. For philosophy depends on the state of 
science at a certain moment. Because science is variable, philosophy must be variable 
too. At the same time philosophy is also speculative and not wholly dependent on 
science. 
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How original Lotze’s answers to the problems concerning the relation between 
science and belief are, Lotze always stayed within the academic mission he received 
from his predecessors.  
2.5.1.2 Influences  
Lotze was an important representative of the movement on the continent and especially 
in Germany, which started halfway the 19th century and in which the spirit of Leibniz 
and Spinoza entered the critical sphere, and which dissociated itself from 
Hegelianism157.  
The reconcilement between the mechanistic explanations of science and the 
teleological worldview, came into existence by combining the monads of Leibniz with 
the absolute substance of Spinoza, in which the individual things found their existence 
and by which the omnipresent inclusive unity makes interrelation possible.  
But French and British influences were also present in Lotze’s thinking. It is true that 
he cannot be considered as a passionate student of the French and British thought, but 
the British school was already introduced in Germany by Beneke and Herbart. The latter 
was Lotze’s teacher. The French physiological and medical research were followed in 
Germany with interest; especially in Berlin, Leipzig and Vienna. With the latter there 
was a vivacious exchange of students and studies158. 
The fact that Lotze thought in the tradition of Kant means that he also made the 
distinction between scientific knowledge and experience of reality. The scientific 
knowledge, which is founded on the differentiating action of the mind, needs the 
uniting action of the feelings. By these feelings reality is caught integrally159. The value 
theory of Lotze rests upon the feelings. For him feelings are the source of value. He 
speaks of ‘value generating feelings’160. It does not mean that values are subjective, on 
the contrary. The universality of the values is made acceptable by the notion ‘to hold’ 
(Geltung).  
In contrast with Kant, who restricts the unifying action of the feelings to aesthetics, 
Lotze gives them an all encompassing significance, by which science becomes 
subordinated to the ontological value theory, without diminishing the independence of 
science. Herbart had already prepared this spread by adding the ethical to the 
aesthetical. 
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The comparison between Descartes’ rationalism and the ethical individualism of 
Levinas161, fixes Lotze’s position somewhat more clearly in a perspective of time and 
content. The pre-Kantian Descartes had as first principle of philosophy his ‘cogito’, 
which led him to a proof of the existence of God. For the post-Kantian Lotze a proof for 
the existence of God is excluded, but God functions nevertheless as final concept for his 
teleological view on the cosmos, wherein the first principle of philosophy is situated in 
the a priori values. For Levinas morality stands at the centre as first principle, by which 
there is congeniality with Lotze, but the infinity reveals itself in the exteriority, the 
countenance of the other. Opposite Lotze’s theological model stands Levinas’ openness.  
Milkov mentions also an influence from Friedrich Trendelenburg (1802-1872) and 
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834)162 on Lotze as to the development of his 
objectivism. This objectivism reveals an inner connection of all reality. The substances 
are but knots (Kraftpunkte) and what is really important are the relations. In this respect 
Lotze went beyond his predecessors. 
Apart from the philosophical influences, Lotze also received a scientific education. E. 
H. Weber, W. Volckman and G.T. Fechner introduced him to scientific-mathematical 
thinking, which is responsible for the interest he took in science, especially its 
mechanistic form. The interest in both science and philosophy was not evident at all at 
that time, when the two spheres were radically separated. Few scientist overstepped the 
borders of their discipline, not openly anyway. They were mostly implicit materialists, 
while the philosophers constructed ideas which had nothing to do with science. The 
twofold education of Lotze made him acceptable both among scientists and 
philosophers. Though sometimes he was called a philosopher by the scientists and a 
scientist by the philosophers, especially the Hegelians. Nevertheless the importance of 
his attempt to reconcile science with philosophy was generally appreciated. Moreover 
the time was ripe for a thinker like Lotze, because of the untenableness of the 
separation between science, philosophy and also theology, without any point of affinity.  
To come back to the philosophical aspects of  Lotze’s thinking, he was one of the 
German thinkers who turned away from Hegel and went back to Kant. Some studied the 
first critique, the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’; others the second one, the ‘Critique of 
Practical Reason’, but Lotze chose the third one, the ‘Critique of Judgment’, where he 
got the concepts of value and teleology to design his value theory.  
Lotze does not only criticize Hegelians, but also the materialists, because they both 
try to deduce the rich diversity of experiences from simple principles, the necessary 
ideas for the first, the mechanistic movement for the others. But this critique is at once 
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an attempt to reconcile both. It is this impulse to reconcile opposing views, of present 
interest and of the influences he underwent, coupled with a cautiousness to propose 
differentiated solutions. But that was at the same time the reason why he was 
sometimes misinterpreted. Again, sometimes he was seen as a materialist, sometimes as 
an obstinate metaphysician, sometimes as a disciple of Herbart, sometimes of Leibniz. 
Because he adopted his ideas from diverging sources, he was compared to the French 
eclectics, but Lotze tried to overcome the apparent contrasts in a higher unity163. 
‘Especially intriguing (but also tricky) is the fact that Lotze unfolded different faces of 
his consciously conflicting intuitions in the very course of his investigations. Thus he 
consciously began his ontological investigations with pluralistic realism and ended it 
with monistic idealism. Lotze’s following of the dialectical method made him – similar 
to Wittgenstein later – a ‘slippery fish’. His position was difficult to state, and thus also 
difficult to criticise.’164 
Finally, one must not forget that after all, Lotze’s spiritual home was found in the 
classics of the great German literature, with giants such as Goethe and Herder; that he 
himself was a poet, not without merit; and that he wrote a novel in his youth. 
2.5.1.3 Some striking judgments  
Otto F. Kraushaar165 situates Lotze in the split between the left and right camp of 
Hegelianism. He considers Lotze as one of the few in Germany who, thanks to his 
education in the idealistic movement and in the methodology of the new sciences, tried 
to elaborate a fusion with these two different movements. 
According to John Passmore166 Lotze is an idealist-realist. His idealism has to do with 
the ideal goal in his worldview; realism with the empirical facts in the mechanical 
paradigm of the sciences. Lotze indees tries to save the mechanic vision in the sciences, 
but makes them subordinated to an idealistic teleological view, by which he can also be 
considered as an idealist. Moreover the hidden reality behind observation is supposed to 
be immaterial. It consists of points of force. 
Oskar Krauss167 discovers several inconsistencies in Lotze’s writings. Others on the 
contrary emphasize the coherence in his works and the constancy of ideas during his 
whole lifetime. Wether one chooses one viewpoint or other is dependent on what one 
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considers as most important in his work. But also Krauss writes that Lotze has always 
retained the metaphysical idea by which what has to be (sollen) is the basis for what is 
(sein). In the perfect will of God are the foundations of being. 
Like most of Lotze’s commentators, George Santayana168 considers the attempt to 
reconcile two different schools, namely positivism and German metaphysics of that 
time. For Lotze metaphysics does not begin where science ends. The two are connected 
and complementary parts of the same inquiry. The natural sciences are the sole and 
final judges of knowledge. Metaphysics must not bring changes in the results of the 
sciences, but must be a proposal to accompany and control the scientific explorations, 
namely by taking into consideration the ontological problems and the moral and 
emotional demands. 
It was exactly this special relationship between positivistic science and the 
ontological value theory which brought Philippe Devaux169 to the conclusion that the 
distinction between value judgments and reality judgments, subordinated to 
metaphysical viewpoints, in its extreme consequence leads to the abolition of that 
distinction. The desire to save the Christian tradition gives an effective primacy to 
moral life. That is what actually happened when the Reverend Joseph Cook from Boston 
popularized Lotze and called him the prophet who made the microscope an instrument 
of immortality and science the handmaid of the Bible170. 
In the following Lotze’s thinking is represented as it came to maturity at the end of 
his life. It corresponds in general with the content of the ‘Dictated Portions of Lectures’, 
posthumously edited and ‘Microcosm’, but of course his other works are also important. 
Occasionally Lotze’s viewpoint will be confronted with another viewpoint in order to 
render it more striking. 
2.5.2 Philosophy 
Philosophy is present in all of Lotze’s work, even in his work on physiology. But he also 
wrote about philosophy itself. For him philosophy is the mental activity which has as 
goal to bring all the knowledge together in order to explain things, to eliminate 
contradictions, and to present a worldview in which every thing has a place. The 
changing elements were found in the development of the sciences, connecting with a 
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universal standard in theology. Philosophy can thus be named ‘general science’, because 
it adds something to the blind action of causality. 
In a pre-Heideggerian manner, Lotze also speaks of ‘Sein des Seienden’171. We know 
what we mean when we speak about ‘being’ and about ‘doing’, but we cannot explain 
how being is created and how doing comes about. These questions will always stay 
unanswered. But, the fact that man questions these issues is a sign that he is in quest of 
sense in his existence. Finally Lotze’s philosophical adventure leads him to the good as 
the supreme reason which renders existence meaningful. 
Characteristic for Lotze is his awareness of the fact that his thinking is but one of the 
many attempts in the history of philosophy to realise a consistent whole of supposed 
truths. That Lotze was very conscious of the true nature of his philosophical 
investigations is evident from his assertion that, after a long historical development of 
philosophy, in which every standpoint has come to the fore, was adhered too, has been 
left, and reintroduced, there was no longer any merit for originality, but only for 
accuracy172. He does not claim the merit to have given a definitive solution to the many 
investigations in the past. He says that he ‘makes plain to (himself) whether, and how 
far, it was possible to give a scientific justification of a view which (he) could, of course, 
previously describe only as a prejudice of (his) own, as the subjective principle which 
impelled (him).173’ It is impossible, as Descartes tried, to find a new principle of certitude 
that during thousands of years would not have been discovered. To determine the 
clarity and distinctness of the thoughts on which Descartes founds its knowledge, does 
but leave the judgment of it to the individual. Moreover an exercise of radical doubt is 
not possible because any doubt also presupposes one or other truth. 
As to the philosophical method Lotze asserts that a ‘method of knowledge cannot, like 
that of a practical undertaking, follow a goal fixed upon beforehand’ and ‘(…) is always 
conditioned by the peculiarities which the nature of things presents to our effort to 
know it.’174  He illustrates it with an anecdote on Aristotle. ‘When Alexander the Great 
asked him for an easier way of learning geometry, he is said to have answered: There is 
no special royal road in science. Science, philosophy above all, possesses no mysterious 
methodical road in antithesis to that by which the simple use of our understanding can 
lead us all.’175  Every ‘progress of thought and every method is good, in so far as it adapts 
itself at once to the nature of the thing it investigates at every moment, and to the 
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special aim which that investigation pursues (…)’176 But that this does not mean that 
‘everything goes’177 is clear from his assertion that he has ‘certainly no intention to 
counting, under this name of the natural understanding, that sum of superficial 
impressions, half-thoughts, and groundless prejudices which, together with a few 
indispensable or traditional truths, constitutes the treasury of non-scientific culture.178’ 
An investigation not only states a truth in the world, but by formal rules it is also 
possible to deduce other truths possessing a definite meaning179. Lotze also called his 
method eclectic, in search for the middle-ground between the dominating trends. Of 
course this eclecticism did not have a pejorative sense180. 
The task of philosophy is to order all the knowledge, expressed by language. 
Contradictions in the sciences and everyday knowledge, and between both, are 
extensively and accurately enumerated, discussed and resolved, by tracing 
presumptions and consequences, but also by integrating the result in a harmonious 
whole and by demarcating the borders of science. It is exactly what Lotze did. He 
brought consistency and removed contradictions, unavoidable because of the scattered 
whole of experiences in the sciences and also daily life. Philosophy must bring a 
systematic exposition of the results arrived at181. 
Philosophy182 is not a matter of luxury, but the effort of the human mind to resolve, 
by a coherent research, the enigmas which threaten the heart and incite man to find an 
insight into the great questions of life; and to adjudicate the legitimacy and validity of 
the scientific principles.  
It is very interesting in the context of this study on Lotze to find that the search for 
certainty is also present in Lotze’s writings, especially the presumption that there is on 
the whole truth in the world. Its denial is chiefly due to the inability to see that without 
a moral conviction life would be absurd183. The following presumption is that man is 
able to apprehend this truth, not integrally but partially. The epistemological doubt in 
this context, can generate from a motivated or unmotivated scepticism or a critique on 
knowledge. The first sceptical attitude can only be countered by the admission of its 
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absurdity; the second cannot be refuted nor confirmed, but can lead to cautiosness; the 
third finally brings insight into knowledge but no answer about the true nature of 
things, it does not escape from circular reasoning. Circular reasoning is unavoidable for 
Lotze, who differed herein from Kant184. Thinking is also the relative certainty obtained 
after an examination of the manifold changing facts, expressed in sentences. 
The third presumption is that the world forms a unity and, if fully known, a closed 
system without unrelated or disorderly elements. That unity cannot be found in an a 
priori idea, for that could only be possible from an independent viewpoint, an 
impossible presumption for mortal beings. It is clear that Lotze has Hegel’s system in 
mind. He advocates an open approach in search for that unity. That unity cannot be 
found by a logic train of reasoning, but by a process of intellectual intuition. It must be 
guessed. It ‘presents itself to the human mind in the immediacy of feeling and not by 
discursive thought.185 
With regard to the classification of philosophical matters, Lotze distinguishes first of 
all between ‘what is’ and ‘what has value’186. The two are not causally connected in 
advance, but finally Lotze will come to an explanation of ‘what is’ through ‘what ought 
to be’.  ‘What is’ is further divided into the external nature and the life of the soul, with 
their causal connection, leading to respectively philosophy of nature and psychology; 
‘what has value’ is divided into aesthetics and ethics and also what is common to both in 
valuating. 
The ontology searches for a true being hidden behind the perceptible features of it, 
and asks the questionof how it is possible that the same subject can have different 
properties at the same time or consequently, and how one subject can influence another 
one, which must correspond with a unity in what is apparently diverse.  
In metaphysics the possibilities are examined; in the philosophy of nature the factual 
interconnections of reality; and in the philosophy of religion the ideal significance and 
the goals of the changes in the course of the world run. But philosophy can never be a 
science which constitutes itself stemming from a highest principle187. Lotze comes to 
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this statement after having criticised both the existing realistic and idealistic 
philosophical approaches. The philosophy of religion, the laws of nature and the basic 
facts, and the final goal of being or the highest idea of good and bad, come together in a 
highest principle, but man can only know them separately. They also cannot be deduced 
from each other. Human knowledge is only partial and statements are but one-sided. 
Revelation brings about what is not traceable by the mind and philosophy must reflect 
on the cohesion of its theoretical and ethical worldview within an ontological, 
cosmological and metaphysical perspective. In metaphysics the realists hold the 
assumption of relations between things as something added to them, but for the 
idealists the ideas are an essential part of the world’s procession. In practical philosophy 
the realists think they can deduce moral rules from nature, but what ‘is’ (Sein) cannot be 
mixed with what ‘ought to be’ (Sollen), while the idealists deduce their moral rules from 
a highest principle. From a realistic, atomist viewpoint things are distributed in space, 
and the laws are but blind working forces, without ideas and goals, and thus leading to 
absurdity. From an idealistic viewpoint space is a representation of things in the mind 
and their diversity emerges on qualitative grounds. They fill space dynamically by 
working ideas, which follow certain laws. There is meaning and significance. The 
method is deductive and is in search of the true being. Initially the insight into the 
problems is vague, but it progresses by denying what is not suitable and step by step 
finds a more accurate explanation. The logical accountability of that process stays 
unclear. The all encompassing view is teleological and the view on the essence of life 
must not be confused with its appearance. In the end this subjective method leads to an 
objective one in three phases: in 
the thoughts does not necessarily always lead to the same result. The realistic approach 
is inductive following the law of identity, resolving contradictions and leading to a 
manifold of elements, which highlight the changeable by emphasizing the changing 
connections with each other. On the whole, realism cannot bring the found laws in 
accordance with unity in the world; the question of the necessary unity stays open. On 
the contrary, idealism does not explain the particularities. Lotze’s solution respects and 
the particular as well as the unity. 
2.5.3 Metaphysics 
Dealing with metaphysics does not mean that a theory of knowledge has to be 
formulated in advance, because a critique on knowledge already presupposes a 
metaphysics. With this viewpoint Lotze was in opposition to the prevailing views. For 
Lotze metaphysics cannot be stated a priori, it always supposes a prepossessed 
metaphysical viewpoint. Therefore a critical inquiry into the existing metaphysical 
findings of the past is recommended. 
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Remarkable and symbolic for the importance of metaphysics in Lotze’s thinking is 
that it is the subject of one of his first works as well as that of his last work. Even more 
remarkable is that during the intermediate 38 years, namely from 1841 till 1879, few 
things were changed; not in the theorems, not in the way substances are discussed; not 
in the relations and laws; and all that in a consistent setting. The few developments in 
his thinking were discussed above.  
‘Outlines of Metaphysics’ (1883) comprises three parts, namely ontology, cosmology 
and phenomenology. The ontology deals with the concept ‘being’, the content and 
extent of being, chance and interaction; the cosmology of space, time, motion, force and 
coherence in nature; the phenomenology of subjectivity and the significance of 
knowledge. 
Lotze’s method is to bring a viewpoint to the fore, and then to refute the possible and 
best known objections one by one; to finally come to a clear opinion. It is an approved 
method that was already adopted in the Summa theologica of Thomas Aquinas, thus in the 
late Middle Ages. By treating the matter step by step, Lotze succeeds in making difficult 
problems accessible. His pedagogic reputation is not without foundation. This ability is 
after all mentioned as a reason for his success.  
Lotze’s metaphysics has no absolute method. Any problem can be the starting point 
of inquiry and it is the problem at stake that invokes the kind of method which must be 
applied. ‘Thought has no external standard to appeal to for aid in directing its 
procedure, nor any external means of testing the progress it has made. Itself is its own 
light.188’  
The next step is to consider the fundamental substance or the all-embracing reality 
as the Absolute. The independence of things is but an abstraction of the mind and is 
useful to interpret in a mechanical way, within science the changes that take place 
within the whole, but restricted to the observable, the phenomenon. Science in a larger 
sense of the word cannot be restricted to the mechanical, but has to find the hidden 
meaning of the phenomena189. 
Lotze is also in continuous dialogue with his predecessors. Kant is often mentioned to 
introduce certain principles; Herbart, his predecessor in Leipzig and Göttingen, along 
with Hegel and Schelling, but as to the latter generally to refute them. Fichte is 
mentioned as an extreme example of idealism, namely in the negation of reality. 
Also his medical education and his knowledge of physics, chemistry and mathematics 
comes in handy to elucidate metaphysical problems: Chemistry in matters of natural 
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law and the quest for reality behind the changing phenomena190; mathematics in his 
exposition of the significance of space and time, both subdivided in pointed unities. 
Other passages makes one think of Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s (1901-1972) ‘General 
System Theory’, published in 1968. From time to time Lotze employs the term ‘system’ 
to emphasize the unity of beings, together with their parts191. According to Hauser Lotze 
‘arrived at important insights into the foundation of the life sciences such as the 
information-theoretic approach to biological systems.’192 He views living bodies as open 
systems of elements, which are not closed to the outside world but need it to survive193. 
Pester194 is convinced that von Bertalanffy is indirectly influenced by Lotze, although it 
cannot be proofed clearly.  
Lotze does not have the intention, as Hegel has, to explain the world from one 
principle195, and no more to build a system, from clear defined notions; but it was his 
aim to eliminate all inconsistencies196 carefully. Nevertheless, in spite of his assertions, 
Lotze did build a system, namely a religious one. Anyhow, his method consists mainly in 
pointing at mistakes in the reasoning of different schools, especially Hegel’s, Herbart’s, 
Fichte’s and Schelling’s. But also to criticize rough concepts and opinions of everyday 
live.  
In the writings of Lotze it is be difficult to find something referring to common sense, 
unless to allege its imperfection197. Things receive their reality through their 
relations198. That reality is not a substance, not something that stands on its own with its 
own properties; and it is not static, although it is a unity. That is why it is nevertheless a 
monism. In that whole there are changing phases with internal connections, whereby a 
change in one part is unthinkable without some change elsewhere. This proposition 
exempts Lotze from appealing to a pre-established order as is the case in Leibniz’s 
theory of the monads. What is constant finds expression in the laws. The system that is 
responsible for the laws in nature is not observable. Man knows only the impressions of 
the senses, which are cached as ‘things’ by mental activity. He cannot transgress his 
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own possibilities. Kant’s ‘thing on itself’ (Ding an sich) is still unknowable199, although 
Lotze makes some remarks, but only if the facts are revealed to be necessary by logic 
reasoning. The universal all encompassing substance can be understood by man in 
accordance with his mental abilities. Change is only possible if the multiplicity is 
supplemented with unity. 
This point of view is opposed to the atomistic one, which was advocated by the 
atomists in antiquity200. Also Russell (1872-1970), later his critic, was an atomist, 
although he interpreted it in different ways during his lifetime. They emphasized 
multiplicity and diversity. This positition also stands close to Herbart’s realism and the 
everyday opinion about reality. In contrast with Lotze his teacher Herbert conceived the 
real as a multiplicity of simple unchangeable elements, which can enter into relations 
with one another. The ground of phenomenal change is then founded in the varying 
relations. Lotze thus dissociate himself from Herbert’s viewpoint201, because reality 
behind the phenomenon, which are the sole observable facts, can only be explained in 
accepting one substance, not a manifold of them. What is separated cannot have contact 
or cannot come in relation to each other. Only elements of a whole are able to do so. ‘He 
who posits real relatedness must at the same time allow that the independence of the 
related elements ceases, that they no longer become changeless, permanent centres of 
relation, but merely the relatively permanent points202 in one continuously altering 
system.203’ 
Where there is life, there is also independent existence. The material things outside 
consciousness can best be explained by accepting that they are part of the universal 
substance. The activity of that substance is responsible for the fact that man is 
conscious of them as independent entity, and that is much the case in every day live as 
in science. It also means that the independence of things is but an illusion.  
In Lotze’s study of metaphysics the universal substance is not indicated as God, but 
some interpretations do make that link. They assert that the universal substance is an 
empty concept, which asks to be amplified, realising the significance of creation, the 
value of the good and the highest value of the strive after personal sanctity. 
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Metaphysics is for Lotze the question about being as thinkable. Central in it is the 
post-Kantian opposition between the phenomenal and the noumenal world. How are 
the appearances of the phenomena, the observable symptoms of nature, in relation to 
reality, as thought by the mind and outside observation? What is, in the words of Kant, 
the status of the ‘Dinge an sich’? How do the scientific propositions hold? The subject of 
metaphysics is reality as reality, but it can never be more than reality revealed by man. 
It is always restricted to the knowledge of man.  
The scientific knowledge of nature has to be filled up by a teleological vision to 
explain the ultimate value of man and the world. This respect for scientific research in 
combination with his own idealistic program outlines a universe which unfolds its plans 
in which things are submitted to general laws and the expression of a spiritual interest.  
In analogy with the immediate introspective knowledge of the spiritual, Lotze asserts 
that the centres of force, which generate the laws of nature, are phases of development 
in the substantial substructure of the spirit of the world. 
 
 
Noumenon = what is thought by the mind 
 
Phenomenon = what appears to the senses 
 
The noumenon takes an important place in Kant’s ethics, because it allows to 
know values. 
 
[‘Filosofie: Personen en begrippen van A tot Z, 1998] 
 
Functionality comes foreward in Lotze’s metaphysics in the central place the concept 
law is assigned, or, in a more mathematical formulation: the formula204. It is connected 
with the primacy of thinking, in which contradictions are prevented, with the factual 
world that has to sustain the test of reflection. What remains of that world is but a 
structural correspondence with the representations. Substances are no longer accepted. 
The method, as already mentioned, is characterized by an incessant dialogue with 
opposite opinions. An important place is taken by Herbart, his predecessor. For Herbart 
there is a relation between phenomenon and noumenon. For Lotze the phenomenon 
does not say anything about the nature of something; but it depends on the human 
perception and possibilities of conception. Although observed changes must correspond 
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with real changes, the real changes stay unknown in their true nature. For Herbart pure 
things must exist, for how could relations come into being if they do not emanate from 
real things. Only something that exists can be active and must also exist even when it is 
inactive. So it must have a pure existence. It means that things are capable of having 
relations. The German term ‘Setzung’ stands for a pure position, apart from relations. For 
Lotze something that has no relations cannot be observed205. A pure thing is impossible. 
All that exists is relational. From the beginning of his exposition Lotze states that the 
whole solvable task of our knowledge only can be in the proof of an inner relationship 
in reality206. About the art of the things that are related can be thought, but observing is 
not such thing as to take something up as a whole, but via the possibilities of the senses 
and the cognitive capacities. Lotze replaces Herbart’s concept of pure thought by a sort 
of philological contextualism. Instead of the affirmation of a particular thing comes 
nothing other than a proposition, of which the content of the notion is brought in 
relation with that of another one. 
For Herbart there are unchangeable substances and what changes is accidental. Kant 
spoke of absolute positions. Lotze sometimes also speaks of substances, but erodes the 
concept totally. What changes is no longer situated in things, but in the repetition of 
similar relations. In chemistry for instance reactions are predictable. The changeable 
can be caught in a formula. The conceptual relations however are mental constructions 
depending on perceptual forms. They must not be seen as something that exists before 
and detached from the things207. Santayana maintains that Lotze keeps the term 
substance208, but leaves its meaning209. 
For Herbart relations are put between things; for Lotze it is impossible. They must be 
internal. To be relational is fundamental for existence. The reality of things is thus 
completely occupied by the reality of relations. The real is an adjective and it can denote 
a quality but not the thing itself. Just like the term ‘position’ it has the possibility to 
characterise being. Reality must be seen as a part of an ordered whole, by which 
everything must be recognised as the ultimate action of the good, which, as ordering 
and purposeful principle rounds off the teleological image.Also the problem of causality 
is self-evidently solved by diverting it to a mental process and not by looking for a 
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relation between mind and world, or an interaction between the separated things. The 
latter, that is in the supposition of separate things, there is no sensible explanation 
possible how one thing could interact with another one. Metaphysical pluralism has to 
be turned down210. 
The idea from observation that things are originally manifold and existing in 
themselves, must be replaced by the image of one true being M which is the foundation 
of all individual things a, b, c, …211 In contrast to Hume, who reduced causality to a 
mental propensity and in this way gave it a psychological explanation, Lotze appeals to 
the establishment of a regularly repeated sequence, expressed in a law or formula. The 
explanation of the sequences simply lies in the art of the phenomena, which is nothing 
else than the law which represents and describes these sequences. There is no reason to 
look for a more fundamental explanation. The only thing to do is to agree with the data 
and further unexplained order in nature. 
Lotze champions a monism on reasonable grounds212. An immanent operation means 
that only that sole being M, of which ‘a’ and ‘b’ are elements, changes. It changes 
internally and wholly. When ‘a’ changes in M ‘b’ must change too, but without the 
change of M separated changes of ‘a’ and ‘b’ cannot take place. The universe is a whole, 
a cosmos. 
Lotze is not only a functionalist and a monist, but also an instrumentalist213. Things 
are but ideas which are necessary to understand the phenomenal world and man is 
restricted by his mental capacities in his examination of the world. More than a unity 
and existence cannot be discovered. Although reason can trace that some qualities of 
the objects must exist. The sequences of things cannot be perceived but can be assumed. 
That some components of perception [a b c d] are ordered in that specific way and not 
as [a b d c] can only be explained by those qualities. Because that ordering cannot 
depend solely on innate mental capacities. No variety in perception would be possible. 
The ordering itself however is a pure mental act214. As to spatiality it is also strictly 
mental data215.  
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Next to some functionalistic and instrumentalistic features of Lotze’s method, a 
sociological approach is also discernable. The epistemological subjectivity is 
supplemented by a correspondence between the knowledge of different persons216. 
As already stated, Lotze is sometimes characterised as an eclecticus. Idealism as well 
as realism have been his sources, but if his reasoning is followed strictly, the mentioned 
judgement is but a caricature. He remains a genuine idealist but in a original and 
consequent way. The different and diverging influences he underwent, are thought out, 
refuted or assimilated in one great thought process. The label ‘eclecticism’ does injustice 
to him. His dialogue with others gives Lotze the opportunity to give some nuances to his 
expositions. 
The meaning of the wortd ‘mechanism’ must be expanded. It encompasses all the 
laws of the phenomenal world, life and spirit included. The mechanical becomes the 
only scientific way of explaining facts and relations in the world. But mechanism must 
not be put on a par with materialism. That the spiritual phenomena, separated from the 
corporal ones, are implicated in the mechanistic model of explanation could lead to 
such position. Although Lotze has no conclusive argument for the relation between the 
spiritual and the corporal, at least not on a scientific level, and although he admits his 
impotence in relation to this, it cannot be ignored that they stand in relation to each 
other. There is a mechanical relation between the material and the immaterial. 
The phenomena described in physiology, psychology and pathology remained 
mechanistic on an scientific level. Consequently philosophy had to investigate into the 
more deeply situated significance of life, in a speculative way, by observing the 
normative rules of thinking.  
The critique Adamson exercises on Lotze’s approach of metaphysical problems is 
analogues to his critique on Lotze’s Logic and aims at defending Hegelianism, which is 
criticised by Lotze. Adamson reproaches Lotze that he does not distinguish between 
logic as a formal process, where no self-development can take place, and logic as applied 
on real existence, where Lotze maintains a ‘needless’ opposition between real 
experience and thought217. 
 
                                                     
216 ‘Wahrheit besteht dann nur in der Übereinstimmung einer Vorstellung mit derjenigen Vorstellung, welche 
in bezug auf dasselbe Object in allen andern Geistern von derselben Organistation entstehen muss.’ 
(Lotze,1887:95). 
217 1885b:576-755. 
The Anthropology of Hermann Lotze 
74 
2.5.4 Biology and philosophy 
Science is very important to Lotze, but its significance must be restricted. Reality will 
never be confined to the sciences only. Merz218 emphasizes that in the end Lotze was not 
interested in science as such, but only to designate its inability to explain reality fully. 
Furthermore, consciousness cannot be reduced to the intellectual functions; also 
feelings and valuating are important in the life of man. 
The vitalistic opinions of Schelling dominated biology. 
Because Lotze was educated in late idealism by C. H. Weisse, as well as in biology 
thanks to his medical studies, and also in the mathematical scientific methodology, he 
was directed to refute some paradigms of that idealistic-romantic philosophy of nature. 
First of all the vital power (Lebenskraft) had to pay for it. The difference between the 
living and the non-living matter, was, by the prevailing theory, explained by the 
presence of a special vital force, which was responsible for the organisation within 
organic bodies.  
Lotze recalled Kant’s distinction between the regulative and constitutive principles. 
So teleology can be very clarifying for some heuristic goals, but cannot be a scientific 
principle. Terms as ‘ordering’ and ‘goal’ are suppositions which are inherent to a 
theoretical discourse, but they cannot be brought in as explaining factors. Besides they 
hinder the search for deeper causes by putting as a fact what had to be examined. ‘Vital 
power’ was such a regulative principle that should not have been introduced as being 
part of a structure of the organic bodies. It cannot be the cause of organic phenomena. 
The solution the Protestant Lotze brought in, differed fundamentally from that 
of the Roman Catholic Church. By putting all the weight on the rationality of the 
sciences and neglecting the empirical facet of the modern sciences, the latter fought on 
the wrong battle-field. Pope Leo XIII (1810-1903) recommended the study of the 
doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, that is Aristotle’s teleological science in a Christian 
attire219. 
So, when Lotze speaks of the teleological actions of organic beings it is not in the 
sense of Aristotle, but he brings in the causal relation of human intentions. The 
purposeful actions of organic beings match perfectly with mechanistic theories. 
Theology and mechanism are not incompatible. ‘Vital force’ is thus a superfluous 
hypothesis and is not needed to explain order and goal in the living world. But Lotze 
does not remain in a mechanistic worldview, because it is a materialistic one and an 
incomplete account. It leaves a metaphysical vacuum, which has to be filled by a 
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philosophical investigation, by a speculative reflection and by the necessity evident 
from reasoning. Although the concept telos is paramount in explaining the possibility of 
life, Lotze also emphasizes the need for cause-and-effect relations employed by nature 
toward the realization of its ultimate purpose220. 
Central in Lotze’s image of man and view of the world is the primacy of ‘ought’ over 
‘is’, to put it in the terms of George E. Moore. Although it is not an ethical premise as is 
the case for Fichte. Lotze develops here his value theory which will have a huge impact 
and which will generate an explosion of studies in axiology. However instead of the 
terms ‘ought’ and ‘is’ he uses ‘significance’ and ‘being’. Science denotes what exists in 
facts, but philosophy has to settle which significance to give to the results of the 
sciences. 
2.5.5 Logic 
The subject of logic was, in Lotze’s time, not restricted to an exposition of the terms, the 
propositions, the syllogism and the fallacies, as in the case of classical or Aristotelian 
logic, and the argumentation theory, or the formal treatment in the present 
approach221, but it encompassed also the hypothetical approach in science, and 
epistemological  as well as metaphysical questions. Therefore his logic can only be 
understood in function of the whole of his work222.  Moreover, during Lotze’s life logic 
demarcated itself against psychology ‘and the idea of introducing quantifiers was only 
conceived in the last years of his life.’223 
Thinking is an ongoing critique of the mind on the material of the representations224. 
The disordered chain of representations is interpreted thanks to secondary-thoughts 
(Nebengedanken)225, such as the reflection that there is a causal effect at stake. Also 
thinking leads the subjective associations of the representations back to the principles 
of the objective synthesis of their content226.  
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In ‘Little Logic’ Lotze paid much more attention to the underlying metaphysical 
questions, while in ‘Logic’ of 1874 he makes less distinct references to them227. In the 
following the two approaches will be treated in a mixed way and with taking into 
account the metaphysic background in which they took place. One of those 
metaphysical presuppositions is that the empirical, perceptive world consists of laws. 
Adamson underlines that the concept of a priori as to logic is different from Kant’s, 
because it ‘does not contain the element of thought, and regards it as self-evident, 
intuitively grasped data. 228’ This explains why Lotze’s a priori is considered as Platonic.  
When in experience action is exercised on the mind, the result of that action is 
determined by the nature of the mind. The special forms in which the experience is 
moulded procure the a priori aspect, and that a priori can only be revealed through 
experience. Nevertheless logic does not depend on the mental capacities, which deliver 
only the physical conditions. It also does not depend on the elements of reality, which 
are first of all not knowable, although it doubtlessly corresponds in one way or another 
to these elements229. Moreover the forms of thinking, known through subjective 
experience, have a universal validity. 
Lotze made logic not dependent on the mental capacities, but, on the contrary, 
considered such position as psychologism. Moreover, he sees the logical rules as 
detached from experience, although they are grasped during and on account of 
experience. There is, according to him, an absolute standard of conjunction and 
negation. Therefore, it is possible to speak of true and false judgments. But, for Lotze the 
capacity to reason and the content of reasoning must not be considered as separated. 
Separation could be possible, because man can reflect on his actions, but that separation 
would be undone because the complexity of thinking can only be mastered thanks to an 
individual process of learning. Knowledge is a mediating process. The mind systematises 
what is given in experience, and truth is not about real things as beings or even the 
occurrence of events. Validity and not real existence is the question.  
Lotze’s anti-psychological concept of logic definitely comes forward in his assertion 
that psychologism is ‘an illusion of psychology and a corruption of logic’230 It would be 
the same as if any scientific theory would depend on a theory of neural physics. 
Lotze expresses the metaphysical relation between the nature of things and logic in 
such a way that the destiny of thinking is to lead to the true nature of things. This 
proposition reveals a correspondence between reality and imagination. But the 
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correspondence is not related to the results of science, which is mechanistic, but to the 
metaphysical findings of the intellect. It relates to Lotze’s monistic worldview of reality 
which came forward through his rationalistic-metaphysical research.  
He refuses to see logic as a purely formal matter or as a reproduction of reality. Logic 
is not independent from the object to which it relates and it does not represent the 
relations between the objects, but it is at once formal and real. Hauser qualifies Lotze’s 
justification of logical laws as essentially teleological, because Lotze writes that just as 
metaphysics, logic begins with ethics. The ethical and the aesthetical are important in 
reasoning, for inconsistencies can be detected as false in comparing them, but this is not 
the case for the absurd. The latter supposes a superstructure to determine what is 
valuable, indifferent or factual231. Moreover the choice of the exact form of deduction 
(modus ponens, reduction ad absurdum, etc.) that is to be adopted, depends only on the 
content of the proposition232. ‘In other words ethics imposes a superstructure on the 
class of consistent statements that puts what is valuable (‛wertvoll“) ahead of what is 
indifferent (‛gleichgültig“) or merely factual (‛tatsächlich“).“233 
So Lotze did not extend the reserve he had for the sciences to epistemology. The 
borders Kant did establish in epistemology were repeatedly overstepped and all the 
Neo-Kantians did so. Lotze declared that he doubted that man could only know the 
phenomenon and not the things in themselves, because he could not accept that man 
would be content with what is the lowest, while he has the possibility to attain the 
highest. He looks behind the phenomenon in the representations for fixed points, which 
procure the first certitudes capable to report upon the laws which rule the world234. 
Logic is, in the eyes of Lotze, formal in the sense that it is the theory of the processes 
of thinking, by which the subject transforms its thoughts to knowledge; but it is not 
formal in the sense that it is but a form of thought which can exist without any relation 
to the problems of reality. Logic is certainly not reality in the sense that its forms are 
elements of the essence of things, but it is real as far as these forms depend on these 
essences. In the nature of things are motives which incite the thinking mind to adopt 
those forms of understanding which are adapted to the objective facts. As a means or 
instrument of knowledge the thinking mind unites features of its own with that to 
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which it is related, namely the reality which must be known. On the other hand ideas do 
not have factual reality, they have validity. ‘They are true, but not existent’235. 
In exactly the same manner as for metaphysics, Lotze asks himself why in logic 
separated entities, in casu the impressions, can be thought of as in relation with each 
other. Those impressions have to be a priori and present in an adapted form, to make 
the relations possible. First of all Lotze ascertains that in almost all languages one makes 
use of certain distinguished classes of words236, namely substantives, adjectives and 
verbs237. The independent substantives are the main materials; the dependent adjectives 
denote features of these substantives; and the verbs interpret the actions which take 
place between the substantives.  More general concepts are not possible238. As to pure 
logic, Lotze begins with stating that the mental activity is above all a matter of 
connections. The ideas appear to each other as successive or as simultaneous. Than the 
question is: do these connections show a real coherence or is it only fortuitous. Do the 
ideas, considered as atoms, lead to objective knowledge or do they only generate 
illusions and subjectivity. If it is not only about a conjunction of ideas, but of a coherent 
whole, than that must be found by reasoning. ‘That it should be possible to obtain a 
coherent representation is a fortunate accident, depending on an arrangement of the 
real contents of experience which is not a necessary truth239. Lotze does not search for 
that foundation in psychology, of course, but in a transcendental research which must 
procure that a priori. This attitude corresponds with the a priori interpretation of the 
early analytic philosophy and with the rejection of psychologism, to indicate that the 
justification of logic can never be an empirical matter. However, in the last quarter of 
the 19th century, psychologism became, from a restricted opinion amongst naturalists, a 
broader movement240.  
Besides the established connections of ideas the capacity to draw conclusions must be 
borne in mind, to impose the logical form on the manifold of unordered sensual 
impressions. Thus Lotze does not accept psychological processes as a foundation of 
logic, but only as a process of thinking for the formation of concepts. In that process of 
thinking different phases can be distinguished. First of all impressions must be 
transformed into ideas. Produced by indicating and denominating, by which in this 
subjective action the objective content appears. Language undeniably has an important 
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role in Lotze’s explication of that process241. In front of the logical categories object, 
feature and relation, there are the grammatical ones of substantive, adjective and 
verb242. It does not mean however that thinking would depend solely on language, but 
that there is a mental capacity which generates both. For instance in music the gamut 
forms a structural whole, but it cannot be put in a proposition. Thus there must be a 
separate capacity of the mind. The elementary processes must be viewed ‘as pre-
requisites for the critical activity of thought rather than as forming part of it.243’ 
In the field of formal logic Lotze’s concept of tokens or marks244 (Merkmale) is worth 
mentioning. It also means that the coordination of sub concepts does not come to 
expression by means of a simple sum of relations [S = a + b + c + …], but by a functional 
representation [S = F (a, b, c, …)]245. The Aristotelian logic with its system of 
classification, going from small content extent and great number of features to the more 
abstract, greater content extent and smaller number of features is not able to explain 
arising, being, mutual relations and interactions, changes and disappearing of the 
phenomenon246. 
In other words a general rule or law is on the basis of logic sentences. Functionality, 
rules and laws are not only present in Lotze’s logic, but are also the backbone of his 
metaphysics. The law of identity does not procure any explication of thinking; the 
hypothetical does, because it expresses a relation247. Lotze goes even further by saying 
that truth is guaranteed by the concentrated impression of all experience. A universal 
proposition is constituted of the interconnections of conditions of individuals, and the 
general judgment finds its complement in the disjunctive. Although the disjunctive is a 
more adequate expression of a relation between subject and predicate, it is also 
imperfect because it suffers from the undetermined choice of alternatives. To elaborate 
a coherent conception of experience however the integrated arrangement of syllogistic 
judgements fails, because the material for discussion is too rich. Not even the more 
complex forms, the quantitative248 and the classificatory, suffice. 
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Lotze adopts the classification of judgments by Kant, applied to the significance of 
the copula, which bring the subject and the predicate together: quantity, quality, 
relation and modality249. Quality has to do with affirmation or confirmation (P or non-P), 
but non-P does not denote anything that is not P, non-P supposes a restricted whole of 
things under an encompassing more general denomination. Otherwise non-P no longer 
represent something. Modality has to do with content and not with logic, because for 
instance (S can be P) is independent of its logical form. 
Lotze criticises the doctrine of abstraction250. Not the simple omission of features (p1, 
p2; q1, q2) can lead to an abstraction, but there must also always be thought of general 
features (P, Q) which replace (p1, p2; q1, q2). The features yellow, green, red, etc. must 
be replaced by the concept colour. If all the features were omitted, without 
replacement, nothing would remain251. Of course the latter must be seen in Lotze’s 
vision of substances without substance.  
The Platonic aspect of Lotze’s thinking finds expression in the description of the 
ideas. They are, of course, not the eternal ideas stemming from an immaterial life which 
are remembered in a Platonic252 way, but nevertheless they belong to an unchangeable, 
timeless realm, where they have no factual existence, but where they hold (gelten). That 
is a very important opinion of Lotze. But how do they hold? How can the logical forms 
be discovered, if they are considered detached from the mental activity? The foundation 
for those forms is brought about mechanically by the natural laws of the mind, because 
consciousness is implicated in it . The subjective action of the thoughts is detached from 
the content of these thoughts, which entail objectivity. It is a process of objectivation, 
but that objectivation is not the same as reality. This explanation corresponds 
epistemologically with Neo-Kantianism. A content, distinction, and comparison is stated 
for, in and by the thoughts. The possibility to discriminate and compare is brought 
forward by the thoughts, but not created by them. 
The formation of knowledge is a gradual process in which the opposition of 
distinctive marks of the objects and the possibility to compare them, are offered to, not 
made by thought253. Frege will criticise Lotze for not putting these possibilities into the 
act of thinking (See: 3.4.7. Influence on analytic philosophy: Frege). Between the 
tentative effects of thinking and the modes of real existence of things there is no precise 
correspondence, nor a substantial identity254.  
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An impression than becomes an object of a representation and comes across as an 
independent content. It receives a name and can be communicated. That content is 
independent in as far as it has once been represented in the mind, but it does not mean 
that the representation expresses a reality outside. There can be said that somebody 
else can also have the same representation, but it remains an object immanent to 
consciousness255. The naming and the representation are the first steps in the 
objectivation of what is initially subjective. To give a representation a name is first of all 
to consider it as identical to itself, as different from other representations, and as 
comparable with them256. It is an objectifying identification of a sense stimulus 
(objectivirende Identification eines Sinneseindrucks). After this follows an idea-forming 
abstraction of a concept (ideirende Abstraction eines Begriffs), which is firstly an intuition 
and secondly the formation of a concept. For instance the concept ‘man’ is grasped in 
such a manner that all men correspond to it, but it is not the same as to give a definition 
of ‘man’. The concept colour can be obtained by eliminating the colours, but at the same 
time being aware that it must have a colour257. In varying the particular things the 
necessary essence comes to the fore. Also an empirical idea comes about through 
abstracting. 
The critique of Adamson, an English Hegelian idealist, is of course focused on Lotze’s 
separation of the timeless and changeless content of thought and the changing, 
temporally modified content of perceived reality which leads to the distinction between 
Logic and Metaphysics. According to Adamson the ‘world of thought per se is truly a 
‘kingdom of shadows’258 when we compare it with the full reality of concrete existence, 
but we should not on this account suppose that thought is somehow divorced from 
things and has but a formal function in that regard. The perplexities to which such a 
supposition leads take ample vengeance for the error of mistaking a distinction in 
thought for a distinction of thought from things259.’ The critique on Lotze from Adamson 
says much more about Adamson’s Hegelian idealism, than about Lotze. Hegelian 
idealism in England had evolved into an objective one in which science could be 
integrated. In the same context the second part of Adamson’s critique on Lotze can be 
situated. It catalogues Lotze’s logic partly in Metaphysics, partly in Psychology, instead 
of considering it as an independent discipline. This is possible, according to Adamson, 
because Lotze narrows the definition of psychology. 
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Some points of Lotze’s logic will be examined more profoundly when the influence on 
analytic philosophy, and especially Frege’s logic, will be discussed later on. 
As closure to this paragraph about logic, some less laudatory words can be 
mentioned260. Martin Heidegger for instance complained, in the face of his pupil Georg 
Picht, about what he had to endure in following Lotze’s ‛Logic“ when he was a student. 
And Beyer speaks of a ‘Kantischen Trokkenheit’ (Kantian Aridity); of the lack of 
consequent and consistent terminology; of the bad habit not to work out fully a 
commenced idea or not to handle a question straightforwardly; of turning off into a side 
road and neglecting to return to the main road. All these remarks, true or false, also 
mirror the viewpoints of their critics. 
2.5.6 Value theory 
Windelband states that the value theory has led to a new way of philosophising, since 
Lotze placed the concept of value at the centre of logic and metaphysics261. 
Although Lotze did not give a clear definition of the concept of value, Pierson 
distinguishes some unanswerable elements which lead to the following specification: 
‛(…) value is a universal and objective guiding principle or animate Geist present in all of 
the truly unique and autonomous parts of experience-able reality.“262  The uniqueness 
must be understood as not determined in the sense of Hegel’s teleological worldview, 
but manmade. It is the mission of man to realize a better world, in which the universal 
values beacon.  
A value is always associated with something valuable. Its objectivity lies in the 
intrinsic significance of the object at stake, but also in the feelings of pleasure or pain it 
invokes upon the observer. These feelings are not merely additional features of 
experience that occur from time to time, but they are closely connected with all our 
experiences. There cannot be an experience that is not accompanied by a feeling, which 
in turn does not emanate from an aesthetic faculty. Furthermore every experience thus 
perceived in a valuating action must be unique for every knowable thing or event in 
every situation of the knowing subject. But to be truly objective the apprehension of 
value also has to be placed in a purposeful whole. ‘In other words, to recognize value is 
to recognize an absolute standard against which to measure what the valuable thing or 
event is, which for Lotze means to recognize where it is going, and most significantly 
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where it is going for us. In Lotze’s view, people are more than just value-knowers. People 
are also value-formers.’263 
Ethics is understood as value theory and stands outside the knowledge of nature. A 
tendency in nature can only arise from human consciousness, which aims at what is 
good, and, thanks to the mechanistic knowledge of nature, man transforms nature in 
function of its goals. The values however do not depend on man. They hold universally, 
but  become clear through experience. Situated in the worldview as a whole, there is an 
evolution toward more happiness.  
The value theory of Lotze is not a matter of intellectualism. He points out that many 
do not even know that man also acquires knowledge with the feelings. If, in the process 
of acquisition of knowledge, feelings would be eliminated, an impoverishment of 
knowledge would follow, especially in front of the transcendent things, in front of 
exactly those things which are essential for mankind.  
Lotze refers to Plato to introduce the concept of ‘value’, by which he gives an 
interpretation of the Greek philosopher, which would not be endorsed by everybody, 
but which is important to understand Lotze’s viewpoint264. He thinks that Plato was 
misunderstood. Plato’s assertion that ideas are not spatial would only mean that they 
are not things. These contents of thought have another status of existence than that of 
things. The misinterpretation of Plato was due to an imperfection in ancient Greek 
language, ‘namely its inability to draw a distinction between existence (of things) and 
validity (of relations obtained between platonic forms)’265.  Things are, events occur, and 
values hold. Like Plato’s ideas the values hold as universal and objective. They can thus 
be true or false, independent from and preceding a judgment in which they are 
expressed. In contrast with Plato they are not situated in a certain place and they do not 
really exist. They hold in the same way as ‘1 + 1 = 2’. 
Their only place is between the different thoughts and their significant elements. 
They are part of a whole, the thinkable. Because Lotze also suggests the physical objects 
perception as being central, thus as a mental datum, the value appears analogically. The 
axioms in mathematics are treated in the same way. They cannot be induced 
empirically, and they are not innate. Their foundation is no longer based on a 
psychological source, nor on a special capacity as intuition, but they hold universally 
and come before the particular applications. According to David Sullivan266 this 
representation of truth must not be confounded with the pan logistic trial to find out 
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the truth by an a priori deduction. It is above all reduction or the regressive method 
that makes the concept of the ultimate presuppositions possible. 
Value-theory is the key word for the ultimate idea, the Good, but also for 
comprehending and interpreting the process of life itself. Metaphysics begins with 
ethics. ‘This view expressed in the year 1841 was repeated by Lotze nearly forty years 
later, in the second part of his system’.267 Lotze’s anthropology appears to be a theology. 
To found existence on the concept of the Good is not new, but Lotze anchors it in 
epistemology. It is the uniqueness of his concept of value, which goes beyond its 
familiar usage and the usage in economics. 
‘Thus value is the final analysis the living, personal, loving presence of the highest 
Being, God, guiding but not imposing, directing but not coercing, all the really unique 
parts of reality as they develop; and are freely developed by human value-formers, 
toward their ultimate telos in Him’.268 
2.5.7 Psychology 
The main question of Lotze’s psychology is: under what conditions and forces the single 
processes of the spiritual life originate; how do they interconnect and modify; and how 
the whole of spiritual life is accomplished269. Orth distinguishes in Lotze’s Psychology a 
descriptive psychology and a parapsychology. With the latter he is in search of the 
metaphysic aspects270. The scientific approach is important but it cannot replace the 
foundations of the spiritual activities, for instance their substantiality.  
Lotze’s first elaborated treatise on psychology came out in a dictionary in 1846, 
namely ‘The Soul and Life of the Soul’ in Rudiger Wagner’s ‘Dictionary of Physiology’. It 
more or less contains his program of research. His last contribution to psychology, 
‘Outlines of Practical Philosophy’, came out posthumous in 1882. Meanwhile different 
works saw the light and this clearly shows that he always came back to psychology 
again as one of the most important subjects of his philosophical interests271.  
The treatment of psychology will be more elaborated, because this doctoral thesis is 
about the anthropology of Lotze, which means that it is foremost an image of man and 
his capacity to know and transform his environment. Moreover, it is important to take 
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cognisance of Lotze’s way of thinking. The leading motive here is: let the reasoning 
speak instead of speaking about the reasoning. It does not mean that his work will be 
paraphrased, but that some striking reasoning will be quoted, next to some 
indispensable commentary, of course. 
The ‘Outlines of Psychology’ (1881) breaks up into two parts, namely about the 
separated elements of the inner life and about the soul. The description of the separated 
elements begins with the simple sensations, to come to an analysis of the spatial 
representations and the sensorial worldview, via the representations, the intentional 
knowledge and attention. Also perceptual illusions are presented. The first part ends 
with a discussion of  feelings and motion. 
After expatiating on the existence of the soul, Lotze comes to his dualistic and causal 
approach of the relation between soul and body, a problematic issue that is also present 
in his other works, such as ‘Metaphysics’. He further deals with the seat of the soul, its 
time aspect, and its essence and changing situations. At the end Lotze mentions some 
reflections on the significance of the contents of the soul.  
Methodically he starts with the impressions coming from outside and nourishing the 
mental activity, than the manifold internal manipulations of the impressions get looked 
at, and finally again the externalisations via movement and action. Finally Lotze’s 
intention is to have an insight into the inner nature of the subject.  
The impressions of pleasure and displeasure272 generate values and anti-values273. No 
assertion is fully neutral, but the valuation of pleasure and displeasure only escape from 
the attention of man because, in adult life, the sense and the significance of things has 
become more important274.  
Lotze’s psychology contains three methodological aspects, namely (1) a descriptive or 
empirical; (2) an explanatory, mechanical; (3) and an ideal or speculative one. The latter 
is not submitted to the methodological rules of the mechanical sciences. The descriptive 
psychology has as its object the observable separate elements, which are the sensations, 
the representations, feelings and strivings, and their mutual connections. In the 
explaining psychology the results of the descriptive psychology are of course explained 
by describing their nature, and the forces and conditions of their action. The ideal or 
speculative psychology finally, discusses the significance of the life of the soul in world 
affairs. The question psychology has to ask according to Lotze is, under what conditions 
and by which forces the separated events of the spiritual life come into existence, how 
do they connect, change and produce the whole of spiritual life. 
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Although Wilhelm Wundt generally is considered as the founding father of 
experimental psychology275, Merz situates Lotze at the beginning of modern 
psychology276. Anyway, he was considered as one of the founders of physiological 
psychology thanks to his work in the field of medical psychology. Lotze in turn refers to 
the explorations of his tutor Weber, by which the beginning of empiric oriented 
physiological psychology can be situated even earlier277. 
Two tendencies in Lotze’s psychology will develop separately, namely a rational 
psychology and an anthropology. They characterise two trends in thought and form two 
independent areas of research. They also go back to two problems, which have a 
transcendent offshoot and are linked up with the limits within which the individual 
experience commences. The two problems are the search for an essence in the inner life 
and the management of the relations between things278. It is clear that for Lotze his 
teleological model is central to it. Within humanities it is important to take into account 
the philosophical and ipso facto the anthropological vision, because they are 
indissolubly related with the way by which is looked at the object of study279. 
Inspired by Herbart, but more in accordance with Schleiermacher, Lotze elaborates 
the idea of the soul clearly and distinctly. The capacities of the soul to express itself  are 
manifold, but the soul is in essence one and the same, and is completely present in any 
form of action. The soul, to be thought of as a unity, is also always active with all its 
potentialities at the same time, when any one of its functions is active at a certain 
moment280. Of course at any one time the capacities for representation, feelings, striving 
or willing, is preponderant, but all the other capacities always remain active to a certain 
degree. When somebody wants something, there must be a goal. That goal must be 
represented in the mind, while, when the goal is pursued, that pursuing is due to the 
feelings, which define the goal as worth pursuing. It is possible however that feelings of 
pleasure and displeasure do not have anything to do with representation, and also 
nothing with striving, but then man cannot be aware of them, because awareness 
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without representation cannot be called awareness. If there are feelings without an 
activity of the will following, one can say that the element of will is latent, or that to feel 
and to will are different phases in the development of one and the same event.  
It is an ancient prejudice of intellectualism that the function of representation of the 
soul, especially when knowledge is at stake, is isolated from the other functions. The 
reason for that intellectual attitude is to be found in the conditions man requires for 
scientific knowledge.  
The threefold division of the soul in representing, feeling and managing is derived 
from Kant281. In the Middle Ages the division was twofold, namely cognitive and 
conative, supplemented with a sensitive and intellectual distinction. Leibniz reduced 
sensitive knowledge and striving to the vague source of knowledge, and contrasted it 
with the clear one of the intellectual capacity. It was because of Kant's Copernican 
revolution in epistemology that Leibnizean distinction was replaced by the receptivity 
which is directed at the singularities and the spontaneity of the general concepts, which 
connect to the first (the singularities). Knowledge and the capacity to manage are 
directed to the objects; the feelings are simply a product of the subject, also not directed 
at an object, although that is not essential. In spite of this shift in the interpretation of 
the soul, it is clear that Lotze starts from this speculative paradigm, even if he tries to 
join the empirical trend of the time. 
The most elementary psychological activity is perception. A psychic being receives 
input on the perceptive side: the external stimulus. The simple presence of an object 
does not suffice to bring this stimulus about. Either the object nudges the subject, or 
between the object and the subject a medium accomplishes the connection. For instance 
noise comes to the subject via sound waves. Lotze emphasizes that this input differs 
qualitatively from the mental process which is related to it.  
The external stimulation arouses an inner process. The changes at the external 
surface of the body pass to the neural receptor and move along the sensory nerve into 
the brain. Only at that moment it is possible to have a conscious observation. If the 
peripheral neural system is damaged, the external stimulus cannot have any effect. For 
Lotze the fact that knowledge of the functioning of that process has not made much 
progress yet, is not important for psychology, because psychology is focussed on the 
question of whether the event is purely physical or whether there already is some 
mental activity. 
Nevertheless Lotze makes some speculative propositions about the physical 
functioning of observation. In order for a signal to progress through the sensory nerve, 
every atom from a to b and so on, must become in condition E until that condition is 
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passed to the brain. How the condition is passed to the brain is not yet known, but 
finally also in the brain the condition is present. Continuously Lotze is confronted with 
his Cartesian dualistic starting point. If body and mind are thought of as separate, a 
causal explanation of their interaction is problematic. 
The consciousness of experience is really the only thing in which man has insight. 
The process of transmission of a signal along the nervous system is a purely physical 
process, because the nerves do not have any awareness of experience. The content and 
the way by which that content is brought about are completely different. The only thing 
that can be expected is that a chain of physical sensations corresponds with a chain of 
psychologically conscious content. It is, in other words, an epistemological 
correspondence theory. At other points in Lotze’s texts a cohesion theory is adopted, 
especially where non-empirical ‘truths’ are concerned. M. Dummett even discerns a 
tendency to intersubjectivity282. 
The correspondence between stimulus and experience are evident in features such as 
progress, contradiction and periodicity. That correspondence is presumed, but cannot 
be induced from experience. In any case, colour, sound, and smell are forms of 
sensations which are independent of each other. Ethereal waves283 produce light effects 
and air waves sounds. The doubling of the sound waves is responsible for the building 
up of octaves, but colour has another qualitative ordering. It is not excluded that other 
forms of sensation and perception exist. Lotze thinks of special capacities in animals, 
such as the capacity to detect upcoming storm. That sort of reflexion is nowadays 
labelled as pseudo-science, till evidence to the contrary. 
The duration of the sensations coincides with the external stimulus, although there 
are after-effects which themselves cause a sensation. To explain the end of a sensation, 
Lotze applies the law of inertia. In other words there has to be a counter-force. That 
force is the normal process of metabolism. In this way new stimuli get a chance. 
Sometimes through very strong stimuli like rays of the sun on the eyes, the impressions 
last longer and hinder the development of a new sensation. 
The receptivity for small differences in strength, between for instance consequent 
tones or light-effects, is present, but vague. It means that they cannot be expressed 
mathematically. It would be impossible to put on a scale exact measurable strengths of 
stimuli, with the corresponding scale of the sensations, although not founded on the 
subjective sensations. For that empirical problem there is an empiric-mathematic 
 
                                                     
282 1981:441. 
283 Ethereal waves were in those days the existing explanation for space as conductor. Michelson and 
Morley established in 1880, that is one year before Lotze’s death, that the velocity of light in any 
direction is independent of the motion of the earth and that there is thus not any effect on the 
existence of a world ether. [Standaard Encyclopedie: ‘Michelson’]. 
Lotze’s anthropology 
 89 
solution. The strength can be measured in a devious way. It is possible to measure the 
smallest possible experienced difference (α and β) between two stimuli a and b. 
Lotze mentions Weber’s law which says that the change in stimulus divided by the 
original stimulus is constant. If that constant is 0,1 than an increase from 100 to 110 is 
observable, not from 100 to 101. Lotze also mentions that a sensation is proportional to 
the logarithm of the stimulus, or, in other words, by an increase according to an 
arithmetic row, there is an increase in sensation to a geometrical row. The latter is 
Weber’s law in which the phenomena is formulated some 30 years later by Fechner284. 
To explain a bottom line under which there is no sensation, Lotze introduces a 
resistance which keeps the influence away from the soul. But, how this functions is not 
yet known. 
Within the context of the explanations about the diversity in sensations in relation to 
the intensity, Lotze asks himself whether the observations of different discrete variables   
are quantitative or qualitative. As for sound it seems to him that a tone is sometimes 
experienced stronger and sometimes less strong, as far as it concerns the same tone, 
that is of the same pitch and timbre. But, is it also the case for the sense of touch and 
taste? Is a more concentrated acid stronger or different? Are warmth and cold 
opposites? And what about light intensity, colours and the opposition black – white? 
There is a theory that asserts that discrimination is only about intensity. Formulated 
otherwise (but not by Lotze): can a quantitative change generate a qualitatively 
different sensation? 
That the relation between the rising force of a stimulus and sensation is not 
proportional, which would be expected, is probably because the nerves are not able to 
react effectively to the stimulus. A satisfying explanation has not been found as yet. 
Neither is there an explanation as yet for the fact that a continuous rise of force of a 
stimulus does generate a discrete one in sensation. As to hearing and impressions of 
light, there is a discontinued stimulation of the nerves, but insight into the functioning 
of other sensory-organs is absent. So no conclusions can be drawn. About the oscillation 
between stimulation and non-stimulation, nothing is found in the observation. Mentally 
the observation is perceived as continuous.  
Different nerves have a specific action. From the moment they are stimulated, they 
generate a certain sensation. That specificity is due to the special structure, but again it 
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Fechner, ‚Revision der Hauptpunkte der Psychophysik’ (1882).  
This law is one of the oldest laws in experimental psychology that can still be found in manuals of 
psychology, with more precise amplification by S. S. Stevens (Bernstein, 1994: 181-182).  
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is not yet clear here what that structure precisely consists of. It is plausible that an 
electric current generates chemical reactions and consequently a sensation, for instance 
a taste sensation.  
The stimulus does not necessarily come from outside. There are also internal stimuli, 
as for instance a glow through fever. They cause a subjective sensation. A lot of 
observations are mixed. It means when different nerves are stimulated, several 
sensations occur at the same time. A pressure applied on the sense of touch can also 
cause pain.  
Previously it was thought that light stimuli acted directly on the nerves, but 
apparently the construction of the eye is somewhat more complicated. In Lotze’s time 
they already knew of the existence of rods and cones on the retina and that the stimuli 
generated a chemical reaction. The material which is liberated and stimulates the 
nerves was called ‘Sehpurpur’285. Lotze states that of the touch and taste particles much is 
still unexplained. The auditory organ however functions differently. The different hair 
cells of the organ of Corti receive, like a piano, the different sounds and transmit them 
to the different nerves286. Through analogy and as a result of the existence of colour-
blindness the hypothesis was uttered that three primary colours exist, namely: green, 
red and violet. By mixing these, the other colours would be created. But again it was not 
yet clear how this occurred. Lotze repeatedly draws the attention to what is still to be 
explored. His scientific speculations are of the open kind.  
All phenomena are subjective. There is no resemblance between the representations 
and what is represented, in case of the outer as well as the inner world. What is 
perceived is neither the working of the nerves, and nor the functioning of the brain. The 
perceptions are representations caused by the action of the outer world, but they are 
not representations of it. The assertion that things outside of consciousness would have 
the same features as that of the representations, is completely senseless, as this can 
never be proved. Toothache which nobody feels, does not exist287. Nevertheless Lotze, 
like every Neo-Kantian, will make an attempt to reach some insight into this 
unknowable world, although not in the sense of a ‘mirror of nature’, to employ an 
anachronistic image288, but as a result of a rational investigation. The correspondence 
theory, that is present in Lotze’s thinking, is restricted to a limited number of general 
 
                                                     
285 By now it is known that the photo pigment contained in the rods includes a substances that is 
called rhodopsin: and in the cones three varieties of iodipsin, which provide de basis for colour. 
(Bernstein, 1994:144). 
286 It was a contemporary of Lotze, Helmholtz (821-1894), who discovered the functioning thanks to 
the accurate description of the inner ear by Corti (1822-1876). 
287 Lotze,1887:88. 
288 The title of a book by Richard Rorty: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Rorty: 1983. 
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paradigms such as: progress, opposition, and periodicity. Past,  present and future are 
found in the representations as well as in reality. That something is opposite to 
something else must also correspond to a reality, and the observation of a repetition 
cannot be without a repetition in reality, whatever that reality is. Also the coherence-
theory is applicable to Lotze’s epistemology. Man discerns a truth when he ascertains 
that a certain observation develops in his consciousness only when certain other 
observations confirm this.  
Memories are representations of the absent, namely of bright light that no longer 
shines, of sounds that no longer ring, and of a disease that no longer hurts. It is a 
representation but not a reproduction. It is evoked without an external stimulus, and 
therefore it must have been present unconsciously. How this is possible is therefore 
evidently not knowable.  
The disappearance of the representations from consciousness can thus not be 
observed, but nevertheless some conclusions can be drawn on the basis of some 
principles. Lotze does not accept any explanation that is grounded exclusively in the 
intellectual human capacities. He looks for a solution in the action of valuating, 
introducing the notions of pleasure and displeasure. To bring the feelings in connection 
with teleology is of Kantian origin and borrowed from the Critic of Judgment (Kritik der 
Urteilskraft)289. 
Lotze refutes the theory which is based on an analogy with physics, to present his 
value theory. It is not true that only the representations have to be explained and that 
their fading away was only due to their absence. It is the disappearance that has to be 
explained. The law of inertia requires this. However, the analogy with physics is not 
without problems. A moving body changes position without changing itself. The soul on 
the contrary changes internally. Perhaps it is an inner counter-force which restores the 
original situation, without annihilating the impression, but by bringing it from 
consciousness to unconsciousness. This explanation is however not tenable. Also the 
hypothesis that the unity of the soul manipulates the impressions is not satisfying, 
because the diverse impressions would not jostle each other, but through the action of 
unification leads to a homogeneous mixture. 
In the comparison with physics only the content of thinking must be kept. The 
concept of force is only relevant as to the content of the representation and not in the 
act of representing. The difference between bright and dull light, thunder and 
whispering is not marked by a difference in intensity of represention. A greater effort or 
emotion generates a different representation. A weaker representation is not less clear, 
but exhibits more lacunae. Because the representations are not identical with what is 
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represented, - the representation of a passion is not passionate, – the opposites cannot 
crowd each other out. The representation of black does not push the representation of 
white out. The concepts of strength and resistance are not suited to mechanically 
explain the psychic phenomena.  
Then Lotze introduces his value theory. Together with every input of a 
representation a feeling of value is also present. The soul is, as explained previously, not 
a sole intellectual activity. It is in the experience of pleasure and displeasure, which 
accompany the perception and representation, that gradation originates. It is also 
valuation that arouses interest and pushes the representation back into the 
unconscious. This intensity of feelings depends on the totality of the soul. The concept 
strength and resistance must be placed in that context. It is obvious that Lotze’s 
explanation is tributary to the Cartesian dualistic viewpoint. 
The reproduction of a conscious representation develops from association.  
Representation ‘a’ is linked to representation ‘b’, which is already present in the 
conscious mind, and thus ‘a’ also appears here. During life everyone builds a series of 
representations which belong together, because in the past they were perceived 
together or in succession. This simultaneousness or succession is also responsible for 
the reproduction of the representations in a spatial whole or in succession, as in a 
melody. When a stimulus reappears to a subject, the former associations are recollected, 
and the choice of a particular series of associations depends on the preceding 
associations, but also on the temporary mood of the subject and the necessities of life.  
Representations can also be created of the coming into being of the representations, 
their relations and the changes which occur. In this way knowledge of the relations of 
knowledge itself is generated. The concepts ‘qualitative likeness’ (for instance between 
blue and red), quantitative ‘more’ or ‘less’ (for instance brighter or less bright) and 
‘sameness’ arise because of two separated representations, which remain separated, 
generate new concepts. To be able to compare them, the two entities must not fuse. Red 
and blue do not become violet and bright and less bright do not become something in 
between. These representations of a higher order cannot be explained mechanically. It 
is not as it is in physics where two motions result in a third. At best it can be accepted 
that two representations (red and blue) are the stimuli which rouse a third 
representation (sameness). The subject has the capacity for higher representations. Also 
the general concepts (colour) arise. Two or manifold entities do not vanish into a new 
one, the original entities which cause the new one remain unchanged. It is also 
impossible to create a precise representation of the general concepts. Colour is neither 
blue, nor red, nor violet. It does not have view. The concept ‘animal’ is not represented 
in the same way as a horse or a cow. A general concept is thus not the sum of separate 
representations, but a term that incites an enumeration, by which not the separate 
things are at stake, but what they have in common. As to the universals Lotze is 
somewhat of a nominalist.  
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Because it is possible to reminiscence the relations between the observed elements 
after the sensual stimuli have passed, the impressions must have been conscious. 
Comparing is above all an activity separated from observing. It is a higher activity, 
which cannot exist without the lower one of observation. However, the lower can exist 
without the higher one. Consciousness finds expression through establishing that also 
the unconscious influence can exist (Seelenblindheit), without any connection being 
made with an inner or outer situation.  
It is possible to hear tones, without understanding the words; to understand the 
words, without understanding the meaning; to understand the meaning, without 
understanding the significance of life. Each time a different gradation of attention is at 
stake. Consciousness is not a separate activity which brings the unconscious elements to 
light. 
Herbart stated that attention is caused by a stronger influence of observation. But 
Lotze does not agree. However strong the intensity of an influence may be, it can only 
produce a stare at the content of an observation. Attention is but present when the 
presented content is related and compared, even if only a representation of a simple 
content is at stake. In case of the latter different events are compared related to 
different moments. 
Different levels of attention can be discerned, from very simple ones, via the grasping 
of cohesion with other representations, to understanding the value and significance of 
the representations in the whole of a person's life. 
That Lotze obtained a good and lasting reputation in psychology is not because of his 
dissertation on the theory of consciousness, but on spatial awareness. The question is: 
how is it possible that a subject stimulated by sensations is able to represent things 
spatially? 
The eye is build in such a manner that the rays of light which start from one point 
come back together on one point of the retina. The various points arrange themselves in 
the same way as in the outer world, although on a one dimensional surface. The 
question of how it is possible that the result of that one dimensional surface is 
experienced as spatial, remains. The statement that the spatial soul is receptive to such 
stimuli and that it interprets them as spatial does not provide any explanation at all. 
The multiple stimuli on the retina lose their geometric relations on a plane surface, 
because what is represented is not the same as the representation, as already stated 
earlier. A ‘left’ point is not situated on the left of a right point in the representation, 
because the representation is not spatial, but both points are represented as if one is on 
the left and the other on the right. Many points are present in the soul at the same time, 
but not spatially arranged. How is it possible that the soul represents them spatially 
even though they are not? From the impressions only a spatial ordering cannot be 
generated. It is the nature of the soul and the way the impressions are perceived that is 
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important. The soul must have an innate capacity to think spatially. If the soul has that 
capacity, even then it is necessary to analyse how the spatial construction is realised. 
There has to be a sort of guide which is given at the same time as the stimuli and which 
renders it possible that the points of observation are thought of as spatial. The capacity 
of the soul is not a spatial capacity but a capacity to transform a sequential given into a 
spatial image. 
How does Lotze finally resolve the question? 
A red point that stimulates a certain place rα, but also the sideways associated points 
rβ and rγ, will be recognised by the soul as being situated in different places. In order  
for it to occur in an orderly way, the sideways impressions (of the points rβ and rγ) have 
to be completely separate from the main impression (of point rα) and they may not 
disturb the latter. They must all be separated from each other, of the same kind, but 
above all from a sequential system, in order that for each impression r it is possible to 
situate the associated points (α, β, γ). Lotze elaborates this starting point further in what 
is known in psychology as the theory of the ‘local signs’ (Lokalzeichen)290. 
The theory of the local signs291 was a theory which met a wide ranging response and 
caused a lot of controversy. Local signs are memories of perceived movements of 
muscles, derived from eye movements, which are necessary to catch an object visually. 
When a person observes an object with his peripheral visual faculty and then turns the 
eye-ball to bring the object in the centre of the field of vision, local signs are induced by 
actions of the eye muscles. These local signs are joined to already existing ones. Three 
dimensionality is build up in a first phase by a reminiscence of the amount of movement 
necessary to bring the object into the clearest field of vision.  
Lotze’s reasoning is as follows: when a bright light reaches the retina, on a place P, 
the eye is automatically turned, from P to E, until the light falls on the central, sharper 
observing part of the retina. This movement is accompanied by the perception of 
movement of the eye muscles. By repetition the movement can also be reproduced 
mentally, from π to ε, independent of the movement from P to E. The same happens 
with a movement from R to E and the corresponding representation from ρ to ε. When R 
and E appear at the same time and opposite to each other, the movement cannot take 
place. The reminiscence of the former movements are still there however, as well as a 
representation of the respective places (π - ε) and (ρ - ε). Although the eye no longer 
moves, the spatial places are recognised. So, to perceive something as left or right is 
nothing other than to be aware of the effort which would have been necessary to move 
the eyes from one point to another.  
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However, the explanation is not yet complete. How is situating a place in a larger 
space brought about? Opening and closing of the eyes reveals images in front of the 
subject. Images behind him are not perceived. When the body turns around, 
subsequently the images abc, bcd, cde, def, …, xyz, yza, zab, abc appear to the subject. 
Thus the observer becomes aware of a circle of images, and at the same time of the body 
movement. By repetitions in different directions a perception of a spherical shape 
finally comes forward. Nevertheless this sphere does not contain any depth yet. It is still 
represented in two-dimensional geometry. The depth perception is build up due to the 
subject moving itself between the objects, which cause a shifting of the images in 
relation to each other. Now three dimensionality is explained, but not the act of 
estimating the extent of the distances.  
To make a statement about the normality or not of an image, considering the fact 
that the image on the retina is turned upside down, is a statement based on a prejudice. 
The geometrical place is mentally independent from the place on the retina. ‘Up’, 
‘down’, ‘upright’, or ‘upside-down’ are representations independent of the sensations, so 
that the ordering within a more extended space must be interpreted differently. The 
movement of the muscles offers an explanation. ‘Above’ and its inverse ‘below’ respond 
to the direction corresponding to the gravitation that has to be surmounted. Even in the 
dark the body is not misled. In the same way an object is perceived as upright when the 
upper points correspond with the top and the bottom ones with what is underneath. 
Thus also caused by the eye movements and the sensations of the muscles. 
Apparently psychology was not yet able to give a satisfying explanation of the 
existence of two eyes. Because Lotze’s starting point is that there is an absolute 
separation between the mind and the body, the impressions on the retina must always 
generate the same image in the mind, whether it comes from the left or the right eye. It 
is not an image that is transported from the retina to the mind, but the local signs 
produce it. Lotze says that physiology till now has been restricted to the denomination 
of the phenomena, namely as identical of not, as both eyes generate the same image 
simultaneous or whether there is a double image. He asks himself why the two imprints 
on the retina give the same local signs.  
Thus far the visual faculty. As to the sense of touch, contact with the skin can be 
localised by seeing the contact, but one cannot rely on reminiscence, because the body 
has already been touched in so many places during a life time that it is impossible to 
determine which place corresponds to which touch. Their localisation has to be 
established again and again, by each contact (pushing, pressure, warmth or cold). Each 
pressure on the skin is accompanied by an ancillary pressure, independent of the main 
pressure, but dependent on the position on the skin. A disturbance of one point on the 
skin cannot be without a disturbance in another place, because of the extensiveness of 
the skin. The skin spans several bones, muscular tissues, hollow spaces and different 
structures of the limbs, in such a way that from place to place the proportions differ. 
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The signals, transmitted to the brain by the nerves, can therefore be distinguished by 
the mind. This means that not every point on the skin has a specific local sign. Lotze 
mentions Weber’s research, edited in 1829, by which is ascertained that on tender spots, 
as the lips, the top of the tong or the tips of the fingers, two points of pressure with a 
distance of 1mm (1/2 Linie)292 can still be discerned, while on the arms, the legs and the 
back, the distance is sometimes 4,5 cm (20 Linien). Lotze explains that difference by use 
of the same theory. The points are less discernable because the skin is more similar on a 
greater surface.  
For somebody who can see, the possibility to recognize the points on the skin is 
combined with an idea of their own body. For a blind-born however things are different. 
Although the sense of touch is able to discern a sequence of sensations abc, bcd, etc. and 
to order them in combination with muscle sensations, and although by de movements 
of the limbs distances can be discerned, the spatial representation of a blind-born must 
be less clear. Lotze refers to testimonies of operated blind-born293 and to the manual of 
H. Helmholtz294. 
Also the stimuli coming from outside, generate representations, which are gradually 
consciously and spatially defined. A worldview of the senses comes to the fore, but at 
the same time the potentiality for illusions.  
The simple sensations are but separate facts which do not say anything about the 
things to which they relate. These sensations are properties, states or actions of those 
things, but it is up to the intellect to say something about them. And it is also the 
intellect which causes mistakes. This is the case when a and b are related, under 
condition c, but wrongly under condition d. Not only the intellect but also perception 
can be wrong, for instance when the relations between the objects of a three 
dimensional given are falsely presented in a two dimensional representation, for 
instance when objects which are far away are perceived as smaller, when parallel lines 
seem to approach each other in the distance or when the level of the sea seems to be 
higher than the level of the coast-line. Once again it is the intellect which has to correct 
the optical illusion. Lotze presents an enumeration of different wrong perceptions, 
influenced by different conditions during observation. A lot of these examples are still 
found in present day manuals of psychology295.  
 
                                                     
292 The ‘Linie’ is a linear measure which is still applied in the industry of clocks. 1 linie is 2,256 mm 
long, ½ linie 1,128 mm or approximately 1 mm, and 20 linie 45,12 or approximately 45 mm.  
293 Chesselden, W. (1729) ‘An account of some Observations’. In: Philosophical Transactions, Vol. 
XXXV, London, p. 447-450. 
294 (1867) Handbuch der physiologischen Optik. Leipzig, p. 586-593. 
295 To mention two manuals: Woodworth, 1959:387-426 and Bernstein, 1994:174-211. 
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Three elements are important, namely the real size, the apparent size and the 
distance to the perceived object. If two of these elements are known, the third can be 
deduced. If only one element is known, for instance the apparent size of a mountain, 
than a second has to be introduced indirectly to find the third. A known object which is 
situated on the mountain can do the job. If its size is known, the distance can be 
estimated. 
To be able to compare colours, tones, tastes and grades of warmth some conditions 
have to be in place. The strength of the stimulus has to be strong enough, either in 
intensity, spatial extent, or length of time. The sensations must be isolated enough. It is 
impossible to test two sources of warmth with two fingers at the same time, it is only 
possible in succession. However, the interval must not be too long in order for the 
sensation to still be vivid in the consciousness. But neither must the interval be too 
short, as in that case the first impressions would still be present too strongly.  
An object which runs across the retina is observed as moving. The appearance of 
motion is not only present when the subject observes passively, as when it is on a sailing 
boat, but also when it repeats the motion in thought. This is illustrated in the whirling 
of the environment when a person stands still after turning around for a prolonged 
period of time. Some other remarkable phenomena which emphasize the functioning of 
the mind by observing are remunerated by Lotze. As for instance when an object is 
touched with a stick, there is the impression that it is touched without the stick, as if the 
stick forms an extension of the hand, while the sensation does nothing other than 
register the pressure of the stick on the hand. 
This example demonstrates Lotze’s approach to psychology. But for him psychology was 
not a pure empirical science, because he connects it with the great problems of the soul, 
and metaphysics. His explanations of psychology hold this ambiguity.  
The rational approaches of psychological problems prevail, in other words, the 
approaches which implicate that reality are traceable by reasoning. Nevertheless 
empiric material also gets a chance. When empirical research was conducted, he 
mentions that and he incorporates it in his rational explanations. The preponderance of 
rational data above empirical data must be ascribed to the youthfulness of empirical 
psychology. In reality is it not true that science is always testing rational reflections? 
Because rationality is of paramount importance in Lotze’s writings, the paradigms of his 
approach come across more clearly, explicitly as well as implicitly. Explicitly he 
mentions the dualism body/mind and the law of inertia. Where a restoration of a former 
situation is to be explained, he found it in a counter-force, as when the state of arousal 
of a nerve is stopped by the influence of some forces on the body.  
Lotze also requires coherence in a theory, which gives him at the same time an alibi 
to venture into a description of the things outside (Ding an sich) and in bringing the 
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transcendent into his reasoning. The things in themselves can be known by a moral and 
intellectual effort296. 
He makes a distinction between faculty and validity. The holding truths are true on  
grounds of their unconditional imperative. One of these truths is freedom of will. 
Mechanism is not opposite to free will, but is the efficient condition to exercise free 
will297. 
2.5.8 Philosophy of Religion 
Lotze may be the defender of mechanistic science, an opponent of vitalism and the 
‘inventor’ of the value theory, his whole work and his thinking was in function of the 
integration of all of that in his faith, which was protestant and directed to a personal 
God. It forms the conclusion of his thinking.  
Lotze’s anthropology outlines an image of man in the world in threefold, namely  the 
existence of facts, laws and values. These components are only distinguished in our 
mind; in reality they form one whole. The moral values are realised in a world of facts 
and are following laws. Such unity can only be thought of from the viewpoint of a 
personal God, who, in creation and care for survival, has freely chosen some laws, which 
assure the realisation of the ultimate goal. In other words, he put forward a natural way.  
Lotze repeats Fechner’s attempt to reconcile the mechanistic sciences with a theistic 
spiritualism, which meets the needs of the soul. The classic implication is the idea that 
the world is essentially good. It was in an even stronger manner than Fechner that Lotze 
saw the task to integrate the acceptance of a personal God in Christian faith. It is not 
surprising after all that many theologians endorsed this view.  
In the tradition of Kant, the immortality of the soul cannot be proved, but is rooted in 
faith. According to Lotze the coming into existence of the soul was the consequence of 
the activity of the spiritual ground of the world, which was active during the generation 
of a germ. Each time an impregnation took place anywhere in the world, God created a 
 
                                                     
296 Merz,1976:Vol.4:285. 
297 This corresponds with the statement of Etienne Vermeersch : ‘Dat we vrij zijn betekent niet dat 
we ongedetermineerd zijn, maar wel dat we gedetermineerd zijn door die aspecten van ons 
organisme die we als de meest centrale beschouwen: onze fundamentele lange-termijnbehoeften en 
ons redelijk denken bij het realiseren van die behoeften’ (That we are free does not mean that we 
are undetermined, but that we are determined for those aspects of our organism, which we consider 
as the most central ones: our fundamental long-term needs and our rational thinking in realising 
these needs. HV) [http://www.etiennevermeersch.be/artikels/wijsbeg_ethiek/vrije_wil/ 
(05/09/2005)] 
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soul in addition298. Lotze’s philosophy is related to Leibniz’s theory of monads and 
spiritualism. True reality is not material or an idea, but the personal spirit of God and 
the world of the personal spirits, mankind. Lotze differs from Leibniz because he does 
not design an image of God on rational grounds. For Lotze only belief in the activity of 
love is the ultimate meaningful aim of life.  
Lotze did not elaborate his philosophy of religion extensively; although he intended 
to do so. The subject is but treated fragmentary, which does not mean that it was devoid 
of importance for the trend in theology. In the protestant tradition, a personal God is 
put forward and related to a reflection on a concept of the world. Like Kant, Lotze is of 
the opinion that it is ethics which shows the way to God, not cosmology. 
If Lotze’s thinking lent itself to a submission of science to religion, as Devaux299 
suggested and the Reverend Cook actually did, it was not at all Lotze's intention to 
combat the results of the positive sciences with religion as tool. The microscope does 
not show immortality, but the results of the microscopic research receive a significance 
in the teleological image passed by religion. Science is not the servant of the Bible, as in 
the Middle Ages philosophy was the servant of theology, but scientific research follows 
its own path, independent of religion. The results are only inserted into a religious 
worldview. Milkov expressed Lotze’s credo as to the importance of science in the 
following words: ‘no philosophical proposition should contradict the realism of the 
scientific results300. That is a long way from Reverend Cook’s assertion. 
Mechanism is one aspect of the relations between things, but the goal of the 
interrelations is the realisation of the highest good. The laws of the efficient causes deal 
with the transitive activities between man and the natural objects. The particular things 
are not independent, but the activity of the world ground itself and is framed in an 
eternal being, that can only be represented spiritually, namely the personal God. 
2.5.9 ‘Microcosmos’ 
Lotze’s intention was to determine the essence of man as a bio psychosocial unity in an 
idealistic way. He attempted to trace the complexity of the relations between man and 
nature as a physiological, historical and global problem, inspired by J.G. Herder’s ‘Ideen’ 
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thus almost always wrong. 
299 1932. 
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and A. von Humboldt’s ‘Kosmos’, and to ideologically deal with the influence of 
technology,  the metropolis, the increasing division of labour and of lifestyle301.  
‘Microcosmos’ is, according to Merz302,‘the first attempt to take a comprehensive and 
synoptic view of the world and of life from an introspective and anthropological 
standpoint. He did not build a whole system on a sole idea, but reviewed the great world 
of facts, orderly arranged and finally brought together in a consistent whole. He 
searched for ‘hidden’ truths contained in those manifold cultural systems, elaborated 
upon consciously and unconsciously by the efforts of the human mind.’ 
Although in ‘Microcosmos’ Lotze presents an all-encompassing view of the world, he 
does not have Hegel's intention of explaining history and the whole world process from 
a single general principle. He says ‘Only a Spirit who stood in the centre of the universe 
which he himself had created, could, with the knowledge of the final goal which he had 
given to his creation, make all the particular parts of it pass before him in the majestic 
succession of an unbroken development’303. Man must be aware that, in constructing a 
complete image of the world as a whole, he can only do this from ‘somewhere among 
the branches which have spread out’2 from creation. 
Lotze starts the preface of the first part with the assertion that between the needs of the 
heart or the feelings and the results of science, there rages an old and never solved 
battle. If the high expectations of reason, which intent to design the world differently 
and more beautifully than the unrestrained glance can catch, are disillusioned; this is 
always the beginning of new insight. What is previously seen as a higher opinion is but a 
desire. However many borders are disclosed, few goals are reached. 
 
In part two anthropology is discussed. For Lotze knowledge of man is knowledge of his 
destiny, of the means available and of the obstacles encountered. The facts form the 
area in which values are realised, according to the laws of nature. All that is only 
possible through the idea of a deity, as creator and embodiment that assures survival. 
Facts, laws and values are separate, but come together in one whole. Lotze gives an all 
 
                                                     
301 ‘Es war sein Anliegen, das Wesen des Menschen als biopsychosoziale Einheit auf idealistischer 
philosophischer Grundlage zu bestimmen. Lotze versuchte, anknüpfend an J. G. Herders ‚Ideen’ and A. v. 
Humboldts ‚Kosmos’, der Komplexität der Beziehungen zwischen Mens und Natur als physiologischer, 
historischer und globaler Problematik nachzuspüren sowie den Einfluss der Technik, der Grossstädte, der 
zunehmende beruflichen Arbeitsteilung und der Wissenshaft auf die Lebens- und Empfindungsweisen von 
Menschen und Vôlkern weltanschaulich zu bewältigen.’ (Pester,1987:807). 
302 1976,Vol.4:766. 
303 Lotze, 1880:135. 
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encompassing view of the life of man, individually, socially and historically in order to 
interpret the significance of human life in the universe. He reduces things to a 
fundamental unity of existence, which revert to an infinite thinking substance. That 
theological monism, which has some congeniality with Spinoza’s worldview, is 
elucidated in metaphysics by the discovery of  sense data which lies at the teleological 
basis of the cosmos. Science only generates empiric knowledge of facts. 
 
If their would have been any doubt left about the religious character of Lotze’s 
anthropology after the ‘Polemic Pamphlets’ came out, ‘Microcosmos’ definitely removes 
it. Belief in God and moral founding of existence, in combination with responsibility, on 
the individual as well as the social level, are prominent. 
The work brings together all knowledge from mechanistic nature to the world and to 
God, and in that order. The first book, ‘The Body’, commences with a turning down of 
mythological and other still prevailing non-scientific explanations of the world, to 
present a description of the mechanistic functioning of nature, organic and inorganic. 
The second book, ‘The Soul’, looks at the existence, nature and faculties of the soul; the 
representations; the forms of mental activity; the feelings, consciousness and will. The 
third book, ‘Life’, deals with the connection between the body and the soul; the seat of 
the soul; the interaction between body and soul; and the life of matter; concluding with 
the coming into existence of the soul and immortality. The fourth book, ‘Man’, focuses 
on nature as fact and the teleological background of existence; on the difference 
between man and animal; and on the differences between human beings. The mind is 
the subject of the fifth book; treating the distinction between mind and soul; the senses; 
language and thought; knowledge and truth; morality and conscience. The sixth book, 
‘The Course of the World’ attempts to outline the destiny of being, in particular the 
influence of nature on history; the human condition; manners and customs; social life 
and culture; and finally the inner life. The seventh book is called ‘History’ and begins 
with the creation of man, followed by a description of the meaning of history; the 
working powers in history; the external conditions of development; and the historical 
development from nomadic life onwards. Although Lotze did not appreciate the 
Enlightenment very much, he dedicated a whole book to one of its characteristics, 
‘Progress’. It contains subjects such as truth, knowledge, art, religious and social life. 
The ninth and last book brings all the former together and is called ‘The Coherence of 
Things’, with the significant sub-titles ‘Of the Existence of Things’, ‘The Spatial and the 
Supernatural World’, ‘Reality and Mind’, ‘The Personal God’, and ‘God and the World’. 
The different parts of his exposition are linked together by a logical stringent 
reasoning, which gives it a coherent outlook and a characteristic of necessity. The 
justifications which Lotze gives for his assertions will not be discussed or mentioned 
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here. It would only be a paraphrasing rewrite of ‘Microcosmos’. The purpose is to 
outline Lotze’s anthropology.  
 
 
 
Substance = something that only needs itself to exist (Descartes) 
 
In the nineteenth century the concept ‘substance’ was subjected to severe criticism, 
because it represents reality as static and not as a process, and because it isolates the 
entities from each other (Leibniz’ monads).  
[‘Filosofie: Personen en begrippen van A tot Z’, 1998] 
 
Lotze, who was influenced by Descartes and Leibniz, still adopts the critique on this 
concept as seen from the sciences. Descartes and Leibniz were the first in doing so, 
but Lotze reinterpreted it in an idealistic way. As a result, he turned it down within 
science, but brought it back in to sustain the unity of human consciousness. 
 
 
Lotze begins with a defence of the mechanistic sciences against mythology, personal 
spirits, and the idea of a world soul and animated strivings. But, he also warns against a 
mechanistic thinking process which does not leave space for freedom and ethical 
questions. Natural science must be brought back to its right proportions. Central in it is 
the value of general laws, upheld by the hypothesis of the atomic theory and by the 
conjunction of physical forces. The mechanical approach is also appropriate to the 
living world but only in its functioning. The causal explanation of facts is the first 
ordering of things, but also limited to that. The ‘coming into existence’ cannot be 
explained by science, and neither is it its task. The mechanic functioning of things 
differs from the artefacts, because they depend on the action of wheels and screws and 
not on genuine forces in themselves, namely the molecular forces304. 
The human body is also a system of forces and organs that functions as a mechanic 
whole, in as far as the mind is not taken into consideration. The mind as separate 
principle of explanation is necessary next to matter, but the two are not comparable. 
There is no analogy between them, only interaction. The mechanical interpretation 
encompasses experience, observation, association, mechanisms of reproduction and 
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thoughts, memory and even will, although subordinated to the proper life of man. The 
autonomy of the mind finds irrefutable expression in the unity of consciousness. This 
unity depends not on the way man appears to himself, but rather on the fact that it can 
appear to him. Human beings are substances, but from that immortality cannot be 
deduced. On ethical grounds, namely responsibility and repentance, freedom is due to 
that unity. The mechanical is not an obstacle to freedom, because freedom has no 
teleological implications. Even causality does not matter, because the mind acts 
independent of the body and can intervene, leading to a new chain of causality.  
Although there is an interaction between mind and body, the spiritual world is true 
being. Matter is but a system of means. In this respect Lotze remains an idealist. So, the 
influence of the mind on the body is an issue to him but not really a problem. He rather 
asks himself why the interaction between mind and body should be a problem while the 
interaction between material things is not. Lotze’s Neo-Kantianism is prominent here. 
The properties of the material things are but representations. They are subjective. 
Besides, the observations are tied to the physiological conditions of the senses, and a 
colour which nobody can see, is like a pain which nobody can feel. It is a materialistic 
prejudice that the physical qualities are objective properties of the things outside of 
perception. 
Also Kantian is his idea of the ideality of space. Spatial awareness does not originate 
from direct experience, but from mental construction. Instead of ‘space’, Lotze speaks of 
a system of ‘pure forces’ which create the appearance of space by the action of force 
centres. The idealistic view finds expression on account of the monads, as centres of 
force, which are ascribed to an inner life, a soul. In this way only one form of being 
remains, namely the spiritual one. In short, de physical world is spiritual. There is an 
animation of the whole world, but the atom-souls must not be confused with the human 
soul. They are less fruitful and vigorous. Therefore Lotze does not take them into 
consideration any further. The highest foundations of the world are to be found in an 
infinite substance as the only explanation of the orderly course of and coherence in the 
world, which cannot depend on a multitude of isolated elements. 
Lotze’s panentheism means that the finite can only be active due to the infinite 
which is also included in the finite. The visible is only capable in so far as the invisible 
infinite allows it. 
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Pantheism: God = the world (Spinoza). God is immanent. 
 
Theism: God is transcendent. 
 
Panentheism: God is transcendent, but he is, besides the creator (creatio ex nihilo) 
also the moving principle (creatio continua) (Lotze). God is immanent and 
transcendent. 
 
 
Consequences of the doctrine of the infinite are: immortality and the origin of the soul. 
The soul will remain, because of its value and meaning it has to be part of the world 
order. That which does not have that value, will perish.  
In contrast with ‘Medical Psychology’ (1852), ‘Microcosmos’ gives a more objective 
interpretation of the infinite. The concept of the foundations of existence or of the 
infinite, in which all the finite is implied, is no longer but a perspective, but is given a 
more important impact. It became more than a subjective preference of Lotze. In the 
end the mechanical laws are no more than a compilation of forms by which God's will 
has decided to let the unknown inner essence of being integrate, and to connect all the 
situations in a coherent worldview, that cannot be overlooked.  
In history, man has a prominent role to play as a moral being. He comes more and 
more to the fore and plays a growing part in the formation of a world vision. Moreover 
the fact that there are interactions is a sufficient reason to believe that there is a real 
unity of all things and that they all have a common source, from which they generate. 
Each change in one part of the universe has repercussions on the other parts, 
compensating the disturbance. The organic whole entails that the sequence of moments 
in the world exhibit coherence.  
The notion of a higher reality is not attained by a succession of continually higher 
ideas, but by a teleological approach, contrasting with the causal-mechanical one of the 
sciences. The difference between man and animal is situated in the capabilities of the 
hands, which are very adaptive and led by the soul. Also the erected body sustains man’s 
balance. Nevertheless, Lotze does not accept the fanaticism of Herder, and he ascertains 
that there are similarities between man and animal in all fields, as far as the mechanical 
is concerned. Some subtle sensations, the power of speech and its connection to 
thinking, knowledge and significance of truth are not essentially different in man or 
animal, but the difference is to be found in the kind of application. There is no danger of 
both coming too close together as man has a higher development and because the main 
difference lies in the spiritual. There are no innate ideas; only inborn habits, which 
come into consciousness via experience. 
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For Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) man is but a poor thing in comparison 
with animals. He is weaker and misses the certainty of the instincts. On the other 
hand he is said to constitute himself, and for that purpose provided with reason 
and freedom. 
 
 
Even consciousness is not innate but there is also an inborn germ which develops 
likewise through experience. An indication that consciousness does not contain 
irrefragable directives is found in cultural differences, the influence of education and 
occupation, ruling customs, the spirit of the age, and nationality. The latter is clearly 
inspired by reigning nationalism in Europe. The incentive is pleasure and displeasure, 
but not at any cost. There is a hierarchy of forms of pleasure. Experience in itself leads 
to a refinement of higher value judgements by which traditional morals emerge, and 
also a consciousness of obligation. Reflection brings man from instinctive obedience to a 
conscious founding of his actions. The moral judgement depends on the meaning man 
gives to his existence and on the values and the goals he sets himself. Endeavour is not 
limited to self-defence, but has a broader mission, not restricted to self-realisation, but 
focused on a goal. As a consequence misconceptions can exist and moral purity needs a 
supernatural order. Materialism and pantheism are incompatible with moral 
representations, because they deny the free will. But even man, provided with free will 
and an integrated world view, gets stuck in a fragmentary view of the world. 
Mankind has always been concerned with two problems, namely creation and the 
meaning of history. Creation has to do with man, not with the cosmos, but it cannot be 
an anthropomorphic representation. God is the immanent ground for all events. There 
is no contradiction between the natural development of things by causal law and the 
naive want to see the special interventions of God at certain crucial moments. Natural 
development is the expression of divine action. On an individual level amelioration 
through education is discernable, but applied to mankind, dispersed over generations, 
the individual clarity disappears, because the different generations do not know each 
other. So it is difficult to speak of any progress. Even the progress made in science 
cannot be invoked, because science is not a common property. Hegel’s self-realisation of 
the mind is turned down, for it does not show, to full advantage, the individual life with 
its responsibilities. Moreover, an all encompassing world history is impossible, because 
what happened within a fraction of the human race cannot be extended to the 
development of the world spirit. 
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On the other hand all denial of progress is no more acceptable and leads to 
quietism305. A history without meaning is not acceptable for the morally conscious man. 
There has to be amelioration even if man cannot understand it. The significance of 
history is found in a higher coherence in which all is present in a communion outside of 
time. In the lively unity of mankind the harvest of the whole of history can be 
recognised. The working forces in history cannot be deduced from ideologically founded 
general historical laws, but from the mechanics of the community. It is Lotze’s 
sociology. The community rises above the individual and reveals the conditions and the 
consequences of the interactions of living together. Next to psychology there is need for 
what Lotze calls a social psychology.  
Worth mentioning is that he neither looks for moral nor for mental explanations for 
the preponderance of the white race, but that he mentions the wicked will (böse Wille), 
the lust for power and egoism. Nevertheless he expects a propagation of European 
culture all over the world. 
The concrete description of history is traditionally developed along the timeline of 
Ancient Greece, Rome, the Middle Ages and Modern Times. Sometimes he makes 
comparisons with the Hebrew life and the East, rendering himself by the latter guilty of 
orientalism, as was the rule at that time. The main merit of Greece was the 
establishment of science, research opposed to prejudices and superstitions. But, it also 
led to sophism. The Greeks did not yet make the distinction between the truth which 
holds and the existing things. That is the reason why they ended in scepticism. As a 
consequence of slavery they disdained labour, but on the other hand they were forced 
to fill up spare time in an idealistic-human way. To the protestant thinker Lotze, labour 
is an important element in the fashioning of a personality, and, by absence it can lead to 
unscrupulousness and a deficiency in the sense of duty. In Ancient Greece family-life got 
lost and the positive contribution of the women was missing. Beauty, originating from 
mythology, was focused on the general and missed the refined individual feelings. As to 
religion the Greek gods were anthropomorphic and thus stayed fixed within the earthly 
sphere.  
The main merit of Rome was the elaboration of the state and lasting institutions, 
especially law. Next to that, the Romans exhibited correctness and elegance. They 
elevated the formal duties to valued ones, by stylizing the prose of life. 
The Hebrews passed monotheism to Christianity. Christianity in turn developed the 
consciousness of personality, free will, guilt and responsibility, resurrection and 
immortality. The leading force of the Hebrew faith was merely focused on ethics and 
theorising about  ordered community life. Christianity on the contrary appears as the 
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fulfilment of the promise of immortality, with a God as personal spirit and almighty 
love. On the credit side of the balance are dogmatism and the deviation from the 
original ideals. Lotze’s appreciation of de Middle Ages is found on the same level. The 
feudal system and chivalry did not bring any progress, but the towns and commerce did. 
There was love for labour and deepening moral. Reformation brought personal 
experience and the Bible to the centre of belief of the Church, without tradition and 
speculation, not generating from the gospel. Christianity developed the distinction 
between the world of appearances and truth, conceived as moral, but the attempt to 
bring the content of belief in accordance with philosophy led to dogmas and the 
confusion to the conflict of the universals. It was the recognition of experiment and the 
general laws in science which led to a solution. Only the atomists in Ancient Greece saw 
it, but, of course, Lotze does not appreciate their materialism. In art the symbolism of 
transcendence found expression.  
Changes came with the great discoveries and inventions; and the disappearance of 
the dark past is appreciated by Lotze, however, not the Renaissance and the 
Enlightenment. Although he speaks positively about the participation of people in 
matters of state, he is against the revolutionary movement, which places equality above 
freedom, with as a consequence the tyranny of majority. He is not a cultural pessimist, 
everywhere he discovers progress, but he emphasizes the responsibility of man. The 
spirit of his era is named ‘modern humanism’. Man does distinguish himself from 
animal; he develops tolerance and restraint. 
About the final goal of mankind there is no certainty, but there is progress in 
technology and in the economic sciences. Nevertheless man will not be able to realise 
the perfect world (glänzende Schlusszene). There is a higher moral necessity. What Lotze 
expects is a synthesis between realism and idealism, by which the one-sidedness of both 
will be overcome. Research, induction, experiments and the calculus of probability must 
reveal general laws, and representations of the extent and structure of the world and 
the coherence of its working. Because of the geographical discoveries, the prosperity of 
science, the invention of printing and strengthened by commerce, the world becomes 
an economic unity. The other side of the coin is materialism, and the absence of higher 
aspirations. Lotze also speaks of labour division306, uniformity and mechanising of 
labour, which leads to the proletariat (Handlägerei). The solution to the problem could be 
the reintroduction of autonomy. Mechanisation would lead to shapeless lives and the 
surplus of leisure-time to emptiness. The sense of duty would degenerate to business-
like behaviour in all circumstances. The unbridled growth of towns creates unhappy and 
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horrible life conditions for an increasing number of people. The progress in knowledge 
and skills do not necessarily bring more happiness.  
In modern times, art estranges from life. The production of art is no longer 
dependent on the moments of life, but stands autonomous. A general ideal is also 
absent, only a multitude of changing styles.  
Lotze also cast a glance at the differences between Western and Eastern culture. In 
the West, there is a trend to separate the religious from the secular and with it piety 
disappears from manners and customs. The sources of religious concepts are nature and 
society. Nature does not bring in moral values and presents only partial knowledge; 
society has influenced religion and vice versa. However, in the East religion has more to 
do with externals. 
Lotze warns against an absolute rationalism with aimless obligation and without 
moral prospect, even if it refers to necessity and laws deduced. Christianity removes 
blind factual existence and places it in a created world full of sense, proposing 
blessedness. That’s the real Gospel. The Church however has emphasized the historical 
grounds for her existence more than the moral teaching. Lotze does not reject miracles 
and dogmas in themselves, but the way they were used. The dogma of the Trinity 
however is not appreciated by Lotze. Not only is the Catholic Church criticized, but also 
Protestantism to the extent that it is allied to the state. Important of course is the 
protestant freedom of religious conviction and free inquiry. 
Orientalism, the leading view on the East307, is present in Lotze’s discussion of the 
concept of state. He speaks of great despots in Asia, after having described the primitive 
beginning of the state. In Europe, on the contrary, there are personal rights and the 
possibilities for self development. Sparta is not a good example, because the individual 
is oppressed and the state only perpetuates itself, without any benefit. Also in de Middle 
Ages the unity was important but Christianity emphasised the significance of 
personality. Absolutism furthered bureaucracy, the concept ‘legitimacy’, and the 
distinction between natural right and the right legitimated by history. No stress is laid 
upon the human community in which the individual is starting point and centre. In the 
extension of that concept of individuality, social engineering (selbstgestaltung) is 
possible. Lotze discerns four elements for the formation of a state: (1) a people with the 
same language and a consciousness of unity; (2) a territory as a means to autonomy; (3) 
a government, representing the historical continuity of the national spirit; and (4) a 
kind of contract theory. The best system of government is a hereditary constitutional 
monarchy. It is clear that the absence of political statements in his early life was no 
longer required when a more lasting form of government was established. 
 
                                                     
307 Said, 1978. 
Lotze’s anthropology 
 109 
Lotze ends with some words on international politics. Because a recognised law of 
nations and democratic international institutions are absent, the law of the strongest 
reigns. He also states that it is better to defend that which is considered as legitimate at 
any cost  than to accept a peace which will accumulate injustices in the future. His 
utterances with a political impact were conformist.  
2.5.10 Anthropology 
Lotze brings the three questions of Kant, namely ‘what can I know? ‘what will I do?’; and 
‘what can I hope for’, together in the question: ‘What is man?’308. Lotze warns however 
against the inclination to elevate man to the level of a god, when he comes to the centre 
of attention in anthropology. Although Lotze applauds the development of the sciences 
and their integration in human existence, he does not appreciate the technologisation 
of society. Also sociology can elucidate human behaviour by going beyond the borders 
of the individual and by unlocking the course, the conditions and the effects of 
interactions; but it is impossible to elaborate upon an encompassing technique of 
sociological intervention to control human interactions, because human knowledge is 
too fragmentary. Lotze probably had the upcoming Marxism in mind. 
Important in Lotze’s anthropology is his epistemology. Because knowledge can but be 
seen as knowledge of phenomenon, by which man functions as a transhipment of 
reality, metaphysics is decisive. The plurality in the sciences is supplemented by the 
search for unity. And that unity takes shape in human consciousness. Moreover, the 
whole human soul must be taken into consideration: knowledge, of course, but also 
feelings and emotions, actual and in historical perspective.  
The sense giving faculty of man resides in the feeling capacity linked to the mental 
reality of his inner state, all subordinated to the action of the aesthetic evaluation. The 
threefold distinction already mentioned, namely the occurring of events, the existence 
of things, and the holding of truths, is important here, because truth and value, which 
do not exist, nor occur, are nevertheless crucial. The values which thus come to the fore 
are the building blocks of ethics, which are reciprocally ordered in an immanent 
structure. They are objective moments in the individual human history. 
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Chapter 3. The historical significance of Lotze 
3.1 Introduction 
Kraushaar mentions that ‘the generation of Windelband, Rickert, Wundt, Falckenberg, 
Hermann Cohen, Stumpf, T. H. Green, Bradley, Bosanquet, Caird, Royce, James, 
Santayana, and Dewey, in his younger days, found in Lotze a respected and challenging 
teacher. His ideas continued to be a powerful ferment along many fronts in Continental, 
British-, and American philosophy up till the World War’. 309 He also writes that ‘during 
this period the thoughts of this unassuming sage of Göttingen were the rallying point 
for moderate idealists all over the Western Hemisphere.’310 How great the influence of 
Lotze was, nevertheless many of the people he influenced turned into a different 
direction. For instance Wundt, who, although a psychologist, made a summery of his 
philosophical ideas, was, as Lotze and a lot of other thinkers, convinced that science and 
religion could be reconciled, but he disagreed in the way it could be obtained. He also 
denies Lotze’s conception of the soul as a substance. Substance cannot be applied to 
mental phenomena311. Wundt however was in the first place a scientist and the 
philosophical and religious speculations were in function of his scientific interest312. 
The research on the historical significance of Lotze can be conducted in two ways, 
which complement each other. First there is the quantitative method, which consists in 
considering the amount of reprints, translations and secondary literature. The 
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qualitative method on the other hand comprises an examination of the influence Lotze 
had on important thinkers and currents. The number and spread of doctoral 
dissertations is also an indication of the academic interest. 
The qualitative method varies from very vague similarities between ideas to exact 
references to him, with all the nuances in between. Moreover the influence can be 
direct, but also indirect. For instance since Lotze, there was (and still is) a growing 
interest in the concept of value, whereas before the concept of virtue was central to 
ethics. The striking amount of publications about ‘values’ is an important indirect 
indication of his historical importance. 
Kerkhofs gave a brief overview of the historical significance of the concepts value and 
virtue313. He noted that the term value repressed the term virtue slowly. Even in 1902, in 
the ‘Dictionary of Philsophy and Psychology’ by J. M. Baldwin, the term value was only 
approached in its economic sense. Under the influence of Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche 
and Max Weber, the debate about idelogogies became interwined with the value 
problem. In the 20th century, under the influence of psychologists and cultural 
sociologists, the term ‘vertue’ disappeared as subjective for the more neutral estimated 
term ‘value’. It was only after the WWII that the study of values became systematic. The 
names of Maslow, R. Inglehart, Talcott Parsons, and Milton Rokeach are linked to it.  
Until the 16th and 17th century the value problem was not the main problem, because the 
knowledge of nature was entirely encapsulated in the teleological structure of the 
world314, thus with a worldview directed to a final goal, the Christian salvation. The 
introduction of an additional explanation about sense was superfluous and did not even 
arise. When however the teleological aspects were one by one eliminated by 
secularisation, the value problem imposed itself as a separated data, especially there 
where the mechanistic approach was not able to provide answers and where intentional 
behaviour had to be explained, that is to say  in the humanities. That is perhaps the 
reason why Lotze’s concept of values scored. 
The qualitative approach needs an attempt to situate the historical events in their 
context. Because life conditions were not the same as today and because other opinions 
dominated, the utterances had a different significance. It is of course but an attempt, 
because in the end only a pale outline and an abstract analytical model of that time can 
be presented. Nevertheless that ‘time excursion’ could make it possible to provide 
answers to problems of our time, put in a different, fruitful perspective. 
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Lotze’s viewpoint is known. He restricted the methods of the exact sciences, which 
generated mechanical theories, and integrated the results of the sciences in a 
teleological worldview. This solution will give rise to two developments after him. One 
development at the Marburg School, starting with Cohen and Natorp, emphasizes the 
unity of thought which reflects in one philosophical-scientific system. The other 
development, the South-West German School, with Windelband and Rickert, places 
values at the centre and accentuate the proper character of the humanities, cultural 
science included315.  
That Lotze’s influence can be found in opposite trends, is perhaps due to the way in 
which he developed his ideas in his writing, namely as an advanced dialogue between 
many relevant hypotheses, theories and doctrines, and because he ended that 
discussion in a compromise. Lotze himself considered his philosophy ‘as an open 
market, where the reader may simply pass by the goods he does not want. (…) As a 
matter of fact, he gave impulses to the most different – and most influential – 
philosophies of the coming twentieth century: analytic philosophy, phenomenology, 
pragmatism, to Heidegger’s form of existentialism.’316 
His ‘Microcosmos’ was very popular, but it was his ‘Logic’ that met with a great 
response in the academic world of the German Neo-Kantian tradition and also in France, 
where the first and third book were re-edited in 1989. Especially the third book, ‘Of 
Knowledge’, was of great importance, while the first, ‘Of Thought’ also permitted to 
understand how Lotze could influence modern logic317. ‘Microcosmos’ on the other hand 
had more influence on the English Neo-Hegelian tradition318. His concept ‘to hold’ 
(gelten), which was elaborated as an argument against naturalistic tendencies, will lead 
to the origin of anti-psychological argumentation of Frege, Windelband and Husserl. Up 
until the beginning of the hermeneutics of the philosophies of life (Lebensphilosophie) 
(Schopenhauwer, Dilthey, Spengler)319 Lotze’s concept of holding dominated logic and 
the epistemological doctrines. 
First of all Lotze’s influence is to be situated in Neo-Kantianism. Notwithstanding the 
negative statement by Bertrand Russell about the post-Hegelian period, Neo-Kantianism 
was an influential philosophical current during the last three decades of the 19th and the 
first decade of the 20th century. Even Russell himself did not escape it. Initially he made 
acquaintance with Hegel through neo-Hegelianism, but when he read Hegel's original 
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work he became aware that it was not Hegel, but ‘some aspects of Lotze’s philosophical 
logic which was assimilated in their writings, as well as the Lotze-style relationism.’320 
Neo-Kantianism invokes Kant in a rethought manner. Starting with two works, 
namely ‘Kant and the successors’ (1865) (Kant und die Epigonen) by Otto Liebman and 
‘History of Materialism’ (1866) (Geschichte des Materialismus) by Friedrich Albert Lange. 
These two works mark a historical turning point, but the call to pay more attention to 
Kant was already present. Among others, C. H. Weisse, one of Lotze's professors, did so 
in an address in 1837.  
In Neo-Kantianism several, more or less separated schools can be distinguished. Otto 
Liebman, Eduard Zeller, Kuno Fischer and Johannes Volkelt belong to the metaphysical 
trend of early Neo-Kantianism. The physiological Neo-Kantian school was initiated by 
Hermann von Helmholz. He considered Kant’s philosophy as a precursor of scientific 
physiology. Gustav Theodor Fechner, Johannes Müller, Emil du Bois-Reymond and the 
already mentioned Friedrich Albert Lange all belong to this trend. 
Kant’s transcendental deduction is an opportunity to develop a theory of the exact 
sciences at the Marburger School, established by Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, and 
including Ernst Cassirer, Karl Vorländer, Arthur Liebert, Eduard Bernstein and initially  
Nicolai Hartmann. They examine the logical conditions of the natural sciences and try 
to explain mathematics. They were only indirectly influenced by Lotze.  
As to the Southwest German or Badener School, a direct influence can be established,  
and can be found in opposition to the Marburger School. It was active from 1890 till 
1930 in Freiburg and Heidelberg. Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert were the 
most important representatives. They dealt above all with a value-philosophy and, 
unlike the Marburger School, they were focussed on history. This they considered as 
individualising and ‘value-loaded’, thus not generalising and ‘value-free’ as in the case 
of the natural sciences. To that Neo-Kantian tradition belong: Otto Liebmann, Bruno 
Bauch, Jonas Cohn, Georg Mehlis, Richard Kroner, Eugen Herriegel, Hans Pichler and 
Emil Lask. Worth mentioning is that Ernst Troeltsch and especially Max Weber are 
influenced by the Badener School. The early Martin Heidegger also belongs here.  
To the neo-critical line can be counted: Alois Riehl, Friedrich Paulsen, Oswald Külpke, 
Heinrich Maier, Octave Hamelin, François Thomas Pillon en Gaston Milhaud; to the 
Frisian School Jakob Friedrich Fries and Leonard Nelson. The most important adherents 
of Russian Neo-Kantianism are Georgij Iwanowitch Tshelpanov, Alexandr Iwanowitch 
Wwenski and Michael Matwejewitch Troizki; and of Marxist Neo-Kantianism Eduard 
Bernstein and Karl Vorländer, Rudolf Stammler, Franz Staudinger and Ludwig 
Woltmann; of the Scottish critical realists of Neo-Kantian tendency: S. S. Laure, Andrew 
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Seth (Pingle-Pattison) and R. Adamson. Finally are to be mentioned the latest Neo-
Kantians Hans Kelsen, Richard Hönigswald, Leon Brunschwig and Raymond Aron. Most 
of them were only influenced indirectly and it is likely that some were no longer 
familiar with the name ‘Lotze’, let alone his works. 
Borden Parker Bowne of the Boston University studied, as so many Americans at the 
end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century in Europe, in Göttingen. He 
underwent the influence of Lotze and became convinced that personality is the central 
concept for philosophical and theological inquiry321. 
The influences on phenomenology are obvious. Franz Brentano, to whom Husserl 
referred, was a colleague of Lotze’s, and Anton Marty and Carl Stumpf322, who was a 
teacher of Husserl, were pupils of Lotze.  
Less well known is the fact that early analytical philosophy has some roots in 
continental philosophy, especially Lotze’s Neo-Kantianism. The reason why is to be 
found in the realistic, anti-idealistic character of analytic philosophy. Sluga323, 
Dumett324,325 and Gabriël326 unravelled the congeniality. 
Although a detailed account will be given when the different areas of influence will 
be treated later on, one of the most influential elements in Lotze’s thinking is worth 
mentioning already, namely the self-identical status of the content of thought. That 
means that the content is independent from the singular objects which conceive them. 
In other words it is not the psychological condition that explains them, although these 
conditions can be studied, but the content can be considered as objective and not as 
real. Gabriel writes that ‘it should be clear that here Lotze prepared the categorical basis 
for the separation of logical investigations from psychological ones. The self-identical 
content or propositions appeared later, for instance, Gedanke (Frege), Sinngebilde 
(Rickert), Objektiv (Meinong), ideal identischer Inhalt (Husserl), or logischer Inhalt 
(Heidegger)327.  
Another line of influence goes to the United States of America. Göttingen, where 
Lotze was teaching, was one of their destinations. William James, the architecht of 
pragmatism alongside Pierce, studied under Lotze.  
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3.2 Testimonies 
 
To say that the testimonies come from experts, evidence is necessary. Therefore 
some information about the different authors. 
 
- Bertrand Russell adheres to analytic philosophy. He is known for his work on 
mathematics and logic. He also received the Nobel Price for Literature; 
- Ernst Wolfgang Orth is a professor of Philosophy at the Trier University; 
- Gottfried Gabriel is a professor of Philosophy at the Friedrich Schiller Universität 
in Jena; 
- John Arthur Passmore was a professor of Philosophy at the University of Otago 
and the Australian National University. He wrote ‘A Hundred Years of Philosophy’ 
(1957); 
- E. Auxier Randall is a professor at the Southern Illinois University; 
- Paul Grimley Kuntz was a professor at the Emory University; 
- Kai Hauser is a professor at the Humboldt Universität of Berlin; 
- of Bernd Kettern is only known that he wrote two books; 
- John Theodor Merz wrote several books such as ‘A History of European Thought 
in the Nineteenth Century’; 
- David Sullivan is a professor at the Metropolitan State College of Denver; 
- Herbert Schnädelbach is a professor of Philosophy at the Humboldt Universität of 
Berlin; 
- William James is one of the founders of pragmatism; 
- Robert Adamson was a professor of Logic at the University of Glasgow. 
- Heidegger is one of the most distinguished thinkers of the 20th century. 
 
 
The core concepts, introduced by Lotze and still widely discussed today are328: 
 the concept of value in logic (The term ‘truth-value’ was introduced by Lotze’s 
pupil Wilhelm Windelband); 
 the objective content of judgement, which later on led to the distinction between 
object and subject; 
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 Kant’s and Hegel’s context principle, which was revived by Lotze; 
 the concept ‘state of affairs’ (Sachverhalt) taken over by Husserl and Wittgenstein; 
 the notion of the given, which is found in the notion of ‘sense-data’; 
 the idea of judgement as a function, developed by Frege; 
 the metaphorics of ‘colouring expressions’ and of ‘saturated – unsaturated 
expressions’. 
Finally, some of Lotze’s ideas loom up again in the modern founding principles of 
psychology, mathematics and of the sciences of the living world329. 
Although authoritarian arguments are not accepted in science, the opinion of some 
prominent and recognized experts does carry some weight. Even the negative statement 
by Bertrand Russell is not without any importance, because a person who really is 
insignificant to philosophy would not be mentioned at all. Moreover, the negative 
utterance by Russell has to be situated in the polemic context of British thinking. 
Idealism was paramount and was threatened by upcoming realism, which slowly 
repressed the latter. Russell, who was a realist, was not an unprejudiced judge. Maybe 
the fact that he himself paid tribute to Lotze (see 3.2.6. Influence on Analytic 
Philosophy), the enemy, explains his vehement reaction psychologically. The positive 
testimonies outweigh anyway.  
The testimonies themselves can be found in: ‘Appendix 5: Some Testimonies about 
the Significance of H. Lotze.’ 
Finally and for the sake of completeness, those who did not mention Lotze, because 
they feel that he is no great philosopher, cannot be traced of course. 
3.3 Quantitative approach 
Quantitative evidence for the importance of Lotze can be found in the amount of 
reprints; the geographical diffusion of his works in German, but above all in 
translations; and the academic attention, determined by the number of dissertations on 
Lotze.  
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Firstly a remark has to be made as to the quantitative approach. To be fully correct, 
the results of counting the number of reprints and translations should have been 
compared with other publications in the same field, for instance the number of reprints 
and translations of philosophical work (and/or work on physiology) in general. That is a 
research in itself however, and, to my knowledge, such investigation has not yet been 
done. So a standard to compare with, is absent. The amount of reprints and translations 
is nevertheless so important that the conclusion can be made that the works were 
successful. On the other hand there is no possibility to express the level of that success. 
The search for the material indications was conducted via Internet, namely in the 
online catalogues of different libraries in Belgium and abroad. Appendix 7 gives an 
overview of the consulted archives. This choice could have caused a bias, if a library, for 
instance at a monastery, was not yet available on the Internet. But, after having 
examined some catalogues, the same works always appeared and few new works were 
found, at most a translation at a library abroad, a dissertation or some additional 
information. For instance, some Italian translations were found at the library of the 
University of Rome. In Spain the harvest was of a lesser degree. In Barcelona no works 
were found, and in Madrid only one English piece of work in a 1998 edition. Is an 
absence of influence due to Roman Catholicism?   
When nothing new was found any longer, and a wide range of European and 
American libraries were consulted, the search was stopped. The results can be found in 
Appendix 1. The fact that many works of Lotze were present at almost all the libraries, is 
an additional proof of his success. 
Where non-digitalized catalogues were available (microfilms or cards), they were also 
consulted. 
Not only primary literature was sought, but also works which are about Lotze (see 
appendix 2), and about values (see appendix 3). Because Lotze is considered as the 
initiator of the value theory in philosophy, it could be expected that some indications 
about his influence can also be found there. Prior to Lotze not a single work about 
values was found, only about virtue. But afterward, from about 1903 onward, a huge 
amount of works on values saw the light. The qualitative research linked them with 
Lotze, because the initiators of these editions were influenced by him. Naturally the 
spiritual climate was favourable for the acceptance of a theory of values, especially the 
conservative social movement and the religious defence against materialism. Of course, 
only the traditional values were promoted. 
A sample was shown in the catalogue of some Universities, on the one hand by way of 
the terms ‘Tugend’, ‘vertue’, ‘vertu’ and ‘deugd’ and on the other hand the terms ‘’Wert’, 
‘value’, ‘valeur’ and ‘waarde’. As to the latter ones not a single work was found before 
1900, while for the first group of terms a lot of works were found from the 17th century 
onward. Virtue was already an accepted term in antiquity, as is sufficiently known. The 
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amount of works is so enormous that not even an attempt has been made to make a list 
at all.  
The interest in Lotze was not only an academic affair. ‘Microcosmos’ was very 
popular outside the universities, while it was his work on physiology and logic that 
attracted the academic milieus. To get an insight into the interest of the academic 
world, a list of doctoral dissertations was gathered (see appendix 4). According to 
Gottfried Gabriel, a professor at the Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, his university 
in particular became a centre of studies on Lotze330. 
The grouping of the works of Lotze is done through following Wentscher331, which is  
the same order as in paragraph 2.4. (Synopsis of Lotze’s Publications in Chronological 
Order). 
Ernst W. Orth mentions332 that Lotze was one of the most discussed philosophers in 
Germany from 1875 until World War I. He was known in France, in the United States of 
America and in England, where from 1885 till 1899 translations by Green, Bosanquet, 
Nettleship, E. Constance Jones and the daughter of Sir William Hamilton333 appeared.  
Of his first works only ‘Little Metaphysics’ was translated. However, this French 
translation came out after Lotze’s death. Few German reprints were made.  
Of his work from the first period only ‘Medical Psychology’ was reprinted twice and 
also translated into French.  
As to the second period it is evident that ‘Microcosmos’ was one of Lotze’s most 
successful books. The three volumes came out in 1856-1864 and were reprinted five 
times,  in 1869-1872; 1876-1880; 1884-1888; 1896-1909; and once more in 1923. In 1913 
and 1929 partial reprinting took place. Considering the size of the work, such reprints 
are not very common. Shortly after Lotze’s death ‘Microcosmos’ was translated into 
English and reprinted four times, at short intervals (1885-1886 – 1887 – 1888 – 1897). The 
interest in Lotze was above all stimulated by the well known British philosopher 
Bosanquet.  ‘Microcosmos’ was also translated into Italian. The Italian interest is 
associated with the development of Neo-Kantianism in Italy. Between 1988 and 1916 
there were four editions. In 1988 two different translations came out, one of them was 
reprinted between 1911 and 1916, and there was also an edition in 1919. ‘Microcosmos’ 
was translated into Russian in 1870. This is probably linked with the interest in religious 
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problems of Russian philosophy during the late 19th century. Men like Solovjov334, 
Fedorov and Tolstoi bear witness to that interest. 
The ‘History of Aesthetics in Germany’ came out in 1868, was reprinted in 1913, and 
again in the second half of the 20th century, namely as photomechanical reprint in New 
York (1965). Although photo reproductions are not included in this quantitative 
approach, this one nevertheless shows that some interest in Lotze still existed. The 
‘Polemic Pamflets’ only appeared once. 
The works of the third period, which contain a systematic and matured account of 
Lotze’s thinking, were very successful. The German ‘System of Philosophy I’ on logic and 
the ‘System of Philosophy II’ on metaphysics were reprinted repeatedly until 1989 and  
once again in 2004, completely or partially. Translations were only made into English, 
from 1880 till 1888, with a reprint in 1980. Apparently the Russians were only interested 
in  ‘Microcosmos’, which presents a full vision of life. The German ‘Outlines of 
Psychology’ were reprinted seven times; ‘Outlines of Practical Philosophy’ four times; 
‘Outlines of Philosophy of Religion’ three times; ‘Outlines of Philosophy of Nature’ twice; 
‘Outlines of the Philosophy since Kant’ also twice; ‘Outlines of Logic and of 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy’ seven times; ‘Outlines of Metaphysics’ three times; and 
‘Outlines of Aesthetics’ five times. These numbers give some indication as to the interest 
in the different fields in which Lotze was active, and this from shortly after his death 
until 1922. In 1969 ‘Outlines of Practical Philosophy’ was reprinted once again, as well as 
‘Outlines of Aesthetics’ in 1990. The English editors were interested in ‘Outlines of Logic 
and of Encyclopaedia of Philosophy’ (3 reprints); ‘Outlines of Psychology’ (5 reprints, of 
which one in 1977 and one in 1998); ‘Outlines of Metaphysics’ (3 reprints); ‘Outlines of 
Philosophy of Religion’ (six times, one of which in 1970, and the edition in 1885, 
immediately after the edition of 1884  leads to the assumption that its success in 1884 
already required a reprint the year after);  ‘Outlines of Practical Philosophy’ (only once); 
‘Outlines of Aesthetics’ (twice). In Italian only ‘Outlines of Psychology’ was translated 
(1984), in Danish ‘Outlines of Philosophy of Religion’ (1886). That Danish edition may be 
linked to anti-Hegelianism and the rediscovery of Kierkegaard and his religious 
existentialism by Georg Brandes, after the cold reception of Kierkegaard (1813-1855) by 
the Danish scientific and cultural world335. 
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Spread of the secondary literature on Lotze 1850 till 2000 
1850 - 1860 1 
1860 - 1870 1 
1870 - 1880 2 
1880 - 1890 23 
1890 - 1900 28 
1900 - 1910 13 
1910 - 1920 18 
1920 - 1930 13 
1930 - 1940 7 
1940 - 1950 4 
1950 - 1960 4 
1960 - 1970 6 
1970 - 1980 18 
1980 - 1990 26 
1990 - 2000 25 
 
The amount of secondary literature is perhaps even more striking proof of Lotze's  
importance. In total 203 books and articles were found. A little exercise is conducted as 
to the spread, in time, of the secondary literature. During the decades after his death the 
secondary literature was abundant, but afterward it diminished slowly. In the 1930s it 
lapsed considerably, to then revive from 1970 onward. The latter finding corresponds 
with Milkov’s assertion that from then on, the philosophical audience again took some 
interest in Lotze, and that the period 1880-1920 was labelled the Lotzean period336. 
It is clear that these numbers do not tell the whole story. Qualitative research is also 
needed and even crucial. But this exercise is conducted in the following paragraph. 
To get an idea about the academic interest in Lotze, a quantitative approach is also 
possible. In appendix 4 some dissertations from several universities are gathered. These 
works should have been added to the list of secondary literature, as they initially 
belonged to that list, but, where it was possible to determine that they were 
dissertations, even where published afterward, they were added to the list of 
dissertations. Where the name of the university is known, the dissertations are 
mentioned under the name of that university, classified alphabetically. Where it was 
impossible to get the name of the university, the works can be found at the end of the 
list. 
In the presumption that the lists are relatively complete, which is presumably not the 
case, not the Georg-August-University of Göttingen, but the Friedrich-Alexander-
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University of Erlangen counts the most dissertations. Universities in Germany, 
Switzerland, Poland, the United States of America, France, and Sweden are represented.  
Please note, that in the appendices, are to be found a list of special editions (appendix 
6) and a list of Lotze's works to be found in William James’s library (appendix 8).  
All these lists proof that Lotze was much more important than generally accepted, 
although the lists are not of perfect quality. 
In terms of methodology, a distinction can be made between the quantitative and the 
qualitative aspects of the research regarding Lotze, but both are connected to each 
other. Because of the interest in the content of Lotze's work, reprints and translations 
were made; while the reprints and translations in turn prompted renewed interest.  
As to philosophy, the 19th century was known to be characterized by the formation of 
national traditions, a trend that was prepared a century earlier. German, French and 
English philosophy had some contact with each other, but they maintained their own  
thinking337. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century things changed. 
English analytic philosophy received strong impulses from German philosophers, like 
Frege, Wittgenstein, Popper and the Wiener Kreis. Because of the increasing influence of 
the United States of America, one can speak of an Angel-Saxon philosophy338. Lotze 
undeniably belongs to the range of important influences, next to Kant, Hegel, Spinoza 
and Leibniz339. 
In the next paragraph the influence of the content is discussed. 
3.4 Qualitative approach 
To study the influence of Lotze is to study the philosophy of the late 19th and  early 20th 
century, because of his far reaching impact on thought. Nevertheless that influence 
must be moderated, because the persons who were influenced were also critical, as he 
was of his predecessors. In the long run the opinions of the influenced thinkers were 
thus divergent that only the questions remained the same, but that the answers were at 
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times the opposite to Lotze’s. In other words to the extent that time progressed the 
diverted ideas estranges from Lotze’s interpretation. 
Lotze’s Logic was discussed and criticised by thinkers of the first order in Germany 
and England. It helped them to clarify their own ideas, often in opposition340.  
3.4.1 Influence on different philosophical movements 
Lotze had an influence on the thinking of several important thinkers after him. Orth341 
mentions Gustav Teichmüller; Wilhelm Dilthey; Franz Brentano; Otto Liebman; William 
James; Rudolf Eucken; who in turn has an influence on Max Scheler; Friedrich Paulsen; 
Wilhelm Windelband; Carl Stumpf; Gottlob Frege; Edmund Husserl; Kasimir Twardowski; 
Hans Dreisch; Emil Lask; Bruno Bauch; and Albrecht Ritschl. The influence on some of 
them will be discussed hereinafter. 
3.4.1.1 Idealism gradually corroded 
Russell’s assertion, mentioned earlier, that Lotze and the thinkers around him were 
unimportant because they were academic and traditional, can also be formulated in 
another way. His assertion led to believe that no innovative impetus was given by these 
thinkers, but that is not totally correct. It is true indeed that no philosophical 
earthquake took place, and it is also true that the work was pursued with academic 
accuracy, but that does not mean that no important insights were gained. At the very 
least there is the influence Russell himself underwent and which is covered elsewhere in 
this work (see: 3.4.8. Influence on Analytic Philosophy: Frege). Above all a transition 
took place from the enthusiastic German idealism of the first half of the 19th century to a 
more cautious, academic attitude during the second half and inspired by the sciences. 
Nevertheless they considered it their task to judge the achievements of the past in an 
impartial and critical manner, to obtain some order in the multiplicity of terms, to 
define their significance and extent, and to place the stormy impulses or ideas from the 
past in their rightful context, and not primarily to create new ideas and brilliant 
generalisations342. This assertion suits Lotze very well. His cautious and prudent 
analyses generated a value theory, with radical consequences and it was especially by 
collating vagueness that clear insight became possible, which was innovatory. This 
 
                                                     
340 Merz,1976, Vol.4:765. 
341 Orth, 1986:10. 
342 Merz, 1976, Vol.3:6. 
The Anthropology of Hermann Lotze 
124 
attitude is related to the attitude in the philosophy of language that will arise later and 
which is called the ‘ideal language philosophy’ in opposition to the ‘ordinary language 
philosophy’.  
On the other hand, although it was not his intention, Lotze did also contribute to the 
expansion of materialism343. The reduction of science to the mechanical is also currently 
a method to allow for a certain worldview, especially in the New Age craze, though at 
the time Lotze lived, the mechanistic view on science was the prevailing paradigm, now 
it is outdated. An outdated example of the integration of science and religion is 
presented by Ken Wilber344. 
Rudolf Eucken, the neo-idealist thinker345, winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature 
and student at Göttingen under Lotze, can be mentioned here. Although he found Lotze 
too acute and too much of a learned philosopher346, there are nevertheless some striking 
continuities between the two men. Eucken’s ‘ethical activism’ saw in the soul of man the 
possibility to overcome the gap between nature and the spiritual life. 
3.4.1.2 Influence on the Neo-Kantian schools 
Neo-Kantianism had two different branches, the Marburg School347 and the Baden 
School348. They were inspired by different components of Lotze’s philosophy. ‘The very 
architect of this movement, Otto Liebman, the author of the revolutionary Kant und die 
Epigonen (1865), was a pupil and a follower of Lotze.’349  In general Neo-Kantianism is 
characterised by its focus on the transcendental accountability of knowledge. The 
Marburg School emphasized the logical unity of thinking and the unity of the scientific 
system, while the Baden School, also called the South-West School, highlighted values 
and thus the true nature of the cultural sciences. The leading figures of the Marburg 
School were Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) and Paul Natorp (1854-1924); of the Baden 
School, Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) and Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936)350. 
The value theory comes from the political economy and was elevated by Lotze to a 
fundamental philosophical concept351. The term ‘virtue’, which was current since 
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antiquity was supplemented by the term ‘value’ due to the attention Lotze paid it. 
Before the economic value theories defined, in a clearer way, the hazy notion of value of 
everyday life, before Kant and Fries gave it a place in the act of judging, and before Lotze 
expanded its significance and influenced thinking about valuation, the notion of virtue 
was adopted to express, more or less, the same phenomena. ‘More or less’ because 
‘virtue’ is always related to the personal qualities of the people concerned, even if some 
moral qualities of a certain society are meant. ‘Value’ on the contrary has a more 
extensive significance and is nestled in epistemological reflections, at least  in Lotze’s 
view. 
Sassen352 discerned four post-Kantian trends: critical realism, critical idealism 
(Marburger School), psychological Kantianism, and the Badener or Southwest German 
School. The latter was most indebted to Lotze, but also Arthur Liebert (1878-1946), who 
was related to the Marburger School underwent his influence353. He borrowed the 
concept of holding (gelten) from Lotze. In ‘Das Problem der Geltung’ (1906) (The Problem of 
Holding) and ‘Geltungswert der Metaphysic’ (1906) (The Value of Holding in Metaphysics) 
he elaborated the concept in such a way that it could fit in with the criticism of the 
Marburger School.  
Otto Liebman (1840-1912) and Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) were both influenced 
by Lotze. Windelband earned his doctorate under Lotze in Göttingen in 1870354, and 
according to Gabriel ‘Hermann Lotze (…) can be regarded as the founder of Neo-
Kantianism’, because he was a ‘central figure in the whole intellectual scene before the 
unfortunate separation of continental and analytic philosophy. 355’  
Windelband distinguished between nomothetic and idiographic sciences. The former 
are the empirical sciences of nature, which are concerned with what is repeatable and 
hence can be formalised within laws; the latter are the sciences of history, which have 
the unique as object. The science of history however chooses what is significant on the 
basis of general values and Windelband adopts Lotze's holding of values as an a priori 
concept356.  
Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) transforms Windelband’s science of history into science 
of culture, and saves the value holding viewpoint. Sense and value are based on the 
individual and unique. It is the task of philosophy to edit a system of universal values by 
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which valuation of things has to take place. Life itself is not the highest value, but life 
must be subordinate to higher values357. 
The further development of the value theory will be discussed in the chapter 
‘Influence on the value theory’. 
Bruno Bauch (1877-1942) who intents to reconcile the two Neo-Kantian schools, was 
mainly influenced by Lotze. Especially Lotze’s distinction between ‘Sein’ and ‘gelten’ and 
the teleological idealism were important. The development of them in his ‘realistic 
criticism’ finally opposed him to Windelband and Rickert and their value criticism. 
3.4.1.3 Influence on Anglo-Saxon Neo-Hegelianism 
In England the way was hewed for Lotze by the introduction of Hegelianism in the 1850s 
and the 1860s. In 1865 J. H. Stirling’s ‘The Secret of Hegel’ appeared and that was not the 
first but certainly the strongest factor in its promotion and enthusiastic reception358. In 
this climate Lotze’s thinking took hold because he got rid of a lot of abstractions and 
dogmas fixed by Hegel and in so doing he made idealism more acceptable. Moreover his 
style was known to be clearer and more accurate in articulating ideas than was the case 
with Hegel or Kant. In a broader sense Lotze, as well as Hegel, was promoted as a 
defence against positivism and agnosticism and as a support for religion359. 
An important offshoot of Lotze’s thinking is found in Hegelianism, with important 
names, such as Bradley and Bosanquet. The latter introduced Lotze in England. This 
movement is to be situated in the twofold development of Hegelianism. On the one 
hand, with Edward Caird as leading figure, the origin and genesis of Hegel’s thought was 
studied; on the other hand, in the meaning that T. H. Green gave it, there was a trend 
away from Hegel. In the latter case, Lotze, with his pertinent criticism of Hegel, took a 
prominent place and was adopted by Bradley and Bosanquet360. Not his theologising, but 
his logic and theory of knowledge were primarily discussed. 
Milkov draws the attention to the real Hegelian character of the group361 consisting 
mainly of Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882), Francis Herbart Bradley (1846-1924), and 
Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923). First of all the name ‘Neo-Hegelianism’ was given by 
their opponents, who intended to associate them with a foreign thinker in order to 
discredit them in front of the public. The referred to philosophers have read Hegel, but 
a lot more Kant. They were not necessarily connected with Hegel. Moreover, according 
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to Merz362 the difference between Neo-Hegelianism and genuine Hegelianism can largely 
be explained by the influence of Lotze.  
Merz363 notices resemblances in the writings of Lotze and Green. One of these is the 
way in which the definition of reality is expressed, namely as a system of relations. As to 
the influence Lotze would have exercised on Green, it is more likely that both arrived at 
certain conclusions independent of each other. Both started from the writings of Kant 
and Hegel; they developed both their thoughts in opposition to naturalism; and they 
both tried to conciliate science with faith. Also the primacy of ethics is present in each 
of their systems. 
Richard Burdon Haldane, Viscount of Cloan (1856-1928) strives to connect Lotze, 
Hegel and Kant, with Aristotle in order to adapt philosophy to the modern sciences of 
nature364.  
Francis Herbert Bradley had a great influence on British thinking and Hegel, Spinoza, 
Herbart and Lotze are the sources of his thinking. In the tradition of Lotze he challenges 
the psychologism of empiricists, especially their theory of associations, and he indicates 
that thinking and reality are different things365, which is Lotzean. The differences 
between Bradley and Lotze are nevertheless pertinent, although the object pursued was 
analogues366. For instance Bradley accepts that the absolute is a whole, a system, but on 
the other hand he comes to the conclusion that experience is the same as reality, which 
is the concrete nature of that system. Reality is sentient experience and there is no 
reality outside the experienced physical existence. Reality is experience and the feeling 
and the felt are just the same. Bradley does  not adopt Lotze’s distinction between the 
world of forms, the world of things and the world of values367. 
 
The ‘personal idealists’, Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (1856-1931), James Seth (1860-
1924), William Ritschie Sorley (1855-1935) and Hastings Rashdall (1858-1924), rejected 
Hegel, criticized naturalism, but also Bradley and Bosanquet, and aimed at a 
reconciliation of a theistic worldview with German idealism from Kant to Lotze368. 
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Remarkable and worth mentioning is that in A. W. Benn’s ‘History of English 
Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century’ of 1906, Lotze is not mentioned, nor his 
influence on English thought.369 
3.4.1.4 Influence on pragmatism 
Although American philosophy has always had an experimental nature, even when it 
was under the tutelage of the continental one370, it was James and Dewey who gave it its 
pragmatic expression, creating an independent American philosophy. But even then, 
certain elements of the idealistic philosophies of their student days did persist371. As 
already mentioned William James (1842-1910) was a student of Lotze in Göttingen and 
his library contained a lot of books by Lotze372. Moreover, the English translation of 
‘Mikrokosmos’ of 1885 was long used as textbook in English and American universities373. 
According to Kraushaar374, who in several publications studied the influence of Lotze 
on James, James was interested in Lotze’s thinking because he too was aware of the 
importance of the spiritual, next to the mechanical explanations of the world. There 
was also an affinity in the fundamental attitude toward philosophy, namely as a quest 
for understanding and readjustment, while the human problems, with their religious, 
moral and aesthetic values, imposed themselves.  
William James375 criticises Lotze’s monism in favour of pluralism. As known, Lotze 
based his monism - that is: there is one indivisible world – on the impossibility of 
pluralism, because separate things do not act on each other by definition. Thus change 
must be an immanent process. James calls it a pretty but purely verbal argument, and 
also vicious intellectualism. The definitions of ‘distinct’ and ‘independent’ implies the 
impossibility of mutual influence, so Lotze changed ‘independent’ and ‘distinct’ into 
‘interdependent’, ‘united’ and ‘one’. So, the things acquire a licence to change, in the 
words of James, and only if the process of interaction is literally and concretely known it 
is possible to know if things can interact or not. James adds that a person once called an 
‘equestrian’ would forever be made unable to walk on his own feet. ‘Because the names 
of finite things and their relations are disjoined, it doesn’t follow that the realities 
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named need a dues ex machine from on high to conjoin them376.’ James opposes the 
rational absolute of Lotze, Royce, Bradley and even Hegel, his ‘pluralistic and 
incompletely integrated universe, describable only by the free use of the word ‘some’377 
as a legitimate hypothesis. 
Thus James378 agrees with Lotze’s distinction between mere coincidence of events and 
inward kinship of content between them and he joins Lotze in his critique on Hume, 
who asserted that ‘the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct 
existences’379. Thus for James, as for Lotze, the necessary truths have an inward 
reasonableness. 
Although he refrains from overestimating the influence of Lotze on James, 
Kraushaar380 makes a general comparison between the doctrines of Lotze and James and 
he adds that the similarities are more than mere coincidence. He supports that claim by 
pointing to the Lotzean texts contained in James library. He also takes into account the 
concurrence in time between the lecture and study of Lotze's work and some of his 
(James’) publications. Moreover, before 1900 Lotze was always quoted in terms which 
show the highest respect. Especially Lotze’s attack on Hegel’s pan-logism was 
appreciated by James. That is evident from the notations on the flyleaves of Lotze’s 
books. Next to it Lotze’s criticism on Hegel’s ‘Absolute’ as a fait accompli was also 
appreciated by James and fitted in with his pluralistic provisional worldview; although 
he grounded it in a somewhat different way, which is in immediate experience. To 
James, unlike Lotze, ‘practical considerations are pertinent only to whatever speculative 
extension of immediate experience the urgencies of human life require.’381 But all in all, 
Lotze’s provocative and instructive critique on Hegel, stating that real relations cannot 
be translated into rational ones, and that individuals are not simply moments in the 
development of the Absolute, appealed to James, as to the tender-minded idealists and 
the tough-minded realists in general.382 
For Kraushaar it is very important that James as a psychologist began the study of 
Lotze’s work before Hegelianism had captured the attention of philosophers in England 
and America383. It means that he did not take cognizance of Lotze’s philosophy in the 
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context of Neo-Hegelianism, but that it appeared to him as a philosophy closely related 
to medicine and psychology. In other words James felt related to it because he 
underwent a similar transition in his thinking. In his ‘Principles of Psychology’ James 
adopted Lotze’s theories on emotion, attention and will, and also Lotze’s metaphysical 
ideas were prominent. Afterwards however, James re-examined his position and broke 
with the traditional logic of idealism. Yet the philosophical criticism of Lotze and 
others, which ‘have emphasized the incongruence of the forms of our thinking with the 
‘things’ which the thinking nevertheless successfully handles’384 was of striking 
importance for the development of pragmatism. 
Kraushaar385 distinguishes three separate doctrines important for pragmatism, 
namely an epistemological, a logical, and an ethical one. On the epistemological level 
James was aware of Lotze’s ever returning insight that things are what they are known 
as, but he finally saw them in a different way. As to the logical aspect, because logic is 
but the scaffolding and not the edifice, the process of thinking has but an instrumental 
value, although it must be fruitful. Moreover, truth is to be understood as an aesthetic, 
hence ethical fact instead of a correspondence with things. The latter is part of the 
practical knowledge, or the realisation of values. According to Lotze, ‛the perception of 
values, he claimed, not only reveals human good, but contains an insight into the nature 
of reality.“386 In contemporary terms: emotional intelligence is of primordial 
significance. All these Lotzean premises were of great importance to the development of 
James pragmatism, although he did not adopt them as such. What he frequently invoked 
however was that Lotze interpreted thought in an instrumental and not a 
representative way. Concepts are not copies of things but a kind of intellectual 
shorthand387. 
Lotze’s dualism, inseparably linked to the instrumental nature of concepts, was one 
of the things James could not entirely accept, which led to a difficult phase in the 
development of his pragmatism. Besides, Lotze had struggled with this problem as well. 
James followed Lotze’s justification that thought was a higher and additional 
development of reality, but he did not agree with Lotze in the subsequent design of an 
absolute monism. On the other hand, James incorrectly thought that Lotze’s concept of 
Geltung was applicable in a pragmatic sense, which means that the validation takes place 
in cumulative verification through experience. It was not. In Lotze’s interpretation 
valuation was intuitive and inherently self-evident, resting on the whole structure of 
knowledge. 
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Perhaps even more striking proof of Lotze’s influence on pragmatism may be found 
in the definitions James gave to concepts as ‘substance’, ‘the self’ and ‘activity’. In these 
definitions one could say that Lotze’s ‘pragmatic’ approach was adopted. When ‘James 
aimed to show that entities or powers must be defined in terms of their capacity to 
perform the phenomena they are evoked to explain’388, he almost paraphrased Lotze’s 
assertion that to act like substances is to be one. But again it must be stressed that all 
these utterances of Lotze are part of his ongoing dialogue and that the pragmatic 
aspects of his thinking do not have the substantial pragmatic meaning which it was 
clearly given by James. It is therefore necessary to resist the temptation to call Lotze a 
pragmatist avant la lettre. While Lotze was dialectically preparing the unity of all things, 
James preferred to remain in the world of piecemeal, contingent and pluralistic 
knowledge. 
To escape from determinism both James and Lotze left room for infinite possibilities, 
Lotze by allowing the free will of man to influence the mechanical chain of activities, 
James on the other hand only accepted the bare fact of contingency389. In this context 
individualism as to ethics and history are present in both philosophers. According to 
them history is not a linear evolution but a daily product of the actions of individuals. 
Nothing of Hegel’s movement of the Absolute Spirit is found. Of course for the 
protestant Lotze, individualism was also paramount in his philosophy of religion. James 
refers explicitly to Lotze when he in turn defends the personal relation of man with 
God.  
‘To the degree in which Lotze supported James’ disposition to defend the Many 
against One, the free against the determined, the process against the substances, his 
influence as a German philosopher was unique.’390 
3.4.1.5 Influence on phenomenology 
Husserl earned his doctorate in philosophy under Carl Stumpf who in turn studied 
under Lotze. He read 'Mikrokosmos' while studying mathematics in Berlin in 1880 and 
especially Lotze’s theory of the local signs. That subject was formerly discussed between 
Stumpf and Lotze. Husserl also lectured on Lotze, namely on his logic and epistemology. 
Several of his students did their thesis on Lotze. Moreover Husserl made numerous 
explicit references to him391. 
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The milestone of phenomenology is Edmund Husserl’s ‘Logische Untersuchungen’ 
(Logical Investigations) (1900-1901). It was an anti-psychologistic philosophy of logic, 
preceded by his ‘Philosophie der Arithmetik’ (The Philosophy of Arithmetic) of 1891, which 
was psychologistic392. It is clear that he underwent a transition from psychologism into 
anti-psychologism under the influence of Lotze’s interpretation of Plato. In the 
‘Philosophie der Arithmetik’ he applied Brentano’s rule to search for a psychological origin 
of any primitive concept, but he had some difficulties to reconcile the subjectivity of 
psychological origin with the objectivity of the numbers393.  
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) himself referred repeatedly and empathically to the 
special weight of Lotze’s ‘Logic’ of 1874, next to Bolzano’s ‘Wissenschaftslehre’ for the 
development of his phenomenology. Thus in particular Lotze’s anti-psychologism and 
interpretation of Plato’s theory of ideas, was of decisive importance394. Lotze used the 
title ‘Phänomenologie’ for one section of his ‘Gründzüge der Metaphysic’395. It was the 
lecture of Lotze’s Logic which incited him to drop his psychologism in favour of logicism 
and Platonism396. He interpreted Bolzano through the eyes of Lotze. It means that he 
interpreted Bolzano in a Platonic way, which was foreign to Bolzano, according to 
Husserl himself397. The distinction between the mental act (Vorstellen) and the content 
(Vorgestelltem) enabled him to release Brentano’s conception of the object of a mental 
act as immanent content398.  
Another interpretation of Husserl’s abandonment of the psychologistic viewpoint on 
mathematics for an a priori one is linked to a harsh criticism of the ‘Philosophie der 
Arithmetik’ by Frege399. ‘He objected that Husserl’s analysis blurs the distinction between 
subjective and objective domains, and concluded that his work was a typical example of 
psychologism400. But he omitted to refer to the latter. Because he referred to Bolzano 
and Lotze, but not to Frege, the false opinion can arise that he is only indebted to the 
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former thinkers. Nevertheless, even though Husserl is influenced by Frege, through him 
it was still by Lotze, although supplemented with Frege’s possible acquisitions.  
Hauser401 draws up an inventory of the elements in which Husserl agrees and 
disagrees with Lotze. Husserl praises Lotze for having deepened with great perspicacity 
some of Herbart’s suggestions and to have developed them in an original way, but he 
criticized both of them for having confused specific ideality with normative ideality and 
to have considered logic as a morality of thinking. Lotze’s view of logical principles as 
normative laws of thought, grounded in the nature of the soul, is considered as a 
misunderstanding, for ‘there is no reason to expect a correspondence between the 
composition of the soul and the structure of objective reality.’402 For Husserl, on the 
contrary, the logical rules are evidently true, and there is no foundation of it possible. 
He in turn reproached Lotze for being psychologistic. 
Nevertheless he recognises that he is indebted to Lotze as to the concepts of ideal 
significations, and of ideal content of representations and judgments403. Although he 
assimilated Lotze’s theory of holding (gelten) and his theory of ideas, his theory of 
knowledge is very different404. He rejected Lotze’s dichotomy drawn between ‘sein’ of 
things and ‘gelten’ of truths. Also ideal objects, such as in mathematics, already have the 
status of existing in ordinary language. On that account refuting Lotze’s reliance on 
ordinary language to make his dichotomy plausible. He also disagrees with Lotze about 
the mutual independence of the notions ‘existence’ (of things), ‘occurrence’ (of events), 
‘obtaining’ (of relations), and ‘holding’ (of propositions), for the significance of the 
relationships remain, regardless of the category. By extension, the difficulty Lotze 
encountered with the question on how a general truth, that does not exist in the 
physical world, can govern the events in that world, was dismissed by Husserl because 
truth and reference have the same ontological status. To him ‘there is no contrast 
between truth as subjective and existence as objective.’405 ‘The descriptive relation 
between ‛forms and laws“ and ‛content“ requires only a descriptive analysis; but no 
far-reaching metaphysical theories.’406 That is part of Husserl’s slogan ‘back to the 
things themselves’. The other thing which was not accepted by Husserl was Lotze’s 
radical distinction between the ‘logical laws as the norms for correct inference and the 
factual state of affairs in a mind-independent reality.’407 Husserl will break with the 
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notion of truth in itself and with logicism after his ‘idealistic turn’ (1905-1907). Before 
the objective validity of knowledge did not depend on the conformity with things, but 
only on the identical, permanent, stable character of the representations. Since then he 
brought his epistemology into line with realistic opinions about objectivity and 
intersubjectivity408. 
Something Husserl adopted from Lotze in rejecting scepticism is the criticism of 
Descartes systematic doubt. Scepticism undermines itself by a contradiction, because 
the negation of any truth is itself a truth. Moreover anything which is an object of 
inquiry is due to a connection of representations, and only what is known can be 
compared with what is known, and impossibly with what is not known, or with the 
thing represented409. The special status of knowledge brings Lotze to the statement that 
even a more perfect spirit, that of an angel for instance, could not know the things in 
themselves, for knowledge is something totally different from these things. Also Husserl 
denied God the power to know the things in themselves, because only the phenomenal 
is accessible to intuition410. 
Husserl rejects Lotze’s subjective interpretation of reasoning by rebutting the 
argument that a variety of proofs can lead to the same result. On the contrary it proves 
that thinking is equal to an objective reality. On account of this and other statements411 
Husserl believes that Lotze must be considered as a psychologist, anthropologist and 
naturalistic relativist412. There are two reasons why the two opinions do not match 
entirely. The weak point in Lotze’s viewpoint is the absence of an explicit reference to 
the success of a theory whether or not there is a correspondence between the 
representations and the real things, and not, as Husserl stated, in different distinctions 
and incompatibilities between them. Of course Husserl’s critique must be understood in 
the context of his own viewpoint, namely the uniformity of the mental activity. In 
pragmatism the explicit reference to the success of a theory in action will be made, but 
then without many of Lotze’s ontological speculations. The latter were criticised by 
Husserl as mythological metaphysics413. 
All these critiques do not prevent Husserl from recognizing the hand of Lotze in his 
acceptance of a theoretical unity between mathematics and logic, the abandonment of 
the conception of cardinal numbers as exclusive base of arithmetic and in the treatment 
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of the theory of functions414. But in logic he disagrees with Lotze’s normative 
interpretation, because of the dependence of the validity and necessity of the logical 
rules on the aesthetic nature of mind, means that logic does not exist by itself. 
Normative propositions depend on a norm giving standard, such as an idea of a supreme 
purpose415. In spite of the many original ideas, Husserl considers Lotze’s logic all in all as 
psychologistic, as previously stated. He also reproves Lotze’s concept of universals, 
which do not exist, because in representing them we always have a particular thing in 
mind. ‘Red’ only exists in represented things even when we are speaking of it in general 
terms. This does not fit in with Husserl’s eidetic intuition, of course, because the 
actuality of an object is not decisive for the representation of it. Husserl ‘insisted that its 
investigation must be a descriptive analysis of the immediately evident facts concerning 
experience, an analysis abstaining from the kind of metaphysical presuppositions or re-
interpretations found in Lotze.’416 
Heidegger (1889-1976) can be mentioned here, although he strived at overcoming the 
philosophy which takes consciousness as starting point, he was to a certain degree a 
pupil of Husserl417. 
Heidegger adopted the distinction between the existence of sensual things and the 
existence of general reality, from Lotze. According to Beyer the significance of Lotze for 
Heidegger’s ‘Denkweg’ cannot be overestimated418. In a winter semester course (1925-
1926), titled ‘Logic: The Question of Truth’, Heidegger devoted an extended first part to 
an examination of the situation of modern logic and the question of psychologism, 
which led him to an exposition of Lotze’s theory of ideas419. Heidegger sees in Lotze 
somebody who can interpret the Platonic ideas as values, and in founding logic on 
ethics, naturalism is overcome. Françoise Dastur420 assumes that the reason why 
Hiedegger fulminates against Lotze’s concept of ‘holding’ (Geltung) in his ‘Sein und Zeit’ of 
1927 is due to the fact that he, in his thesis ‘The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism’ 
of 1912, had joined Lotze’s value theory earlier. An essential element in Heidegger's 
philosophy is the insight that man is already situated in the world and that he cannot 
stand outside of it. It is an insight derived from Lotze, who emphasized that only God 
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can fully understand his own creation and that human existence is aware of already 
being in the world421.  
3.4.1.6 Influence on analytic philosophy422.  
Analytic philosophy has been regarded, by the analytic philosophers themselves and by 
others, as a brand new trend in philosophy, disregarding their roots. This was a mistake. 
Frege for instance who stands at the beginning of analytic philosophy was ‘deeply 
indebted to the thought of Hermann Lotze and through him to the philosophical 
constructions of Leibniz and Kant423,424’, but by the latter also directly425. Subsequently 
the link between Frege and other analytic philosophers is evident from the analysis of 
logical concepts and the way logic is formalized in Bertrand Russell’s theory of 
description, although he (Frege) did not incorporate empiricism, something the later 
analytic philosophers did. Frege also influenced Alfred North Whitehead, the co-author 
with Russell of the ‘Principia Mathematica’. Frege was convinced that arithmetic was a 
branch of logic, and Russell, together with Whitehead, tried to proof that the principles 
of mathematics can be derived from logic. Lotze has set an example to Frege and Russell, 
in asserting that mathematics is a branch of logic. He rejected the opposite viewpoint of 
the algebraization of propositional logic as carried out by Boole and De Morgan426. 
A student of Frege, Rudolf Carnap, was an adherent of logical positivism, a trend 
affined to analytic philosophy, and his ‘The Logical Structure of the World’ (Der logische 
Aufbau der Welt) was greatly influenced by the ‘Principia Mathematica’. Frege’s influence 
on Wittgenstein and Carnap was however for all a matter of linguistic philosophy. Here 
must also be kept in mind that analytic philosophy slowly developed from a certain 
Platonic conception of mathematics to a more realistic one, that is deviating from 
Lotze’s idealistic concept, and that Lotze’s viewpoint cannot be found in later 
developments, even when there is a direct link. There is even a link between Frege and 
phenomenology through his critique on Husserl, but that is of no concern to this 
paragraph. (See: 3.4.6. Influence on phenomenology: Stumpf, Husserl, Scheler, and 
Heidegger). 
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Although Frege (1848-1925) attended the lectures of Lotze on ‘Philosophy of 
Religion’427, he was obviously also acquainted with Lotze’s ‘Logic’. Michael Dummett 
compared Frege’s ‘Key Sentences on Logic’ (Kernsätze zur Logik) (see appendix 9) with 
Lotze’s ‘Logic’ in the original, that is German edition, and concluded that it was 
‘apparent that the ‘Kernsätze’ form a series of comments by Frege upon Lotze’s 
Introduction, or, more exactly, of remarks prompted by reflection upon it’428. A more 
striking proof of the early influence on Frege’s logic cannot be found. Also the critique 
on the correspondent theory by Lotze in ‘Logic’ is almost literally taken over by Frege in 
his ‘Kleine Schriften’429. In the following the results of Dummett’s investigation of the ‘Key 
Sentences’ will be presented in a few words. 
Dummett takes two key sentences from Frege and compares them with the 
introduction of ‘Logic’ by Lotze. Key sentence number two is expressed in exactly the 
same (German) words as Lotze’s assertion, but as a negation. Frege asserts the opposite 
to Lotze, but borrows Lotze’s expressions. Also the twelfth key sentence is borrowed 
from Lotze, only the word ‘holds’ (bestehe) replaces the word ‘obtains’ (stattfinde). 
Dummett concludes that these ‘two instances are enough to show with certainty that, in 
writing the ‘Kernsätze’, Frege had Lotze’s ‘Introduction’ in mind430.’  
The main criticism of, and thus the difference with, Lotze for Frege, is that although 
Lotze made a distinction between the mere stream of ideas and thinking, he did not 
focus on the action of thinking itself. ‘The central idea of Lotze’s theory is that the 
logical forms correspond to different levels of one activity of the mind, namely to ‛trace 
back what occurs together to that which belongs together.“’431 For Frege thinking is not 
a combination of ideas, but an activity in itself and a working with ideas, instead of a 
working of ideas. For Lotze, on the contrary, thinking is a combination of ideas which 
belong together, thus is true, in contrast with a combination at random, which is 
untrue, and to be true or untrue is given by the auxiliary thoughts (Nebengedanke). For 
Frege it must first of all be clear what ‘true’ and ‘untrue’ means, and secondly the 
indication of being true or untrue is an act of thinking and does not lie in the 
combination of ideas, which is neutral. Dummett expresses it as follows: ‘We may say 
that for Frege, Lotze had the right conception of where the answer lies: what he did not 
have was the right question.432’ It is in the light of the opposition between the opinions 
on logic of Lotze and Frege that the ‘Key Sentences’ becomes meaningful. The 
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fundamental difference lies in the status attributed to Logic. For Lotze the auxiliary 
thoughts constitute the true/untrue criterion and therefore it is possible to conduct a 
psychological investigation of the law-giving consciousness, although this could not 
procure the laws of thinking; for Frege on the contrary the laws of thinking are more 
idealistic (key sentence 17: The laws of logic cannot be justified by means of a 
psychological investigation), although following Dummett. 
 
 
Lotze: 
Reality (Wirklichkeit) 
 of things (Dinge): they are (or exist) 
 of events (Ereignisse): they happen (or occur) 
 of relations (Verhältnisse): they obtain 
 of propositions (Sätze): they are valid (or hold). 
 
Source: Gabriel, 2002:42. 
 
 
Was Frege an objective idealist, in the rational tradition of Leibniz, Kant and Lotze, as 
Hans Sluga stated; or was he a realist as Michael Dummett ascertained? Michael 
Resnik433 solved the problem, in a first phase, by pointing out that the context principle, 
which sustained the idealist view, was dropped prior to 1891, so that Sluga was right in 
relation to the period before, and Dummett in relation to the period after 1891. 
Nevertheless for Sluga, Frege never gave the context principle up. Yet the solution of 
Resnik is for all due to a refinement of approach of the problem. In discriminating 
between methodological, ontological and epistemological Platonism, Frege can be 
situated more precisely in front of Lotze (and Kant). A further refinement consists in 
recognising that Frege underwent an evolution in his thinking and was not even always 
clear enough. In the ‘Grundlagen’434 Frege was, following Resnik, an ontological Platonist 
and an objective idealist. This does not mean that numbers are entities in the purely 
Platonist sense, but that they come into existence through the faculty of reason, thus by 
applying the context principle or in other words, the significance they receive in the 
context of a sentence. ‘Thoughts are by no means unreal but their reality is of quite a 
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different kind from that of things.435’ In later writings numbers received a much greater 
independence of the mind; they are part of an objective realm, not sense perceptible 
and already on hand. Nevertheless Resnik does not follow Sluga in denoting Lotze as the 
precursor of Frege’s idealism. Unlike Sluga and Dummett, Resnik pays attention to 
Frege’s notion of unsaturateness436, which superseded that of the context principle, and 
which ensures that a combination comes about into a whole through the fulfilment of 
something unfulfilled437. 
Resnik criticised for all Sluga. Gregory Currie438 on the other hand pointed his arrows 
at Dummett’s article concerning the ‘Key Sentences’. To call Frege an anti-psychologist, 
an anti-subjectivist and an anti-relativist is calling him an objectivist and not 
necessarily a realist as Dummett did. However Currie also thinks Frege was a realist, but 
for other reasons, namely because Frege ascertained that thoughts have effects. 
Ambivalence (true or untrue) is not the core problem as to existence. ‘If the admission 
of truth-value gaps (for instance if the King of France does not exist in the sentence ‘the 
King of France was bald’, HV) is a sign of anti-realism, it is not a sign of any kind of anti-
realism which is occasioned by doubts about having a verification-transcendent 
conception of truth conditions.439’  
 
 
What is realism? 
 
In the Middle Ages: 
  
 = the universals do really exist 
 
  
terms, constructions of the mind. 
 
Now: 
 
 = materialism (19th century) 
 
                                                     
435 Frege, ‘Der Gedanke : Eine logische Untersuchung’. In: Beiträge zur Philophie des deutschen 
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 = the objects of knowledge exist really independent from knowing. 
 
   idealism = even if knowledge takes shape on account of an 
experience, it is not a mirror image of the world 
outside, but a construction of the mind. 
 
  neo-Thomism: it is impossible the stand outside being to settle the 
problem. 
 
  pragmatism: it suffices that knowledge is effective, it need not be a mirror 
of the outside world. 
 
 
definitions are abroad. 
 
 
 
Apparently the experts are not unanimous in their interpretation of the status Frege 
gave to logic and arithmetic. It is not here that the problem must be solved, it suffices to 
establish that there was undoubtedly an influence from Lotze on Frege, and via Frege on 
analytic philosophy, although in the end few remained of Lotze’s starting-point, unless 
the questions, not the answers. None the less a little remark about the polemics can be 
made. After due examination it seems that these polemics have to do with definitions. 
Dependant on the definition of realism it is possible to qualify Frege's approach as 
realistic or not. The different experts apply different definitions and are also somewhat 
selective in the reported arguments. Their conclusions are correspondingly. Sluga’s 
approach is much more to the point, because he does not apply an alien model to 
Frege’s thoughts, but he departs from the assertions of the predecessors of Frege and 
Frege’s writings, and not from anachronistic labelling. Reskin’s solution is very efficient 
for he refines his approach in such a way that the categories of Frege can coincide with 
those of the applied model. Sluga440 presumes that there is a close correspondence 
between Lotze and Frege in this matter and refers to Lotze’s interpretation of Plato (see 
above). Objectivity is what is the same for all thinking beings and meanwhile 
independent of them. Truth also comes by reasoning so that only valid propositions, not 
concepts are true. That means that Lotze is an epistemological Platonist, and not an 
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ontological one. The latter would have meant a correspondence theory of truth and that 
ideas were a picture of the world of facts. Sluga assumes that Frege is of the same 
opinion. To return to Lotze, of whom Currie does not speak, the following phrase of 
Frege: ‘something wholly and in every respect inactive [unwirksames] would also be quite 
unwirklich and would not exist for us441’, resembles quite well the assertion of Lotze that 
a pain nobody feels does not exist. Lotze must really have been a realist idealist. 
There are also other striking resemblances between Lotze and Frege. For instance the 
distinction between concept and object; the grammatical distinction between 
substantives, adjectives, and verbs and which consequences it has for logic442; the 
rejection of the Kantian view on arithmetic as synthetic a priori443; the meaning of the 
concept identity444. 
Gottfried Gabriel analysed the relation between Frege and Neo-Kantianism. He 
establishes a similarity between Frege (and also Liebmann) and Lotze in rejecting 
empirism as to the justification of logic. Induction is not able to explain logic rules on its 
own, some basic laws must be assumed in addition445. Also Lotze’s distinction between 
genesis and value (Geltung) is paramount in Neo-Kantianism and in Frege. Knowledge 
cannot exist without experience, but that has nothing to do with logic and arithmetic as 
such.  
It is Gabriel’s thesis ‘that at least early analytic philosophy has its roots in the 
tradition of continental philosophy, especially in the philosophy of Hermann Lotze.446’ 
But, next to Lotze, also Kant, Leibniz and Trendelenburg were of paramount importance 
to Frege. 
Bruno Bauch discerned four features of Lotze’s logic in function of the influence on 
Frege447, namely 
1. anti-psychologism; 
2. the distinction between an object of knowledge and its recognition; 
3. the Platonic theory of ideas as an ontology-free theory of objectivity; 
4. concepts as functions. 
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Frege did not take over all these features at once448. First he only considered logic as 
an objective a priori science. Afterwards when the need for more precise explanations  
imposed itself, he returned to Lotze’s logic for further clarifications. Especially Lotze’s 
Kantian assertion that first comes the proposition as a whole as to its validity and that 
the significance of the concepts depend on the proposition in which they figure. Also 
Lotze’s attack on empiricism was adopted by Frege: a genesis of knowledge cannot 
replace its foundations. It is a genetic fallacy. Moreover, in replacing an addition [S = a + 
b + c + …] by a function [S = F (a, b, c, …)] (see also above) in the symbolic treatment of 
the construction of a concept, Lotze prepared the development of mathematics on the 
basis of logic. Mathematics is a part of logic because concepts contain quantitative 
aspects. The domination of logic over mathematics is not only justified by the 
quantification of concepts but because all knowledge is subordinated to logic. However, 
Lotze’s logicism remained programmatic, but Frege worked it out fully449.  
 
So far all attention was paid to Frege's work, but what about his influence on the early 
Cambridge analytic philosophy. First of all, Frege's significance for the development of 
modern logic cannot be overestimated. The post-Aristotelian logic begins only with 
Frege450. Although Lotze is the link with Leibniz and Kant, and although he himself also 
influenced Frege, the merit of Frege himself was tremendous. 
Next to logic, also in the field of language theory Frege is important. The ideal 
language theory has adopted Frege’s program, although modifying the details. The 
program is as follows: 
1. ‘ Meaningful statements possess an objective conceptual content. 
2. That content is only inadequately represented in ordinary language. 
3. It is possible to design a system of notation in which the conceptual 
content of any statement can be given an adequate and clear expression.’ 451 
After some years of bitter lack of appreciation, suddenly Bertrand Russell was 
interested in Frege’s work in function of his own research. It was the beginning of 
acknowledgement. Through Russsell also Carnap and Wittgenstein became interested in 
his work. Lotze however faded away. But, this does not mean that his influence also did. 
Lotze’s piecemeal re-examination of philosophical problems for instance is also 
explicitly found in Russell’s methodology452. The early Cambridge analytic philosophers 
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also adopted Lotze’s program to get an insight into the all-embracing causal 
connections which constitute the objective world. It lays on the basis of the logical 
constructionalism453. 
Milkov examined the influence of Lotze on respectively Bertrand Russell, George E. 
Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein454, three other giants in philosophy. 
In spite of his disdainful critique on Lotze, Russell dedicated a whole chapter on 
Lotze’s theory of space and substance. He adopted the already mentioned piecemeal 
study of philosophical problems; Lotze’s relationism and connectionism; but not his 
aversion for formalisation in logic. As Lotze he was interested in the order of things, the 
order in space and in time, but also, and here he diverged from Lotze, order in 
mathematics. For Lotze mathematics was but a part of logic. Milkov mentions several 
reasons why Russell of the 1895-1898 was much more neo-Lotzean than neo-Hegelian, 
namely the choice for scientific philosophy itself; the choice of referent philosophers, 
almost all persons strongly influenced by Lotze455 or teachers of Lotze456; the anti-
psychologism457; and of course relationism. After 1898 Russell made his realistic turn 
and Milkov asserts that it was under the direct influence of Lotze. After he attended 
McTaggart’s lectures on Lotze, Russell’s new conception on space, which was already 
prepared by the study of Whitehead’s ‘A Treatise on Universal Algebra’, took a more 
solid form. His mathematical atomism, material atomism of spaceless material points, 
and the relations between them, became an overall realistic, logical atomism, in which 
the material things are real as well as their relations. As to the disagreement with Lotze 
on the question holism/atomism, Milkov argues that this is due to the 
misunderstanding of Lotze’s dialectic458 method of investigation, by Russell. As already 
mentioned Lotze compromised between opposite propositions to finally embrace an 
intermediate position. For Lotze the points in reality mentioned were material, stuffy 
and not absolute, while the relations were not autonomous. Several writers459 however 
uphold that Lotze accepted a form of atomism. Also according to Lotze ‘the priority of 
things over the relations in which they enter is logical, while the priority of the 
relations over the things is ontological.’460 The question of whether there are absolute 
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points is thus much more complex than Russell assumed. The things are located in a 
network of relations.  
Also George E. Moore was directly acquainted with Lotze’s work, especially his 
metaphysics. Milkov discerns four resemblances between them. Firstly he states that 
Lotze was anxious to be in accordance with the common sense (die gewöhnliche Meinung) 
and that this was a leading principle by him. For the sake of completeness Milkov’s 
statement must be moderated. Lotze was concerned with the common sense, but he also 
drew attention to its imperfection, chiefly the conviction that material things are the 
sole reality, a conviction shared by materialists. Secondly, and related to the first 
resemblance, Milkov mentions the contention that logical reasoning is a critical 
elucidation of the ordinary course of presentations. Thirdly, and also related to the two 
previous resemblances, is the fact that Lotze ‘understood his approach as that of 
clearing up the language-usage and common sense, for example, of the word ‘is’’461. That 
is in accordance with the moderation mentioned above. Finally, the fourth resemblance 
Milkov noticed was that Lotze’s philosophy was a down-to-earth realism, directed 
against any form of deductivism. Complementary to these four resemblances Milkov 
also states that the data on which Lotze’s metaphysics is based are 'indefinable', and 
that was exactly the same word used by Moore in his ‘Principia Ethica’. The most 
striking resemblance however is to be found in Moore’s relational theory of 
judgement462, and also for Lotze a judgement expresses a relation between the contents 
of presentations. 
According to Milkov, the influence Wittgenstein underwent from Lotze was rather 
indirect and most likely through Russell, Frege, Alexander and James. He points at some 
correspondence between Lotze’s ‘Logic’ (1874) and Wittgenstein’s ‘Tractatus’ (1922), in 
particular the concept of ‘atomic fact’ (Sachverhalt)463. Moreover Milkov finds it 
astonishing how closely the construction and accountability of the propositions of 
Wittgenstein approaches those of Lotze’s. The pattern of composition in both mind and 
matter is all the same and consists of nets of relations. Also the different forms of 
relations or similar between the two philosophers: colour, space, time and touch. In the 
clause 5.63 Wittgenstein asserts that ‘I am my world. (The microcosm.)’ and the chain of 
assumptions are all of them with a clear pan physical colouring, which corresponds with 
the microcosmology of Lotze, still according to Milkov. Although Lotze’s panentheism 
must not be confound with Wittegenstein's pantheism (God = nature), they are 
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nevertheless very close to each other. Finally, when Wittgenstein said on the 7th of 
October 1916 that the work of art, the good life and the logical are seen sub specie aeterni, 
it also can be brought in accordance with Lotze’s premise that ethics, aesthetic and logic 
all can be related to value. 
3.4.1.7 Influence on personalism. 
The ‘Journal of Speculative Philosophy’, launched by the St. Louis Philosophical Society, 
and the sole American philosophical revue for 25 years, was in the first place aimed at 
making the work of Hegel known, and also did the same for the works of other German 
philosophers: Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Lotze, and others. Moreover, 
it paid much attention to the problem of Darwinism and the relationship between 
science in general and the future of philosophy and religion464. 
That relation will also be the concern of the Boston school, founded by Browne. 
Idealism could survive thanks to the American religious consciousness and it will end as 
theology. Browne will completely change the Methodist attitude toward science. He will 
remove the fear and evangelical contempt for not revealed doctrine465. 
 
 
 
Borden Parker Browne (1847-1910) studied philosophy at the University of New 
York. He pursued his study in Germany and was seduced by Lotze’s idealism, which 
inspired him to develop his personalism. After some activity as a journalist, he 
became a professor at the University of Boston, where he taught till his death. His 
personalist movement had a huge impact on for all Methodist thinking. 
 
 
Lotze wrote in ‘Microcosmos’ that we have left the childish ingenuity of the 
mythological concepts, and that we have dropped the personal natural spirits, but that 
we have at the same time problematisized every form of personal existence. From this 
statement the former pupil of Lotze, the Methodist Borden Parker Bowne of the Boston 
University, came to the conviction that personality is the central concept in philosophy 
and theology. He also interprets Lotze thus that the scientism of modernity is gone to 
far, by mechanising the life of the spirit and in doing so rejecting the immaterial. Lotze 
would have been a convincing defender of human and divine personalism, because he 
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asserted that reality is enclosed in self-consciousness and that the soul, conscious of its 
own unity and self identity, is real. Lotze also rejected the absolute spirit of Hegel in 
front of the indivisible spirit. 
Although the term ‘personalism’ was already introduced in philosophy466, it was 
Bowne who transformed the concept into a central notion of a school of philosophy467; 
and as Lotze he intended to reconcile belief, a Methodist one, with science468. The 
idealistic character of the human soul came in handy in considering the individual 
person and nature, and ipso facto religion and science, as separate. The results of 
science were considered as irrelevant to metaphysics. Nevertheless Bowne did not 
accept evolutionism, for it can but lead to a naturalistic atheism. Personality is not a 
product of evolution and not of abstraction either, but is perceived as a fact. The 
intellect is a first datum, a fundamental idea, which explains all other things, but which 
cannot explain itself. God is an infinite personality. Lotze on the contrary never was 
plainly opposed to evolutionism; on the contrary, several of his utterances did go into 
the direction of evolutionism. 
Kevin Schmiesing469 mentions470 the most important members of the second 
generation of the Boston Personalistic School: Edgard S. Brightman (1884-1953); Albert 
C. Knudson (1873-1953), of whom Schmiesing gives some more details as an example of 
personalistic thinking of the group; Francis J. McConnell (1871-1953); George Albert Coe 
(1861-1951); and Ralph T. Flewelling (1871-1960) of the University of Southern 
California, who edited ‘The Personalist’, a revue that functions as the forum for 
American personalism; and of the third generation: L. Harold De Wolf (1905-1986) and 
Walter Georg Muelder (1907-). Schmiesing also describe the European branch of 
personalism and the contemporary convergences with the American branch. 
The idealistic personalism translates itself into a metaphysic in which the only reality 
is the personal one, which must be spiritual. But this is but possible in a dualistic 
perspective. Unlike the absolute idealists, who claim the identity between reality and 
thought, personal idealism surely sees thought as valid for reality, but detached from it; 
and that is a Lotzean viewpoint. Knudson articulates it in a subtle manner by saying that 
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man does not make reality but find it. The unknowability of nature means that all 
knowledge rests on faith, which diminishes empirism as an empiricism. 
The German personalism was brought about through the phenomenology of Husserl, 
who pays tribute to the influence of Lotze. Max Scheler and Edith Stein are the 
representatives of personalism presented by Schmiesing. That decision is inspired by 
the focus of both thinkers on the person.  
A somewhat particular place is taken by William L. Stern (1871-1938)471 with his 
irrational personalistic metaphysic, related to Lotze’s ‘Microcosmos’. The term ‘person’ 
receives a very broad signification and encompasses every creature which is gifted with 
a functional directed ability to act. The ordering of all created beings leads to a synthesis 
of causality and a teleological whole, supplemented with a value theory, which 
transforms the value concept of the Badener School into a realistic one.  
French personalism followed a somewhat separate development. But also from there 
an influence from Lotze is discernable. French thinkers like Renouvier, Fouillé and 
Boutroux took note of him472. Schmiesig lets begin the French personalism with Charles 
Renouvier, but Gabriel Marcel, Emmanuel Mounier and Jacques Maritain are the most 
important and realistic personalists. Gabriel Marcel (1888-1973) is known as an 
existentialist, but because he emphasizes intersubjectivity he can be placed in 
connection with personalism. Didn’t he say ‘Metaphysics is your fellowman’ (La 
métaphysique, c’est le prochain), while Sartre said: ‘Hell is the others’ (L’enfer, c’est les 
autres)473. Mounier (1905-1950) labelled himself as a personalist. The person is an 
embodied existence, and sociality is in his nature. The latter unfortunately lead him to 
accept coercion and totalitarianism. Also politically ‘wrong’ and a friend of Mounier, 
Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) attacked individualism and promoted interpersonal 
relations based on a fundamental love. It is the French personalism that will influence 
the personalism of the American Dorothy Day (1897-1980), through Peter Maurin (1877-
1949), and not her American predecessors.  
Poland joins German philosophy again. Roman Ingarden was a student of Husserl and 
introduced phenomenology in the Jagiellonian University of Krakow. His pupil Karol 
Wojtyla, the later Pope John Paul II, adopted the results of his phenomenological 
analysis of human action. As  for all personalists the relation to others is central, but an 
independent core is preserved, which is the source of human action and the basis of 
freedom and responsibility. Here an opposite political position than that of the French 
personalists is adopted, namely against Nazism and Communism. The debate goes on: 
was Wojtyla’s ‘The Acting Person’ a personalistic or a Thomistic piece of writing. 
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The paragraph of personalism can be closed with a reference to an edition of the 
Leuven journal ‘Ethical Perspectives’474. In it Luk Bouckaert mentions Amartya Sen, who 
displays a tendency to personalism in economics. But all this is already far removed 
from Lotze’s thinking. 
3.4.2 Influence in some special fields 
Most of the influences in special fields have been discussed in the previous chapter in 
the context of the influences on the different philosophical movements, but to show 
them to their full advantage some are resumed here. Of course many more special fields 
could be discerned, but they received ample attention already. 
Of the influence on physiology and psychology is not treated, but it is nevertheless 
useful to mention that Lotze, like Weber, Fechner and Wundt passed the modern 
scientific attitude in research in the field of the physiology of the senses, introduced by 
Johannes Müller (1801-1858) and continued by Helmholtz475. 
3.4.2.1 Influence in ethics 
In the German tradition, Lotze was primarily occupied with metaphysical problems, 
while ethics was not his core business, although he intended to pay much more 
intention to it, a plan which could not be accomplished. Though he did not fully work 
out an ethical work, his concept of value was important for the further development of 
ethical thought. Proper to Lotze is that he founds his metaphysics on ethics.  
According to Commers476 Lotze did connect a sentimental doctrine of value and ethics 
to the integrating action of the feelings, a concept introduced by Kant. One can say that 
also in Ethics Lotze played an intermediate role. To that can be added that, by the 
special interpretation of the Platonic ideas, a region of values, independent of the 
human appreciation, holds. As for Plato also for Lotze, this realm of the good is cached 
by man in the daily interactions.  
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Merz477 detects some resemblances between the writings of Thomas Hill Green (1836-
1882), a contemporary of Lotze and an influential English moral thinker of the 19th 
century, and that of Lotze, namely in the metaphysical field and also in defining reality 
as a system of relations. Kraushaar478 on the contrary calls Lotze a respected and 
challenging teacher in the face of a whole generation, while Merz tends to explain the 
resemblances through the same educational background, the similar circumstances in 
which they developed their ideas, and their related viewpoint. Anyhow, one of the 
differences between Lotze and Green is that Green was revolted against the intolerant 
and uncompromising manner in which Christian metaphysics was expressed in 
orthodox literature, although both sought to bring harmony in the religious convictions 
and the (independent) sciences479. The most striking affinity between Lotze and Green is 
the primacy of morality. Ethics cannot be derived from any fact or reasoning, but is a 
basal datum. Merz480 also points to the fact that Lotze did not break into the English 
ethics, because his ethics were restricted to the individual, while in English thinking the 
sociological dimension was stressed under the new interest in culture, society and the 
State.  
Merz481 continues by his approved method of comparison, without putting forward a 
direct influence, to compare Lotze with Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), also an influential 
moral thinker. The first similarities mentioned are very abstract however and could be 
applied to many other thinkers also, but they are nevertheless real:  
I. the intention to scrutinize existing theories; 
II. a sceptical attitude as to the capacities of the human mind to solve the 
fundamental philosophical problems; 
III. the rejection of the origins of a phenomenon to explain it. 
Both thinkers differ in their ethical positions. Lotze places his whole system in the 
acceptation of an ultimate Good, while Sidgwick, in the English tradition prefers the 
common-sense and experience as the ultimate judge. Also typically English is the 
utilitarian and social completion of a hedonistic personal interpretation of the moral 
sense by Sidgwick. 
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3.4.2.2 Influence in theology 
Although Lotze was not interested in theology, his epistemology and philosophy of 
religion were important in the history of Protestant theology. The main contribution 
however is due to his idea of personality482. 
The paramount influence is represented by Albrecht Ritschl. Ritschl (1822-1889) a 
colleague of Lotze in Göttingen, was an influential German theologian, although evoking 
a lot of criticism. Ever since his appointment as a professor of theology in Göttingen in 
1864, he started to introduce elements of Lotze’s philosophy in his theology. Especially 
Lotze’s epistemology was significant. It led him to the statement that man only know 
things in there activity. It leads him away from Lotze, in so far as it was a sort of 
pragmatism avant la lettre and an a-metaphysical statement. Later on, Albrecht Ritschl 
is known for the emphasis he put on the community of the faithful. 
Lotze’s spiritual view on the value theory, which is opposed to the naturalistic one, 
and which lay the value of something in the thing itself as worth to exist, was also taken 
over in theology via Ritschl483. The influence of Lotze is especially present in Ritschl’s 
‘Theology and Metaphysics’ of 1881484. 
Ritschl could glory on a large circle of enthusiastic followers. His ideas continue 
working in contemporary liberal Protestant theology. Magazines which saw the light at 
that time still appear today: ‘Theologische Literaturzietung’485, and ‘Zietschrift für Theologie 
und Kirche’486. Ritschl launched a theological renovation that not yet spent its force, even 
in modernistic Roman Catholic theology487. 
According to Merz488 Lotze’s teaching influenced theological literature in Germany, 
but also in England and America, gradually and almost imperceptibly. The idea of 
personality stands in the centre of it489. For Lotze the personality is constituted by the 
mental process in which past experiences are connected to the awareness of the unity 
in consciousness, and cannot be fully explained by the contrast between the self and the 
not-self. The full personality is present in the Absolute or the Infinite. ‘Finite beings are 
only endowed with imperfect or partial personality, with so much of it as has been 
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bestowed upon them through the Infinite Source of their separate finite existence’490. 
Reminding Lotze’s distinction between the contingent world of things and the spiritual 
world of values, is Balfour’s contention that the world of scientific research is a world 
artificially created by the human mind491. For Balfour, a British personality, some 
fundamental convictions must exist to found a philosophy of religion and that is also 
the viewpoint of Lotze492. Furthermore for both of them it is impossible to build up a 
philosophical system upon a purely rational principle, because the confused and 
contradictory body of thought furnished by science on the one side and by common-
sense on the other, imparted by the unifying and harmonising action of philosophy, 
does not allow so493. 
As already described494 another ancient student of Lotze, the Reverend Borden Parker 
Bowne was a leading and very popular figure in the Methodist Church. He had a huge 
impact on Methodism. 
In general, except for Ritschl and Bowne, to establish a direct influence is not always 
possible, but, as Merz frequently noticed, clear similarities allow the conclusion that 
there is an indirect influence or at least there are a lot of similarities.  
3.4.2.3 Influence in aesthetics 
In the ‘Kritik der Urteilskraft’ (1790) Immanuel Kant had stated that to bring the manifold 
under a uniting denominator neither a reason nor an ethic principle is at work, but the 
aesthetic ability495. The aesthetic judgment perceives the finality of an object thanks to a 
sensation of pleasure or displeasure496. That aesthetic pleasure is disinterested, and at 
the same time universal497, but neither the judgment of the beautiful nor the sublime 
can claim the status of knowledge498.  
Lotze’s views on aesthetics are for all expressed in his ‘History of Aesthetics in 
Germany’ (1868), but also in ‘Microcosmos’, ‘Encyclopaedia’, and ‘Introduction to 
Philosophy’. The work ‘History’ presents, as mentioned earlier, the development of 
aesthetic thought from Kant, over Hegel and Weisse up to Lotze himself. Also the 
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viewpoints of Schelling were important to Lotze. Notable for instance is Lotze’s remark 
that ‘Hegel must have forgotten what Schelling said (…) that the beautiful in nature 
might be the key to her deeper significance.’499 The relation between art en religion was 
discussed by Hegel, Weisse, a teacher of Lotze, and Lotze himself.  
According to Merz500 Lotze did not receive the attention on the part of the historians 
which he deserves in matters of aesthetics. He ascribes it to the critics Von Hartmann 
and Schasler, who allege that Lotze did not bring any new insight and that it was but an 
exposition of Weisse’s ideas. Erdmann on the contrary uncovered significant differences 
between Schelling and Lotze. Unlike Schelling Lotze maintains that without a conflict 
between what is and what ought to be, the beautiful could not exist. 
Furthermore Merz501 notices a fundamental change in treating aesthetics in Germany, 
and he ascribes it to the writings of Herbart, who did not treat the subject exhaustively, 
but stimulated his pupils in doing so. The turn holds a psychological treatment of the 
subject and the connection between aesthetics and ethics. As well R. Vischer as Theodor 
Lipps, two important thinkers of Aesthetics, trace the beginning of the notion of 
‘aesthetic sympathy’ (Einfühlung)502 back to Lotze’s ‘History of Aesthetics’ and also his 
‘Microcosmos’. Although Lotze did not agree with Herbart’s aesthetics, he nevertheless 
appreciates his introduction of the notion of value, replacing Kant’s notion of ‘purpose’. 
Although the concept ‘value’ can be understood as in the extension of the meaning of 
Kant’s concept of ‘purpose’, because it expresses its purpose in itself, it opens the door 
to bringing together the aesthetical and the ethical.  
3.4.2.4 Influence on the system theory 
Although the system theory today covers a broad range of disciplines from single 
organisms to society as a whole, and also informational artefacts, it originated in the 
discipline of biology. The well known standard work is von Bertalanffy’s ‘General 
System Theory’ (1968).  
Following Pester503 the origin of Bertalanffy’s system theory is to find in Lotze’s 
writings, though a direct proof cannot be given. Nevertheless the parallelism of the 
basic outlook and concept formation is striking. Moreover, Lotze’s lectures were 
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actively attended and his publications were read frequently. Consequently many of his 
concepts became common and were taken over without any reference to its origin. Still 
following Pester Lotze was the co-constructor of a reservoir of ideas which was fed and 
also utilised in a creative way by many generations.  
As to the system theory itself, for Lotze an organism is able to maintain itself under 
the action of outside influences. Moreover, an organism needs such influences. The 
encumbrances are necessary for their survival. In other words they found the functions 
of life. Two different disturbing elements are the metabolic action and the impact of 
consciousness. The first is completely determined by cause and effect, the second, in 
Lotze’s dualistic vision, can influence the natural course of things. Special attention is 
given to the soul, with its knowing, emotional and striving function; and which acts on 
the physical system in an accidental way. The power of a living thing would vanish 
rapidly if any action from outside would stop. Lotze also warns against a sacralisation of 
life forms. There is nothing mysterious in living nature. 
By extension Lotze adopts the system theory on the world as a whole. It is his 
monism in opposition to Herbart’s pluralism. In metaphysic terms Lotze qualifies his 
philosophy as a teleological idealism, in which the ideas are not real existent things but 
principles who govern the processes of the world. Pester504 designates Lotze’s ‘Naturidee’ 
as an information system, giving them a present-day qualification. 
3.4.2.5 Influence on the value theory 
Kant had defined the beautiful as having its purpose within itself. Herbart substituted 
the term ‘purpose’ by the term ‘value’, but did not elaborate it further. Lotze on the 
contrary did, by contrasting the region of values or worth with that of facts or things 
and that of laws or relations. According to Merz it was for the first time that these 
distinctions were made; and also for the first time a ‘fairly comprehensive vocabulary 
wherein to express the doctrines of a science of value, or as it has been more recently 
termed, as Axiology.’505 Moreover Lotze did not only distinguish the three regions he 
also connected them to each other506. In other words he gave the concept of value a 
place in his metaphysical system. 
Values are not solely intrinsic, but occur as a result of pleasure and displeasure, 
generated by a receptivity of the feelings by the mind507. Lotze detached the values from 
the feelings, but states that in every day experiences the values are known, thanks to 
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the feelings. This interpretation resembles Plato’s ideas, but for Plato the ideas were 
transcendent, for Lotze the values are transcendental. Therefore they are also detached 
from sciences. Value theory has the same status as mathematics and the a priori forms 
of knowledge. In Dewey’s terms the value expressions would be ‘only utterances’508. 
Lotze’s definition of values could evoke an ambiguous interpretation, although not 
necessarily. In any case it did generate a double interpretation, one that went in the 
direction of the feelings, another of the a priori forms.  
Windelband’s interpretation was based on psychology. For him values are bound to 
the psychological conditions of experience. Value ‘is never found in the object itself as a 
property. It consists in a relation to an appreciating mind, which satisfies the desires of 
its will or reacts in feelings of pleasure upon the stimulation of the environment. Take 
away will and feeling and there is no such thing as value.’509 
In Lotze’s thinking the concept ‘value’ takes an important place and it will give rise to 
a value debate, which is still going; the start of axiology510 and the introduction of the 
term ‘value’ in social life. As already established in the quantitative approach to Lotze’s 
influence, the publications with value as object were numerous, from about 1903 
onward.  
Windelband attracted the attention to the role of the concept of value in Lotze’s logic 
and metaphysics and quoted it as a new and fundamental philosophical doctrine511. 
The economic value theory preceded the philosophical one. The developments were 
already sketched in the ‘Historical Context’. Although Lotze’s value theory is inspired on 
Kant, there is also a direct link to the economic value theory. Lotze, who did not attack 
Marxism directly, did certainly not belong to the socialist camp. Hence it is very 
probable that he had the intention to introduce an epistemologically more fundamental 
approach of the value theory. Marx, although he borrowed the significance of economic 
value from the Classic (Liberal) School, finally gave it a socialist significance. If the value 
of a product is incorporated labour, then labour must be valued. Moreover, value 
theories deal with the same problems, such as subjectivity, universalism, and so on.  
German economic thinking was empiric and inductive in contrast to the British one, 
and counted itself to the positive sciences. Roscher for instance reproached Ricardo for 
his system being idealistic, a statement that is certainly not inspired by the German 
philosophy of his time. Also in theology the term ‘value’ was not yet assimilated. As a 
protestant theologian Ritschl512 noticed that the expression ‘value’, let alone the value 
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judgment, is absent in Luther’s work and was introduced by Kant. In his ‘Grundlegung zur 
Metaphysik der Sitten’ (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals) Kant says that 
everything has either a price or a value where goals are concerned. 
According to Schnädelbach513, and he calls for the support of all present day 
historians, it was the provoking catch-phrase of Nietzsche, namely the ‘Umwertung aller 
Werte’ (revaluation of all values) which caused the boom effect of the concept of value. 
The success of the concept ‘value’ was strengthened by the value theoretical 
interpretation of the cultural sciences by Rickert and Max Weber and by the debates on 
value judgements in social sciences. That a philosophical giant as Nietzsche had and has 
a huge impact, is undeniable and that he impressed moral thinking by his catch-phrase 
‘cannot be denied’. Nevertheless it was Lotze who slowly but surely in an academic way, 
influenced the South-west German School, of which Rickert was a member, and through 
him, Max Weber and the social sciences. Moreover Lotze’s influence was of a 
fundamental epistemological nature, while Nietzsche approached the values in a socio-
historical manner. The problem within social sciences was epistemological, while 
Rickert, who was influenced by Lotze via Windelband, then was occupied with socio-
historical culture. Besides, Nietzsche was familiar with Lotze’s value theory, because he 
relies explicitly on it to develop his concept of perspectivism. Nietzsche was about 27 
years younger than Lotze when he wrote his ‘Der Wille zur Macht: Versuch einer Umwertung 
aller Werte’ (The Will to Power: An Attempt to Revaluate All Values) in 1901. 
The universality of values stated by Lotze is interpreted by Windelband as a standard 
transcending the individual appreciation. An absolute mind is postulated. He speaks of 
‘the sovereignty of a transcendent rational order’ and by that he means God514. To 
Rickert the world of values is even more a world on its own than it is for Lotze and 
Windelband. The judgment, which is an appreciation, does in no sense constitute the 
value, even if we accept that we esteem knowledge as a value. For meaning and truth 
are validities which ought to be affirmed, but they are not our own creations. The 
objectivity and transcendence of value is its validity.515 
Eduard Spranger516 (1882-1963), a pupil of Dilthey, the successor of Lotze in Berlin, 
was also working with values. He holds that a psychological structure can best be 
considered as a system of values and to understand a situation is for all catching the 
sense or in other words situating it into a system of values. 
The sociologist Georg Simmel (1858-1918) was influenced by the idealism of the 
Marburger School and the value theory of the Badener School. He interprets the a priori 
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in a psychological manner however, which lead him to a rejection of objective 
knowledge517. To stress the consciousness on the part of individuals in his sociological 
theory means that he belongs to the agency-interpretation of sociology which is 
opposed to the holistic one. There exists only the individual human being and ‘what 
Simmel calls ‘sociation’ is located in the mind, so that society is a unity of cognition.518’ 
After 1900 Simmel accepts next to a psychological reality also an epistemological a 
priori. It is the holding (gelten) of the concepts, logical forms and laws of nature, but also 
‘ideal claims’ (ideale Forderungen), which means an objective need (sollen) in the relation 
soul-world and which adopt a supra-personal and supra-worldly order. Above the 
subjective psychological events an objective world of norms raises519. The objectified 
values and norms give rise to fixed forms of culture. Simmel approaches thus very close 
to Lotze. 
In the Netherlands the value theory of Rickert was adopted by A. J. de Sopper (1875-
1960)520. His approach of the concept of value still clearly resembles that of Lotze. Values 
have an absolute validity, independent from every factuality, and from subjective and 
inter-individual dispositions. Different from Lotze is that he believes that philosophy 
does no longer have to search for a transcendent truth, but must be restricted to the 
realm of values. By affirming the values as normative for life, man elevates his life to a 
spiritual one, but only religion can complete it.  
Another Dutchman, H. J. Pos (1898-1955), who studied at Heidelberg, a centre of the 
Badener School521, and who started as a philologist, adopted Rickert’s value theory in his 
thesis ‘Zur Logik der Sprachwissenschaft’ (1921) (To the Logic of Linguistics). It was 
directed against psychological and historical relativity of facts of language. 
Gerard Heymans522 (1857-1930), who studied under Windelband and who applied 
himself to experimental psychology, conceived a special completion of psychologism. 
He brought together experimental psychology with the a priori starting point of 
idealism in investigating the psychological conditions of the a priori in order to isolate 
these a priori elements. His metaphysics was related to Fechner’s, a teacher of Lotze. He 
accepted the existence of a reality outside and stated that all contents of observation 
come from a reality outside though arising within consciousness. Nothing, however, can 
be said about that which is outside. An idealistic viewpoint similar to that of Lotze. 
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In England Sorley, an adept of the so called ‘personal idealism’, for instance shows a 
likeness with Rickert’s distinction between the factual and the valuable, but both meet 
each other in the human personality, subordinated to the deity523.  
The French idealist René Le Senne (1882-1954) did undergo the influence of German 
value theory in his ‘Obstacle et valeur’ (1935) (Obstacle and Value). God is thought of as 
infinite value, source of all values524.  
The second Austrian School of value had Franz Brentano, Christian Ehrenfels, and 
Alexius Meinong as eminent representatives. Under the influence of the scientific 
climate they no longer searched for metaphysic or speculative answers. To safeguard 
the objectivity of values however, Brentano had to introduce the concept of evidential 
knowledge. By the absence of metaphysical accountability the psychological account for 
valuating threatened to lead to psychologism and subjectivity525. But by accepting an 
objective standard Brentano’s value theory again came close to Lotze’s a priori 
conception of values. The solution Ehrenfels gave to the subjectivity and relativism of 
values, which for him depended on desire, was less absolute; but there was still some 
uniformity in valuating because of ‘feeling-dispositions’, a sort of pre-established 
behaviour patterns and of the unconscious mechanisms of evolution526. Meinong 
returned closer to Lotze, still being restricted to the psychological framework of course, 
by reintroducing the feelings and making the judgement, which provide the connection 
between the value-feeling and the value-object, an integral part of them. The objectivity 
is partly safeguarded by the reference to the reality of the object valuated527. Moreover, 
Meinong introduces several distinctions in the act of judging which made him able to 
surpass the subjectivity and affirm the values as real and normative. 
The theory of value has been introduced into theology by Albrecht Ritschl528 as 
already stated. 
The concept value has become part of contemporary psychological and sociological 
thought. There are two main examples of this incorporation, one at the individual level 
by the atheistic-humanistic philosopher, Jaap Kruithof529; the other one on the social 
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level by the Catholic sociologist, Jan Kerkhofs530. For Kruithof, something of value, either 
real or fictional, is appreciated because it is beter that it exists than it does not, in the 
past, the present or the future.  The valued object, the value-oriented striving, and value 
itself, presume a valuating subject531.  
3.4.2.6 Influence on genetics 
As already mentioned in ‘2.2. The historical context’ some ideas of Lotze fit in very well 
with Darwinism. He talks about illegal forms of nature, by which he has phenotypic 
variation532 in mind. These illegal forms could, as a result of lucky circumstances, lead to 
new legal forms. Therefore it is necessary that these forms are transmitted to a later 
generation. But he adds that in the contemporary world no such observations have been 
made in the higher organisms. All in all, this statement remains on the mechanical level 
and does not alter the fact that in the end creation is the only acceptable explanation of 
the existence of the world and the world order. As to the difference between the organic 
and inorganic beings he states that both are submitted to the laws of physics and 
chemistry, but that it seems unlikely that the first pattern of the elements could be re-
engendered, according to a statement in 1851533. This statement does not contradict 
Darwinism however, for in 'Microcosmos' of 1856 he gives some further explanations. 
The reason why man is incapable to reproduce the complexity of the different life 
forms, is a lack of knowledge. Nature has undergone changes during a huge amount of 
time, and under the effect of already existent organic forces. It would be impossible for 
man to reproduce them534. Isn’t that Darwinism? Moreover, Pester is very surprised to 
find, in the same 'Microcosmos' of 1856 which is nine years before the publication of 
Mendel's ‘Versuch über die Pflanzenhybriden’, which was not understood by his 
contemporaries, that there is an uninterrupted chain of substances which are bound to 
the smallest elements and which are transmitted during reproduction. Miescher 
published only in 1871 about his ‘Nuclein’, and Mendel’s laws were to be rediscovering in 
1900. Pester also gives an account of Lotze’s input in the development of genetics, via 
Weismann who studied Medicine in Göttingen from 1852 till 1856535.  
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3.5 Why did Lotze disappear from the foreground? 
According to Milkov536, but in the context of Logic, the reason why Lotze disappeared 
from the foreground is that there was a deplorable ignorance about the history of 
philosophy of that period; for instance a lot of anti-Hegelian philosophers thought Lotze 
was a Hegelian, although he was a due critic of Hegel; and, as to the theoretical grounds, 
the general acceptance of Lotze’s ideas about logic became so common that their origin 
was overlooked.  
Merz537 ascribes the diluting of the interest in Lotze’s work to the fact that he was the 
only thinker since Leibniz who had an equal knowledge of the sciences of nature and of 
those of the mind, which he kept separate; the dualistic character of his thoughts; his 
cautiousness which made him appear inconclusive; and the fact that the philosophical 
public was interested in formal logic and history, which was not the case for Lotze. 
 
 
 
WHY DID LOTZE DISAPPEAR FROM THE FOREGROUND? 
 
- His ideas became so common that they also became detached from their mastermind. 
- The World War was responsible for anti-German feelings and a devaluation of German 
cultural achievements took place. 
- Lotze did not found a school and his deserving pupils displayed a critical 
independence. 
- Realism repressed idealism. 
- Phenomenology undermined neo-Kantianism. 
- Lotze was often misinterpreted. 
- By the separation of theology and philosophy Lotze’s idea of the Absolute moved to 
theology, where it was absorbed. 
- The anti-metaphysic premises of positivism left no room for Lotze’s speculations. 
- The history of philosophy was neglected and Lotze was not re-taken afterwards. 
- A combination of these reasons. 
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The World War generated a passionate hate and laceration in Europe. Anti-German 
feelings did not discriminate between valuable cultural achievements and destructive 
realizations. Just at the time the rise of Lotze’s fame took place, it was stopped without 
having the opportunity to last. 
According to Pierson538 the absence of the formation of a school is due to the thoroughly 
eclectic characteristics of Lotze’s philosophy. According to Stumpf however, it is due to 
the not dogmatic openness of his philosophising and also the individuality and nobility 
of his style539. 
In addition the rise of realism in the Anglo-Saxon world, as well as in Germany, 
dampened the further development of idealism. 
In Germany Alois Riehl’s (1844-1924) realism was restricted to an epistemological 
approach, and was not a metaphysical one. It was Oswald Külpke who was the leading 
man, and also Erich Becher and Max Frischeisen-Köhler are related to the upraise of 
realism540. It was a critical realism because it did not accept the naïve common sense, 
but sought for a substantiated assumption of the value of reality. The Ding an sich was no 
longer rejected and the restriction of knowledge to a construction of the mind was 
called in question. It was for all the credibility of science which was at stake. 
The foundations of critical realism were laid by Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906) in 
his ‘Kritische Grundlegung des transcendentalen Realismus’ (Critical Foundations of 
Transcendental Realism), ‘Das Grundproblem der Erkenntnistheorie’ (The Fundamental 
Problem of Epistemology), and ‘Kategorienlehre’ (The Doctrine of Categories)541.  
Some misconceptions must be avoided however. Realism does not mean materialism. 
Events are real, but they are not necessarily material. Moreover realism is not always a 
static concept, all what is real also changes permanently and finally not everything is 
fully knowable. For instance, the concept ‘causality’ cannot be explained fully. The 
different levels of reality, the physical, the psychical and the spiritual may not be mixed 
up. They require an adapted approach542. 
Oswald Külpke’s (1862-1915) ‘realiserung’ means that because the cause of our 
knowledge is outside (causal argument), observation independent of will is possible 
hence there must be data outside (substrate argument), and the objects existed before 
observation and still exist afterwards (continuity argument), an objective reality outside 
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must exist and it is knowable by a rational activity which scrutinizes the data of 
experience.  
Erich Becher (1882-1929) was first of all a biologist who accepted a supra-individual 
factor of life which is necessary to explain the efficiency. A remainder of pre-Darwinism. 
But interesting for the rise of realism is his acceptance of a reality outside and this 
reality is knowable. The concepts of law, causality, quantity, time and space correspond 
to an objective substratum.  
Max Frischeisen-Köhler’s critique on the idealistic Marburger School consists in 
emphasizing the ‘Erlebnis’ (experience) as source of knowledge, something of pure 
reason cannot attain. Science has to analyse the function and content of that 
experience. 
The rise of realism was in the first place an Anglo-Saxon matter. Next to the 
developments in science it could also revert to an empirical tradition. So, idealism was 
attacked by neo-realism, which was related to the study of mathematics, in which Frege, 
although still strongly dependent on Lotze, played a huge role. It is not correct to say 
that Lotze himself caused the demolition of his own thinking, but some reactions to his 
viewpoint, whether or not through others, certainly did. Also, the positive sciences, 
primarily physics and its focus on experience and its stringent methodology, but also 
the attention paid to detailed investigation, were the reasons why realism was adhered 
to. Metaphysics and religion did not fall within the scope of their attention, unless to 
criticize it. 
Not directly linked to realism, but nevertheless not strange to it, the upcoming 
sociological interest and the utilitarian influence on political thinking, was more 
focused on objective morality embedded in culture, society, and State, than on the 
personal responsibility543. 
 
 
Common sense 
 
A whole of views shared by almost everybody for instance that there is a reality 
outside shared with other thinking men.  
 
Störig, 1990:316 
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Sassen544 quotes at first Stradworth Halloway Hodgson (1832-1912). Hodgson rejects 
psychologism but emphasizes that the first data of experience are facts and things, not 
the self as subject of experience. Internal and external experience refer to an object 
which is detached from the object itself. The object plays a crucial role in the rise of 
knowledge. Although material things are the certain basis for realism, their 
contribution to knowledge is but a meagre one. Perhaps there is an underlying 
unknown reality, which forms one unity with the observable world, and is more 
fundamental.  
Also Robert Adamson’s545 (1852-1902) critical realism evolves into an approach in which 
experience takes a primordial importance in the constitution of knowledge. Subject and 
object determine each other in the process in which knowledge comes forward, but the 
knowledge itself is no longer identical with original experience. From Kant he borrows 
spatiality, temporality and causality as the most original concepts in that process. 
The beginning of  genuine history of neo-realism546 dates back to 1903 with an article 
from George Edward Moore (1873-1958)547,548, ‘The Refutation of Idealism’, in which he 
‘showed that the Berkeleian proposition ‘esse est percipi’ (te be is to be perceived) is false, 
and so put paid to the phenomenalist basis of all idealist philosophies.’549 In ‘A Defence 
of Common Sense’ (1925) he based his realism on common sense against idealism and 
scepticism; and gave his realism a dramatic aspect when he presented his ‘Proof of an 
External World’ (1939). During this presentation he raised his right hand and said: ‛Here 
is one hand“, and than he raised his left saying ‛And here is another“, concluding that 
there are at least two external objects in the world, and hence that the external world 
exists. 
The problem of an object which is not observed by somebody and thus does not exist 
in that moment was already known by Lotze, who said that this object is something and 
not nothing, because it can be abstracted from the object of a representation, but tit is 
not in the sense that it corresponds to a sensual thing as accepted in everyday life550. 
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Moore’s ‘ice and water’: 
 
A man sees a recipient filled with water, he falls asleep and awaked he sees the 
recipient filled with ice. For Berkeley the only thing the man could know is two 
different states of water and he can only conclude that the water suddenly 
changed into ice. Moore says the water still existed when the man was asleep, 
even if it was not perceived, so that he can conclude that the water gradually 
changed into ice. 
 
Levy, 1979:159-160 
 
‘G. E. Moore once accused idealists of holding that trains only have wheels while they 
are in stations, on the ground that passengers cannot see the wheels while they remain 
in the train.’551 Apart from his ability to present a graphic description of his ideas, Moore 
was known for his ability to analyse problems, and to trace wrong conclusions and 
ambiguities552. As to values, Moore holds the realistic opinion that they are essential 
characteristics of things. Fritz Heinemann criticizes that old substance-attribute-
scheme, because values have to do with valuating, not with essences in things, and are 
primarily related to persons553.  
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), as many Anglo-Saxon thinkers, shows a discontinuity in 
the development of his ideas. He revised several times his viewpoint in consequence of 
new critical investigations554. Sassen distinguished three periods555. The first period, the 
period of the ‘Philosophical Essays’ (1910), is characterised by a stringent mathematical 
method. From axioms a system, restricted to the a priori, is logically deduced. In a 
second period he paid more and more attention to the empirical reality and he dragged 
in the concept of common sense. His aversion to system building, and to the notion of 
truth of pragmatism and idealism increased. Knowledge is build up by sense-data and 
sensibilia. The sensibilia are the objects of observation and are not really different from 
the sense-data. The sense-data are what appears to awareness. Both are objective and 
form the constitutive last elements of the physical world. Knowledge depends on 
corporal factors: organs, nerves, and brain. Although it is not provable, he initially 
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accepted the existence of sensory things, but afterwards he declined it, with as reason 
‘the razor of Ockham’556. The knowledge of facts and the conclusions depending on them 
suffice. In the third period Russell develops his ‘logical atomism’. The physical world is 
composed of events, which are neither material nor spiritual and which are in relation 
with each other. This resembles Lotze’s viewpoint, doesn’t it? The object of physics is a 
dematerialised world; psychology is the science of behaviour. Russell’s contributor to 
the ‘Principia Mathematica’, Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) combines his 
mathematical insights with physics and even theology557. He was influenced by Henri 
Bergson558, borrowed from him the concept of creativity, and developed a religious 
tinted metaphysics559. 
Thomas Percy Nunn (1870-1944) rejects the distinction between primary and 
secondary properties. He states that the goal of science is practical, the control of the 
world by the mind560. At the university of Cambridge several thinkers joint the realist 
trend, with of course some divergences: Abraham Wolf (1876-1948); Charly Dunbar 
Broad (1887-1971), who developed a descriptive ethics; and John Laird (1887-1946). In 
Oxford the rise of realism was impeded by Hegelianism, which was dominant561. John 
Cook Wilson (1849-1915) could invert the trend, followed by Horace William Brindley 
Joseph (1867-1943), Harold Arthur Pritchard (1871-1947) and William David Ross (1877-
1971). Their realism differed from that of Cambridge in the way by which they founded 
it. They did not rely on empirism but on pure rational arguments. 
Last but not least, Samuel Alexander (1877-1971), professor at the university of 
Manchester, can be added to the list. His epistemology is neo-realistic562. 
In American universities563 an objectivistic idealism was prominently present and 
successfully countered pragmatism, which was considered as subjectivist and therefore 
not suited to a scientific purpose. The counter attack came from en even more 
expressed objectivism. In science the neo-realists also put the relations between things 
outside the subject. In 1910 Ralph B. Perry begins with an accusation directed against 
idealism in his ‘The Ego-centric Predicament’ in which he explains that what the 
idealists are saying is that every thing is already known and that what is known is 
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known, in other words it is impossible that metaphysics depends on a theory of 
knowledge.  
On American neo-realism can be stuck an exact date, namely also 1910, with the 
proclamation of ‘A Program and First Platform of Six Realists’. The six realists were: 
Ralph Barton Perry, Edwin B. Holt, W. P. Montague, W. B. Pitkin, E. G. Spaulding and W. 
T. Marvin. In 1912 they also founded a school and collectively published ‘The New 
Realism: Cooperative Studies in Philosophy’. Their aim was manifestly anti-idealistic in 
rejecting the introspective and intuitionistic philosophy and in promoting the scientific 
methods. Yet their movement was not entirely independent from Lotze, because they 
went back to the pragmatism of James, a well known pupil of Lotze. Although it was not 
entirely in a Lotzean way. From James they borrowed the idea that consciousness is not 
a substance, but a function and that previous to the distinction between mind and body, 
there was a pure experience which was neither spiritual nor physic. So the Cartesian 
dualism, a core idea of Lotze’s idealism, was put aside, but the concept of function 
somewhat recalls Lotze’s anti-substance position in science, his concept ‘gelten’, and his 
description of the object of physics with its stress on relations and laws.  
Three theses are put forward by the neo-realists. 
 
o It is wrong to deduce the nature of reality from knowledge (This ego-centric 
predicament is the existential argument). 
o There are universals which do not depend on the consciousness of them, and 
which are not empirically observable, but which are logically recognizable (7 + 5 = 
12; this argument is substantial and platonic. The universals exist even when they 
are not observed.). 
o Knowledge has nothing to do with transcendence or the supernatural, but it 
belongs to the same world as its object. It is presentative realism in opposition to the 
representative realism and Cartesian epistemology. This thesis will disperse the neo-
realists in a right and a left wing, but that goes beyond the scope of this 
investigation. 
 
The realism of the critical realists is different from that of the neo-realists, although 
they recognize the historic significance of the latter. They do not agree that the 
representations are identical with reality, but they affirm the following statements. 
 
1. The things outside do exist but they are not known in their physical essence. 
They manifest themselves to our senses. The physical world is asserted but not 
inferred. 
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2. The things that provoke a sensorial impression also provoke an internal intuitive 
perception and subjective reactions. It is the referential representation of things 
which is known and not the things themselves. 
As the neo-realists the critical realists agree on some points, the two mentioned above, 
but they also differ on several other ones. Also here no further attention is paid to it.  
All in all the viewpoint of critical realism is not so different from Lotze’s as generally 
thought of, especially that of Santayana. Critical realism starts from the object but puts 
the physical reality into question, while Lotze starts from the subject but interprets 
reality on rational grounds. The result of both is a scientific field that is very abstract. 
Moreover, if the divine aspect and the theory of ‘sein sollen’ of Lotze’s metaphysics is 
thought away, his view on the reality of being is very close to the contemporary views 
on fundamental physics. 
As a method, phenomenology was adopted by several philosophical schools, but as a 
critique it undermined neo-Kantianism. Its realistic attitude prepared the way for a new 
metaphysic564. 
The separation of philosophy and theology also undermined Lotze’s repute, because 
philosophers were no longer interested in his system which was finally based on the 
Absolute, and because in theology, apart from some Methodist interpretations, the 
thesis can be put forward that his ideas had become so commonplace, that a reference 
to him was superfluous.  
Finally the anti-metaphysic trend, for all present in neo-positivism, was pernicious to 
Lotze’s speculations. 
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Chapter 4.  
The contemporary significance of Lotze: a model to 
compare and comparison 
This last part was conceived of as a continuous text to emphasize the coherence of the 
reasoning. It would have given a disorderly impression however. Therefore some 
paragraphs are separated by a mention which sum up more or less the essence of that 
paragraph. On the other hand no numbers are used so as to avoid a hierarchy in the 
presentation of the comparison. 
‘A’ contemporary view 
To crown it all, a comparison is made between Lotze’s view on man and a contemporary 
one. The comparison applies to ‘a’ contemporary view, because other views are also 
possible, my view on this comparison is what seems the most plausible to me, as I write 
this text565. As far as exact science is not concerned,566 I cannot be sure that my view is 
the sole one which can be held for legitimate, but it is the one, which, in my opinion, is 
the most acceptable. It is also the view of the moment I write this text, because I am 
open to change in function of better argued views. Even science does not display truths 
for ones and for all. On the contrary science is the best knowledge, because it is never 
good enough. 
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But, why should my view be better than Lotze’s? Apart from some outdated 
assertions, in the post-idealistic, pragmatic era. I would not say that my view is certainly 
better than Lotze’s, but that I am somewhat convinced that is. Moreover, although some 
discordant viewpoints have always been present in philosophy and will remain, there is 
also some progress towards consensus. The entire hisory of philosophy has been one of 
refutation, proposal, synthesis.  
Well thought-out is not the same as relativism 
Is this relativism? Certainly not. My view is not subjectivist, nor is it without its reasons. 
It is the fruit of reflection, experience, reading, and research. It came into its current 
configuration through openness to other views, a quest for truth, and moral concern, 
and for all aspiration for objectivity as far as possible. It also took also into consideration 
the scientific achievements of which I am aware.  
Free thinking also includes questioning the foundations 
Although Lotze’s religious view on man is probably sincere, and although Protestantism 
is less subjected to dogmatism than the Roman Catholic doctrine, Lotze remained 
limited by religious borders. It could never have been a totally free form of thinking. 
Does totally free thinking exist anyway? Any opinion always has presumptions behind 
its reasoning. Of course it has, but totally free thinking means that even those 
presumptions can be questioned; even if they are less loose than secondary thoughts.  
Finally thinking gets caught up in circular reasoning and the only way out is rooted 
in the feelings, which in turn are culturally conditioned. The remaining question is: can 
feelings be universal? Feelings are what they are but they can be subjected to the ratio. 
They can be studied. So in the end science has the last word. 
God is beyond proof 
Some assertions cannot be proved. Kant did explain why they led to antinomies. The 
existence of God cannot be proved, nor His non-existence567. But why should I believe 
something which I do not need to explain things, but of which the origin can be 
explained. God as explanation for everything does in fact explain nothing. A doctor who 
gives an account for an illness as a punishment from God can only wait till God changes 
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his intentions; but if he knows that for instance the illness is caused by a bacterium he 
can administer an antibiotic.  
The term ‘agnosticism’ was introduced by Huxley.(Merz, 1976:416). 
God is created by man – Religion as a source for morality 
If God does not exist, what explanation do I have for the numerous believes in Him? 
Why, if He does not exist, so many people in the whole history of mankind believed in 
Him, and still do? It must be something in man which leads to the creation of God. In my 
opinion, man is not created by God, but God is created by man; and religion is not at the 
origin of morality, but religion is often, not always, moral because man and his society 
are moral. After science explained a lot of things formerly treated by the holy books, the 
significance of those books became next restricted to their moral explanation. Making a 
virtue of necessity all moral consciousness is often reduced to the sole religious source. 
It is, however, putting the cart before the horse however.  
Ethics as the foundation for existence 
With the disappearance of God, Lotze’s foundation of being on ethics also disappears. 
The in fact Platonic reduction of all ideas to the triplicity of: the good, the beautiful and 
the thru, also come together in Lotze’s view. From there it is possible to develop a 
teleological conception of being. When, however, being as a whole is no longer 
considered as having a pre-established evolution568, only the past can be seen as having 
a tendency, but even then the discerned trend is marked by the conceptions of the 
present and changes with it. The future is not known and prognoses are restricted to 
the extent that knowledge also is. Trends in specific matters can be traced thanks to 
previously established laws, but history as a whole is too complicated and too 
dependent on unforeseeable developments to make any prospect what so ever569. Of 
course predictions of natural phenomenon are more likely to come true than those in 
social sciences. Lotze’s rejection of predictions, a precursor of the end of the great 
narratives, can be confirmed. Nevertheless, as Lotze also stated, man has a 
responsibility to be committed in creating a better world, with all the uncertainties it 
implicates. 
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For Lotze there is only absurdity without moral conviction. He may be right, but it 
does not mean that moral conviction must be founded in religion, as a lot of 
contemporary thinkers also put forward. Lotze is also right when he asserts that in 
moral matters, circular reasoning is unavoidable. When, however, he says that moral 
rules are not deducible from nature, because nature ‘is’ (Sein) and moral rules have to do 
with what ‘has to be’ (Sollen), he expresses an idea that is still generally accepted, but 
which is only acceptable from a mechanistic view on nature. Contemporary thinkers 
cannot lay on that justification. Moral rules can be scientifically approached in the form 
of ‘what is desirable?’, because the demarcation of science is not made by the subject 
matter, but by the method applied. 
Another view on freedom 
Following Kant, Lotze accepts that freedom cannot be proved, but that it can be 
introduced on practical grounds. It even is inevitable because of the responsibility in 
human actions. If there is no freedom, there is no responsibility. At first glance the 
cause-effect way of thinking leaves no room for freedom, for it is in search of 
explanation, and not  responsibility. Nevertheless, some parameters associated with 
freedom can be distinguished: first of all the influence of knowledge. Insight into a 
problem can be a cause for change in behaviour. Lotze asserts that the mind interferes 
in the course of nature, although under his Cartesian presumption. Because of the more 
sophisticated mental capacities of man it seems as if only man is able to reflect, but also 
animals, dogs for instance, have such capacities, even if in a more restricted manner. 
Another aspect is the ability to anticipate the reactions of others. If somebody intends 
to commit murder, thus not just through an irresistible urge, he can be held responsible 
and can be condemned to imprisonment. This knowledge can lead to a change in 
attitude and prevent them from murder. Such behaviour cannot be reduced to 
conditioning, but supposes reflection. But, again, the scientific approach to the problem 
still remains deterministic. Any explanation of phenomenon is indebted to cause-effect 
reasoning, and as also in Lotze’s view, responsible human behaviour is part of it. An 
inevitable deterministic scientific approach does not eliminate the facts of knowledge 
and anticipation, thus of responsibility. 
To conclude, two aspects must be taken into consideration to judge Lotze’s viewpoint 
on freedom. Firstly the Cartesian duality and secondly Darwinism, although Lotze was 
neither as strict in the separation of mind and body, nor between animal and man. He 
did not consider animals as machines, despite the mechanical approach to organic 
creatures.  
Freedom must not be seen as an abstract conception, but as a name for a certain form 
of behaviour. The philosophical aspect of the problem is not a search for an essence of 
freedom, but the finding that it is but a name for a phenomenon. The word ‘freedom’ is, 
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in a way, a language error. It refers to an action and not to a substance, it ought to be a 
verb instead of a noun. 
A sense for existence as a whole? 
From the introduction it is clear that the model to compare is atheistic. But, here the 
problem will be discussed in a more elaborate way, connected to the concept of 
certainty. God is an answer to questions man asks himself, for instance: who gives 
meaning to existence? The question can also be answered with: there is no meaning; or: 
the meaning of existence lays in existence itself. Another approach questions the 
question, or in other words: it is wrong to ask for a meaning of existence, because 
meaning is only related to intentionality, or to purposeful human thinking. Even placing 
the meaning of existence in existence itself is ignoring this fact. 
The search for a sense in non-human existence is an anthropomorphic fallacy. 
God as the creator 
The term atheism only has sense in function of the existence of theism or believe in God 
and because the majority of mankind still believes in some God, the term will not 
become superfluous very soon. Many of the believers also still think that God is the 
creator out of nothing. The reasoning that everything must have a beginning and that 
thus existence as such must have a beginning too, seems to be very evident. But, the 
reasoning omits saying that something which has a beginning is always made up out of 
something that exists already. A chair is made by a carpenter from wood. Wood existed 
before the chair. An oak grows from an acorn and thanks to the presence of fertile 
ground, water and sunlight. Energy becomes from matter and vice versa. For that 
reason it is perhaps more evident to say that nothing is ever made out of nothing. The 
ancient Greek philosophers did not believe that creation came out of nothing, but that 
from chaos order was generated. Nietzsche’s ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ [Die Gebürt der 
Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik, 1872] is about the struggle between the Dionysian 
and the Apollonian, they can roughly be characterised respectively as representing 
chaos and order. ‘God as a creator’ belongs to Kant’s antinomies, although, in the light of 
the former reasoning, I am inclined to think that nothing is ever made of nothing570. 
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The immaterial ground of being 
Behind the observable world, the phenomenon, Lotze thought of an immaterial ground, 
one being as a whole in which the elements are influencing each other and in which 
everything has an impact on everything. It was his solution to the mind-body problem 
and it was also his solution to the age-old problem of the relation between the 
unvarying of Plato and the variable of Heraclites. The achievements within natural 
sciences also received their place in this model. Sometimes Lotze’s metaphysical 
considerations are very similar to  present-day natural sciences, but they remain 
metaphysical. 
Sometimes Lotze speaks of a reality which only consists of relations, in other 
moments of an immaterial substance. The former, however, is essentially used in the 
context of science, the latter in a metaphysical sense.  
Lotze’s metaphysical findings are not retained, although not in their metaphysical 
significance. As for their scientific value they are left to the scientists. It is decidedly 
impossible to have an exact representation of the things in themselves, only laws and 
explaining models can be made and verified. And the progressing theories in science 
reveal a growing gap between representation and the mathematical approach to the 
studied phenomenon. Let's accept that reasoning does not reveal any hidden reality and 
that the natural world must not be understood in the same way as the constructions of 
the mind, in which we have a natural insight.  
Cartesian dualism 
Lotze’s thinking is not only a protestant one, but also characterised by Cartesian 
dualism. In the model to compare Cartesianism is rejected. It is not sustainable for the 
same reason Lotze never was fully able to solve the problem of interaction between 
mind and body, which, as he admitted, was scientific evident, but also for more 
fundamental reasons. Lotze did found an acceptable explanation in his metaphysics. In 
the light of Lotze’s conception of the unity of being,  neither the interaction between 
material things nor between mind and body were a problem longer, because material 
things were but appearances of immaterial things and changes were considered as 
rearrangements inside being, considered as a whole, but not as in Spinoza’s view. That 
solution however cannot be accepted either, because the interaction between 
components of a whole is likewise problematic as the interaction between separate 
things in a pluralistic concept of being, and, once again, the things by themselves are 
beyond recognizability. 
The metaphysical questions Lotze thought to be able to solve by reasoning are leaved 
in the model to compare, because they are beyond our capacity to solve them. Lotze 
thought he could have an insight into ‘things in themselves’ (Ding an sich) through 
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reasoning. In that way the material became a side-issue of the spiritual. Of course that 
solution is not retained. The position taken here is: that there is no possible answer. 
Man can only grasp the complexity of sensual data, construct representations and 
explanations and that in function of confirmed experiments and ordered empirical data.  
As James said, let's no longer ask metaphysical questions of this kind, which are 
outside the scope of our pragmatic knowledge. Also questions as materialism or 
determinism are meanwhile put aside, although in their ontological sense. 
Consciousness is not a separate function 
There are two approaches of a same phenomenon, namely a physical and a 
psychological one. The physical approach gives insight into the physical conditions 
indispensable for psychological activity, while psychology can explain the non-physical 
aspect, as well as the specificity of some physical activities corresponding with specific 
psychological activities, a viewpoint Lotze rejected. But, is the non-physical aspect 
really non-physical? In other words, is consciousness non-physical? Consciousness is 
indeed crucial, because it distinguishes man from machine. However, consciousness is 
not a separate function, but is present in many human functions, as well as in animals to 
a lesser degree. As Lotze said, consciousness is graduated: ‘to hear tones’ comes before 
‘to understand words’, ‘to understand sense’, and ‘to understand the significance of life’. 
Of course, words receive their significance from meaning, and meaning receives it from 
the significance of life, but the consciousness of an animal is of a lower degree than that 
of man. 
The viewpoint of evolutionary theory may bring some clarity. Indeed, the gradual 
emerging of consciousness through the refinement of apperception, from amoeba to 
man, as well as the development of capacity for representations, no longer makes it 
necessary to give special status to consciousness. What remains is our distinction 
between consciousness as a separate functions in our mind. In other words, the 
Cartesian problem exists because we have created definitions for two different concepts, 
because in our representations the mind is outside the body. But clearly it is absurd to 
think of mental activity outside the brain. Although it is difficult to establish the status 
of ghosts probably the Cartesian dualism is absent in most cultures. In ancient Greek 
philosophy the mind is sometimes denoted as very fine material.  
Measuring the brain's activities for instance reveals that conscious mental activity 
makes a particular appeal to the prefrontal cortex, but always in relation to activities in 
other regions of the brain. 
Consciousness is also often linked to the social aspect of human development. It is 
due to the existence of human interactions that the self is build up, but in doing so the 
representations in the mind take a crucial place. It means that the representation of the 
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representation which we suppose being made by others, are in the core of the activity of 
self-consciousness and consciousness as such. 
The mechanistic conception of science 
The mechanistic conception of science was the general conception of science in Lotze’s 
time and is due to the grand success of the natural sciences. It was not yet commonly 
accepted within medicine, and certainly not within psychology, thence the effort of 
Lotze and others to bring some change there too. But, it was also a suitable chance for 
Lotze to demarcate science and to validate his religious weltanschauung. The 
philosophy of science has developed since the 19th century, under the influence of the 
humanities, and the mechanistic view is no longer prevailing. It has a huge impact on 
the methodology of the sciences, the most important feature to demarcate science from 
mere knowledge and from pseudo sciences. Apart from the quantitative approach the 
qualitative one has claimed its rights, and the strict separation of value-free from value-
bonded knowledge turned out to be untenable, for the social sciences anyway.  
The question of whether or not science and religion are compatible can be answered 
negatively. It does not mean however that a scientist cannot believe in God outside his 
scientific work, although I could barely imagine how such position could maintain itself 
without some duplication of reflective consciousness. However, many religious men act 
against pseudo sciences, following a Christian tradition. The Church has promoted, 
although not always and not by every Christian, the study of science as a means to 
counter superstition, sometimes not aware of the negative effect on believe itself. 
One thing a scientist never can conclude is that the cause of an effect is due to the 
intervention of God. God rests beyond science but at the same time unreachable by 
science. That also means that any supposed action of God in the perceptible world 
submits that action to a scientific approach. Saying that prayer can heal is putting that 
statement under the reach of scientific research. In other words it can be falsified. 
The status of science in knowledge 
The prevailing concept of science was the mechanistic one in accordance with the 
dominating paradigms of the natural sciences. It was an advantage to Lotze’s trial of 
attempting to reconcile science with faith. It is much easier to attempt to bring the 
matter to a favourable ending by starting from the mechanistic view on science. It 
would have been much more difficult in the present scientific setting, with the well 
developed psychological and sociological sciences, with their alternative methods.  
The question that can be asked is whether Lotze would have placed as much interest 
in the sciences had he lived today, knowing that he was, in first place, a religious man. 
The incompatibility between science and belief has become insurmountable, because 
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the line between social sciences and a weltanschauung is very thin. Two related 
positions can be discerned, that of the Reverend Joseph Cook and that of Philippe 
Devaux (1932), professor at the ‘Université Libre de Bruxelles’, both mentioned earlier. 
The positive, but very partial, interpretation of Cook talks about Lotze as the prophet 
who made the microscope an instrument of immortality and science the handmaid of 
the bible; and the negative interpretation of Devaux of a built-in supremacy of religion 
over science.  
In my opinion, science must be totally separated from scientific activities, it is 
inconceivable to bring God's actions into the interpretation of scientific data. As to the 
private era, which is independent from scientific activities, man is free to think 
whatever he wants and it is also his task to eventually find a justification of the 
contradictions involved. 
The distinction between living and non-living beings 
For Lotze there must not be made any distinction in science between living and non-
living beings. They must be treated in the same mechanistic way, which is to say as 
phenomenon of action and effect. The only distinction acceptable lies in the ordering of 
circumstances (Anordnung der Umstände). This principle of arrangement would, in 
today's science, be called DNA.  
On the other hand the absence of distinction between living and non-living things 
must neither be understood as materialism. On the contrary, the reduction of science to 
the purely mechanical allows Lotze to develop his idealistic view on metaphysical 
questions, a viewpoint which is not retained in the model to compare, because that 
metaphysical question is turned down as superfluous. It does not mean that all 
metaphysical questions are rejected, as every meta-approach of science is already in the 
sphere of metaphysics. 
The distinction between the functioning of the brain, psychological actions and 
rules of thinking – a pragmatic solution 
In accordance with Lotze the status of Logic, and not the logical rules, will be discussed 
here. Therefore a distinction has to be made between the functioning of the brain,  
psychological actions and rules of thinking. First of all the brain and its functions are 
necessary to enable psychological actions and thinking. Without the activity of the 
brain the other two functions are impossible. The brain is also responsible for the way in 
which the psychological actions and thinking take place. This is evident from the fact 
that all archaeological artefacts are recognizable for the reason they were made under 
the action of brain activities. The form in which they mutually differ is due to cultural 
differences. 
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Recent research in the field of psychological development in connection with the 
brain development has revealed the close relation between the two571.  The accretion of 
hormonal activity, introduced by the brain, seems to be responsible for the wild 
behaviour of the adolescent, because the frontal cortex is not yet fully developed and is 
not yet able to manage long term goals. The adolescent behaviour is therefore often 
capricious and inefficient. Danger is not always rightly estimated. 
That the brain is responsible for the way in which the psychological actions and 
thinking take place does not mean that the categories of the brain functions are the 
same as those for psychological actions and thinking, because the psychological actions, 
although conditioned by the brain, are focused on practical circumstances of the 
environment, and accordingly their categories are different; while thinking is focused 
on for instance communication and argumentation, and accordingly its categories must 
also be different. The brain is a very complex interaction of synapses, and functions 
mainly through repetition and conditioning. Thanks to these activities schemes of 
behaviour are possible, and thinking can be subjected to certain rules. But, the schemes 
of behaviour themselves depend on the circumstances in which they develop. When in 
the evening I am tired, I go to bed. It is not the structure of the brain which is 
responsible for my behaviour572, but the brain offers the possibility to an adequate and 
stored action: going to bed when I am tired. Also, when I  discuss something with 
someone I can choose not to make use of logical forms, and to impose my opinion by 
coercion or even seduction, but I can also discuss on a level of equality. The latter means 
that some rules must be kept in mind. If I say that B can only exist if A exists, than I 
cannot say that B exists without the existence of A. Or, if B is an element of A and only of 
A, than I cannot say that in the absence of A, there is a B. In other words, I cannot 
ridicule my interlocutor. This corresponds with the conceptions of validity of Lotze and 
also with the irreducibility of psychology and logic.  
Only the aspect of success of an action which is pragmatic, is absent in Lotze’s scheme 
of thinking. Lotze stated rightly that the genesis does not explain anything, but by 
introducing the concept of success, all pieces of the puzzle fall into place without 
relying on reductionism. As Lotze could not rely on that concept, logic became a sort of 
mystic whole, although he came very close to a solution with his concept of validity. It 
does not mean either that logic rules are reducible to their mere success. 
On the other hand Lotze was right in stating that language is of importance to 
thinking. He was looking for the a priori forms of thinking through the forms of 
language. But, he did not escape from a Western point of view. Ethnographic research 
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has revealed that those forms of language are not universally true573. Again, the physic 
conditions of the brain restrict the mental possibilities but at the same time allow them, 
but the forms of thinking, although linked to language, are cultural. The structuralist 
findings are mostly Western projections.  
Lotze did not say that forms of thinking depend on language, but that both have the 
same origin. 
Hegel’s admixture of logic and reality 
Lotze had a radical critique on Hegel’s admixture of logic and reality, in fact the 
historical reality. The scheme of thesis, antithesis and synthesis applied to the 
development of history was in Lotze's eyes unacceptable Logic forms and history cannot 
be mixed a priori, but, I think, it does not mean that similarities cannot be detected. 
These similarities are due to a characteristic of human behaviour, on the individual and 
the social level. On the individual level a statement (thesis) can be followed by a critique 
formulated as an antithesis, for instance by an interlocutor, resulting in a compromise 
(synthesis) in which the thesis and the antithesis are elevated to a new thesis. On the 
social level, men can react as a group on certain practices, leading to a development in 
the opposite direction, but finally toned down to a more acceptable form, including the 
two trends. The subjection of women, for instance, was no longer accepted by the 
women’s suffrage movement. In the first phase the feminist movement promoted a total 
equality between men and women. The differences were ascribed to cultural 
circumstances by Simonne de Beauvoir574. Another movement developed, one that 
accepts fundamental differences between men and women575, but which only 
emphasizes the equivalence of both sexes, and the role they both play or can play in 
society.  
 System-builders around one idea 
There is another reason why Lotze criticized Hegel, namely the fact that Hegel designed 
a complete historical development on the basis of one idea. By the way he also attacked 
indirectly Marxism. For Lotze it is impossible for man to know the course of history in 
advance, because his horizon is too limited. 
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Lotze is a transitional figure in many areas, the building of a system included. He rejects 
any system which is designed around a single idea, as is the case for Hegel. He himself 
tried to synthesize his thoughts in an all encompassing whole, laid down in  
‘Microcosmos’. Nevertheless he maintains that man does not have the capacity to take 
in everything at a glance, because his knowledge is always partial and he is not able to 
understand former generations fully.  
Merz576 believes that the term ‘system’ acquired an altered meaning around the time 
when Lotze lived, and that this alteration came ‘out fully and clearly for the first time in 
the philosophy of Lotze’577. For instance, Lotze’s system is worked out at the end of his 
life, while previous systems were almost always designed first and then further 
perfected and defended later on. The new significance of ‘system’ can be recorded as a 
unification of a given knowledge, in order to comprehend and understand it, as in 
Lotze’s interpretation. Therefore the mere facts of science do not suffice, also artistic 
and poetical literature must be implied. The comprehensive view obtained would 
necessarily bear a personal and subjective character.  
Lotze’s rejections of an all encompassing history, on the basis of one idea, could be 
considered as a precursor to the ending of meta-narratives, proclaimed by François 
Lyotard578. Some similarities are manifest: the anti-Marxist tendency, and the attack on 
some universalistic claims of the Enlightenment, especially the progress of history and 
the knowability of everything by science.  
A clash of civilisations? 
Although Lotze had an advanced conception of the relation between races and 
civilisations, a conception that was probably dictated by a protestant colonial view, he 
was convinced that the European culture would, in the long term, prevail in the world. 
It was still inconceivable to think that the preponderance of Europe in the world, could 
be denied. Even nowadays two positions are prominent, namely the clash of civilisations 
of Huntington and the end of history, or the triumph of Western civilisation, of 
Fukuyama. For both theses argumentations can be put forward, but it depends on the 
facts that are taken into consideration, which viewpoint is chosen. Where science and 
technique are considered, Fukuyama is probably right; but in considering customs and 
habits, civilisation can display a great persistence. The only possible thing which can be 
done now, is to ascertain that different trends can be perceived: westernization, 
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hardening of cultural standpoints, occidentalisation, remains of orientalism, but also a 
growing need for dialogue. One thing is certain: no status quo will occur. 
Alternative knowledge 
For Lotze non-scientific knowledge is of paramount importance, namely for his 
teleological interpretation of the world. In the model to compare, the alternative 
knowledge is considered as gradually less important than the scientific one, because the 
latter withstood the merciless attack of scientific methodology. Nevertheless, 
speculative and different kinds of intuitive knowledge play a huge part in the 
construction of a Weltanschauung, but they may never contradict science. This 
alternative knowledge however is often unattainable for falsification, and is in a large 
measure emotional. Emotions must not be underestimated and are in fact necessary for 
valuation and moral foundation. But, when this knowledge takes the place of the 
scientific one, it is pseudo-knowledge or even nonsense. For those who are aware of the 
harmful application of pseudo-knowledge, such as in homeopathy or acupuncture for 
instance, it is incompatible with moral premises and moral responsibility. However, I do 
not think that Lotze would have supported knowledge which is refuted by scientific 
research. On the contrary all sorts of popular beliefs are condemned in his writings. 
Social engineering 
For Lotze man has a responsibility in history, despite his limited overview of the historic 
developments. That responsibility is linked to his freedom of act. The future may be 
dependent on the past, but man can always adapt his behaviour, even though he is not 
able to go beyond the borders of his generation, as it is impossible to truly understand a 
different generation. 
Values 
According to Lotze values are created by man but they do not depend on him. It means 
that they hold universally, although they become clear through experience. This 
experience is accompanied by feelings, as all experiences are. It is how man knows what 
is good and what is bad, what has value and what has no value. Lotze asserts that things 
are, events occur and values hold. Whilst these distinctions may seem to be self-evident, 
they are nevertheless very important. They keep us from substantiating concepts which 
are improper to it.  
Lotze is not followed here in so far he puts the values on a universal standard finally 
apart from the act of knowing them. The values hold and they hold more or less 
universally, but only in their cultural context, this means that they hold in function of a 
whole of valuating actions in a given society or sub-society. The link to the cultural 
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context however does not mean that values are of a pure relative character. There is a 
possibility to put them into question and to search for their universal holding. With this 
restriction in the back of the mind, it is possible to say that values hold in the way ‘1 + 1 
= 2’. 
Another restriction to Lotze’s concept of value is his assertion that they cannot be 
induced empirically. Although he says that values are known during experience and 
that the feelings are always present during the acquisition of knowledge, they are 
independent of that experience. But, experience, accompanied with reasoning can 
nevertheless induce values. For instance pain or humiliation is an empirical data which 
lies at the source of the value ‘human respect’. But that does not mean that epicurism is 
the sole valuable value theory. Pain and humiliation must be seen in their cultural 
context and are subject to a possible inquiry of their holding. Epicurism is a monism. 
The phenomenon of knowledge as mental constructions detached from reality 
Another aspect of the separation between thinking and reality is Lotze’s assertion that 
the phenomenon of knowledge are mental constructions which must not be considered 
as being in exact concordance with reality. Although Lotze believed it possible to know 
the constitution of reality behind the observable world through reasoning, the 
representations in the mind must be seen as dependent from it. Because the pragmatic 
dimension is absent, Lotze’s conceptions are idealistic. In pragmatism such 
metaphysical positions as in Lotze's case, are no longer taken, but, as Rorty stated, 
knowledge is not a mirror of nature. ‘“(O)bjective truth“ is no more and no less than the 
best idea we currently have about how to explain what is going on’579. Science gives the 
most accurate explanations as proved by their success in the last centuries, but they 
were not and are not always considered as such. Anthropology reveals other 
incommensurable explanations which were and are taken for granted in non-scientific 
environments, but they can be left and exchanged for the more accurate, in fact the 
scientific ones. That sciences offer the most accurate explanations does not mean that 
they can explain everything. But too often this limitation of the sciences was and is a 
pretext for all sorts of fantasies and pseudo-sciences to impose themselves.  
This does not mean that science always generates the best actions and the best 
behavioural schemes, but that the facts are explained in the best way. But it means 
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nevertheless that, to know what is the best to do, can be derived from a scientific 
reasoning too580.  
A possible inconsistency in Lotze’s thinking about reality is that on the one hand he 
asserts the independence of the mental constructions from reality, but on the other 
hand he creates an image of that reality based on reasoning. The inconsistency is 
labelled as possible because it is not always clear what Lotze really had in mind, due to 
his very nuanced viewpoint. Nevertheless he must have been convinced from a logical 
point of view, that in reality only one substance is possible and that the diversity of 
perception is due to interactions within that substance.  
Reincarnations in the Philosophy of Mathematics581 
As far as I know, Lotze did not have a direct influence on some contemporary 
philosophical viewpoints in mathematics, but his ideas still ‘contributes to the project of 
understanding the course of the world as opposed to its mere calculation.’582 Hauser583 has 
discerned some striking similarities between Lotze’s views and what he calls the 
reincarnations in the philosophy of mathematics.  
Firstly Lotze’s assertion, that colours and tones in themselves must not be confused 
with the way by which they appear to us and that the relations between their sizes 
expressed in laws are universally valid or false, corresponds with a present-day opinion 
that there is a reality of mathematical objects independent of the mind. Hauser 
mentions Cantor’s continuum hypothesis and Gödel’s assertion that there are no 
individual mathematical intuitions, but objective relations between abstract concepts. 
Secondly, also following Lotze, not the basic laws for the formation of a theory are 
important, but the reasons on which their certainty subjectively rests or the criteria by 
which knowledge and discrimination are established. This reflection on logic by Lotze is 
found in a recent shift from a metaphysical to a pragmatic approach of truth in 
mathematical propositions. 
Thirdly, Lotze relies on a reductio ad absurdum to define true mathematical 
propositions. ‘Something which is ‘denknothwendig’ we would regard as true until it 
provides through its own consequences a different clarification about itself and until it 
itself forces us to declare it a mirage which is then not only an invalid mirage, but 
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stands in a specific relation to truth to which it does not conform any longer.’584 ‘This 
resembles the holistic approaches to justification of Quine, Goodman and Rawls, as well 
as Husserl.’585 
(Philosophical) method 
For Lotze any method in philosophy is needed as far as it is adapted to the problem at 
stake, except the pseudoscientific ones. In science, however, only the methods of the 
natural sciences are acceptable. This position is due to his mechanistic view of science. 
Although the cause-effect reasoning is the typical scientific model used to approach 
reality, science is no longer limited to the quantitative methods. In other words a 
manifold of methods are now available. For instance, in sociology the qualitative 
method is indispensable to understand human behaviour and comes before the 
quantitative ones.  
Philosophy has an ordering task in Lotze’s concept. With the expanded view on 
science, which is thus not limited to the mechanistic one, ordering is also granted to the 
sciences, although separated from theology. The consistency which is, following Lotze, 
necessary in philosophy must at once also be extended to science. However, Lotze 
discerned inconsistencies in the different sciences, which were to be brought in 
accordance by philosophy. The incommensurability between lots of branches in science 
is still a hindrance for the premised consistency. Glaring contradictions must be 
resolved anyway. Yet, it must also be said that, when Lotze speaks of inconsistencies, he 
already went beyond the sciences themselves. 
More of a pedagogical than a methodological approach, but nevertheless with 
methodological implications, is Lotze’s way to present his view, namely by confronting 
different viewpoints and theories so as to finally reach his own nuanced view. This 
procedure has a disadvantage however. It only takes in consideration the already 
existing ideas, either to refute them or to incorporate them in his own viewpoint. It also 
matches Lotze’s contention of there being nothing new in philosophy. Such method, 
however, omits taking into account intuitions from outside, for instance, from daily life 
or other cultures. 
 (Un)certainty 
The epistemological uncertainty, the uncertainty as for the future, and all kinds of 
uncertainties due to the different cultural positions are not useful to the need for 
 
                                                     
584 Lotze, 1880, Vom Erkennen, Introduction, §303, 489 (cited in Hauser, 2003:176). 
585 Hauser, 2003:176. 
The contemporary significance of Lotze 
 183 
certainty in the life of man. God can bring that certainty, but He also brings, through his 
representatives and in different degrees according to the religion at stake, a lot of other 
things as well. Religion can impose a worldview, a surrogate for science, and moral 
imperatives. To believe or not can make a huge difference. And, to have certainty can 
make an even more penetrating difference.  
Ontological questions which stay unanswered are catastrophic for those who have 
based their entire hope and worldview on religion. To believe that there is life after 
death, that nature has meaning, and that there is a teleological explanation of existence, 
is for some necessary for a harmonious life. But not everybody is able to maintain such 
assumptions as real. Apart from some exceptions, man is able to adapt and to regain 
harmony after the appalling finding that his faith was but an illusion. Nevertheless, the 
secularized environment in which many people are raised, prevents them from having a 
similar experience, and the devotion is not always equally strong.  
As a pure intellectual fact uncertainty is, I believe, not able to undermine the 
psychological balance in its own. Men who are aware that what is represented in the 
mind is not an exact reproduction of the world observed, that nature has no meaning in 
itself but only in the eyes of man, and that there is no special destination behind the 
world, do not necessarily live in despair, but are invited to revalue their life and nature 
as such. 
This is the most important difference between Lotze and myself. 
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Chapter 5.  
and beyond 
5.1 Can ethics be a science? 
Lotze distinguished between the scientific knowledge of reality and feeling reality586. 
Scientific knowledge was appreciated in a mechanistic conception of reality in which 
science did not mirror reality, as Rorty put it; and as a way of handling reality, seeing 
things in a pragmatic way. In contemporary terms, ethics is independent from a 
positivistic notion of science. George Moore, in his 1903 book Principia Ethica, labelled 
the link between facts and appreciation a naturalistic fallacy. However, Moore saw the 
relation between facts and ethics in a differently than did David Hume in his A Treatise of 
Human Nature (1739-40). Hume distinguished between what ‘is’ and what ‘ought to be’. 
No conclusions can be made regarding the latter by drawing upon the former. In other 
words, facts cannot lead to ethical conclusions. Moore, on the other hand, did not really 
have ‘facts’ in mind, rather he focussed on one or more properties of the term ‘good’, 
yet still came to the conclusion that these properties cannot lead to ethical claims. It is 
not because something is pleasant or desirable that it is morally good. The hedonist 
viewpoint, which posits that what is pleasant is good, is en example of this naturalistic 
fallacy. What is good is indefinable, because it refers to a simple, non-natural property. 
‘To be pleased’ is not the same as ‘having the sensation of pleasure’.  To Moore all 
properties are either complexes of simpler properties or else irreducibly simple.  
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Nor is it the case that what is natural must be considered inherently good or right. 
First of all, what is natural is not always clear; and secondly, even if it is established as 
natural, it is not necessarily good. For example, forms of sexual contact are sometimes 
considered natural only if they can engender new life, while other forms of sexual 
contact are rejected as unnatural. This is a clear example of disagreement over what 
constitutes natural. But even when there is agreement, it is still not the case that it is 
necessarily good. Whole butter is a natural product, but it is not good because it 
contains cholesterol. Although cholesterol itself is an important and necessary molecule 
for living beings, a high level of serum cholesterol can lead to heart disease. But 
morality has to do with human behaviour, with human experiences, preferences, 
valuations, etc. These facts of life are important to morality, alongside rational 
appreciation and the cultural setting, variations between individuals and socieites must 
be taken into account. It is remarkable that a simple, logical construction is able to 
demonstrate that it is a fallacy to accept that the pleasant or the desired is morally 
significant.  
Lotze did not deduce moral rules from facts. On the contrary, he deduced facts from 
morality. What is, is what ought to be. This position is related to Leibniz’ assertion that 
the world as it exists is the optimal configuration among all possible worlds. Lotze, 
however, emphasized the teleological aspect of being, with God as the ultimate truth. In 
doing so, he followed Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle, who saw good in the realisation of 
potential. From Lotze’s perspective, science is the result of the mind’s ability to 
differentiate. Science disperses reality, while feelings bring unity587. This sentimental 
theory of values as developed by Lotze is somewhat different from the hedonistic view. 
He places the valuation in perception – namely, in an appreciation accompanying the 
perceived reality. Von Monakow later spoke of valuation in terms of the centrifugal 
action of the connotative relationship: toward the object (klisis) or away from it 
(ekklisis)588.  
Stevenson followed the tradition in which the emotions took a central place in 
distinguishing between utterances that suggest representations (Verstellungssugestive 
Ausserungen) and emotive utterances (Emotive Ausserungen). The first type attempts to 
represent reality, the second to arouse interest.  
Economics also distinguishes between positive and normative utterances589. 
‘Economists make both positive and normative statements and the normative 
statements are often based on positive-scientific statements, but do not necessarily 
derive from them.’ However, this statement suggests the possibility of constructing a 
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scientific interpretation of ethics. Because normative statements are often based on 
positive-scientific statements, they receive a scientific basis. What may be added is that 
if an action is better to perform, it must be performed, morally speaking. 
5.2 A critical reading of Stevenson’s Ethics and Language 
According to Charles L. Stevenson (1908-1979) ethics can only be a branch of science if 
disagreement and agreement always and exclusively have to do with belief, not 
attitudes590. Therefore, he rejects the scientificity of ethics because such is not the 
case591. For Ayer, ethics can, at best, only be considered a sub discipline of psychology or 
sociology592. To the contrary, ethics is, or can be, a fully-fledged science with the 
desirable as its own object of study, and with psychology, sociology, social psychology, 
anthropology and interculturalism and other sciences its subordinates.  
Although Stevenson rejected the scientificity of ethics, it was his intention to 
sharpen the language of ethics593. Following Commers, Stevenson, did not take a 
defeatist stance when confronted with the incommensurable pluralism of ethical 
discourse. On the contrary, he tried to salvage the scientific study of moral language594. 
He concentrated scientificity on the purification of moral language, promoting an 
efficient moral conversation. Hare was his ally in this endeavour595.  
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However, this approach developed into an attitude that reduced ethical discourse to 
the study of prescriptive language. Furthermore, profound conclusions were formulated 
solely on the basis of language analysis, a very restricted vision. When this typically 
Anglo-Saxon approach fell into disgrace, it also dragged the research into scientific 
ethics with it. The situation was never rectified.  
In his analytical linguistic approach, Stevenson outlined the concepts and general 
methods by which ethical judgments can be made596. He distinguished two methods: the 
first and second patterns of analysis. The second pattern of analysis takes into account 
the persuasive impact of a definition. By giving a certain definition to a term, a moral 
assertion can be made more acceptable. This specification may initially restrain 
persuasiveness, but it can be further expanded upon later in the conversation597. 
Distinguishing between two methods allows Stevenson to lay bare the complexity of 
moral conviction. The second model offers the better option from the perspective of 
rationality. To Stevenson, however, persuasion is paramount and therefore it is not 
always obvious which model should be employed. Finally, the choice between one of the 
other method is also a choice between language forms; yet, regardless of the language 
form employed, the same possibilities will present themselves in the information 
offered598. Only the persuasiveness will differ. 
Right from the start, Stevenson cannot escape the necessity of positing the existence 
of very general, perhaps even universal, moral assertions. He speaks of reciprocal 
influence through disagreement in attitude599, and by doing so he unintentionally opens 
the door to compromise on the basis of argumentation and the implicit introduction of 
more general values. However, the two sorts of disagreements that he describes are 
narrowly defined. The disagreement in belief is fenced by the words ‘to describe’ and ‘to 
explain’; while the disagreement in attitude is restricted to ‘to prefer’. According to 
Stevenson, disagreement in attitude is a priori considered resolvable only on the basis of 
preferences. However, he also had to add that the human effort, involved in settling 
these disagreements, does not consist merely of preferences, but also of rational 
reflections. However, by neglecting to explore this point, or restricting rationality to 
disagreement (or agreement) in belief, the scope of his analysis is narrowed. Although 
he continuously speaks of a dialogue between preferences and facts, between belief and 
attitude, Stevenson is only concerned with the language by which events are described - 
not the close relationship between fact and preference or their causal relationship. 
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Thus, the possibility of a scientific form of ethical discourse is excluded from the very 
beginning.  
Although Stevenson restricts himself to language analysis, he does pay some 
attention to the importance of imperative utterances. He decides that although 
emotivism reduces the moral to feelings, it does not mean that feelings must be 
suppressed600. In other words, emotions have a place in the lives of men and in society. It 
is because human beings have feelings that a scientific ethics is possible. 
Stevenson quite clearly considers the linguistic element the essential factor in a 
disagreement in attitude, but this shouldn’t stop him from expanding on and 
contextualizing his findings. Although he recognises the cooperation between factual 
knowledge and moral conduct601, he posits that moral conduct is without rationality; 
and although he asserts that both kinds of disagreement affect each other, he maintains 
the separation between them because their relationship can never be logical, only 
factual602. For Stevenson, a disagreement in attitude that is established as a fact is not 
the same as a disagreement in attitude itself. Two persons can establish that a 
disagreement in attitude exists among people - a fact - without being in disagreement in 
attitude or even expressing their own attitudes. Moreover, the finding that other people 
disagree in attitude can turn into a disagreement between those who established that 
fact. Thus, the recognition of a fact can lead to the formation of an attitude, by which a 
causal relation is established between belief in a fact and an attitude. Stevenson 
explicitly admits as much603.  
But, what he does not accept is that an attitude can be recognised as generally valid 
because in his view, an attitude can be neither true nor false. The detonation of an 
atomic bomb can never be considered a universal evil604. Science only can say that an 
atomic bomb causes huge suffering, and that it can only be considered an evil. This 
depends on an attitude, and assertions that rest on an attitude do not belong to the 
scientific realm. Emotiveness is an obstacle to scientific ethics605. 
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Stevenson relies on the finding that all possible relations are open and the logic 
relation thus cannot settle the problem, to prove that the relations between 
disagreement in beliefs and disagreement in attitudes cannot be logic based. If moral 
statements are scientific than the statement that A that X is good is equivalent to the 
statement that A that X is not good. That is the result of making ethical methodology 
equivalent with the scientific one606. Two persons can disagree in belief, but not in 
attitude or they can both disagree in belief and all other combinations of disagreement 
in belief and in attitude. If we accept the assumption that the only explanation for 
disagreement is to be found in the individual’s feelings, evident in Stevenson’s emotivist 
conviction, than he is right. But, as he himself stated, two persons do not base their 
attitudes solely on feelings - they argue with one another as well. To the extent that 
rationality plays a role in the discussion, logic also looms; and the problem is no longer a 
question of simple right or wrong, but of a critical investigation of the logical reasoning, 
of the terms used, or of the premises. The problem with Stevenson’s theory is that he 
assigns science a narrow, positivistic character, and sustains his idea by linguistic 
analysis. By doing so, he can differentiate between belief and attitude and 
simultaneously join them in a relationship.  
To Stevenson the ethical method is a matter of persuasion. An imperative can be 
supported by reasons afterwards. The imperative itself, however, depends on an 
attitude, which can be influenced by reason. Here, the initial assertion ‘this is good, then 
do it’ is supplemented and becomes ‘this is good, then do it because…’. By reducing the 
ethical aspect to mere intersubjective persuasion, it becomes impossible to give any 
objectivity to ethics, and consequently to give it a scientific status. Therefore, it is useful 
to add something to Stevenson by which a closing argument can be formulated.  
Between ‘this is good’ and ‘then do it’ is to be added ‘what is good has to be done’. The 
reasoning thus becomes ‘this is good, and because what is good has to be done, you have 
to do it’. ‘This is good’ and ‘what is good has to be done’ are true assertions, while 
persuasion is only ethically justified because doing what is good, is good. There is 
nothing wrong in founding ethical assertions on a moral ground. ‘It is good doing what 
is good’ is an objective ethical utterance. Persuasion, as such, is not scientific, but 
neither is it ethical. The ethical is what is good, and that can be objective, emotively 
neutral and scientific. That an assertion can be emotively neutral does not mean that 
emotions are unimportant in ethics, only that emotions are important for man. They are 
important for the wellbeing of man, and thus have a role to play in ethics. 
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Stevenson also discusses the vagueness of ethical terms like ‘justice’, for instance. He 
contrasts them with the exactitude of scientific terms607. Although he does not rely on 
this analysis to demonstrate the unscientificity of ethics, it is relevant. When he outlines 
his second analytical model, which is characterized by the complementary descriptive 
meaning of the term used and the consequences of this usage, he demonstrates that 
vagueness is inherent to the ethical discourse. Terms are generally well defined in the 
exact sciences, but in the social sciences, and thus in ethics, this is not always possible. 
The reason why is that human actions receive their meaning from social actors608, and 
this cannot be said of a chemical reaction. Moreover, the context in which terms are 
used is also relevant. This does not mean that an effort to avoid obscurities and 
ambiguous terms should not be made. On the other hand, the relationship between the 
common usage of words and expressions and the purified language of academia is very 
close; this is certainly the case in ethics. Besides, many ethical terms cover a multitude 
of significations. ‘Justice’ can be given a precise significance by a particular author or a 
researcher, but the danger looms of deviating significances, not only by other 
researchers, but by the society under investigation as well. Is justice for the free, male, 
autochthon Greek during Ancient Times the same as that of the suppressed Roma 
people in the Balkans today? Is social justice the same in the United States of America as 
in Europe? The social investigator will therefore sometimes use an open significance in 
the central terms used in research609. The word receives a provisional significance, 
which will be narrowed during the investigation and by additional, empirical material. 
This creative practice in science prevents the significance of terms from being 
prematurely closed. This allows the construction of more efficient definitions to become 
possible. As applied to ethics, terms will reveal their significance through the context in 
which they are used.  
Stevenson also stresses that ethical terms are inconstant and he adds that they 
receive their persuasive meaning in communication through this characteristic. He uses 
the word ‘culture’ as an example. Sometimes, an individual is praised for being 
articulate and at other times for his originality and sensitivity610. Stevenson also states 
that when a sign is submitted to fewer rules, the degree of ambiguity increases until it 
looses its descriptive meaning611. However, it is not Stevenson’s intension to introduce 
vagueness into the social sciences, only in ethics. He makes a thorough, pragmatic 
analysis of the concept of meaning and he comes to the provisional conclusion that 
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meaning is a sign that has an effect on a listener, but ‘only if it has been caused by (…) an 
elaborate process of conditioning which has attended the sign’s use in 
communication’612. This definition is clearly the foundation for the importance that 
Stevenson attaches to the persuasive character of ethical language. Consequently, he 
calls the definitions employed in the moral field ‘persuasive definitions’613. 
‘The distinction between a descriptive and an emotive meaning depends largely on 
the kind of psychological disposition that a sign (…) is disposed to evoke’614; and they can 
operate independently of one another615. Sometimes the descriptive meaning changes 
while the emotive meaning stays the same. For instance, the meaning of democracy 
changed slightly when Winston Churchill asserted that it is the worst form of 
government apart from all the rest. Also, the definition of democracy can change 
without the enthusiasm for it varying. It is possible to speak of a representative or 
strong democracy616 while still being a fervent supporter of it.  
Although Stevenson’s assertion that emotive utterances can never be scientific is not 
followed here, the distinction between the descriptive and emotive aspects of judgment 
is useful. Their psychological impact differs and as does their truth status. Descriptive 
utterances are true or false, emotive utterances are valid or not. Validity is a scientific 
concept. 
Does Stevenson’s analysis mean that he adheres to a nihilist position or that he 
promotes egoism in the ethical field? The answer can be negative because he aims at 
banning vagueness from the ethical discourse.617 Yet he cannot avoid the more 
substantial question. The demand for content imposes itself alongside the demand for 
general norms and rules. It seems that he is attempting to formulate a procedural 
approach, by which ethics receives its content via a continuous, historical dialogue 
among equals618. He emphasizes that the content of ethical dialogue is not the subject of 
his analysis. To the contrary, his scientific attitude dictates the acceptance of 
compulsive, imposed rules by an absolute monarch or a tyrannical father as almost 
equivalent to a dialogue between equivalent interlocutors. Yet he cannot afford to be 
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entirely apathetic to the question. He dissociates himself from dictators and ‘self-
seeking’ politicians, who would misuse his writings619. Once again, the normative cannot 
fail to be appreciated. Anyhow, it is clear that when dialogue takes place, persuasion 
plays a crucial role. This is the key concept in Stevenson’s ethical thinking and this is 
what he contributed to the work of his contemporary and emotivistic precursor, Ayer. 
While aiming to bring persuasion to the foreground, Stevenson does not wish to impose 
a certain, moral truth620.  
Nevertheless, his efforts are of exceptional importance. He brings clarity to the 
complexity of ethic dialogue, both the inner dialogue of an individual as well as 
interpersonal dialogue621, by highlighting key features622. He discusses the motives of 
actions in terms of an argument or an objection; by citing the origins of customs or 
habits the ethical position that he takes, is made more palatable and his stance becomes 
clearer because it is then made with reason. Of course, inconsistency in conduct or 
accountability can be unmasked in an ethical dispute, or the consequences of a 
particular course of action can be discussed. General principles can either support or 
harm a stance. In short, the vigorous dialogue of ethical discourse receives more nuance 
and more efficient handling through Stevenson’s discrete concepts. He also mentions 
invalid, but quite common, methods of argumentation such as ad hominem. A catholic 
priest, for instance, who asserts that paedophilia is a sin, while he himself is guilty of it, 
cannot speak with authority - but that does not mean that paedophilia is not a bad 
thing. 
 
 
Language is not the mirror of the world, but it does give us access to it. 
 
(Jürgen Habermas, in: Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion.) 
 
According to Stevenson, general agreement in attitude is unlikely because people live in 
so many different situations wherein they develop their own preferences623. But why 
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can’t agreement be possible, taking these differences into account? He also posits that 
disagreements in beliefs can be settled by reasoning and investigation, but that for 
disagreements in attitudes, neither reasoning nor investigation can bring any relief. 
This assertion is correct, but only is far as an attitude is perceived as independent from 
its previous history and from its embedding in facts. Unfortunately, this is entirely 
fanciful. An attitude is never situated in a vacuum. When Stevenson asserts that rational 
methods can only settle disagreements in attitudes when they have their origins in 
belief624, he ignores the fact that ‘pure’ attitudes are fictions. An attitude always has a 
raison d’etre and for the person holding it. Nor does this mean that everybody develops 
the same attitude under shared conditions. There are entirely acceptable differences in 
attitude. Moreover, it is possible for the persons concerned to distance themselves from 
their own specific situation and, through empathic understanding, transcend it. This 
allows them to take a supra-interpersonal position, by which they grant ethical values a 
status that transcends subjectivity.  
Stevenson’s entire treatise is saturated with his argument regarding the interrelation 
of belief and attitude, but he subsequently concludes that they are separate and 
independent factors. The difference may be methodological, not fundamental. As if 
people make an enormous effort to arrive at a reasonably acceptable moral rule, which 
transcend their own viewpoint, only to forget it afterwards and assert that they still 
adhere to their original viewpoint. Once again, by restraining his analysis to the course 
of events and the issue of language, there is no room for a normative approach. His 
analysis lays bare the formation of norms, without admitting the possibility of valid 
norms. As described by Stevenson, the process is without actual engagement, restricted, 
as it is, to persuasion. 
That is also the reason why Stevenson rejects a scientific approach, or, in his words, 
an approach which is based on belief – beliefs in facts, that is. Facts cannot settle ethical 
dilemmas625, because somebody else may always have another attitude. In his view, an 
attitude is always optional. When somebody asserts that boxing should be abolished 
because it is medically unacceptable, somebody else has the right to assert that he does 
not care and that boxing should continue because he finds it very enjoyable. This does 
not mean that the boxer himself may not decide to practice his sport - but that is not 
what Stevenson says. Autonomy can certainly be defended on scientific grounds626. 
Stevenson defines persuasion as influence without making use of beliefs or scientific 
knowledge. This becomes quite clear in his assertion that validity can be applied to 
either the logical design of argumentation or to empirical support for an affirmation, 
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but not to methods of persuasion. For him, doing so would be nonsensical627. Two 
critiques can be made here. First, persuasion is never detached from facts and logic, and 
secondly, persuasion can definitely be seen as valid. If I were to assert that ‘to harm 
somebody is bad’ Stevenson would say that it is my intention to persuade someone to 
renounce harming others. But, the assertion ‘you may not harm somebody’ is certainly a 
valid assertion, even without further explanation. Most people would agree with this 
assertion. A physician may add that although he administers painful injections, he 
considers harming somebody needlessly to be unacceptable. Consequently, this begs the 
question of why the assertions ‘to harm somebody is bad’ and ‘you may not harm 
somebody’ may be considered valid. The answer is that harming somebody is not an 
isolated event. To hurt is an empirical experience; moreover, it is one that is quite 
unpleasant. When asked, anyone can recall such an experience. Logic also plays in 
important role here. Surely, if pain is an unpleasant experience and unpleasant 
experienced are best avoided, this means that both pain and causing it in others is bad. 
As Stevenson explicitly states, much depends on the definition of ‘value’. He 
associates value with truth; otherwise, he says, value does not have meaning. However, 
this association is unclear. Once again, he uses a disagreement in attitude between two 
interlocutors to explain his viewpoint. According to Stevenson, truth cannot settle this 
disagreement, thus value is not an appropriate concept for giving convictions scientific 
value. However, when truth means there is empirical evidence and that valuation is 
viewed as acceptable, then Stevenson’s argumentation becomes invalid. The only 
remaining question is: does validity give a proposition a scientific status? When 99 % of 
the world population accepts that there is a god, or something akin to it, is it then true? 
The problem with God is that one must appeal to truth - not validity. Moreover, a 
transcendent ‘truth’ does not lend itself to verification or falsification. Finally, the 
defence of validity as a scientific concept hinges on the finding that an attitude does not 
have an independent life, as it were. It is always related to decisive facts and logical 
connections. The facts themselves are true or false and the logical form is correct or not 
and consequently the attitude is valid or not. Agreement or disagreement does not 
change any of the fundamentals in a case. Ethical problems, which are manmade 
problems, are very complex and cannot always be settled in the twinkling of an eye, 
which is also Stevenson’s position on the matter.  
The definition of validity is, as yet, incomplete. Validity also has to do with valuating 
and values do conform to a standard. In turn, none of these concepts are independent of 
empirical material or logical connections. Stevenson may very well have ‘discovered’ a 
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linguistic independency regarding validity and truth, but this doesn’t mean that reality 
conforms to his findings. People valuate based on facts, even if valuations themselves 
are not considered factual. But, facts account for valuations and that is a starting point. 
Even if valuations were based only on feelings, as is the case in Stevenson’s emotivism, 
these feelings are real, both subjective and universally human, albeit with some 
transversal variables, such as tradition, culture, conviction, religion and personal 
experiences. But these variables can be taken up in the quest for general or universal 
validity in ethical propositions. Residual differences in attitude need not be considered 
immoral. They can be explained through personal preference, and, concepts such as 
autonomy and free choice are important too.  
The consequence of the other view on the choice of a persuasive method is that it not 
a matter of free choice. Following Stevenson, the choice of method is a normative 
matter, provided that facts and logic do not interfere628. However, as we have seen, this 
would only be correct if moral attitudes were independent of facts. But, because an 
attitude always depends on facts, this relationship will be a determining factor in 
choosing the most efficient and effective method of persuasion. To conclude that 
disagreements about method can only be settled if related to facts629 is rather trivial, 
because any other types of disagreement, in casu a pure disagreement in attitude, do not 
exist. Stevenson is thinking along these lines as well when he asserts that persuasion is, 
in fact, also in need of reasons in order to be effective. Purely persuasive language 
simply does not have the same impact630.  
The idea that persuasion is the central pillar of ethical discourse can be called into 
question because persuasion is not a moral term. Stevenson, unwittingly, suggests this 
when he states that persuasion is sometimes good and sometimes bad631. A striking 
instance of persuasion at work can be found in the propaganda machinery of Nazi 
Germany – hardly an example of what is morally good. Morality cannot be explained 
simply through placing persuasion and feelings at the centre of ethics, in spite of the 
fact that feelings and persuasion play a huge role in moral events, alongside rationality 
and facts.  
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One of Stevenson’s many merits is that he, via a thorough analysis of moral language, 
elucidates the complexity of ethical events through typologies. The concept of an ‘ideal 
type’ is introduced to the social sciences by Max Weber, who drew on his Kantian 
background in doing so. Such an ‘ideal type’ can be formulated through the unilateral 
extension of one or more viewpoints, which when combined, leads to a unifying 
representation632. It cannot be found in reality as such, but it allows us to make reality 
more knowable and manageable.  An extraordinarily successful example of such an 
exercise can be found in chapter 8, §3633. By delineating types of agreement in attitude, 
Stevenson can explain a common mistake in ethics. ‛Philosophers of ethics“, as he calls 
them634, present intrinsic value as a unique explanation of ethics. His typology 
demonstrates that this monistic approach does not fit reality. In my view, Stevenson’s 
reduction of ethical problems to agreement and disagreement, when placed alongside 
his recognition of the complexity of the interaction between facts and valuation, and 
between extrinsic and intrinsic values, corresponds with my monistic fallacy. This false 
reasoning abrogates the naturalistic fallacy of Moore635. Stevenson also emphasizes that 
complexity leads to reinforcement of an attitude and that the study of complex 
agreement is very important to ethical methodology636. His critique of hedonism, in 
which he puts forth the pluralism of human goals, is in the same vein637. 
For Stevenson, ethical utterances rest on knowledge of the world, but not exclusively. 
Personal and social reflections of a persuasive character always play a role. Therefore, in 
his view, a scientific study of normative ethics was still possible, but normative ethics as 
a science was impossible638. It is these personal and social reflections that can give ethics 
its scientific character again, but because these may vary across interlocutors they 
cannot immediately lead to any solutions. They are contingent, not arbitrary.  
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5.3 Plurality and unity in contemporary ethics 
The contemporary ethical landscape is characterized by plurality on the one hand, and a 
tenacious grasp on unique ethical models on the other, mostly of religious origin. Both 
may be found, more or less, in Alisdair McIntyre’s ethics. In After Virtue (1981), he 
posited the incommensurability of ethics and premises in moral argumentation. He 
deplored the break up of the moral world that meant that only restricted narratives 
corresponding to certain moral practices remained639. But he also proposed a model to 
solve the problem of plurality, namely the Aristotelian moral and political practices of 
teleological rationality and virtue ethics, in a historical perspective. But perhaps more 
important than this attempt at restoring a unique ethical model, is his lesser known 
Dependent Rational Animals (1999), wherein he grounds his moral thinking on an 
anthropology in which the interdependency of the human beings generates morality. 
However, this is highly problematic. The collective conduct of people is not necessary of 
high moral standards. Interdependency can generate morally good conduct, but not 
necessarily.  
Although absolute unity in the moral field has never existed, not even in the Middle 
Ages640, post-modern critique has had a huge impact on thought in general and mutatis 
mutandis moral thinking. In this philosophy, the diversity of meanings became 
paramount and was even appreciated. Such diversity is advocated by Richard Rorty, 
attested to by his Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (1989), Donald Davidson (see his 
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford, 1984; and Essays on Actions and Events, 
Oxford, 1980); and Michael Stocker in his Plural and Conflicting Values (1990), among 
others641. The diversity discussed was primarily theoretical, by which the same actions 
were sometimes founded on opposing principles. In other words, different foundations 
could lead to the same conduct. 
The deconstructive tendency in postmodernism became self evidently 
methodological and led to attempts at reconstruction642. Also, the need for convergence 
in ethics, if nothing else, was never completely absent, not even when pluralism was 
promoted as the answer to factual divergences in the ethical field. Moreover, the 
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frequent contacts made in a cultural diverse world, as well as within the within the 
West, means that a procedural form of ethics has become the minimum requirement for 
intercultural relationships, as well as a search for common values.  
However, the Gordian knot of plurality/unity must be cut through the introduction 
of other ideas that allow for more nuance, happiness, for instance. The right to 
happiness is generally recognized, as is the fact that how it is obtained can differ from 
person to person, or from culture to culture. Here, both plurality and unity are 
preserved. Happiness is a concept that is difficult to describe. Almost everybody has 
their own interpretation and cultural context can play an important role in this. But 
that need not be a disadvantage. If everybody could live according to his own 
conception of happiness, without infringing on someone else’s, there would not be an 
issue. Even the belief that happiness only can be realised in an afterlife does not 
contradict this unity/plurality. Despite the diversity of conceptualizations, some shared 
features of happiness or unhappiness can be discerned. For instance, happiness could be 
considered a synonym for a dignified life. 
Article 23 of the Belgian Constitution establishes the right to a dignified life for all643. 
It encompasses the right to work and freedom of choice in occupation; the right to 
social security, the protection of health, as well as social, medical and juridical 
assistance; the right to decent housing; the right to a healthy environment; and the 
right to cultural and social development. Similar provisions have been stipulated in the 
European Social Charter of 1961 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights of 1966. They all have their roots in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. The focus on social and economic rights is more recent, and it is 
noteworthy that all Belgian political parties, apart from the extreme right, more or less 
supported this change. Yet, there were also objections from all political parties. Senator 
Paul De Grauwe opposed some provisions on ideological grounds, his argument being 
that the right to work cannot be compelled in a capitalist society644. But economic 
objections could also be made645. For example, is it possible for an impoverished country 
to secure all these rights? That ethics has become scientific does mean that clear 
precepts that are applicable to all times and places can be dictated. 
This example demonstrates the complexity of moral questions. Personal, social, 
cultural and ideological aspects always loom. However, morally acceptable diversity is 
always rooted in self-determination. Autonomy and freedom must be accounted for.  
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5.4 Mill’s On Liberty 
Scientific means that every assertion must be accounted for by facts and firm reasoning, 
which is not say that circular reasoning should be excluded. In particular, John Stuart 
Mill (1806 – 1873) made a remarkable effort at defending the notion of liberty646. His 
argumentation will be discussed, and analysed chapter by chapter in the following 
paragraphs, with additional remarks.  
However, it must be stated that Mill has by no means been the only philosopher to 
tackle this subject. Pico della Mirandolla, a Renaissance philosopher, was one of the first 
to realize that self-determination and individuality are important values647. This was 
shocking at a time where it was commonly accepted that the destiny of man and 
mankind is in God’s hands. Other philosophers have since carried on with this theme. 
Wilhelm von Humboldt, at the beginning of his book On Liberty, cites one very good 
argument in favour of it, namely that the importance of human development lies in its 
rich diversity648.  
5.4.1 Introductory 
In his introduction, Mill limits his discussion of liberty to its negative sense. He does not 
intend to handle liberty of the will, but civil liberty. This is liberty with limits, imposed 
by either an authority or through social control. He begins with an outline of the 
historical emancipation process by which the democratic form of government arose, 
where rulers come from among the ruled and the ruler is not opposed to the ruled. The 
same transition took place in Germany during Lotze’s lifetime. Yet Mill does not limit 
himself to historical description. He also discusses the ‘tyranny of the majority’649. This 
tyranny is exercised not only through official institutions but also in a very penetrating 
way via social contact. ‛Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is 
not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion 
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and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil 
penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from 
them (…)“650. Patrick Loobuyck calls attention to the fact that social control is mostly 
beyond the reach of the judiciary and that because of this, Mill discussed the tyranny of 
the majority in relation to social control while mainly focussing on governmental 
interference in freedom651. 
Until this point, apart from the quotation by von Humboldt, no explicit justification 
for freedom had been offered; only the historical process of emancipation and the 
finding that liberty is incomplete when social control is still able to restrain an 
individual’s actions. However, some can found in the margins of Mill’s text, such as the 
satisfaction of going one’s own way, but this analysis will be restricted to what Mill 
explicitly brings forward. 
To make way for an ethics founded in reason, Mill had to first deal with unreasoned 
moral conduct, which is mostly fixed in customs. He refers to a universal illusion in 
custom, ‛which is not only, as the proverb says, a second nature, but is continually 
mistaken for the first“652. Men believe that their feelings in moral matters are ‛better 
than reasons, and render reasons unnecessary“653. Customs, according to Mill, are often 
generated by the leading class, and wherever ‛there is an ascendant class, a large 
portion of the morality of the country emanates from its class interests, and its feelings 
of class superiority“654.  
But customs alone do not explain moral conduct in Mill’s estimation; there is also 
‛the servility of mankind towards the supposed preferences or aversions of their 
temporal masters, or of their gods“655. In short, many moral preferences have to do with 
sympathy and antipathy - not with the interests of society. It is clear that Mill’s position 
is the opposite of Stevenson’s. For the latter, ethics cannot be scientific because it rests 
on feelings while for the former, true moral conduct must be based on reason. The latter 
is situated in a positivistic tradition in which language plays a central role; the former in 
the tradition of Enlightenment.  
In his warning against the tyranny of the majority, Mill situates the origin of 
protection for minorities in their realization that they could not become majorities and 
their resultant pleas for permission to differ. The rights of minorities are very 
important in modern democracy. In the Belgian political setting, the protection of one 
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community against another is rooted in the constitution. As Bert van den Brink, 
professor of political and social philosophy at the University of Utrecht states, political 
decisions are not made solely on the basis of what the majority wants, but must be good 
for society as a whole first and foremost656. 
Mill mentioned a principle he considered very important to both his essay and 
society, namely ‛that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their members, is self-
protection“657. This is the first foundation of liberty Mill brought up, but how he 
elaborated on it remains to be seen. What it comes down to is that the sovereignty of 
the individual over himself has but a single restriction: he may not cause harm to 
others. This also includes not doing what must be done, not helping a person in need, 
for instance.  
Nevertheless there are some exceptions to individual sovereignty. First of all, there 
are those persons not yet fully able to exercise human capacities because they are still 
learning, children, for instance. What is neither acceptable nor self-evident is Mill’s 
assertion that citizens of developing countries belong in this category. Here, Mill had 
fallen prey to the colonialist attitude of his era, in which non-Western cultures were 
considered to be at an early stage of human development. Regarding children, however, 
there is now physiological evidence of their incapacity. Recent research in the field of 
brain development has revealed that until roughly the age of twenty-one, the frontal 
cortex, which is responsible for regulating cognitive function, is still in development658.  
Mill also provided another reason why some states cannot afford too much liberty 
for their citizenry. A weak state, surrounded by stronger nations, ‛in constant peril of 
being subverted by foreign attack or internal commotion (…) could not afford to wait for 
the salutary permanent effects of freedom“659. 
Apart from the rule regarding harm, Mill has another foundational principle in his 
ethics: utility. This despite the fact that James Mill, his utilitarian father, considered his 
son ‛a deserter from his standard“660, and John Stuart Mill criticised Bentham, his 
father’s mentor661. The question is did he base his propositions on utilitarianism, or on 
‘utility’ at an individual level? It seems that Mill had the individual in mind as well as 
the prosperity and progress of society, although he did not mention the utilitarian rule 
of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. The difference between the 
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Utilitarians and Mill is that the former restricted their morality to a common 
physiological basis, while the latter emphasized the irreducible originality of the 
individual.662 Critiques made on the basis of the principle of Utilitarianism principle are 
not valid. Simply put, Mill, in advancing the cause of the individual, was also advancing 
the casue of society.  
Mill writes that mankind ‛are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems 
good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest“663. 
Liberty has to be viewed in the context of self-realization664. Loobuyck summarizes it as 
follows: Mill’s defence of liberty is ‛a liberal policy which guarantees the conditions of 
possibility for self-realisation and stimulates the development of higher capabilities, but 
which never compels (adult) people to live a better or another life than that which they 
choose themselves“665. 
5.4.2 On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion 
The ‛peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the 
human race“666. Discussion cannot take place and truth cannot be established. The 
imposition of truth implies that the individual or group attempting to do so is infallible 
and that is never the case. The discovery of truth is a long, ongoing process that will 
never come to an end. It is this incomplete nature that demands freedom of speech. 
Only when conflicting ideas are confronted with one another, can any progress towards 
truth be made and therefore, all opinions have the right to be expressed. Man ‛is 
capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by experience 
alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted“667.   
What is Mill’s position on pseudoscience? It is clear that anybody may express their 
own opinion, even when it is evident that this opinion does not bear scientific scrutiny. 
However, truth remains the ultimate goal and so facts and arguments must be 
employed. This means that allowing erroneous assertions and mere assumptions to go 
unchallenged is impermissible. Only if someone has done a serious and thorough 
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investigation and ‛taken up his position against all gainsayers (…), he has a right to 
think his judgment better than that of any person“668. 
As mentioned in his ‛Introductory“, utility is a founding principle of Mill’s ethics, but 
which utility? Liberty in speech is useful because it is a prerequisite for finding truth. On 
the other hand, there are ‛certain beliefs, so useful, not to say indispensable to well-
being, that it is much the duty of government to uphold those beliefs“669. But, Mill went 
on to argue, by this the government is supposed to be infallible in laying down what is 
true and useful. The usefulness of an opinion is itself a matter of opinion, and requires 
discussion. ‛The truth of an opinion is part of its utility“670. Loobuyck speaks of the 
practical nature of Mill’s freedom of speech671. He believes that Mill is more focussed on 
the achieving something, rather than expounding upon the underlying concepts. It was, 
above all, Mill’s intention to defend a particular liberty.  Mill’s book is a tool for building 
a better society, a guidebook as it were. 
Mill also states that the argument made by some in defence of persecuting new 
opinons, that the truth always triumphs and therefore mitigates the evils of doing so, is 
not a valid one. I think, that although Mill may believes the the truth can be suppressed 
through persecution, he is more concerned with the effects that such actions may have 
on slowing the progress of society. Regardless of where Mill laid the emphasis here, he 
quite clearly stated freedom of religion must also be guaranteed. Mill counted the 
freedom to be an atheist alongside freedom of religion. To that end, he criticized the 
practice of requiring court witnesses or public officials to make oaths to God because 
this makes an atheist either an outlaw or a hypocrite. Mill took great care to emphasize 
that the freedom of religion and philosophy can never be guaranteed once and for all, 
and that persecution always looms, both on the part of the government as well as from 
‛narrow and uncultivated minds“ in society672. Moreover, he viewed the persecution of 
religious dissenters as injurious to more than the individual in question; the ‛greatest 
harm done is to those who are not heretics, and whose whole mental development is 
cramped, and their reason cowed, by the fear of heresy“673. An additional reason why 
freedom of belief and speech are necessary is that it enables the average of human 
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beings to attain the mental stature to thing by themselves. It also allows great thinkers 
to go against the tide in times of oppression674.  
Nevertheless, Mill made an exception to the freedom of speech. Opinions ‛lose their 
immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to 
constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act“675. In this 
case, freedom of expression becomes an instrument with which to harm somebody. 
All arguments relevant to a decision must have a chance to be aired, and to be 
presented in a convincing manner; that is, put forth by a fervent defender. ‛So essential 
is this discipline to a real understanding of moral and human subjects, that if opponents 
of all important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them, and supply 
them with the strongest arguments which the most skilful advocate can conjure up“676. 
For the very same reason nobody should be excluded from discussion, not even the 
layman, religious matters included. If people were excluded, the search for truth would 
stop and doctrine would take its place. According to Mill, an even worse state of affairs 
would then arise, in which belief would be weakened because believers would no longer 
actively engage with their own religion.    
Mill did not fail to support his defence of liberty with empirical material, such that 
available in the religious or political spheres. Elsewhere he sought support for his 
assertions in the work of prominent thinkers such as Plato. An unfortunate choice 
perhaps, in light of Karl Popper’s critique on Plato’s Republic677.  
Assertions can be true or false. Yet, they can also be partially true because they are 
‛exaggerated, distorted and disjoined from the truths by which they ought to be 
accompanied and limited“678. Despite this, they often appear as polarised opinions, as in 
politics, where for instance conservatism is considered the antagonist of liberalism. 
Only diversity of opinion can ensure ‛a chance of fair play to all sides of the truth“679. 
The truth would lose out if one opinion were silenced. It is for this reason that Mill 
rejected intolerance in religious matters.  
Lotze was known as a very moderate critic, not in the sense that his critiques were 
not thorough, but in the sense that he did not use disrespectful methods, such as the ad 
hominem arguments commonplace in the work of his contemporaries. More than 
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anything, his concern for logical, solid and scientifically justified argumentation guided 
him in this. Mill also appreciated civility in discussion, but he also emphasized that the 
suppression of speech on the grounds that it is indecent may impair the open and broad 
exchange of ideas necessary to the search for truth. 
5.4.3 Of Individuality, as one of the Elements of Well-being 
First of all, Mill emphasized that individuality is the only attitude that can assure the 
complete development of human capacities. ‛The human faculties of perception, 
judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are 
exercised only in making a choice“680. This is an Aristotelian standpoint because it 
promotes the actualisation of human potential. But it is more than that. Individual 
development also generates wellbeing, which comes as the result of having self-
autonomy.  
For Mill, the opposite of individuality is a loss of originality and complete surrender 
to custom and tradition or to imposed rules, as is the case in Calvinism, where 
‛whatever is not a duty, is a sin“681. Individuality is necessary is not only to individual 
wellbeing, but it is also beneficial for society. ‛In proportion to the development of his 
individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of 
being more valuable to others“682. The entire society gains as a result.   
According to Mill, it is not right to say that man’s desires are so strong that they 
ought to be suppressed. ‛It is not because men’s desires are strong that they act ill; it is 
because their consciences are weak“683. Submission to custom and strict rules without 
any gainsay generates slavish ‛automatons“ and ‛ape-like“ imitators684.  
Mill did not have much esteem for the masses. From the viewpoint of progress and 
renewal, he was right. It is known that societal change encounters great difficulties 
because of the conservative reaction of people. Although the word ‘change’ is a 
powerful political slogan, once changes are implemented, strong opposition can be 
expected – one not entirely explained by self-interest. The ongoing success of the 
change mantra is more the result of dissatisfaction with the existing situation than a 
call for real change. Fortunately, originality and the acceptance of change are also 
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culturally rooted. Hence, there is still a chance to bring about actual change in at least 
some circles. For Mill, progress and innovation were closely related to individualism, 
which was a conditio sine qua non. 
Mill, who had a colonial attitude as we have seen, was also guilty of orientalism, an 
illness of his time. He was not nuanced when he spoke of ‘the East’. According to him, in 
the East there was apparently only despotism and oppression without progress. China, 
once a great innovating country, had now degraded to a static state, without either 
individuality or innovation. Although communism and modern economic growth are 
relatively recent occurrences, even in Mill’s time there must have been more diversity 
and transformation than he perceived.  
5.4.4 Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the individual 
There are two principles on which the balance of rights between the individual and 
society rests, namely the protection offered by authority and the necessity of respecting 
some minimal rules in order to render living together possible. The latter means that 
authority should not interfere ‛when a person’s conduct affects the interests of no 
person besides himself“685, provided that the individual in question has come of age and 
has an ordinary amount of understanding. The reason for this is that the person himself 
is ‛the most interested in his own well-being“686 – not the authority or others. They may 
have opinions regarding wellbeing that may be wrong or unfitted to the person 
concerned. Of course, the individual also has their own ideas over wellbeing, but they 
are his own and he is the only person responsible for them. According to Mill, ‛errors 
which he is likely to commit against advice and warning, are far outweighed by the evil 
of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem is good“687. It may well be that 
someone is displeased about another’s conduct, but that cannot be considered a valid 
reason for making that person’s life uncomfortable.  
The remaining question is whether it possible to distinguish between actions that do 
not harm others and those that do so. Mill stated the following: ‛Whenever, in short, 
there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the 
public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or 
law“688. Someone who is drunk should not be punished for that alone, but a policeman or 
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a soldier who is drunk on duty should be. It could be added that someone who drives 
under the influence is legally and morally in the wrong, because the risk of harming 
others is statistically high. The risk to society is quite real. The risk of harming others 
while inebriated in the privacy of one’s own home, while not not nil, is statistically low. 
All actions carry an associated risk, and Mill would probably agree. The word ‘definite’ 
here covers the statistical risk. Moreover, there are some inconveniences ‛which society 
can afford to bear for the sake of the greater good of human freedom“689. Apparently, 
what society and authority can tolerate with regards to the extent of personal liberty is 
a matter of proportionality. 
5.4.5 Applications 
In this chapter, Mill applied his theories to different situations. This means that not only 
his ideas became clearer and more concrete, some unsuspected aspects also come to 
light. To begin with, Mill formulated two maxims that together form the entire doctrine 
of his Essay. ‛The maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society for 
his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself. (…) 
Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the 
individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, 
if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection“690. 
It is now becomes neccessary to define ‘prejudicial’. Fair competition may cause some 
damage to others, but as long as there is no fraud, treachery or force involved, this 
cannot be seen as a punishable offence. In matters of trade, Mill supported ‘Free Trade’, 
but it is clear that his choice was not ideological. Rather, this was justified by the belief 
held in the relatively new field of economics that it was the best form of trade. Trade is a 
social event in which neither the liberty of the producer nor the seller is at stake, but 
any means available, excepting force or fraud, can be used to influence the buyer.  
More generally speaking, it is the task of the government not only to detect and 
punish crimes, but also to take necessary measures to prevent crimes or accidents. Yet 
according to Mill with regard to potential accidents, ‛when there is not a certainty, but 
only a danger of mischief, no one but the person himself can judge of the sufficiency or 
the motive which may prompt to incur the risk“ therefore he ought ‛to be only warned 
of the danger, not forcibly prevented from exposing himself to it“691. Mill used the 
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example of an unsafe bridge. The authorities must warn people that the bridge is 
dangerous, but if someone knowingly insists on crossing the bridge, he may not be 
prevented from doing so.  
Mill stressed that actions acceptable in the private sphere may become subject to 
prohibition when they enter the public sphere; when they are considered indecent, for 
example. But question then arises, what is indecent? Indecency is relative to time and 
place, but Mill should have added that it is also subject to change through social action. 
For instance, the prevailing attitude towards abortion (abortus provocatus) in Belgium 
changed as the result of social actions carried out by morally outraged health care 
providers and other persons who were aware of certain abuses in the practice. Doctor 
Willy Peers and some partisans openly admitted that they performed abortions. Doctor 
Peers was officially accused and arrested for doing so in 1978. However, other 
physicians were not cowed by this and no longer attempted to hide the fact that similar 
practices were employed in their hospitals. Only in 1990, did abortion become legal in 
Belgium. This was largely due to the initiative of senators Roger Lallemand and 
Lucienne Herman-Michielsen, but it passed by a majority in both chambers, with the 
yeas coming from across the political spectrum.  
Mill also questioned whether or not a person should be allowed to sell himself into 
slavery. The answer is somewhat self-evident. Freedom to sell oneself is a contradictory, 
self-abrogating act – in part because decision to do so is, by definition, irreversible. 
Further on, Mill pled for equality between man and wife; for the duty of parents to give 
their children a sound education; for the right of the state to compel parents who do not 
fulfil their parental duties to do so; the duty of the state to provide education if private 
initiative is lacking or unavailable; and - although the state must be impartial as what 
opinions it promotes692 - the imposition of minimum scholastic requirements693.  
Balancing liberty against society, Mill stated that the ‛laws, in many countries on the 
Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of 
supporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers of the State“694. This view 
would probably not garner much support now, but taking into account the variety and 
reliability of contraception available, it is still morally valuable on an individual level. 
Moreover, Mill, who lived in the nineteenth century, was inevitably influenced by 
Malthus (1766-1834) and his work on demographics. As yet, there was not as much 
knowledge about the circumstances under which large families prosper as there is now. 
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Other contemporary events that clearly influenced Mill’s thinking include the Poor 
Laws and Corn Laws, two sets of legislation the effects of which, and the debates 
surrounding them, echo throughout the politics, philosophy and economic theorizing of 
the time.  
In the last part of this chapter, Mill discussed the constraints and duties of authority, 
but not those that directly involve the liberty of the individual. Nevertheless, the 
authories have a role to play in forstering greater freedom, through education and all 
those policies that could advance social interaction.   
5.4.6 Conclusion 
Mill’s defence of liberty is an example of how moral values can be found in a scientific 
fashion; although, it may be not perfect and is subject to ameliorations - by taking into 
account intercultural conditions, for instance. It is clear that Mill’s theories on liberty 
are firmly rooted in the Western tradition, particularly as it developed following the 
Enlightenment. The values that grew out of this particular philosophical trend are also 
subject to inquiry regarding their foundation and evolution. Indeed, if a cultural change 
can only occur through war, terrorism or revolution, then the method may be worse 
than the objectives aspired to. Besides, the results of radical change are ultimately never 
what was expected and, as for the rest, neither are the results of more sedate change695. 
However, such objections should not be used as an excuse for supporting the status quo.  
Lotze drew the same conclusion. He was extremely cautious about making any 
predictions as to what the future would hold, but he also realized that the past not fully 
visible either. His reluctance to speculate was probably motivated to some degree by his 
presumed anti-communism, and therefore quite post-modern in some ways. 
Nevertheless, he still emphasized man’s social responsibility. 
Mill’s essay is scientific because it relies on facts and sound reasoning. Its scientific 
character becomes even more evident when the scientific knowledge of his time, which 
influenced his work, is compared with the scientific knowledge of today696. This is 
particularly striking in his utterances regarding demographics.  
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Summarized, the freedom of opinion and the freedom to express one’s opinion, 
ensures the mental wellbeing of mankind, ‛on which all their other well-being 
depends“697. Mill does not base his moral statements on feelings, but on an objective 
standard of wellbeing – certainly the result of his utilitarian background. At the same 
time, feelings have an implicit role because not harming others requires a certain 
amount of empathy in order to know where the line between what harms and what is 
good, is. As to certainty, Mill cannot be situated in any particular epistemological 
tradition. His thinking remains grounded in the practical, and he aimed to provide a 
solid basis for a moral principle, namely freedom.   
Is liberty conceived on the basis individuality impossible in those cultures in which 
the individual is submerged in the collective? Pinxten discusses how for traditional 
Navajo, clan obligations supersede everything698. Every member of the clan is duty-
bound to help another clan member in need, as best as he can. This may make it difficult 
for a traditional Navajo to begin a business. A store could be bankrupted if the owner 
felt obliged to extend an endless line of credit to any needy member of his clan.  
It is necessary to distinguish between a moral rule and the how an individual’s 
actions are actually judged. The Navajo shopkeeper’s clan mates will judge him on an 
individual level for not following the Navajo way of life. From an objective, ethical point 
of view, the tradition itself will be judged according to its consequences. Is the 
individual unjustifiably limited in his actions? Is he harming another? Is the limitation 
of an individual’s liberty permitted if considered necessary for group survival? What 
about traditions that continue to be observed despite the fact that the circumstances 
under which they were created are no longer extant? Sometimes traditions are 
maintained out of personal interest. It may be jealousy or envy that dictates the custom. 
I want to make it very clear that I am not judging this particular Navajo tradition 
because, frankly, I do not have any great knowledge of their institutions, the 
circumstances under which they live or their way of life. However, generally speaking, 
when restrictions on an individual’s actions, and the resulting damage to him, exceed 
acceptable moral limits then they can be considered morally wrong, even when religion 
or custom is invoked as justification. However, any strategies adopted for changing such 
practices must be appropriate to the situation, and cause as little harm as possible in 
return. 699 
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What about collective guilt, the practice of vendetta, for instance? Family honour is 
not a reason for sacrificing lives. An individual who does not wish to participate in this 
tradition may be forced to do his ‘duty’ and this could cause him acute distress. Both for 
tradition and religion, an independent ethical judgment can be made according to other 
criteria, such as autonomy and whether or not it is harmful. 
A last matter to be resolved is that of aggiornamento700. Can liberty be maintained in 
today’s society? When discussing so-called ‘alternative medical methods’, Etienne 
Vermeersch states that intervention against these alternative practices is not 
paternalistic for the following reasons: first, other persons may be involved, namely 
when they cannot renounce their duty to give assistance to a person in need; second, an 
extensive network of police, fire-brigades, hospitals and health insurance is deployed 
when public health is at stake, in the case of epidemics, for example. Therefore, if these 
practices cause harm, the authorities may intervene701. The answer is yes, liberty can be 
maintained in today’s society, but the principle of non-harm still plays an important 
role in safeguarding both individuals and the wider community.  
5.5 Interculturalism 
5.5.1 Definition 
Interculturalism is often strictly defined as a practice and even further restricted to 
political action. Under these terms, interculturalism is the promotion of exchange 
between cultural groups within society. In order to fight ethnocentrism and 
xenophobia, the political realm developed this strategy in which the socialization of 
citizens of different origins and different cultures is encouraged. One part of this 
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scheme is to encourage new comers to master the language in order to promote 
dialogue and integration.  
But interculturalism is much more than that. It is also a scientific approach, in which 
both the subject of inquiry and the object are involved. This means, for instance, that by 
participating in observation, the observer is not neutral towards the observed object 
and thus must take his own position into account. Besides this, it is necessary to 
understand the thought processes of the individuals belonging to the community under 
study. This requires dialogue - not distant observation.  
Interculturalism is also the name for a particular societal phenomenon. Here it refers 
to cultures that are close in the physical sense, and converging culturally. Some features 
or ideas from the other culture be adopted and/or adapted. This process often takes 
place in a natural and discreet way. Even when culturally different groups, or groups 
that define themselves as different, are hostile to each other, such exchanges still take 
place.  
Interculturalism defines itself in opposition to multiculturalism. Multiculturalism 
does not imply any mutual influence, neither in a positive nor in a negative sense. 
Cultural differences and boundaries are maintained, at least in theory. In reality, there 
is always some kind of interaction taking place. However, the multiculturalist model 
aims at perpetuating an existing cultural setting. Theoretically, it can only function if 
there is some degree of indifference towards the other.  
5.5.2 Culture is dynamic: the G/wi Bushmen in Africa 
Multiculturalism generally considers cultures to be static. Yet no culture in history has 
remained untouched by the passage of time. Certain features may span centuries but 
any aspect of a cultural setting can be subject to change. Moreover, the actual practice 
of some ideas, customs and traditions may be quite creative. The following passage from 
Silberbauer, regarding the G/wi Bushmen of Africa, illustrates the flexibility with which 
cultures deal with issues.  
‛A woman had left her husband for his closest friend. Divorce was not normally a 
shattering event, the spouses usually finding new partners within a year and settling 
down happily. But this man would not; he mourned the undoing of both the marriage 
and the friendship with so much sorrow as to disturb everybody in the band. His lot 
thus became a public, hence political matter and the band saw itself having to solve an 
intolerable problem. The man could not be condemned; he had done no wrong, but was 
unbearable. His former wife and friend had moved away, so were beyond the blame or 
other direct influence of the band. Enquiries found that they were happy together but 
the man missed his former friend. Delicate diplomacy uncovered the couple’s 
willingness to return and try out the unprecedented arrangement of a ménage à trois. 
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Polyandry was completely unknown; it appeared to constitute adultery but, if all 
acquiesced, was it? All did acquiesce, it was deemed not to be adultery and the band, the 
couple and the deserted husband lived more happily“702. 
5.5.3 Migrations: Bruce Bawer and Paul Cliteur. Islam and ethics in 
Europe. 
With the latest wave of migration generally flowing from the development countries to 
the developed ones, the question of multiculturalism versus interculturalism is 
extremely relevant today. Values and customs come under pressure, and some acquired 
values, such as freedom of expression, freedom of religion, equality between man and 
woman, and the separation of church and state are sometimes questioned through 
symbolic issues such as the headscarf or the burqa. Although smooth integration is, of 
course, preferable, it would be unrealistic to ignore ideological, political and sociological 
tensions. 
Bruce Bawer, an American residing in Europe, has pronounced a strongly biased 
judgment against Islam703. Throughout the entire volume, there is not a jot of nuance to 
be found when it comes to his opinion of that religion. Only at the very end does he 
offer a solution to what he considers a problem in the form of encouraging a moderate 
Islam, but this is utterly unconvincing. When Bawer speaks of ‘a’ radical Islam, he means 
‘the’ radical Islam. Nevertheless, taking into account these concerns regarding his 
objectivity, some of his theorems are worth mentioning.  
Bawer criticizes Europe’s attitude and approach towards the issue of immigration. 
Unlike in the Unites States of America, which relied its policy on integration and work, 
Europe’s starting point is in social care. The former resulted in the so-called ‘melting-
pot’, admission to American society on an equal footing - which has not always been 
successful, or without its own problems. The latter, on the other hand, has always 
maintained a sophisticated distinction between them and us from the outset. The 
immigrant is not looked upon as an individual, but as a member of a group. Bawer 
speaks of an underlying racism in this case. This ethnocentric, condescending attitude 
does not allow any space for responsibility and thus self-respect on the part of the 
immigrant. Bawer links this to political compartmentalisation, which puts everyone and 
everything in its appropriate nook.  
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Bawer compares the current policy in Europe with that of the Weimar Republic 
(1918-1933). This juxtaposition is excessive to say the least, and was probably chosen for 
sensationalism. According to Bawer, Europe is now, as then, caught between infirmity of 
purpose or fascism. Only a vigorous liberal resistance, inspired by the American 
example, can bring about an alternative future. His solution to the problem is, of course, 
embedded in the premises of his reasoning, namely that Islam has an aggressive 
character and current policies are inefficient. Although Bawer’s work does contain some 
valid comments and it can certainly be used in justifying a certain policy, such polemics 
mostly just pour oil on the fire. By neglecting to examine all sides of an issue, and 
avoiding those arguments that could poke holes in their own, they inhibit full insight 
into a problem. Thus, no adequate policies can be derived from them. Such arguments 
are part of the problem, not the solution.They are self-fulfilling prophecies. 
Less radical, is the position taken by Paul Cliteur in defending a ‘moral Esperanto’704. 
Cliteur makes clear that the revival of religious ethics hinders, and even can make 
impossible, the easy coexistence of different convictions. An autonomous ethic and a 
neutral government are necessary in the creation of a harmonious society in which 
everybody is free to think and say what they want. ‘Moral Esperanto’ is the counterpart 
of religious fanaticism and indifferent cultural relativism705. Religion must remain a 
private matter and banned from any area in which the government is supposed to be 
neutral: the courts, police, army and official meetings. Cliteur is clearly not the radical 
he is often accused of being. He does not demand that the general public space be 
neutral, nor does he advocate for the prohibition of religious symbols in public schools – 
something the French legislature was decidedly in favour of.  
In an interview with Elma Drayer for ‛Filosofie Magazine“, Cliteur responded to the 
charge that he is an ‘Enlightenment fundamentalist’ by stating that if freedom of speech 
is restricted for the sake of not causing insult, then that freedom is threatened706. He 
cites the 1976 decision of the European Court for Human Rights that freedom of speech 
also includes statements that shock, disturb or offend. But, he goes on to say, there is 
such an enormous preoccupation with the injuries people could sustain if criticized for 
their religious fanaticism that the truth is jeopardized. When seen from a different 
angle, the post-modern way of thinking generated a relativization of opinions, which 
paralyses any opposition to this development. Cliteur cites James Madison, one of 
America’s ‘founding fathers’: in a secular state, the citizens enjoy fundamental rights 
and freedoms.  
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Central to Cliteur’s argumentation on the impact of religions, especially the 
Abrahamic faiths, is their complete submission to the almighty. The biblical story of 
Abraham being ordered by God to sacrifice his son to him, is characteristic for these 
religions. Although God ultimately restrained him, this moment of unconditional 
surrender to the Almighty is a central pillar in these faiths. While the majority of 
believers would not go so far, some would, and it is these fundamentalists who would 
cause human misery in name of their God. Even when they are a numerical minority, 
their impact is not minimal. Unlike the Roman Catholic Church, which generally 
propagates a more centrally controlled and more moderate position, the radical 
freedom of scriptural interpretation promoted by Protestantism and Islam leaves the 
way open to the kind of fundamentalism that may justify murders if neutral political 
policies are viewed as being in opposition to ‘true’ faith.  
Cliteur criticizes the ‘Enlightenment optimists’ who, with their attempts at passive 
appeasement, forget that they are subverting any criticism in doing so. Even scientific 
progress could be in danger. The freedom of religion must not interfere with secular 
legislation, established democratically. Relying on Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, 
John Stuart Mill, Voltaire, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, Cliteur develops his 
theory of moral Esperanto, expressing an autonomous ethic, independent from religion 
and in combination with a neutral state. But what is the best solution from a moral 
perspective? Is moral Esperanto a better solution, independent as it is of ideological 
considerations? Can it function in a democracy? Does Islam truly constitute a threat, 
apart from its small but dangerous minority? To answer this last question is necessary 
to look at how Islamic ethics function in Western society.  
Hermann Beck and Gerard Wiegers, both professors of religious studies specializing 
in Islam at the University of Tilburg and Radboud University in Nijmegen respectively, 
analysed the advisory notices of Islam specialists, the so-called fatwa’s, which are based 
on the Sharia707. Sharia forms the guide to moral behaviour in Islam and is based on the 
Qur’an, the Soena, the general consensus of religious leaders and reasoning by analogy. 
The Qur’an represents God’s word and it is thus the most important source of moral 
knowledge. The Soena describes the life of the prophet Mohammed and provides 
guidance when ambiguities or differences occur in the reading of the Qur’an. If there is 
still not any consensus, then religious scholars, those respected in the Islamic 
community and not self-proclaimed, non-recognized experts, look for a solution 
through reasoning by analogy. This means that all contemporary problems ‘apparently’ 
not described in the Qur’an, can be solved by relating them to those that are, and which 
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show some affinity to the issues at stake. I use ‘apparently’ because the Qur’an is 
supposed to contain an answer to all possible questions that have ever arisen.  
The Islamic ethic is, like the Catholic one, a heterogeneous affair: no man determines 
what is good and what is bad, but rather an authority outside the individual does. The 
believer must conform to the expectations of this authority. In spite of a lot of 
similarities between the Catholic and Islamic ethics, there are also a great many 
differences, both in terms of their principles and their elaborations. The most striking 
divergence is the singular authority of the Pope in the Catholic world. Authority in 
Islam is more diffuse, when Islamic scholars fail to reach a consensus, the believer may 
chose what he judges to be the most acceptable opinion. The conscience is the only 
equivalent in the Catholic Church, but the conscience of an individual believer may err. 
Nevertheless, a Muslim living in the West has an advantage over his brethren in 
fundamentalist Islamic states, where deviations are sanctioned severely.  
All this suggests that there is a great deal of diversity in both the thought 
surrounding precepts and their practice. Next to the individual believer, who may be 
plagued with same doubts any person of faith may have, there are different trends in 
Islam with their own interpretations of the faith, such as the Hanafi, the Maliki, the 
Shafi’i, and the Hambali School. Then there are larger divisions, such as Sunni Muslims 
and the Shiite Muslims, which differ so much that intermarriage is problematic. Which 
tradition or school is followed depends largely on the individual’s country of origin. The 
common thread among all lines and branches is that for the true believer, only complete 
surrender to Allah, the Almighty, is valid; and disbelief is the worst sin a man can 
commit. Even after a serious setback, doubt and despair are not to be succumbed to.  
Developments in the medical field have also provoked ethical questions for Muslims. 
What stance should be taken towards abortion, euthanasia, and organ and tissue 
donation? Beck and Wiegers’ study demonstrates that in Islam, reflection on the 
interrelated legal, ethical and theological levels is animated, and takes place in a 
constant dialogue with day-to-day practice, and diversity the norm. In Europe, the 
solutions to ethic dilemmas are considered largely a matter of individual choice, but 
religious authorities – both from Europe and abroad - collectively shape those choices. 
One of the main problems with which Muslims are confronted is the relation to the 
unbeliever. This can be either a Muslim from another branch, someone of a different 
faith, an atheist or agnostic. The possible watering down of Islamic tradition through 
interaction is seen as a threat. That’s the disadvantage of greater freedom in Europe, but 
the practice of writing fatwa allows Western modernity to be absorbed and neutralized. 
Beck and Wiegers confirm Cliteur’s ‘divine command theory’. They found a close 
relationship between theology and the reflection on ethical problems fundamental to 
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Islam. This means that the Muslim links attitudes and behaviour to the Almighty. 
However, Beck and Wiegers did not discuss the impact of fundamentalists. Cliteur does, 
and this results in a critique of the attitude taken by European intelligentsia708. He states 
that it is a mistake to separate religion and radicalism, as if the representatives of the 
latter are merely misrepresenting their faith and can be ignored on those grounds. If 
religious radicals claim justification for their acts through scripture, then this has to be 
taken seriously; and it is inappropriate to explain their acts away as the result of 
hunger, marginalisation or frustration. Terrorists, according to Cliteur, are not driven 
by these, but by holy conviction.  Scott Roeder, who was convicted for the murder of the 
abortion doctor George Tiller, had purely religious motivations. Cliteur wants to know 
the religious motives of the man who arrived with an axe before the door of the Danish 
cartoonist, Kurt Westergaard. Because the orders of God must be obeyed, all depends on 
how the word of God is interpreted and where any individual is allowed to interpret 
scripture for himself, this can lead to horrific results. Cliteur admits that not all the 
followers of the same religion display the same behaviour, and that Scott Roeder’s 
interpretation of his faith is not the only one. Yet, it was not wholly absurd either, 
provided the certain premises are taken into account. Cliteur also admits that not all 
believers cut throats or murder abortion doctors, and this moderate majority delights 
him. 
Cliteur also considers it a false equivalency to point out that gruesome violence also 
occurs in non-religious contexts, such as the violence of Nazism, communism, and 
nationalism. Simply put, this does not negate the possible relation between religion and 
terrorism. On the contrary, it links conviction, religious or otherwise, with violence. It is 
not because Nazis were simply bad people that they did bad things; they became bad 
people because of their convictions, fuelled by social control and propaganda. A small 
number of terrorists can cause large amount of misery, their impact is not restricted to 
the physical surroundings, but they also effect the entirety of society.   
Cliteur continues by positing that free speech is now trivialized. Through a 
questionable appeal for respect and dialogue, enormous concessions are made to the 
faithful. Self-censorship is one expression of this. It is an absolute mistake to think that 
the achievements of the Enlightenment are irreversible. Therefore, it is necessary to 
continue to establish limits, and to defend democracy and freedom of speech. The Mill’s 
in-depth argumentation could be added to Cliteur’s defence of the values of 
Enlightenment. Is moral Esperanto the solution? In practice, it would become the 
leading language in moral matters because those who look to integrate on the basis of 
dialogue can advance the success of that venture by emphasizing what unites over what 
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divides. The general rules of a moral esperanto and a secular attitude may appear self-
evident, but they are nevertheless contingent. Still, this method could prove quite 
successful because it comes from below, rather than being imposed from above.  
Migration has always existed so perhaps some historical and structural 
contextualization should be brought to the discussion. The object of Willems and 
Lucassen’s research was the stigmatisation, image building and prejudices regarding 
minorities in the context of the metropolitan problems709. First of all, the authors 
question the theory of national identity, in which natives and immigrants distinguish 
between each other. They do not think this is sufficient to explain the problems 
associated with immigration. They go back to the French Revolution to find an 
explanatory model, and focus on the slogans of liberty, equality and fraternity. 
Basically, they conclude that the struggle for equality has had unintended 
consequences. Immigrants have to conform to the indigenous customs, while, 
paradoxically, they are perceived as greater threat the more closely they come to 
resemble the natives. In other words, the more they integrate, the more inequality they 
may experience. This also results in greater trouble in dealing with inequality.  
‘National amnesia’ is an important concept in the context of this discussion. 
Essentially, migration is not, by any means, a new phenomenon despite claims to the 
contrary. Willems and Lucassen present an abundant mass of historical data to support 
this. Nevertheless, there are some differences between past migration and that of today, 
particularly with regards to the governmental and administrative attitudes. Before the 
rise of the nation states and the drawing up of firm national boundaries, governments 
appear to have been less concerned about migration in general. Only afterwards, did 
they begin to feel a sense of responsibility towards their citizens. This manifested in the 
form of charitable organizations and other institutions and policies in which utopians 
played an important role. Increasingly centralised governments gathered statistics in 
order to support their policies and they framed social cohesion as a problematic issue. 
Of particular concern, was the increasing mobility of the lowest level of society. 
Nevertheless, integration was not yet under discussion, because, in spite of the 
influence of Enlightenment thought, inequality still was seen as the natural state of 
affairs. After World War II, when the welfare state took shape, attention for migrants 
children grew, coupled with a growing egalitarianism. Inequality gave rise to 
discomfort, the fight against what was considered deviant behaviour, and equal 
opportunities policies.  
However, because the distinction between natives and immigrants was a condition 
sina qua non of policy development, the struggle for equality actually culminated in its 
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opposite. Although the researchers did not intend to suggest or develop a new policy 
strategy, their unmasking of how the issue has been falsely framed and represented 
automatically provides an opportunity for improvements. The current narratives 
simply do not conform to reality in that they enlarge and problematize small, irrelevant 
details; furthermore, their explanations are generally wrong. For example, they claim 
that migration is a new problem, when in fact the number of people who have migrated 
in the Early Modern and Modern periods is striking. What follows is a by no means 
exhaustive list of groups that immigrated to the Netherlands alone: 
- migrants from the Southern Netherlands under Philip II of Spain; 
- French speaking immigrants from Northern France who settled mainly in Leiden; 
- Iberian Jews in Amsterdam; 
- French Huguenots; 
- Scandinavians and Germans; 
- Ashkenazi Jews from Poland; 
- German families specializing in shop keeping; and just in the 20th century: 
- German servants; 
- Hungarian nurses from religious orders; 
- immigrants from the Dutch Indies; 
Also forgotten is that those migrations were quite often accompanied by severe, bloody 
conflicts of which the irreconcilability of Protestants and Catholics is but one, bitter 
example. The resultant cultural mixture has been a long-term process. The current 
generation no longer sees the differences in most places. Yet, culture is rarely 
homogenous, only the constructed idea of it is. These narratives are palliated by the 
immigrants and their offspring. Generally, no one willingly admits to being the 
descendent of either slavers or slaves, and the family versions of personal histories are 
often embellished, or white washed, as the case may be. Scientific research into 
problems surrounding migration present a rather more accurate view of the issues and 
mutatis mutandis can generate a somewhat more efficient policy. But, the discrepancy 
between the real situation and the perceived one is also a scientific datum, namely a 
sociological one, which also has to be taken in consideration. 
The ideas of the Enlightenment are often placed opposition to religion, Islam in 
particular of late. But what is the significance of the Enlightenment to ethics? Is the 
central position of human welfare in scientific ethics due to this largely European 
phenomenon? Is scientific ethics reducible to a purely historic and cultural issue? Or, to 
put it the other way around, was the Enlightenment first, or did the struggle for human 
welfare precede it? This last question in particular hides within it a certain attitude 
often expressed when discussing the achievements of the Enlightenment, namely its 
relative status and thus its relative weight. It is but one of many other movements. 
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Consequently, from a human standpoint, religious views would be equivalent, while it 
would be inferior from the standpoint of any supposed ‘Supreme Being’. Such reasoning 
is but a matter of pure logic, and because logical reasoning is dependent on its premises, 
it’s the latter that is crucial. Indeed, the success of Enlightenment is unmistakably due 
to its firm roots in human feelings. Moreover, even if one considers the Enlightenment 
to be the founder of contemporary ethics, it engendered a way of thinking which is able 
to question it. Thus the ethical question is not: are we loyal to the principles of 
Enlightenment, but: are the principles of Enlightenment morally good ones? Moreover, 
the Enlightenment is not the only source of good moral principles. The code of 
Hammurabi was a step in the right direction, as were many of statements attributed to 
Jesus of Nazareth.  
5.5.4 Neutrality of the State: the headscarf 
A final matter to be resolved is that of administrative and court neutrality. Of course 
these must be neutral. They must carry out what is required under the law. In so doing 
they themselves are neutral because they make no discrimination that is not prescribed 
by the legislator. However, whether those who represent these bodies, namely the 
officials, must also represent that neutrality in their appearance. It would perhaps be 
preferable, but if neutrality in carrying out the law is not hindered, then this is certainly 
small potatoes, and from the viewpoint of morality, completely irrelevant. Why should a 
headscarf behind a ticket-window be a threat to the customer? On the other hand, the 
legislator may, in a democratic way, approve a law prohibiting the wearing of religious 
symbols in official places. It is up to individual of faith to decide if he or she is able to 
adapt to the rule.  
In this context, Beck and Wiegers results are interesting. They distinguished three 
tendencies in the answers that different religious authorities gave to questions on 
morality. The first is that of salafiyya-Islam. They aim to keep the religious and moral 
practices of Muslims in the west pure, and to distinguish themselves from the religious 
identities of other groups. Liberal, individualistic Muslims represent the second trend. 
Naturally this group is not as prominent in the study because Beck and Wiegers focused 
on fatwa- literature, but it could be more numerous than thought. The third trend is that 
of the wasatiyya-movement, called the ‘middle-orthodoxy’710. Despite their differences, 
all three are firm on the place of Allah and each group links theology with ethics. There 
is not yet any sign of a large scale trend towards secularisation, but both Western and 
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Islamic values have many more things in common with each other than is generally 
recognized or admitted to by either side.  
What did Beck and Wiegers find in the fatwa-literature concerning the headscarf? 
Mohamed Charfi is a Tunisian Muslim, Professor Emeritus of the Law School of the 
University of Tunis and president of the Tunisian League for Human Rights. He was 
Minister of Education and Science from 1989 until 1994. In his opinion, the headscarf is 
part of the oppression of woman by Islamic law. He is also a critic of the ‘Islamic Human 
Rights Declarations’ that support the more discriminatory stipulations of the Sharia. 
Furthermore, according to Charfi, the Sharia violates such principles as the liberty of the 
individual, the equality of men, the equality between man and woman, and respect for 
the physical integrity of the human being. Charfi’s attitude is characteristic of those 
Muslims that have adopted Western living standards. Also characteristic of this debate 
is a generational conflict with some young Muslims who want to turn the clock back. Dr. 
S.M. Darsh deplores the attitude of parents who, for fear of judgment by their 
neighbours, forbid their daughters to wear headscarves711. Because daughters must obey 
their parents, they are allowed to take of the headscarf at home, but, because the law of 
Allah prevails, when they are outdoors they must put the headscarf on.  
The headscarf issue is but a symptom of a much deeper problem, that of the 
assimilation with the ‘enemy’712. Some Islamic scholars consider clothing irrelevant to 
religion, but others assert that wearing Western clothes is forbidden because it 
implicates assimilation in religious matters. Mohammed said: do not assimilate with the 
unbeliever. Mohammed also said that a anyone who imitates a different group of people, 
belongs to them. Therefore, some scholars are even stricter when it comes to forbidding 
Western dress. For Shaykh Ibn Baz, one of the most prominent legal scholars of Saudi 
Arabia, a Muslim who imitates a non-Muslim in this way has become one. Yet not all 
Muslims share this opinion, and practice doesn’t always reflect scholars’ wishes. In one 
talk show very popular in the Islamic world, known in the West as ‘Satellite Queens’, out 
of four female presenters, only one wears a headscarf713.  
On an individual level, whether or not to don a headscarf can be a real religious 
problem. From an ethical viewpoint, the question is not: is it a religious obligation, but: 
is it an infringement of autonomy and does it harm somebody else? If a woman chooses 
to wear a headscarf because she wishes to reserve the beautiful undulations of her hair 
for her husband’s eyes alone, without being forced to do so, neither by religion, nor her 
husband, she cannot be prevented from doing so. In addition there is no reason to 
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suppose that she harms anyone. But if she does not want to wear a headscarf and her 
religion demands that she do so, then she is being harmed.  
5.5.5 Refugees and Human Rights 
Annemarie Busser’s book, which presents stories of refugees and is thus not focused on 
migration as such, presents a very different account714. She was the coordinating officer 
of intake and education in the Department of Refugees at Amnesty International. Her 
work draws upon her own experiences, which she supplemented with extensive 
interviews of the persons concerned. She describes their difficulties, the tortures, the 
fears they experienced and the Kafkaesque situations in the procedure to gain refugee 
status. The main topic of the book, which examines eleven cases, is the strained relation 
between the law and humanity. The core of the problem is to be found in the existence 
of nations and borders.  
Daan Bronkhost, also active in Amnesty International, also emphasizes this point. His 
own work provides a theoretical basis for supporting the interests of the refugees. The 
concrete background of this issue is formed by totalitarian or regimes that are 
democratic only in appearance, where legal order is absent. Turkey, which hopes to join 
the European Union, is part of this group, along with Syria, China, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Iran, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chechnya and Iraq. The problems with 
which the asylum seeker are confronted are initially situated in their country of origin, 
where no boundaries between the private and the public sphere are recognized or 
respected, and where security and safety are undermined by the authorities themselves. 
Secondly, they fall prey to unreliable smugglers, who, without any regard to the person, 
abuse the frailty of their fellow citizens with only one thing in mind: money. 
Subsequently, the asylum seeker is confronted with international agreements and 
legislation that are not properly applied, or were poorly written to start with. Finally, in 
their new host country, where a demand for authenticity is made, they are often 
subjected to what can be a quite humiliating process of interrogation.  
The status of refugee is, however, on a different order than that of the migrant. 
Immigration was, and still is, most often driven by economic reasons. While the refugee 
is motivated to leave their place of origin through fear for their life.  
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5.5.6 Are Western values better? 
The previous section may give the impression that that Western a-religious values are 
better than those values found in other parts of the world.  That is not necessarily the 
case. But, we must be certain that Western moral values are better if we wish to apply 
them elsewhere. Otherwise, we do not have the moral legitimacy to do so. The ‘West’, if 
such a crude demarcation may be made, has been superior in science and its 
applications since the Early Modern period. Capitalism conquered the world, even in 
communist China. But, is democracy better? Are its views on human rights? Democracy 
is a method of governing and its success in application must be measure against these 
human rights. The basis for these rights can be found by examining them in the light of 
the individual and his role in a prosperous society and world.  
A basis, however, is not the same as a set of presumptions. Because reason is used to 
establish this basis, circular reasoning is inevitable. However, the wellbeing of man, 
eventually supplemented by the wellbeing of other creatures, sets the standard for 
morality; this does not rest solely on presumptions, but rather on verifiable facts. Then 
ethics is no longer a speculative process with a departure point in presumptions and 
thereby doomed to remain in the realm of logical reasoning without any substantial 
roots in reality. Therefore, sound reasoning cannot be the only foundation for a 
scientific ethics; there must also be verifiable facts and falsifiable hypotheses.715  
But why should wellbeing be the standard by which morality should be evaluated? 
Wellbeing can be a basis if human experience is taken into consideration and if 
autonomy over ones own life is accepted. Stevenson’s linguistic analysis aside, the 
worthniness of wellbeing as the standard for morality means that it is imperative that it 
should be the standard for morality. It means that morality would then be based on 
morality. Is there anything wrong with this? This is the return of Lotze’s ideas, albeit 
clad in scientific, atheistic clothing.  
The difficulty remaining is that of those ethic systems that do not accept the 
autonomously defined wellbeing of man as an ultimate goal. This includes any system 
subordinates morality to a deity even when it is adverse to man; or those that see 
morality as a means subjugate individuals or groups in the interests others. Because 
circular reasoning is accepted, such moral systems can be labelled as immoral. 
Nevertheless, even in these anti-human systems of morality there is still a residue of 
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wellbeing, chiefly in the form of a life hereafter, where virtuous conduct is rewarded; or 
in the form of an abstract moral obligation, represented, for instance, as a duty to the 
society as a whole. It seems that man cannot help but aspire to wellbeing. Only its 
concretization differs from person to person, or from society to society - hence the 
necessity of introducing autonomy. 
5.5.7 Culture opposed to nature: the master of the spear 
The pursuit of wellbeing and happiness is rooted in human nature, as well as in that of 
other living beings, and even in the very functioning of the brain716. However, culture 
can oppose this nature because solidarity is such a strong social cement that it is 
difficult to escape. Thus, culture can be quite coercive. What should we do when culture 
inhibits normal human development? The following example may bring some clarity to 
this matter.717 
At the start of the 20th century, anthropologists working in Sudan called attention to 
the existence of a ritual in one tribe that consisted of burying a man alive. The British 
colonial authorities prohibited the shockingly ‘barbaric’ practice. But was the practice 
really so barbaric as thought? A closer look at the mythological background shows a 
very different picture. The person buried alive was the most important person in the 
community, namely the ‛master of the spear“. The spear was a symbol of status because 
iron was such a scarce metal in that area. Its master embodied the principle of life, the 
wei, of the Dinka. If this man were to die, the wei of the whole community would 
decrease considerably. Therefore, when the master of the spear became aware that he 
was weakening and growing old, he would gather his people together and order them to 
bury him alive, so that the wei could not escape. This closer analysis reveals a moral 
concern rather than a barbarian practice. It was not immoral, merely erroneous from a 
scientific point of view. It would have been immoral if the practice were to continue 
despite information showing that the underlying principal was not valid. Some masters 
of the spear tried to escape their fate but were forced by the community to live up to 
their responsibility. This illustrates both the tension between culture and human nature 
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as well as how important cultural knowledge is in understanding moral issues. This 
knowledge is key to any strategy attempting to change behaviour.  
5.6 Applied Ethics 
5.6.1 Comparative method 
Many methods have been formulated as a way in which to gain insight into the 
institutions found in cultural settings, but the Pinxten’s is undeniably the most effective 
and efficient of them all718. This comparative method of analysis consists of six steps: 
- First, the problem must be formulated using the concepts of the culture involved. 
For the Western participant, for instance, an economic problem will be 
considered in market terminology, for a farmer in Cameroon, subsistence.  
- Secondly, the cultural intuitions involved must be known. For some contemporary 
Orthodox Jews, Halacha means that a Jew is not able to independently organize 
his political world. The Israeli government, which is composed of Jews, therefore 
has no legitimacy in the eyes of certain Orthodox Jews.  
- Thirdly, the strategies employed by the parties involved must be laid bare. Are 
they formal, cumbersome, direct? 
- Fourthly, the results of the preceding steps should then be compared, and both 
parties should have full control over this process.  
- Fifthly, all of the data collected should be placed into an intercultural meta-
reference framework [IMR]. 
- At this point, negotiations on conflicts and problems can begin. 
5.6.2 An instance: outbursts of mockery in Funyallang 
The strategies that various cultures employ can be decisive. For example, agreements 
are often not observed in Africa and quite often this is a result of their not having been 
adapted to the customs of the people concerned. Anything ‛agreed“ upon in this way 
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has no impact on how the community sees the matter. In Funyallang (Tarokland, 
Central Nigeria), when a conflict looms, those involved begin by jeering at each other719. 
After a while, they both burst out laughing and the problem subsides, an instance in 
which emotions are channelled and controlled. The system works between individuals, 
clans and even beyond ethnic borders, provided that both parties are aware of this 
cultural habit. Another ritual that works very well involves a joint meal. According to 
tradition, placing one’s hand in the food indicates agreement with the proposed 
solution. This is considered more binding than a written contract.  
5.6.3 Ethic dialogue: the Brown model 
The Brown model, although lacking the intercultural finesse of Pinxten’s method, can 
be another useful tool in ethical negotiations720. This model outlines five important 
‘sources’ in decision making: propositions, observations, value judgments and 
presumptions. To counteract one-sided decision-making Brown emphasizes that 
discussions must also take into account alternative viewpoints. By doing so, stalemate 
can be avoided and group decisions can be facilitated. This method ensures that the 
broadest range of possible insights into a problem is obtained. To this end, a detailed 
and explicit account of every viewpoint must be made.  
The same concern is also present Gula’s moral theological approach. ‛The goal of 
moral analysis is to reduce this uncertainty to a manageable size. It tries to ensure that 
consideration is given to at least the most obvious alternatives and outstanding 
consequences which can be determined on the basis of past experience, the guidance of 
moral norms, the insight gained from broad consultation, and the evidence of empirical 
investigation“721. 
The Brown model also minimizes two possible pitfalls in any group discussion: self-
censorship and domination by any particular member. More generally, the active 
attention paid to alternative points of view and their sources overrides any attitudes 
capable of generating personal conflicts.  
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BROWN MODEL 
 
Five sources: 
       Alternative viewpoints: 
 
propositions     propositions 
observations     observations 
value judgments     value judgments 
presumptions     presumptions 
 
 
In opposition to the bottom-up process of brainstorming, the Brown model starts with 
putting forth ethical propositions, a top-down process. The various sources are 
examined in light of the ethical matter at hand, as expressed by the propositions. 
Inquiries into the relationship between proposition and observation require a search for 
the value judgments and presumptions that form this link.  
Propositions are prescriptive and suggest actions to be taken. They are put on the 
table for deliberation and evaluation. Observations are descriptive, but also specific. 
They comprise facts, preferably scientifically accounted for. They must meet the criteria 
of validity and reliability. Value judgments are general and normative and are also 
directed towards actions. They can be embedded in a framework of presumptions that 
can have a philosophical basis. A value statement brings together and posits a 
relationship between a proposition and an observation. Only by granting a value to a 
statement can a moral proposition be formulated. Although value judgments are thus 
closely related to observations, they cannot be accounted for empirically – as both Kant 
and Stevenson have made clear.  However, valuating can generate scientific value. 
Moreover, is science even possible without valuation? Observations can be evaluated in 
light of ethical traditions and philosophies, but this does not take place in a vacuum and 
such evaluations lend themselves to a scientific approach and generalisation, although 
always with respect for autonomy. It is this autonomy that can be compromised if moral 
questions are left up to an ethics panel. Only those moral decisions that do not infringe 
on individual sovereignty can be made subject to a group of experts.  
Presumptions represent philosophies and attitudes and are culturally and 
subjectively tinted as well as general and descriptive. Brown states that these are often 
taken for granted and often escape attention, especially that of the persons who 
formulated them. Generally, it is the person who does not share these presumptions 
who is most aware of them, one more reason why they should be openly discussed. 
However, they can also be found through theorizing, a process that subjects them to 
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criteria of relevance, consistency and coherence. As to the introduction of facts, those 
concerning human behaviour are subjected to intentionality, and receive their meaning 
through a network of meanings722. 
Yet, what is missing in the Brown model, is the social and material conditions in 
which moral values operate and their relationship with and effects on sources. One 
doesn’t have to be an economic Marxist in order to appreciate historical materialism, 
and take into consideration the impact that a society’s superstructure has living 
conditions. Although this relationship should not be interpreted as deterministic or 
unidirectional, it is most assuredly present. Not taking its effects into account 
significantly decreases the amount of insight that can be gained into the moral problem 
at hand.  
A final observation as to the use of models in deliberation and discussion is that, in 
practice, the steps are rarely followed in order, or in their entirety. These models are 
tools for supporting negotiations, not hindering them and exceptions must be made 
where cultural institutions, strategies and intuitions require it. As we have already seen, 
if these are not known in advance and respected, any deliberations may fall on deaf 
ears. But again, it is possible that within the context of such a discussion that the 
discovery of misunderstandings can in turn lead to the unmasking of underlying 
intuitions. As a result, such models are particularly invaluable when the conversation 
flags, or when difficulties arise. It is the same with logic. Nobody explicitly follows the 
rules of logic, but they are there to be fallen back on in critical moments and when a 
particular line of reasoning is criticized or coming up short.   
5.6.4 Ethics as affecting morality 
That dynamic nature of both culture and morality means that knowledge about 
morality can influence morality. Ethics, the study of morality, is neither neutral nor 
passive in this process. When- and wherever differences are observed in practice, 
people have always argued about moral issues, and this deliberation has an effect on the 
matters being deliberated – possibly even a corrosive one. As Ernst Mach says, science 
disillusions us because it shows us that what appeared to be wholly strange and 
unfamiliar is but a special manifestation of some very familiar mode of connections 
between experiences. The demystification of morality, insight into moral processes and 
the knowledge that morality is a human product, could lead to the annihilation of 
morality and the triumph of selfishness. Nietzsche’s ‘death of God’ led him to make the 
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following utterance: ‛when arises the danger that man may bleed to death through the 
truth that he recognizes“. Byron expresses this in immortal lines:  
  ‛Sorrow is knowledge: they who know the most 
  Must mourn the deepest o’er the fatal truth, 
  The tree of Knowledge is not that of Life“723 
However, man’s discovery that ethics are man-made and dependent upon their social 
context has not led to men suddenly becoming amoral or immoral beings. The despair 
expressed by Nietzsche came from his concern that if morality is entirely dependant on 
God, his disappearance would leave only emptiness. Happily, such is not the case. 
Society functions as a generator of morality, as do certain psychological and socio-
psychological impulses. It is not because religious motivation for good moral conduct 
vanishes that all motivation vanishes. Moreover, even were everyone to engage in 
immoral conduct following a crisis of faith, this would not change what is right or 
wrong. What is good still remains good. Not only that, but reason can also persuade 
people to engage in good moral conduct.  
5.6.5 Taboos 
Although ethical discussions can in turn influence morality, there are certain areas that 
are resistant to this process. A taboo is something that may not be done, but it is also 
something that is not considered suitable for discussion. Every society, every tradition, 
every culture has had its own taboos. In small-scale societies, taboos sometimes are 
connected to what is the most precious and fundamental. Not speaking about something 
means that it cannot easily be called into question. In some religions, speaking the name 
of God is prohibited because man is not fit to pronounce this sacred word. Christian 
blasphemy was punished right into the 19th century724. For example, Richard Carlile 
(1790-1843) spent nine years in prison for publishing Thomas Paine’s blasphemous The 
Age of Reason.  
Taboos exist in contemporary societies as well725. For instance, to advocate social 
reform in the United States may immediately lead to the speaker being labelled a 
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communist or socialist by some circles. Often used interchangeably, they are both 
considered an invective, and indicate that someone is a subversive, intent on 
undermining the social order. This example demonstrates that the security of a 
community is often considered dependent upon the unquestioning acceptance of some 
of its elements. However, such taboos inhibit full, scientifically based development. If 
some parts of a worldview are simply off limits, then any line of reasoning based on it 
may be at fault, and insight into how a particular society functions will remain woefully 
incomplete.  
An imaginary scenario may, in its naivety, illustrate the problem. Suppose a scientific 
researcher concludes that in physiological, psychological and sociological terms, a 
labourer is no different from a slave, and that the money earned is but a substitute for 
the daily food ration of ancient Egypt. The whole concept of freedom of employment 
would be shaken to its very foundations. Moreover, this scenario would make it clear 
that some fundamental values are not necessary morally high ones. They would be 
revealed as vulnerable, and attempts would be made to secure them at all costs – 
including efforts to prevent such scientific research from being propagated. Of course, 
this is not a serious example, and modern society copes with far worse things on a day-
to-day basis, but all researchers must remain aware of the influence that taboos can 
have on obscuring certain phenomenon.  
Kant, for example, emphasized the inscrutability of the origins of legal authority – 
considering it a necessary, practical principle to avoid subverting authority726. Walter 
Benjamin, however, advocated for the necessity of criticizing authority and he labelled 
Kant’s standpoint a confirmation of the ruling class’s status quo. Calling it a bourgeois 
philosophy727. From a moral point of view, if a taboo covers up the morally inferior 
foundations of a society, why continue to support it? In an ethical discussion or analysis, 
all such presumptions must be examined. If this is not done, any proposed strategies 
will both their efficiency and effectiveness. Any ruling class can survive through 
adaptation, but the question is how much are they prepared to give up? Considering the 
current threat to the entire planet posed by the rampant exploitation of natural 
resources by the ruling classes, from which the larger population gains relatively little 
in comparison to the long term costs as the resulting damage grows, this is an important 
question. The actions of this class may generate a lot of money, but honourably. In this 
instance, individual benefit does not counter the negative effect that such actions have 
on all.   
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5.6.6 Religion and the scientificity of ethics 
5.6.6.1 Mythology 
To be scientific, ethics must shake off the shackles of religious and other mythological 
ballast. As J. S. Mill put it, a truly scientific ethics is autonomous728. And why shouldn’t it 
be? In actuality, many believers do not follow the prescriptions of their faith, although 
they may claim otherwise – instead, they follow what their own conscious dictates. 
Sometimes, they may act contrary to their beliefs without being aware of it. A scientific 
ethics, in which every aspect of a decision is examined and weighed, would free people 
from such hypocrisy. The progress towards such ethics has been a long, and arduous 
road. 
Carlos Steel speaks of Greek mythology, in which science and speculation were not 
yet separated, as a prefiguration of philosophy729. Although philosophy eventually 
distanced itself from mythology, the latter was in many ways its breeding ground. 
Myths are sacred narratives which aim to elucidate reality, but without explaining 
things in a rational way. They present their versions of reality as unassailable. Not only 
do they tell the story of the beginning of the world, and thus the essence of being, but 
they also suggest rules that must be observed in order to be in accordance with the 
sacred. In ancient Greece, mythological beings were already detached from daily reality 
and the myths became mythology. This trend, supplemented with criticism on the 
behaviour of the gods, laid the groundwork for an even more detached attitude and the 
search for a rational explanation of existence.  
The Old and New Testaments also contain mythological elements, borrowed from 
even older myths in the region. Steel does his best to separate the message of the 
Christian God from this mythological framing, but ‘a message from God’ is a myth by 
definition. For Steel, however, to label Christian belief as a mere fancy, or to reduce it to 
psychological, social or political phenomena is not to apprehend its full meaning. But to 
consider any faith beyond real world phenomenon is to cheat oneself, and to deny 
evidence that would in fact allow one to understand it and grasp both its impact and 
meaning. Anyhow, from the viewpoint of ethics, the question is not whether you believe 
in a god or not, but whether what you do or intend is from a moral point of view. This 
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shift in focus does not prevent people from continuing to believe whatever they wish on 
an individual level 
Yet, how does religion position itself in a changed world? Richard Rorty, Gianni 
Vattimo and Santiago Zabala have examined this question and others730. How can any 
religion continue in the post-modern context, or is does this state of affairs provide an 
impetus for renewed religious orientation? And what is the place of science in all of 
this? Zabala is a philosophical researcher associated with the Pontifical Lateran 
University of Rome. He is especially interested in hermeneutics, pragmatism and 
Vattimo’s so-called ‘weak thinking’. Vattimo is a Catholic, post-modern thinker strongly 
influenced by Martin Heidegger, Hans Georg Gadamer and Friedrich Nietzsche.  
Vattimo’s post-metaphysical views include the rejection of any transcendental truth, 
an affirmation of the inevitability of the historical, and a nihilistic interpretation of 
hermeneutics. His ‘weak thinking’ re-creates a religious dimension in which power, but 
especially Christian charity are leading principles, while the dogmatic doctrine of the 
Church are rejected. The social dimension of belief, however, is retained. At the same 
time, Vattimo also emphasizes the private character of belief. 
Rorty, a pragmatist raised in an atheistic setting, takes a remarkably indulgent line 
by accepting a religious dimension in life as an inherent part of human existence. 
Nevertheless, in ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’, he states that knowledge that 
does not mirror reality in its essentials lends itself remarkably well to weak thinking. 
His defence against the Communitarists, made in the essay ‛The Priority of Democracy 
to Philosophy“ from the collection Consequences of Pragmatism, namely that the state 
should not pay attention to either personal ideas about what constitutes a good life or 
religion. This corresponds with Vattimo’s private model of religiosity. 
Rorty has always been open to other thinkers because he sees philosophy as a form of 
empathic understanding, but he interprets them in function of his own insights. As 
such, he has often been reproached for twisting their thoughts. This critique is not 
applicable in this particular essay because however deeply he enters into Vattimo’s 
thought process, he does not embrace the totality of it. Perhaps his turn to religion is 
inspired not only by the openness and intrinsic features of his thinking, but also by 
national pride – not in itself a refutation of his ideas. In ‘Achieving Our Country’ he 
outlined a very patriotic picture of the United States, although not one lacking in 
nuance731. The religiosity of the majority of its population is well known, and it is not 
unreasonable to conjecture that – despite his atheistic background – Rorty has been 
influenced by this cultural trend.  
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The content of the dialogue between Rorty, Vattimo and Zabala does not differ very 
much in essence from most of the attempts made to keep religion acceptable in a 
secularised and scientifically oriented world, although Vattimo did apparently learn a 
lot from the critiques of other such endeavours. His vast knowledge of the literature 
allows him to adapt his ideas easily to the constant dialogue he engaged in. This makes 
it difficult to follow his very subtle transitions in reasoning. Vattimo anticipates the 
critics, making him almost immune to criticism. An important premise in his work is the 
equality he sees between the natural and social sciences because both are linked to 
paradigms. However, this is not what Thomas Kuhn, whom he cites, meant. That both 
are associated with paradigms does not mean that they are linked to the same 
paradigms. Moreover, the two fields employ different gradations of certainty in their 
statements. Scientific experiments provide reality-based answers. It is not because 
reality is ultimately unknowable to humanity – limited as we are by what we can 
perceive and comprehend – that we have no meaningful interaction with it. On the 
contrary, this often occurs in a decisive manner. Is this not what pragmatism suggests? 
Finally, our limited grasp of reality in its entirety is hardly a reason for refuting a-
religiosity. Vattimo is guilty of logical errors against here. Post-modern, pragmatic 
thinking does not provide any conclusive arguments against atheism. Vattimo and 
Zabala’s attempt to defend religion by making use of weak thinking is of a high standard 
intellectually, but it is nonetheless a failure. Nor is Rorty’s soft stance towards religion 
of the same quality as that of his other work.   
On the other side of the argument, some atheists go too far. They adhere to what 
Engels, the ally of Karl Marx, called ‘vulgärmaterialismus’. For his part, although Marx 
attacked Hegel’s idealism, his reaction was not materialistic - despite his use of the term 
‘dialectical materialism’. In fact, Marx experienced some terminological difficulties with 
this particular concept. It was not his intention to deny the human spirit; rather, he 
intended to abrogate the antagonism between the transcendent and the worldly 
realm732.  
The additional information on the cover of Maurice De Bona’s book on atheism does 
not leave the reader in any doubt as to his stance: ‛how the facts of science destroy the 
myths of religion“ 733. He situates man and his creation of gods within evolution theory. 
Subsequently, these narratives regarding the divine are subjected to critical analysis. 
For example, the contradictions and impossibilities of the Old and New Testaments are 
unmasked. One of best-known theories regarding the afterlife is that people are simply 
afraid to die. De Bona takes another approach to this phenomenon. He says it is 
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explained by the law of inertia, simply put: all that lives will continue to live provided 
there is no force exerted to counter it. That assertion is characteristic of De Bona’s 
materialistic way of thinking. He also examines epistemological questions, such as the 
knowability of reality and the relativity of everything that has to do with life, but always 
placing the scientific aspects of such matters first. Genetics, DNA, RNA, brain function 
are all linked to so-called religious experiences.  Religion, in De Bona’s eyes, is a 
cultural phenomenon inferior to science. Spiritualism is totally excluded. In fact, he 
rigidly adheres to deterministic materialism. Scientific knowledge has a deterministic 
character because it is focused on manageability, but freedom of action, the 
responsibility of man, is related to consciousness. De Bona recognizes this but 
subordinates it to physical and chemical processes. This reductionist argument is a flaw 
in his thinking, but one that can be mitigated. Consciousness, made possible by physical 
and chemical processes, allows man to act contrary to what biology may dictate is 
necessary. The combination of physical developments with personal experiences in a 
cultural setting -learning, in other words - makes it possible for man to anticipate things 
and, in so doing, to determine his own future to some degree. Freedom of action can still 
be conceived of without appealing to the concept of a soul or a spirit detached from the 
body. 
The main mistake De Bona makes is to deduce ontological answers from science. 
Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of being, not beings. Kant in his 
examination of the limits of knowledge, firmly established that what is known is always 
a construction of the mind and is limited by the mind’s capacities734. The thing itself, 
outside the confines of the mind, cannot be known in its entirety. This viewpoint is not 
necessarily idealistic, as it was for Lotze, because the mind’s representations are 
constructed through experience of the world, and so cannot be entirely unworldly – 
otherwise, no one would be capable of surviving it. Yet we should not assume that 
because we can see a tree that we then know something of its essence. That would be an 
incorrect metaphysical conclusion. It is not possible for man to say that the world is 
materialistic or deterministic. It is only possible to say that our representations of 
things are materialistic, and that these mental constructions allow man to act contrary 
to nature. Therefore, the facts of science do not destroy religion. It is De Bona who 
destroys religion by only accepting the facts of science. Although he is right when he 
states that religion can be explained on psychological and sociological grounds, atheists 
cannot transgress the boundaries of human knowledge.  
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Human beings have the capacity to construct representations of things in their 
minds, and to link things in causal relations. This is useful because it permits us to think 
ahead – we can speculate as to outcomes in various situations and prepare for the 
future. But this capacity can lead us into error if we are unaware of our limitations, by 
causing us to believe we can conceive of being-as-a-whole, an impossibility in actuality. 
Moreover, if this being-as-a-whole is linked to causality, questions then arise about its 
beginning and end. These are then answered by appealing to God or an infinite entity. 
But because this creator, at least in the Abrahamic tradition, is en infinite entity, only 
the infinite remains and the possibility of a finite world is excluded. In his book Tot in 
der eindigheid, Jean Paul Van Bendegem demonstrates that it is perfectly possible to live 
and think without appealing to the infinite735. 
5.6.6.2 Science: deontological approach 
Now we come to the heart of the matter: what is science? To answer this, the 
deontological or normative position will first be examined. Although the reality of 
practice often falls short of the ideal, the scientific method’s rules are what ultimately 
separates science from non- or pseudo-science.  
First, there is the matter of objectivity. What is striking in the behaviour of a scientist 
is the studied indifference with which he approaches the object of his inquiry. This may 
seem to be the point at which we may be stymied in our efforts to construct scientific 
ethics. Doesn’t this indifference contradict the emotive character of the moral object? 
However, an ethicist does not differ from his fellow scientists, whether physicists or 
sociologists, because although emotions are important to his work, they do not lead it. 
Of course his empathetic faculty enables him to understand the emotions involved, but 
afterwards they are placed in a meaningful, yet emotionless, framework. He considers 
them in terms of how they lend to explanations.  
What of the normative character of ethics? If the normative is restricted to individual 
preferences, then ethics cannot be a science. However, the ethicist is not following his 
own preferences, he is merely paying attention to the preferences of others as far as 
they are relevant to establishing what is morally good. Although it may be difficult for 
him to maintain his distance from the object studied when the ethicist is himself 
concerned, and he almost always is in one way or another, he must act as if the situation 
does not affect him. Moreover, in the social sciences it is not possible to make 
statements without taking a position; in other words, it is not possible to make entirely 
value free statements. This is not an issue in science provided that it is done openly, and 
 
                                                     
735 Van Bendegem, 1997. 
and beyond 
 237 
is completely acknowledged. His position and the circumstances in which he came to his 
results must be entirely accessible. Every aspect of the process must be subjected to 
criticism.  
The public nature of science and its scrutiny is key. It is not because a scientist may 
have a copyright, that his findings should not be accessible. Making misuse of a 
copyright to withdraw a finding from public view may be legally justified, but it is not 
right to do so from a scientific point of view. To obtain a copyright and place the results 
of research in a safe is not at all scientific. However, despite the open nature of science, 
scientific results are not subject to a popularity contest. Criticism must made on purely 
scientific grounds and the truth of a theory is not necessarily in accordance with what 
the majority, or even an authority, believes. Furthermore, although a statement 
expressed by a professor has more chance of being correct than that made by a first 
year student, the final criterion for determining its accuracy is not the authority of the 
professor, but rather the scientific argumentation employed.  
Four fundamental features of a scientific ethics can be discerned: emotional 
neutrality, universalism, community orientation, and individualism736. Emotional 
neutrality has already been discussed above. Universalism means the results do not vary 
across geographical areas, although not in their final principles. This also means that 
ideological differences are only acceptable if they are covered by the general principle 
of autonomy. A religious doctrine, a holy scripture, or an ideology is not the ultimate 
standard by which what is morally good is to be determined, nor are any possible 
benefits that a particular person or group of persons may obtain through the 
implementation of any results. Community orientation means that the search for truth 
is not made for oneself alone, but that it is first and foremost for the sake of science or 
scientific knowledge, and subsequently for the sake of humanity. The latter is especially 
valid for ethics because the study of what is morally responsible has humanity’s 
wellbeing at its heart. Individualism is somewhat related to ‘emotional neutrality’ in 
that it means that the values and norms of science are important – not those of a 
particular authority.  
Deontology, the method of determining what is ethical by examining how it adheres 
to a set of rules, can prefigure a method for a scientific ethics. The argumentation is at 
times similar to Mill’s defence of liberty. Emotional neutrality functions to prevent the 
scientist from being influenced by his own preferences. The cost of not adhering to this 
rule is that the results may very well be erroneous. This is similar to what happens in a 
murder mystery, where the homicide investigator does not want to suspect the local 
teacher because he likes teachers and it turns out that the teacher did it. Universality 
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prevents there from being different explanations about the same thing. They cannot all 
be true or valid. That is in theory. In reality, different theories or paradigms often exist 
alongside each other. In sociology, for instance, two paradigms are adhered to. The first 
is a holistic one, which states that a society is more than the sum of the individuals and 
that the individuals are moulded by its customs and traditions. Drukheim was a 
prominent representative of the holistic viewpoint. The second paradigm is 
individualistic, and it states that society is the result of its members’ actions. The 
publicity of the results of science ensures that they can undergo criticism, which is 
necessary to validate them. Individualism ensures that it is not the majority that defines 
what is true or valid.  
Permanent critical examinations and discussions about the most general paradigms 
of the sciences render them variable. Sometimes they are considered inferior to other 
so-called perennial truths, but it is this variability in the sciences, under the pressure of 
permanent criticism, that results in its high truth-value. Scientific knowledge is the best 
knowledge because it is never good enough. Its theories must survive strenuous 
experimentation and correspond to empirical data, thus systematically excluding flights 
of fantasy and delusions. Ethics, as a science, must be submitted to the same severe 
examination and open discussion. The ongoing nature of the scientific process means 
that we must remember that the ultimate objective of science can never be attained and 
the truth never reached, and it is therefore more accurate to speak in terms of value 
rather than truth.  
Because facts play a crucial role in science, a positivistic approach came to the fore. 
Van Bendegem discerns the naïve verification, the naïve confirmation, the sophisticated 
confirmation and the falsification, the four are arranged in a historic order, which is 
also a logical sequence737. Naïve verification restricts scientifically acceptable knowledge 
to an exact description of an experiment. The following statement is an example of this: 
‘If a thermometer is inserted into a bowl of water and it reads 100° C, then bubbles rise 
to the surface and vortices appear’. If science is nothing more than such utterances, 
then it is impossible to arrive at universal statements, such as ‘water boils at 100° C’. 
Moreover, historical statements, such as ‘the Great War officially ended on the eleventh 
of November, 1918’ are also impossible to make unless directly witnessed. The limited 
nature of naïve verification means that the formulation of theoretical terms is 
impossible.  
With naïve confirmation it is possible to make universal statements on the basis of 
such exact descriptions. This is the so-called hypothetic-deductive model, which was 
developed by Wiener Kreis. Here, universal and historical statements are scientifically 
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acceptable because they can be confirmed by empirical data. But some problems 
remain, namely the paradoxes of Hempel’s black ravens and Goodman’s ‘grue objects’738. 
According to the rules of logic, the statement that ‘all ravens are black’ is equivalent to 
and confirmed by the statement that ‘everything that is not black is not a raven’. It 
would also be confirmed by a ‘blue chair’ – or anything else not a raven and not black. It 
is self evident that a blue chair cannot be accepted as a proof that ‘all ravens are black’. 
Grandy dismissed the ‘blue chair’ because only statements that are mutually exclusive, 
namely ‘all ravens are black’ and ‘all ravens are not black’, are acceptable739.  
Nelson Goodman’s famous counterargument introduced the colour ‘grue’ in 1955740. 
But it also led to another paradox, An object is grue if it green before a certain time t, 
and blue afterwards. If we examine emeralds before time t and find that emerald a is 
green, emerald b is green, and so forth, each instance confirms the hypothesis that all 
emeralds are green. However, inductively, if t has not come to pass, then emeralds a, b, 
c, …etc. also confirm the hypothesis that all emeralds are grue741.  
Clearly, naïve confirmation has its limits. For Clark Glymour (1980) confirmation is 
always relative to a certain theory. This provides a solution for Goodman’s paradox as it 
is not part of a theory. Karl Popper’s falsification theory approaches the problem from 
another direction. According to Popper, a theory maintains itself under the assaults of 
contradictory data. For example, all swans are white until a black swan is detected. 
However, theories are not given up the second that a contradiction is found. Closer 
examination can be instructive, and may lead to the rejection of the new data, a 
refinement of the original theory, or to its provisional acceptance in expectation that a 
better one will be developed, on which will account for more data.  
But its Popper’s methodological reflections that are of more interest in the context of 
this analysis. According to him, theories are more meaningful when they can be refuted 
more easily, not because they are worse, but because they contain specifications that 
are more significant. The statement ‘all planets circle the sun in an elliptical orbit’ can 
be falsified by the discovery of a planet that describes a perfect circle in its orbit; yet the 
statement ‘all planets orbit the sun’ would not be falsified by it. In relation to this is his 
conviction that theories that claim to explain everything cannot be refuted, and are 
therefore not scientific – as is the case with many of Freud’s psychoanalytic 
explanations. Moreover, withstanding experiments of different kinds strengthens a 
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theory. For instance, Darwin’s is strongly affirmed by new findings in different fields, 
such as radiometric dating, genome comparison, palaeontology, et cetera. These results 
provide more confirmation than would the discovery of yet another finish with yet 
another differently shaped beak.  
What can be learned from the philosophy of science? The transition from facts to 
theory is not always evident. Generally, a scientist takes the following steps. In order to 
solve a scientific problem, he begins by going through the secondary literature that 
refers to the problem at hand. Being sufficiently informed, he then constructs a 
hypothesis. To test the hypothesis he has to 'instrumentalize' it, that is he has to 
formulate it in such a way that it can be tested. Experiments are not the only method by 
which a hypothesis can be confirmed or denied. Empirical data gathered in another 
manner may also do so. In psychology and sociology, experimentation is generally not 
done for ethical reasons, and – particularly when it comes to history – only secondary 
sources may be present at times. 
Does this hold true for ethics? Certainly, facts about the happiness or wellbeing of an 
individual or a group can be gathered, hypothesises drawn up, perhaps even 
experiments carried out, and general theories formulated. But the same problem 
regarding the relation of facts to general statements will remain.  
5.6.6.3 Science: the descriptive approach 
Science has not always followed the deontological beaten path and, because people 
carry out scientific investigations, psychological and sociological aspects of their 
makeup can thwart the scientific progress.  
Thomas Kuhn’s 1962 volume entitled The structure of Scientific Revolutions questioned 
science’s deontological approach742, its inductivist and falsificationist aspects in 
particular743. Kuhn studied the history of science and found some striking 
characteristics. Science passes through different stages, namely prescience, normal 
science, crisis, followed by a revolution and a new, normal science. Central to this 
process of development is the concept of paradigms, which consists of the entirety of 
the theoretical assumptions, scientific laws and technical applications that function as 
guidelines for the scientist. In the prescience stage, a central paradigm is not yet 
present. In the normal science phase, where the central paradigm is established, 
falsifications are not yet seen as threatening to that paradigm. However, the 
accumulation of such falsifications results in a crisis for the prevailing paradigm, which 
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eventually leads to the establishment of a new and better paradigm. That new paradigm 
then gives rise to a new, normal science. The rival paradigms are incommensurable, 
which means that it is impossible to understand the new paradigm in terms of the old 
one. Although, scientific revolution is not always quite so revolutionary, nor 
incommensurability as incommensurable as Kuhn would have it, his concepts are 
immensely useful in understanding scientific practice. That the deontological facets of 
the scientific activity cannot be easily laid aside is demonstrated by the necessity Kuhn 
saw in introducing five criteria for determining a theoretical choice: accuracy, 
consistency, broad scope, simplicity and fruitfulness744.  
Imre Lakatos tried to reconcile Popper’s falsificationism, a prescriptive approach to 
science, with Kuhn’s scientific revolutions, a descriptive approach745. In so doing, he 
came closer to either in describing how science actually functions. He introduced the 
concepts of ‘hard core’ – the common thread in a series of theories – and ‘research 
programmes’, or the entire collection of theories as they changed over time in a 
particular field. The shifts in such research programmes were, in Lakatos’s view, less 
radical than Kuhn’s incommensurable paradigms, instead they evolved over a long 
period, with slight changes here and there until the latest theory bore little resemblance 
to the first. To bring Popper closer to Kuhn, Lakatos theorized that falsifications were 
not drastic events in which theories were completely refuted, but instead, they gave rise 
to a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses. Kuhn’s revolutions became evolutions in 
which progressive research programs were characterized by growth, and degenerating 
research programmes by a lack thereof as the protective belt in the latter case does not 
generate new insights. 
At this point in the philosophy of science, Feyerabend’s provocative Against Method 
brought an anarchic view to the fore746. According to Feyerabend, the main purpose of 
the scientist’s total liberty is to prevent any rule of scientific practice from hindering 
new insights and findings. To make his case, he appealed to instances in scientific 
history in which the theory posited violated the rules of scientific practice at the time. 
In his attack on the consistency criterion, which requires that new theories be 
consistent with older ones, he was not totally wrong in positing that this gave an unfair 
advantage to possibly quite incorrect theories for no other reason than that they are 
older. Progress in science can benefit from temporary inconsistencies between theories, 
both between old and new ones. Theories yet to be discovered may later bridge the gap. 
If Feyerabend’s somewhat caricaturized view of science is examined from a distance, 
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some of its insights could prove fruitful. One such overstatement on his part concerns 
the equality between mythological or religious theories, pseudo-science and science. 
Feyerabend did not accept the superiority of science because he believed that other 
factors could be responsible for the science’s apparent successes. However, it is hard to 
conceive of the successes we have achieved through science with its severe deontology 
and peer review. 
5.6.6.4 Ethics as a science 
Lotze refused to outline a proper method for philosophy. In this regard, his view was 
somewhat similar to Feyerabend’s ‛anything goes“ version of science. But Lotze 
explicitly distanced himself from pseudo-science, although some pseudo-scientific 
statements were still present in his work, such as the possibility that some animals have 
a sort of sixth sense. However, this was the result of his dualistic Cartesianism. But even 
his methodological liberty was limited by the consideration that choices had to be made 
in function of what was being studied. Each object of study required an adapted method, 
although only in philosophy. Strict rules were adhered to in the mechanistic conception 
of science. Lotze’s viewpoint can now be extended to the entire field of science, for the 
purely mechanistic version is no longer accepted. Each object of inquiry now demands 
its own method and also its own scientific tools. This does not mean that these methods 
are restricted to one research field, only that the choice of method and technical 
apparatus must be made according to what is being studied, the methods of mechanistic 
sciences included.  
However, not all methods generate the same degree of exactitude. The distance 
between two points can be measured in exact terms, including possible error, but the 
nationality of a person cannot be fixed mathematically. At best, only a numerical code 
referring to it can be assigned. A measurement of ratio has a non-arbitrary zero point, 
such as on the Kelvin temperature scale, it also has a constant unit magnitude and it can 
be ranked. An interval scale, such as the Celsius temperature scale, does not have an 
absolute zero. An ordinal scale also lacks a constant unit magnitude. For instance, the 
Latin levels of academic distinction (cum laude, magna cum laude, and summa cum laude) is 
an ordinal scale. Finally, a nominal scale lacks all the characteristics of a ratio 
measurement. Ratio measurements do not exist in the social sciences, at most only 
semi-ratio measurements are used.  
The social sciences require methods that allow the researcher to understand peoples’ 
intentions, which is not the case for physics. But inside the behavioural sciences, 
different approaches are still possible. They may be grouped under qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Qualitative methods are geared towards understanding social 
phenomenon by direct observation, supplemented by communication and participatory 
observation, as well as textual analysis. Quantitative methods deal with large sets of 
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data, which are analysed through descriptive statistics and probability calculation. A 
survey of a representative sample of a population is one of the methods resorted to in 
quantitative research. This particular method is appropriate, for instance, for finding 
out the preferences of a population for marketing purposes, but in ethics it can also 
provide solid information as to patients’ preferences in health care. Nevertheless, a 
quantitative approach in the social sciences still requires a qualitative understanding of 
human behaviour. Before taking measure of preferences, it is necessary to know what 
the possible preferences may be.  
There exists the possibility that morality could be reduced to its biological origins. Frans 
de Waal’s revolutionary discoveries concerning the behaviour of primates, the 
biological order to which humans also belong, threw light on their social activities, 
including conflict resolution, reconciliation, empathy, and the evolution of morality. 
The similarities between animal and human behaviour are clear, and it cannot be denied 
that morality has evolutionary roots. For instance, gossip is a strong means by which 
social control can be exercised. However, it is also physically stimulating in that it 
results in the release of endorphins, which causes a pleasant feeling. Yet social control, 
which generates social order, is not always morally good. It can cause displeasure on an 
individual level and even drive somebody to suicide. Empathic consideration for the 
feelings of others prevents gossip from being considered moral.  Thus, a moral 
judgement is based both on knowledge and feelings, not biological reductionism.   
Kant came very near to that position, although he was still held hostage by Cartesian 
dualism. Kant posited that if happiness is grounds for a moral rule, this could only be 
the case if it is extended to include the happiness of all humanity747. Therefore, the 
moral foundation is not the subjective feelings of a single individual, but in the 
extension of one’s concern to others. However, Kant situated these thoughts in the 
practical field, and thus did not consider them phenomena. Yet the struggle for 
happiness is not an attribute of one, but of all persons, taking into account cultural and 
religious variations. That it is precarious to assert the existence of universal features in 
the human sciences must also be taken into account – they are always subject to 
questioning. At the same time, happiness does have a biological, physical (and 
presumably universal) basis because it is perceived through the release of endorphines.  
Nietzsche, in his On the Genealogy of Morality, outlined a history of morality that had 
the hunger for power at its heart748. This represents a cultural approach to ethics. 
According to Nietzsche, Judaism, and later Christianity, developed a slave morality, 
which grew out of the resentment experienced by the weak against the powerful. It was 
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a spiritual victory of the priestly mode of valuation over the aristocratic warrior class. 
In fact, two cultures were involved, namely a military and an agrarian one. However, 
from an ethical viewpoint happiness must be taken into consideration, as well as the 
necessity of self-defence at times, without which peace may be impossible.  
Scientific ethics does not start from fixed values or theories, but from human 
feelings, taking into consideration that those feelings are not entirely independent from 
the individual’s cultural context, and the autonomy must be respected. However, 
culture and autonomy are not always the decisive factors. Culture can offer the wrong 
solutions to moral questions; individual autonomy can in practice infringe the 
autonomy of somebody else. However, the ethical scientist does not follow his feelings 
in assessing the values at stake, as a human being he is aware of the feelings of his fellow 
man. He can thus establish what is important and what not, respect autonomy within 
certain limits, and be aware of cultural differences in order to better understand the 
moral setting.  
But, should religion and culture receive special consideration? Diana Brown begins 
her article of the same title by examining a 2007 case in which two young people from 
the Indian state of Haryana were murdered for marrying within the same Hindu clan, 
which is against their tradition749. A state court passed judgement on the family 
members who carried out the ‘honour killing’ as well as a leader of the traditional, local 
governing council. The former received death, and the later life imprisonment. There 
was an uproar, much of it carried on by various members of the local council, and 
although it is unthinkable that the authorities would change their laws, this was 
nevertheless the demand of the protestors. Brown then goes on to take a closer look at 
this problem, particularly with regards to Islam, Judaism and Christianity.   
In Islam, it must be admitted that in many places Sharia takes the place of secular 
law. Some features of Sharia, as some scholars interpret it, are in contradiction with 
secular law, such as the inequality of man and woman, and Muslims and non-Muslims. 
Blasphemy, apostasy and atheism are treated as crimes and even capital ones in some 
instances. ‛Some forms of Islamic law permit or even mandate cruel and severe forms of 
physical punishment such as lashing, amputation and stoning to death“750. Brown 
highlights the fact that international human rights are founded on individual rights, 
which must be protected against the tyranny of the majority; and this is also the 
viewpoint that is advocated for here, in connection with Mill’s defence of liberty and 
autonomy. Brown adds that it ‛is also doubtful that in a fair, secret ballot the majority of 
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the population would necessarily favour Islamic law if they were fully informed of its 
provisions“751. According to Brown, the application of Sharia in western countries, even 
for family disputes and even on a voluntary basis, cannot be allowed, because ‛women 
may well be coerced into using it in preference to the general secular law“752. I would 
not go as far as Brown in simply banning Sharia in all spheres of life – only that it should 
not be refered to in the civil courts, or used as a justification for any act that is against 
society’s civil laws. Brown also warns against using the word ‘Islamophobia’ as 
equivalent to racism. She believes that the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
has successfully promoted this false equivalency ‛to deflect attention from their 
shortcomings in the field of human rights“753.  
With respect to Judaism, Brown only focuses on the situation in the Middle East, 
where two groups are clashing over the same, small strip of land. Orthodox Jaws claim 
the territory on the basis of three thousand year old promise made by God to His people; 
while the Palestinians, mostly Muslims, believe that once a land has been placed under 
Islamic control, it should remain that way. In addition to this, there is the grief of 
recently being disposed of their ancestral territory.   
Brown’s section on Christianity is somewhat more expansive. She briefly sketches the 
its historical development, from the persecutions in Ancient Rome onwards. But once 
the Church was in position of power it prosecuted others in turn others, namely 
polytheists, atheists, apostates, and heretics. According to Brown, ‛the anti-Semitic 
attitudes that led to the 20th-century Holocaust owe much to the church’s view of Jews 
as ‘Christ-killers’, handed down over the centuries“754. Brown also states that ‛the 
church was a law unto itself, with clerics being exempt from obedience to civil law, but 
subject instead to canon law“755. The Church committed cruel crimes in the name of God 
and faith, including torture. With the Renaissance and the Reformation, the Church 
gradually lost some of its power but it extended its influence in Africa, South and 
Central America and some Pacific isles. Although Protestant and Orthodox Churches 
were almost as authoritarian, this Christian fragmentation attenuated the authority 
that could be exercised over any one group. Secularism benefited from this dilution, but 
the various Christian denominations have not yet capitulated; hence, the increasing 
usage of the word ‘Christianophobia’, which is analogous to the term ‘Islamophobia’. 
Brown refutes the assertion that Christianity is being persecuted by secularism. Such 
complaints as some Western Christians have on that front pale in comparison to 
genuine prosecutions of their brethren in Pakistan, Egypt and Nigeria.  
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From her analysis, Brown concludes that ‛everywhere we find expectations and even 
demands for special treatment for religions and beliefs. The UN human rights 
instruments establish a right to belief or non-belief, but this right does not and should 
not trump all other rights.“756 Brown’s secularist critique of Islam, Judaism and 
Christianity can also be subjected to an anlysis from a scientific ethical standpoint. In a 
scientifically ethical view, a demystified one in other words, human wellbeing is central 
- not the preponderance of a fictive whole, or of a phantasmal God, which remarkably 
often benefits the power of a priestly class. That does not mean that freedom of religion 
should be used as a means of prohibiting criticism, but that religious doctrines can, and 
should, be subject to non-confessional and scientifically moral critiques. 
Must scientific ethics express universal moral values? And are they embedded in 
Cliteur’s moral esperanto, the common values between cultural settings, or a 
scientifically established common value scheme? The answer is both none of the above 
and all of the above. However, it must be taken into account that positing any kind of 
universality in the human sciences is precarious because provisionally adopted 
universal values can always be diluted by both individual and collective consciousness. 
Ethical deliberation always depends on the circumstances under which it takes place. 
Even physical values, such as pain, cannot escape from their cultural setting. Human 
experience continually confronts us with new situations, problems and questions. 
However, to recognize that fact, is not to promote radical relativism. The tools for 
dealing with these issues have been provided to us by the past.  
5.6.7 Non-malfeasance or beneficence? 
Why make non-malfeasance, or do no harm, the guiding principle of scientific ethics, 
and not a positive principle, namely beneficence? Beneficence presupposes an idea of 
what is good, and what is good presupposes a certain philosophy. Thus beneficence 
cannot be put into practice without imposing a certain view on life, which infringes 
autonomy. But if the person concerned determines for himself what is good for him, 
then the issue is covered by autonomy. This can also be applied to a group, but only with 
regards to some customs. The individual cannot be sacrificed on the altar of the group. 
As to autonomy, this can only said to be the case when choice is accompanied by 
informed consent. Only a person who is informed as well as circumstances permit can 
make a reasoned decision. Vermeersch, writing with regards to alternative medicine, 
proposes that when patients are being informed prior to giving their consent to these 
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procedures, the information should include the fact that according to the Academie of 
Medecine the method has no proven medical benefit757. 
The sanctity of life is a considerd a guiding principle in many ethical systems, mainly 
religious ones, and is often used to oppose such practices as abortion, contraception, 
and euthanasia. Some religions adhere to the sanctity of life doctrine, claiming that life 
is God given, and therefore not man’s to dispose of. But the legislation of many 
countries also disallows an individual to end their own life. Such laws are the result of 
the close relationship between ethics and legislation, as well as the predominance of 
religious ethics in the past. Suicide was once considered a felony in various countries, 
but such attempts were rarely prosecuted. Ironically, in some countries, the penalty for 
attempted suicide was death. In the United Kingdom, up until 1961, people who 
committed suicide forfeited their property to the state. Non-religious reasons for 
prohibiting suicide have included some governments’ desires for an increased 
population. The Nazis, for example, instituted breeding programs and spread 
propaganda intended to encourage men to produce children destined for Hitler’s 
armies.  
However, there is another reason why suicide has been considered a sin or crime. The 
will to live is considered to be intrinsic to all human beings. It is therefore difficult to 
conceive that somebody could knowingly and without mental defect, intend to end his 
or her own life. There is also a concern that suicides that receive media attention could 
trigger people who suffer from some kind of mental illness to do likewise. This is known 
as the Werther Effect. The term is the result of a rather strange phenomenon, namely 
the wave of suicides that followed the publication of Goethe’s novel, The Sorrows of Young 
Werther, in which the protagonist takes his own life.  
There is also a privacy issue when it comes to media involvement. Suicide is a 
personal matter, and this should be respected even after death. If a private person, i.e. 
not a public figure, commits suicide, if this is make public by the media, perhaps the 
person who is ultimately responsible for doing so should be called to account. Would 
this be an infringement on their freedom of speech? If the individual makes it known 
beforehand, then certainly it belongs to the public sphere. If they have not done so, 
then publicizing it is questionable. General information, for instance the statistically 
growing rate of suicides, can be made public. Or the suicide of a public figure could be 
made known, but this must be balanced against the right to privacy.   
An in depth study could clarify the psychological status of an individual with a 
suicidal inclination, but, if it is established that this person is of sound mind, there is no 
reason why he should be prevented from ending his life. However, the matter hinges on 
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the how to define ‘of sound mind’, and this cannot be determined independent of the 
cultural context. 
Another issue of non-malfeasance is pain. Do no harm includes the infliction of 
physical pain. Pain is fact and it is a moral fact because it is perceived as bad. In 
biological terms, ‛specific pathways carry an emotional component of the painful 
stimulus to areas of the hindbrain and reticular formation, activating emotional 
responses“758. Pain is negatively perceived, which causes people to instinctively seek to 
avoid it – reflexive responses to scalding hot objects, for example. Pain alerts us to 
physical peril, the body’s own alarm bell. It also prevents future repetitions, anyone 
who has ever put their hand down on a hot stove top is unlikely to do so again anytime 
soon. If the cause is internal, people seek medical help to stop it. 
In his day, Lotze was occupied with dualistic differentiated perception, either 
quantitative or qualitative. Modern neuroscience, however, has proven him wrong. 
There is a direct conection between physical stimulus and our perception: ‛different 
pain neurons respond to different degrees of painful stimuli, but each neuron will 
respond to many types of stimuli, such as heat, intense mechanical pressure, or 
chemical irritation. Numerous types of neurotransmitters are used by different pain 
neurons, a phenomenon that has allowed the development of a variety of new drugs for 
pain management“759.  
However, the causes of pain, and ways to alleviate it, are not always evident and pain 
relief remains an ongoing problem in medical science. People attempt to cope with 
long-term pain in various ways. For example, some deal with it by asserting control over 
it. Rather than allowing it to remain indeterminate or vague, they place it in a 
meaningful whole: suffering in the grand scheme of things. Uncertainty about the 
‘meaning’ of pain is an almost unbearable experience for some. The truth, harsh as it is, 
is that an answer cannot always be given, however hard man searches for one. Once 
more, some religions provide relief by asserting that the pain of the present will be 
made up for by peace in the hereafter.  
As long as belief does not prevent research into the real causes of pain, and thus 
remains in the private sphere, there is nothing wrong with it from a moral point of 
view. Nor should faith be a reason for the denial of proper medical treatment, the use of 
analgesics, for example. Nor are drugs the only solution available. When under 
hypnosis, the experience of pain is dissociated from conscious awareness, and the 
sensation of pain is decreased760. In this context, belief cannot replace informed consent. 
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If a person has to make a medical decision it is not religion, but science that provides 
the proper information.   
Pain must also be situated in a cultural context. The rough behaviour of the 
nineteenth century proletariat was a means of coping with inhuman living conditions. 
Being squeamish about pain was neither appropriate nor useful. In Spartan society, 
pain, which is an inevitable part of fighting, was part of the martial education given to 
all citizens, women included. Moreover, pain could prove useful in such situations in 
that it can trigger the ‛stress-induced release of endorphins“ that ‛may account for 
instances in which severely injured soldiers and athletes continue to perform in the 
heat of battle or competition with no apparent pain“761. To a certain extent, pain is all in 
one’s head.  
5.6.8 Ethics in motion: Bioethics 
The Hippocratic Oath is commonly considered to be the oldest text in existence 
pertaining to deontological precepts. Estimates place its composure sometime in the 
fourth century BCE and it is still, in adapted form, valid, and even required by the 
governing medical bodies of some countries. The modern interest in medical ethics 
really started to grow in the twentieth century.  
In 1969, the Hastings Centre of New York was founded in the United States of 
America762. It is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit bioethics research institute 
and is dedicated to the examination of essential questions in health care, biotechnology 
and the environment. It ‛has long been characterized by the openness to different 
perspectives and (its) conviction that conversation across disciplinary boundaries is 
both essential and fruitful. Some projects aim to reach a full consensus; others do not. 
But in the process of identifying and narrowing differences; eliminating 
misunderstandings; and developing tolerance, trust, and collegiality, debates are 
clarified and new insights are produced.“763 Just two years afterwards, the Kennedy 
Institute for Ethics was founded in 1971 at Georgetown University in Washington, DC – a 
Jesuit institution764. It describes itself as a source of expertise on issues such as health 
care reform, death and dying, clinical research ethics, abortion, and environmental 
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ethics. Numerous other centres, universities and medical centres have since applied 
themselves to bioethics. 
In 1985 the European Association of Centres of Medical Ethics (EACMA)765 was 
created. ‘European’ is used here in the broad sense of the term, i.e. from the Atlantic to 
the Urals, and this institution brings together scientists and philosophers from both 
within and without the European Union. It aims at promoting public critical concern 
regarding the ethical issues involved in the development of the biomedical sciences. Yet 
another organization, The International Association of Bioethics has the following 
educational and scientific objectives766: 
1. to facilitate contacts and the exchange of information between those working in 
bioethics in different parts of the world; 
2. to organize and promote periodic international conferences in bioethics; 
3. to encourage the development of research and teaching in bioethics; 
4. to uphold the value of free, open and reasoned discussion of issues in bioethics. 
Initially bioethics was an Anglo-Saxon affair; and, as we have seen, the earliest 
institutions dedicated to this field were opened in the United States. James F. Childress 
and Tom Beauchamp wrote the first American textbook on the subject, Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics. This text marked a transformative moment in the discipline and is still 
considered a standard work. The three cardinal principles of bioethics in the U.S., which 
were first elucidated in this work, were and still are: autonomy, beneficence and justice. 
The development of the discipline of bioethics was spurned onwards by progress in 
medical science and its applications, such as organ transplants, and the ethical problems 
surrounding end of life care. In the United States, the field also expanded as the result of 
several legal cases involving bio-ethics that attracted media attention. In the case of 
Karen Ann Quilan, a controversy arose regarding her right to die. Karen was in a 
persistent vegetative state, and her parents requested that the hospital discontinue 
active care. In 1976, after a legal battle, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in their 
favour. Similar cases include those of Nancy Cruzan and Terri Schiavo. In both these 
instances, the legal fights have gone before the U.S. Supreme Court because of disputes 
between family members, so-called pro-life groups, and even President Georges W. 
Bush; all of whom favoured a religious, rather than humane, point of view. The Supreme 
Court refused to issue a writ of certiorari in the Schiavo case, which would have delayed 
her husband from having her feeding tube removed. In the Cruzon case, they initially 
refrained from making a decision, but eventually allowed the family to remove her 
feeding tube.  
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A modern version of the Hippocratic Oath: 
I swear to fulfil, to the best of my ability and judgment, this covenant:  
I will respect the hard-won scientific gains of those physicians in whose steps I walk, 
and gladly share such knowledge as is mine with those who are to follow. 
I will apply, for the benefit of the sick, all measures [that] are required, avoiding those 
twin traps of over treatment and therapeutic nihilism. 
I will remember that there is art to medicine as well as science, and that warmth, 
sympathy, and understanding may outweigh the surgeon's knife or the chemist's drug. 
I will not be ashamed to say "I know not," nor will I fail to call in my colleagues when 
the skills of another are needed for a patient's recovery. 
I will respect the privacy of my patients, for their problems are not disclosed to me that 
the world may know. Most especially must I tread with care in matters of life and death. 
If it is given to me to save a life, all thanks. But it may also be within my power to take a 
life; this awesome responsibility must be faced with great humbleness and awareness of 
my own frailty. Above all, I must not play at God. 
I will remember that I do not treat a fever chart, a cancerous growth, but a sick human 
being, whose illness may affect the person's family and economic stability. My 
responsibility includes these related problems, if I am to care adequately for the sick. 
I will prevent disease whenever I can, for prevention is preferable to cure. 
I will remember that I remain a member of society, with special obligations to all my 
fellow human beings, those sounds of mind and body as well as the infirm. 
If I do not violate this oath, may I enjoy life and art, respected while I live and 
remembered with affection thereafter. May I always act so as to preserve the finest 
traditions of my calling and may I long experience the joy of healing those who seek my 
help. 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hippocratic_Oath  
 
Next to the very controversial issues of abortion and euthanasia (active or passive), 
other bioethical topics include the proper allocation of scarce health care resources – 
donated organs, for example - and the refusal of medical care for religious or cultural 
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reasons. In Belgium for instance, the state health insurance will not cover the costs of 
homeopathic remedies because they have no known proven medical benefit. Yet, 
because of the high demand for these treatments by people who are convinced that 
these treatments actually work, and because of the competition among semi-private 
insurers, these institutions will partially cover their costs. This policy may be 
understandable from a free market point of view, but it cannot be defended morally. If 
they are not effective, and there is not a scintilla of evidence to show that they are, 
there is no reason why the community should aid anyone in obtaining them. The 
argument that the repayment is in private hands is not valid because in reality the 
money all comes from the same pot. The financial resources could be better spent on 
more urgent, as yet unpaid costs incurred by treatments that are actually shown to have 
a medical benefit. The total cost of health insurance in Belgium, both state and private, 
is quite high and a serious economic issue. This is a textbook example of a problem of 
allocating scarce health resources; providing pseudo-scientific services can distrub the 
balance of a social health network. 
Abortion, euthanasia and the allocation of scarce health care resources are not the 
only controversial issues in bioethics. What about no resuscitation orders, persistent 
vegetative state patients, the withholding or withdrawing of medical treatment? Some 
diseases are also subject to controversy, as is the case for HIV infection and AIDS 
prevention. Organ transplantation deserves a chapter in its own right, and the issues 
include the occasional deaths of living donors and consent issues with donors who are 
technically dead. Progress in the field of xeno-transplants brings with it another host of 
ethical concerns767. The start of life can be just as ethically problematic as the end. The 
unresolved matter of when life actually begins, although it impacts on the abortion 
question is also pertinent with regards to in vitro fertilisation, artificial insemination, 
prenatal diagnosis procedures, contraception and human embryonic stem cell research. 
The patient-physician relation has also been the object of an extended literature 
regarding full disclosure, the extent to which a patient can actually understand what he 
or she is being told in a stressful situation and complaints procedures.  
To gain some insight into the handling of moral problems, one bioethical issue will 
now be discussed. The text concerned is by Dr. Yvonne Denier, a researcher associated 
with the Interfaculty Centre for Biomedical Ethics and Law at the Catholic University of 
Leuven768. This article gives a very complete overview of the issues surrounding prenatal 
diagnostic procedures, although her research was focused on the problem of the choices 
parents face when confronted with the possibility of having a disabled child and who is 
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ultimately responsible. In exploring this issue, Denier borrows Ronald Dworkin’s 
distinction between ‘option luck’ and ‘brute luck’. ‘Option luck’ stands for allowing free 
reign to chance while fully aware of the possible consequences, choice. ‘Brute luck’, 
however, bad or good, takes place without any prior knowledge – accidents, in other 
words. Responsibility is expressed as the costs born by the person himself or by society. 
Two other definitions important to this subject are: ‘wrongful birth’, which means that 
the parents accuse the physician of not having informed them in time in to make a 
choice; and ‘wrongful life’, when it is the disabled person who accuses the parents or the 
physician. The choice to be made by the parents is between abortion and the 
preparation for life with a disabled child, if the diagnosis should the diagnosis turn out 
to be correct.  
Denier subsequently considers the problem from the viewpoint of society, the 
parents and the child. For society a disabled implies a cost, coupled with less 
contribution, but society also has moral interests, such as respect and solidarity. To the 
parents, a potentially disabled child may represent financial burden, as well as an 
emotional one. Moral questions thwart the previous considerations769. The latter give 
rise to three possibilities: a decision to have an abortion, a decision to carry the child to 
term regardless, or doubt and hesitation in making the decision. From the viewpoint of 
the child it is always ‘brute luck’. At the time at which the decision is made, one way or 
another, the child is not yet born and thus cannot have any say. Therefore, the court 
assesses the unborn child’s perspective in term of their potential quality of life.  
The parents or physician’s responsibility here can be labelled either ‘backward-
looking responsibility’ or ‘forward-looking responsibility’. With backward-looking 
responsibility, blame is assigned, as it is in criminal law. Denier asks herself what is best 
for the disabled person. She undeniably prefers forward-looking responsibility, in which 
the parents are making choices within the context of possibilities, chances, meaningful 
examples, values, norms, etc. Denier goes on to denounce discrimination between those 
who make wise choices and those who make unwise decisions in this matter. The first 
opt for tests and eventually an abortion, should the tests turn out positive, while the 
latter choose not to undergo testing. Praising one set of parents while punishing the 
others, and their child is not acceptable in Denier’s view.  She considers it cold-hearted 
to lay the potentially astronomical costs of caring for a disabled person fully on the 
parents’ backs, simply because they trusted to luck and lost. ‘Backward-looking 
responsibility’ implies that because they made unwise decisions, the parents should 
then be excluded from solidarity and a collectively financed system of help and support.  
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Denier also questions whether it is acceptable to oblige an expectant mother to 
undergo a prenatal testing. She considers this paternalistic. Legitimate paternalism 
advances freedom of choice, because a restriction of freedom may in some instances – 
obligatory contributions to social security, for example - engender an increase of 
freedom, by providing for electric wheelchairs, for example. But that is obviously not 
the case here. According to Denier, the obligation to undergo prenatal testing does not 
increase freedom, neither when the test is negative nor when it is positive. Nor does it 
increase freedom of choice in the latter case when the question of whether or not to 
have an abortion is raised.  
Denier comes to the conclusion that holding individuals responsible for choices that 
have implications for the entire community is not what is commonly understood as a 
fair social policy. It does not pay attention to the broader social context in which 
choices are made; nor does it take into account the fact that some choices are very 
fundamental and existential. Persons who reject abortion on religious grounds must be 
allowed to make their own choices. Denier does not mention that the liberty on 
religious grounds must nevertheless be subjected to the critique from a human point of 
view. Than the question is indeed: is it a live worth to be lived. The final viewpoint is 
that of the child, even the unborn child. On moral grounds there are limits to the 
religious liberty. However, a lot of wrongful life and wrongful birth lawsuits have been 
rejected on the grounds that they explicitly implied and publicly asserted that life with 
particular congenital conditions is not worth living. A distinction needs to be made 
between a living person with disability and a not yet living being with the potential for 
having a disability. The difference is that the former lives, while the latter does not. In 
other words, the former is to be respected as a conscious living being who, moreover, 
can – depending on the severity of the disability – make his own decisions, the latter is 
not and cannot. To put it in Aristotle’s terms, potentiality is not the same as actuality. 
The unborn child is only a person in the eyes of its parents, not in reality. 
5.6.9 Three case studies 
What follows are three case studies on Islamic banking, the practice of female genital 
mutilation and the ecological threat to the earth. It was not difficult to find subjects in 
which moral issues are at stake, because moral questions are posed and discussed in 
nearly all times and places. In fact, the difficulty lay in making a choice.  
Islamic banking, the case most extensively examined here, provides an instance in 
which a particular system of thought, namely the fundamentalist form of Islam, may be 
disavowed, but some aspects of Islam as it is normatively practiced may be acceptable, if 
not preferable. The roots of this practice reach far into the past and so a historical 
contextualization is necessary. The proponents of Islamic banking justify their stance 
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with holy scripture; thus an examination of how this is materialized is a must. The 
interpreters of the Qur’an may be persuaded that it is timeless and that Allah himself 
has foreseen everything in advance, but this is neither the way of scientific ethics, nor 
of scientific exegesis. Key here is the fact that scientific ethics is not directed against 
any particular ethical system as such. Rather, it seeks to investigate the moral value of 
the practices engaged in within such systems. It is not intended to infringe on freedom 
of though, speech or religion. 
The investigation of female genital mutilation aims to demonstrate that some deeply 
rooted traditions and customs, which may be self-evident to the persons concerned, 
must be counteracted on moral grounds. The moral ground in case is the harm that 
medical evidence has shown is the result of this particular practice. Here, medical 
science functions as an aid to ethics. Above all, use is made of a particular World Health 
Organization publication regarding the matter, which contains a concise and yet 
complete account of the matter.  
The third case involves the current ecological threat to the planet. This particular 
case study is elaborated less extensively than the other two. Rather, the reader is 
referred to the book of Al Gore, Our Choice: A Plan to Solve the Climate Crisis770. Here, the 
entire issue is explained in a remarkably complete and sound manner.   
It must be stated before continuing onwards, that it is not my intent to carry out 
thorough scientific research into any of these topics. Rather, it is my intention to 
demonstrate, on the basis of some secondary literatrue, how a scientific ethics may be 
developed and used.  
5.7 Case study 1: Islamic banking 
5.7.1 Introduction 
A prohibition of the acceptance or payment of interest fees did existed not only in the 
other two Abrahamic religions, Christianity and Judaism, but in Islam as well. The roots 
of this negative attitude towards interest can be found in Greek antiquity. The question 
here is a moral one. Is Islamic banking from a scientific, and thus objective, viewpoint 
morally acceptable or even morally a good thing?  
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Although asking this question is not really a taboo, some restraints on its discussion 
are visible. This is due to its fundamentalist origin. The revaluation of Islamic banking is 
connected to names such as Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Maududi, founder of the fundamentalist 
religious-political party, the Jama’at-I Islami, in India; and Sayyid Qutb and his brother 
Muhammad al-Sadr, who belonged to the Egyptian Community of Muslims771. The origin 
of this revaluation is not at issue here, only the moral value of Islamic banking, which is 
widespread. There are Muslims who do not adhere to radical fundamentalist principles 
but who nevertheless honour the prescriptions of the Qur’an772.  
Islamic banking is a fact, not only in countries such as Iran and Sudan, where it is 
imposed, but elsewhere in the world as well. The ABN AMRO bank has a 40% financial 
interest in the SHB (Saudi Hollandi Bank), in which the Bin Laden family is an important 
shareholder; and Citigroup and HSBC also offer facilities in Islamic countries773. 
5.7.2 Synopsis of the historic attitude towards usury and the ban on 
interest. 
5.7.2.1 Introduction 
The emergence of interest and its problematization follows general historic lines. The 
attitude of the ancient Greeks can be traced to the economic theories of Aristotle, later 
taken over by the medieval church father, Thomas Aquinas. The religious stances taken 
on interest developed from the Old Testament, thus the Judaic branch, followed by the 
New Testament and the Christian doctrine, and the Qur’an, the holy book of the Islam. 
There are similarities as well as differences in the interpretation and application of 
these various scriptures. 
Care will be taken in the following section to treat the Christian, Jewish and Islamic 
viewpoints as equivalent and to criticise them equally. 
5.7.2.2 Ancient Greece 
Plato (ca.427–ca.347 B.C.E.) was opposed to lending and the payment of interest. He felt 
that the social order, which was very important to him, would be threatened by these 
practices774. Aristotle (ca.384–322 B.C.E.), a disciple of Plato, is important in this 
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discussion because Thomas Aquinas turned to his work on economic theory in the late 
Middle Ages. Even today, his economic views are studied and commented on in the 
Thomist School, their ethic implications in particular775. Although Aristotle was not an 
Athenian citizen, his Macedonian origins placed him among the Greek elite. 
Consequently, his views reflect those of the free, male members of the Greek polis who 
were entitled to the vote.  
Economically the polis was self-sufficient and the manual labour performed by slaves, 
whilst the activities of the citizens were restricted to politics and war. Foreigner 
residents had, to a certain degree, put down roots in the city, but they were not 
accepted as full citizens. They ware not allowed to own fixed property and so their 
economic activities were limited to trade and industry, which often procured them 
considerable wealth.  
The economic views of Aristotle are neither more nor less than a defence of this self-
sufficient economy, which he presented as the natural state of affairs. Purely financial 
activities were disapproved of. The only monetary function Aristotle recognised was as 
a medium of exchange and measure of value776. Money as a reserve for purchasing 
power or as a means of wealth creation was an unacceptable excess. To pay for money, 
that is to pay interest, was unnatural and thus immoral. 
The difference between the Aristotelian view on economics and the view of the new 
merchant class that arose in the Late Middle Ages, can be compared to the difference 
between the self-sufficient economy of the Early Middle Ages and the trading economy 
growing in the High Middle Ages. The former was formulated in terms of subsistence, 
while the later was increasingly couched in market terms. 
Nevertheless, the Greeks generally did not introduce any restrictions on interest 
until the Roman conquest, and compound interest was a common practice777. At times, a 
legal limit was placed on the interest rate, but with the abundance of money the interest 
rate automatically declined. With reference to maritime trade financing, the high risks 
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involved in such enterprises were contractually taken into consideration when fixing 
the interest rate. 
5.7.2.3 The Roman Empire 
Unlike Greece, legalistic Rome knew a continual restriction on interests, alongside 
protections for the creditor. But, as in Greece, these trends were connected to the 
agrarian economy of the early Roman Empire. The Roman enthusiasm for Greek culture 
had repercussions on the matter of interest rates. Both Cato the Elder (234-149 B.C.E.) 
and Seneca (4–65 C.E.) mention the money trade and interest in less than glowing 
terms778. With the rise of trade and industry in the third century, the existing legislation 
fell into disuse.   
Generally speaking, depending on the political and economic situation, either in 
Rome or in the colonies, occasionally there were excesses in the practice of collecting 
interest, sometimes followed by a policy of restraint. What’s important is the distinction 
the Romans made between consumptive and productive lending779.  
5.7.2.4 The Early Middle Ages (5th - 11th centuries) 
From the outset, cannon law and secular law differed in their policies regarding 
interest, but this changed under the Christianisation of Europe carried out by the 
Carolingians. Church fathers, Popes, whether in synod or not, and secular leaders all 
made statements against interest or imposed a ceiling on interest rates. The monetary 
trade itself was put in the wrong. Jesus expelled the moneychangers from the temple, 
didn’t he? Theoretically, interest was seen as the sale of time, but time was a gift from 
God and thus not for sale780. However, because finance was as yet scarcely developed, 
little attention was paid to the matter of interest, either for lending money or lending in 
kind. 
Mohammed (ca.570-632), himself a merchant, did not consider trade to be an inferior 
profession, and only forbade usury. Undoubtedly he must have been aware of the Jewish 
prohibition on lending at interest to other Jews, and he was likely knowledgeable of 
Christian doctrine on the subject as well.  
There were three kinds of lending contracts used in the First Middle Ages: those 
made on the basis of interest, profit sharing, and risk sharing. The first was forbidden; in 
the second case, lending was allowed although the creditor did not receive interest, but 
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rather a percentage of the profits from the investment; in the third case, both partners 
contributed money and split the profits or the losses781. 
This evasion of the interest problem, by and large, did not have an immediate effect 
in the growing Islamic world. Yet warfare necessitated that rulers occasionally obtain 
financial help on the basis of interest, by which private financial institutions began to 
take shape. However, these were also often prohibited782. 
5.7.2.5 The High and Late Middle Ages (12th – 15th centuries) 
The growth of trade and its finance meant that usury was also on the rise. The Church 
could not passively sit back and let this flouting of doctrine continue, and so 
promulgated strict rules. Trade was relegated to a twilight zone in terms of morality and 
interest was deemed a sin. The Scholastics, who predominantly belonged to the 
Dominican order, and whose economic policy consisted of upholding the agrarian 
society, followed Aristotelian theory regarding the infertility of money783. They were not 
the first. Islamic philosophers had attempted to integrate Plato and Aristotle into their 
faith before them, and it was their translations that the Scholastics relied on.  
The most prominent representative of this tradition was Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-
1274)784. His ethic is, of course, theological. God created eternal laws, but he also placed 
the germs of these laws in man in the form of the natural law. Human laws were 
subordinate to them. Relying on both the doctrine of the Church and the writings of 
Aristotle, Thomas developed his theory on interest. First, following Aristotle, he 
considered private ownership good because it would encourage people to take better 
care of things. His ethic then employed the principle of justice, both with regards to the 
pricing of products as well as to the labour invested. Money was not to be considered an 
individual, consumption good. To hand over money ends the creditor’s ownership and 
starts the borrower’s ownership. The original owner no longer has any claim on it and 
thus cannot receive any further remuneration in the form of interest. Self-evidently, he 
had the right to restitution in the form of goods to the same value785.  
Nevertheless there were two things that tempered the rules on lending786, which later 
in history would give rise to to the inclusion of interest in ethical debates. First, there 
was the damage sustained by the creditor because he no longer had that money at his 
disposal. Secondly, the creditor and the borrower came into a kind of partnership in 
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which they shared a risk. These features could still give rise to an indemnity. In other 
words, interest, as income that did not come from labour, was forbidden, but a return on 
capital was allowed. But all things considered, paying interest was nevertheless an 
exceptional event because capitalism was still in its infancy787. Above all, the practice of 
giving credit through a bill of exchange found the most widespread use. Both the risks 
related to the time span between the transactions, and the cost and indemnity 
associated with postponement of consumption, were mitigated through charging 
interest.  
The theologians were also confronted with the problem of defining the concepts 
‘brother’ and ‘foreigner’788. The Bible states ‘You may charge interest to a foreigner, but 
to your countrymen you shall not charge interest, so that the Lord your God may bless 
you in all that you undertake in the land which you are about to enter to possess’789. In 
Christian countries, it is evident that the word ‘brother’, here translated as 
‘countryman’, was not identified with fellow members of the Church. But, with the 
Crusades, pope Innocent III (1198-1216) feared that the Italians, Catalans and Southern 
French would only provide loans and goods at interest. Therefore, a different Biblical 
passage was emphasized with regards to lending: ‘But love your enemies, and do good, 
and lend, expecting nothing in return; and your reward will be great, and you will be 
sons of the Most High; for He Himself is kind to ungrateful and evil men.’790  
The Jewish people791, who were excluded from agriculture and crafts, were therefore 
forced to focus on trade and finance out of necessity. Changing political circumstances 
and varying monetary requirements meant that they were exempted from anti-usury 
legislation, tolerated or charged with costs for licences, reviled, expelled or the victims 
of pogroms by turns. 
When, after a period of fierce economic regression due to the plague and the 
Hundred Years War, the economy revived in de 15th century, the discussion shifted. The 
question became not whether or not to allow interest, but how to fix an acceptable rate 
of interest792. 
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5.7.2.6 Later developments in Catholic lands. 
Small wonder that the need for regulation and acceptable interest rates first became 
necessary in the flourishing money markets of northern Italy and southern Germany793. 
The name of Antonio Pierozzi (1389-1459) is connected with Florence. He mentions that 
an interest of 5% was deemed reasonable. This was the same interest rate that Johan Eck 
(1486-1543) later proposed in Augsburg. He also outlined the so-called ‘triple contract’ 
(contractus trinitus) between the creditor and the borrower: 
1. a contract to engage in a partnership on the basis of profit sharing; 
2. the sale of uncertain profit sharing against a fixed price; 
3. insurance against capital loss at a fixed premium794. 
If the Dominicans dominated economics in the late Middle Ages, the Jesuits 
developed theories more adapted to modern times, although they took Thomas Aquinas 
as their starting point795. The market price was considered fair through the mechanism 
of perfect competition. In other cases, the cost price could function as a reference. The 
authorities could fix a price in a monopolist situation or in the case of famine, the latter 
being far from uncommon at that time. Interest was allowed because the borrower 
could take advantage of the loan amount, and because the creditor abstained from 
reclaiming it, being in turn enable to take advantage of it796. Without this opportunity, 
no interest was allowed. 
Another important explanation for the allowance of interest was a lack of money797. 
At the Antwerp Bourse, traders provided each other credit at a legal interest rate, based 
on that principle. However, this ethical theory could not last and in the end, they 
reverted to the position interest was important for trade and for public good798. 
One trend within the order of Jesuits, the ‘Laxists’, sought, via their well known 
casuistry method, to account for the collection of interest. The importance of the public 
good and the growth of economy, apart from the already known arguments, were 
particularly emphasized. The restraints were inspired by love of one’s neighbour. In 
1838, the ban on interest came to an end, with a pastoral letter to the confessors by 
pope Benedictus XIV799. 
In 1914, the question of interest was definitively settled and regulated in the new 
codified Canonical Law. Canon 1543 stipulates that if an equivalent thing is returned, 
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after the original has been consumed, then interest cannot be a contract stipulation. 
But, it is in se not impermissible to enter into an agreement about legal interest if there 
is a just and proportional title present, at the moment the replicable thing is provided800.  
5.7.2.7 The Reformation 
Luther (1483-1546) was at first reluctant regarding interest because of the negative 
Biblical passages on the subject. Later on, he and Melanchthon (1497-1560) developed a 
more lenient attitude, but he still considered any high interest rates condemnable - 
certainly during the 1539-40 crisis801. Starting in the second half of the 16th century and 
continuing into the first half of the 17th century, the Calvinist attitude towards interest 
spread throughout the new, protestant countries. For Calvin (1509-1564) trade and 
finance were on par with labour and rent for farmers802. That was a radical breach with 
medieval thinking, which was grounded in the doctrine of Aristotelian self-supporting 
economy and considered money infertile. In Calvinist thought, if rent was permissible 
on land, then interest on loans was permitted. Only principles of justice and charity 
could be invoked in opposition. As such, professional lending against interest remained 
condemnable. Furthermore, banks were not allowed to provide credit for wasteful 
expenditure, as the virtue of thrift spoke against this such practices. Keynes’ (1883-1946) 
consumptive boosting of economy was not yet known803. 
5.7.2.8 The secularized views 
In the 17th century, philosophers moved away from the use of mythological statements 
in ethical propositions, although a great deal of the thinkers remained religious, and 
made every effort to clearly state as much. This may have been related to social control 
and self-censorship. The fact remains, that the scientific approach to reality won 
respect and the invocation of authority to sustain argumentation gradually disappeared. 
Naturally, the problems surrounding interest did not escape this trend. How did 
Mercantilists, Physiocrats and the Classics interpret interest? 
Mercantilists aimed to advance the wealth of their own country, disregarding 
differences in how this was implemented804. The bullionistic variant was focused on the 
increase of precious metal holdings. The English variant of mercantilism, focussed on 
commercial and maritime endeavours, allowed the gradual and incremental exchange 
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of precious metals for the acquisition of raw materials, but always with the intention of 
gaining more precious metals through the sale of finished products. Their own 
merchant fleet with a monopoly on trade with those parts of the world under English 
control completed the picture. England and Spain’s colonial mercantilism aimed to buy 
low and sell high to their respective colonies. The German variant strived to increase 
the country’s prosperity through commercial, industrial and colonial mercantilist 
practices. As to the problem of interest, awareness grew that an increase in the amount 
of money in circulation would decrease the interest rate805. 
For the Physiocrats806, with François Qeusnay (1694-1774) as its most prominent 
representative, only agriculture provided surplus value, while both trade and craft were 
considered sterile. Interest was a profit gained at the expense of the debtor. And 
because Qeusnay held capital intensive, large-scale agriculture to be the most important 
factor in economic wellbeing, every farmer who became a debtor was injurious to the 
country’s economy. The authorities had to protect borrowers by fixing the interest 
rate807. 
In contrast, Turgot (1727-1781), although opposed to usury, advocated that the 
interest rate be regulated through the free market. He noted that capital was a factor of 
production and that interest was a cost808. Thus, the free market was a fundamental 
principle of the Classical School of Economics, and the natural rate of interest was the 
result of demand and offer. For Adam Smith (1723-1790), a legal restriction on interest 
would not actually accomplish lowering the rate than that already determined by the 
free market. The legal interest rate would be circumvented and because of the risk that 
such a development would generate, the interest would actually be higher than that 
found on the market. For, if the legal interest rate was but a little higher than the 
market rate, investors would become cautious and engage in lesser risky investments. 
This consideration eventually inspired Smith to take a more charitable attitude towards 
restrictions on interest rates809. 
A similar line of reasoning is found in the works of John Stuart Mill810. An obligatory, 
low interest rate would cause a drop in the amount of money on offer on the financial 
market and thus a decrease in investments. The eventual increase in demand for capital 
and the higher risks allowed for by illegal rates, would cause a corresponding rise in the 
market interest rate.  
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In Marxist economics, the capitalist takes the value of interest out of labour, which 
makes interest part of the exploitation theory. Another explanation is based on the 
principle of moral hazard811. When creditors participate in the economic activity for 
which the loan was destined, they have better control over the risks812. 
With the emergence of economics in the 18th century, interest became increasingly 
accepted as an essential part of the economy, and  with increased secularization of the 
societ, a moral justification had become superfluous. This was not the case in Islamic 
lands, however. There, attempts justify the ban on interest using values continued.    
5.7.2.9 Islamic banking 
While in the Christian and the Jewish worlds, finance and the problem of interest are 
considered from a scientific point of view, with condemnations reserved for extreme 
excesses, the Islamic world generally experiences interest as problematic. 
However, not all Muslims consider interest to be wrong813. The argument is that the 
practices of now are no longer comparable with those engaged in by contemporaries of 
Mohammed. Thus, the rule does not need changing – the ban on interest does not need 
set aside, rather it needs contextualizing. It was, according to some scholars, intended 
only to prohibit the practice by which debt was doubled when the period of repayment 
was prolonged. These days, such a practice would still be prohibited – but it does not 
amount to a ban on all interest. Imam Abdulwahid, who resides in Bommel, the 
Netherlands, states that there is only one translation for the term riba and that is usury. 
Only fundamentalist Muslims understand riba to mean interest814. 
Islamic economic theory emerged from the experience of Western colonial disdain. 
The concept was introduced by the scholar Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Maududi (1903-1979), and 
propagated outside India and Pakistan by Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), one of the leaders of 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and in Iraq by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1931-
1980)815. 
 
                                                     
811 Borrowers are given incentives to change their attitude towards risk after receiving the loan 
because they are not fully exposed to risk. (Vander Vennet, 2008: Chap. 3:15).  
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In 1964, the first Islamic bank was established in Egypt. Since the mid 1980’s they 
have spread, although not in Iran and Sudan, two countries known for their 
fundamentalism, where Islamic banking is forbidden. Islamic banks are currently 
operating in Europe and the United States816. 
There are four principles in Islamic banking817,818. 
 
1. Riba al-nasia (surplus by delay): this is interest based on the difference in time 
between two operations, namely borrowing and returning money. 
2. Riba al-fadl (surplus by unequal exchange): this is the surplus realised because 
two goods of unequal value are exchanged for one another. For instance, bonds 
may not be emitted below par, which would be a method to get around interest. 
3. Gharar (unnecessary risk): uncertainty cannot be indemnified. Assurances are 
thus problematic. Trade also is not without risk, but it is still valued provided 
long-term speculation is not involved. Therefore, it is permissible to co-finance 
trade if the risks are shared.   
4. Maysir (gamble): this covers not only gambling but any speculation, none of 
which are permissible. 
Furthermore, because money may not be exchanged against money, unless at par, 
financial tools must always be underwritten with real goods819. 
Apart from the translation of riba into usury, by which the Islamic solution does not 
differ in essentials from that of the Jewish, Christian and Humanistic ones, Islam also 
contains a stricter interpretation, which comes from the fundamentalist view of the 
Qur’an. Nevertheless, it is not because it is wide spread that it cannot be labelled 
immoral. One possible criticism rests on the greater risk a bank undertakes because it 
participates in the risks of the client. But loans are handled with caution and follow-up 
on investments made, this shortcoming can be remedied. Moreover, banks will be more 
cautious if the risks are greater. 
A credit crisis of the scale caused in the United States through poor lending practices 
and the collapse of the real-estate market is therefore less likely to occur in Islamic 
banking820. Generally speaking, lending money for trade is not forbidden, but fixing an 
interest rate in advance is. In other words, both the creditor and the borrower must 
take reasonable risks when engaging in trade. 
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The assets and liabilities on the balance sheet of a conventional bank both show 
items subject to interest821. However, the balance sheet of an Islamic bank will be a little 
different, as shown below. 
 
 
BALANCE SHEET OF AN ISLAMIC BANK 
  
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Cash Investments accounts 
Mudaraba 
participations Savings accounts 
Musharaka 
participations Transactions accounts 
Murabaha advances 
Quard al-hasana 
accounts 
Ijara finance Own funds 
 
The operational resources consist of six different instruments. 
 
Mudârabah is a kind of risk capital. The bank loans money and in turn receives a 
percentage of the gains as well as the repayment of the money lent. The loss is on the 
part of the creditor. The entrepreneur brings in his experience and labour. This lending 
method is short-term, and is especially used to finance trade and investment projects. 
This solution to the ban on interest is not generally approved because it is not a real 
partnership, but rather only a form of profit sharing822. 
Mushâraka. Unlike mudârabah, both gains and losses are shared, relative to the capital 
brought contributed and the value of the incorporated labour. The borrower shares in 
the risk here. This method is especially used for long-term projects. 
Murâbah. In this method, which is generally employed in trade finance, the bank buys 
the goods on its own account and resells them through instalment payments with a 
small increase on the price823.  
An obvious criticism of this procedure is that the purchasing and selling is 
superfluous. The interest that conventional banks charge can be substituted by service 
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charges, cover costs, a premium for risk, a margin or profit and compensation for 
inflation. This solution to the ban on interest is obviously unknown in Islamic 
banking824. 
Ijara. The bank buys goods for its client, rents it out and finally sells it to him. Ijara is 
often used for the acquisition engines and means of transport means, such as 
aircrafts825.  
Bai’salam. This is an accepted exception to the ban on risk taking. The customer 
(merchant, manufacturing) pays the supplier (agrarian enterprise) in advance. There is 
thus a great risk involved because crops can fail, but this is acceptable because 
otherwise the agrarian sector would be unable to function.  
Quard al-Hasan is a loan without interest, albeit possibly with a commission. These are 
intended for farmers, small traders and poor consumers. In Pakistan this method of 
lending was adopted for students in order to fund their continued scientific studies826. 
Istisna is also exceptional because it concerns goods that do not yet exist and thus an 
element of risk is involved. In such an agreement, payments are made according to the 
stage of development827. 
Islam bonds are bonds that do not yield a fixed interest, but rather a share in the 
profits828. 
Islam credit cards are credit cards that circumvent interest, but these are not 
unanimously accepting across the Islamic banking world829. 
Takaful830. Because assurances are rarely accepted in the Islamic world, only a co-
operative form, namely takaful, may be used. In 2001, the total market share of takaful 
was about 538 million dollars, of which 63% was in the Arabic world and 27% in 
Malaysia. 
Some of these financial instruments resemble conventional forms. The mudârabah, for 
instance, is comparable to a limited partnership, with a distinction between silent and 
managing partner. Mushârak is similar to a limited liability partnership, and ijara to 
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leasing. Murâbaha contracts make up 75% of agreements and ijara contracts a further 
10%.  
This cursory list of solutions for the bans on interest and risk is by no means 
exhaustive. Because there is such extraordinary flexibility and freedom in contractual 
agreements, all sorts of secondary forms exist. Moreover, there is no accordance in 
Islam about what is permitted and what is not. In the most extreme cases, most of these 
financial forms are rejected because they do not answer to the spirit of the law831. 
With regards to Islamic banks’ resources, some client accounts are seen as 
investment stocks, namely, the profit-and-loss sharing accounts (PLS accounts). 
Furthermore, there are special savings accounts that warrant a nominal value and 
periodical payments; transaction accounts without indemnity; and the quad al-hasan-
accounts, which do not yield any interest, but are used to secure quad al-hasan-loans832. 
5.7.3 Conclusion 
What can be concluded from this analysis of Islamic banking with regards to the 
scientificity of ethics? What are the facts, the propositions, the value judgments, the 
presumptions, cultural intuitions and conditions? How are they related? As stated 
previously, these concepts will not be discussed in this order, but they will be 
mentioned where necessary to the line of reasoning, which has a development pattern 
related to the problem at hand. Thus, there will be no on paragraph cultural intuitions, 
no paragraph on facts, no paragraph on judgments, etc. Rather, the sequence will be 
dictated by the problem of the ban on interest, risk taking and so on, and the concepts 
incorporated and discussed as needed. 
A twofold approach (historical and structural) puts this analysis in perspective. The 
Islamic origin of the ban on interest differs from that of the Christian prohibition 
because the former was not opposed to trade because Mohammed himself was a trader, 
while the latter advocated against it from the viewpoint of the self-sufficient agrarian 
society present both in the Middle Ages and in Ancient Greece, and from which the 
Aristotelian doctrine of the Christian church originated. The latter points to an 
ideological aspect, namely the Aristotelian trend in Christian theology. However, 
neither were aimed at regulating specialised lending institutions, such as banks or other 
credit establishments in contemporary terms. Also, money did not circulate to the same 
degree that it does in a modern, capitalistic society. Therefore, only after the revival of 
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trade and money transfers in the late Middle Ages did the problem of interest yet again 
rear its head.   
The financial strategies adopted by Islam varied throughout the course of history, 
and were dependent upon the traditions and political conditions under which they 
operated. When Islam is the dominant force in a country, two stances towards other 
traditions are possible: tolerance of other religions and traditions, often the case in the 
Mediterranean of the Middle Ages, or the imposition of Islamic rule on all residents, the 
stance taken by contemporary Iran. In Europe, immigrants and their offspring enjoy 
freedom of religion, by which they can experience their religion in their own way while 
required to be tolerant towards other religions and customs. This interaction has helped 
to develop the somewhat recent phenomenon of Islamic banking. Differences in attitude 
towards this form of banking are all related to different interpretations of the Qur’an. 
Sometimes, a defensive attitude may develop if some regulations are seen as 
contradictory to the faith. Then, immigrants may make use of the opportunities for 
expression afforded to them by democracy, namely political influence, the court system, 
and demonstrations.  
Another condition that has yet to be examined is the function of interest in economic 
life. The market mechanism serves to regulate the supply and demand of money. This 
mechanism is also linked to the rest of economic life. The opportunity cost is the cost 
related to the next-best choice available among several, mutually exclusive options. 
This choice is made on the level of the individual. In the typically deductive reasoning of 
economics, this choice is theoretically made under ideal circumstances with sufficient 
information and employing rational behaviour.  
Interest serves to help regulate supply and demand because it represents 
compensation for those who lend money and a cost for those who borrow it. What is the 
effect on the system if this interest mechanism ceases to function properly? Does 
lending suffer? It is not as simple as that. A monetary surplus is generally deposited in 
the bank. Someone who accepts the ban on interest will choose an Islamic bank. 
However, the money is not withdrawn from the economic cycle, but flows back into it 
without the mediation of interest, in a form determined by the level of adherence to the 
ban. For instance, with the mudärabah, a kind of risk capital, the money is not lent on 
the basis of a return via interest. Instead, the associated transaction costs, as well as the 
potential proceeds from the economic activity it funds, determines whether the bank 
invests or not. Hence, the risks for Islamic banks are higher than those encountered by a 
traditional bank, which only have to look at the credit-worthiness of the client. For a 
traditional bank, the expected return on its investment is known in advance and 
dependant on the interest rate. In Islamic banking, the result is not a decrease of 
economic activity but a shift of the risks. However, if the ban on interest is applied in its 
strictest form, namely that no risks at all may be taken, the question can be asked 
whether or not any economic activity would be able to subsist. 
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Yet a more fundamental question arises: what sort of economy is wished? Milder 
interpretations of the ban on interest do not hinder full economic development. For 
instance, Saudi Arabia, a country in which Islamic banking is practised, intends to found 
six "economic cities" (e.g. King Abdullah Economic City), which are slated for 
completion by 2020. These new industrialized cities are intended to diversify the 
economy of Saudi Arabia, and are expected to increase its per capita income. The King 
of Saudi Arabia has announced that the per capita income is forecast, to rise from 
$15,000 in 2006 to $33,500 in 2020. The cities will be spread around Saudi Arabia to 
promote diversification in each region and their economic activities are projected to 
contribute $150 billion to the GDP.’833 
Maybe Islamic banking is better than traditional, Western banking. The ban on 
maysir, for instance, covers speculation as well as gambling. This means that the 
excesses taken by those dealing in derivatives and the risky lending practices of the 
real-estate sector in the United States for instance will never become prevalent in 
Islamic banking as it is practiced today. Of course, Islamic banks are not immune to 
fraudulent activity, but it is, by and large, restricted to the kind found in joint ventures.  
Islamic banking can be considered as morally good, independent of its 
fundamentalist origin, and what is good must not be sanctioned. It also shows that it can 
function alongside existing, traditional banking. However, this does not mean that it 
must be implemented everywhere. Traditional banking is in se not bad, but some 
unbridled practices are pernicious to the economy and peoples’ savings. It would be a 
good thing if the dealers in high-yield securities received probability training, so that 
they would not be fooled by random market fluctuations834, both for their own sake and 
that of society as a whole. 
One facet of ethics that has not yet been dealt with is that of simplicity. Simplicity is 
particularly applicable where difficult deliberations hinder the smooth application of 
moral rules. It is not always possible to extensively research the pros and cons of a 
moral problem. Often, a quick decision is required or the persons concerned do not have 
complete knowledge of the situation. If a quick decision is required, the deliberation 
should be as complete as possible. If the persons concerned do not have the required 
knowledge, the reason why they lack the necessary information must be taken in 
consideration. If they are mentally incompetent, they should be placed under tutelage.  
Yet religious leaders or other persons with some degree of moral authority over 
people often consider it appropriate, or expedient, to differentiate between themselves 
and the majority. The Arabic philosopher Averroës [Ibn Rosjd] (1126-1198), in comparing 
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philosophy with religion, came to the conclusion that the philosopher knows a higher 
and purer truth, while in religion the truth, as it is expressed, is adapted to the weak 
understanding of the crowd. That is the case both for knowledge in general as well as 
moral judgments. The masses need clear rules, commands and interdictions. The 
Catholic Church’s catechism, with questions and answers to be learned by rote, is an 
example of this. The Ten Commandments were hereby supplemented by clear rules and 
guidelines. And during homilies and retreats, interdictions were presented, 
compounded by the threat of eternal damnation.  
Moral judgment is certainly not perfect, but even an imperfect determination must 
be respected. Generally, only harming others is not allowed. If somebody makes a 
decision that appears to be erroneous, he must take full responsibility, with some 
consideration, perhaps, of the difficult circumstances in which the decision was made. 
An adult is able to make a responsible, moral decision even when others in their circle 
do not share the same sensitivity of conscience. Moreover, rules imposed from above 
are not necessarily better. Certainly, the anti-Semitism fostered under the Nazi-regime 
was not.  
5.8 Case study 2: Female genital mutilation and cutting 
(FGM/C) 
5.8.1 Introduction 
The focus of the present case study is not the practice of female genital mutilation or 
cutting (FGM/C) itself or the reactions to this practice as such but rather an analysis of 
its scientificity. This practice has been determined to be psychologically and physically 
damaging to women and girls, both in the immediate aftermath and throughout their 
lives. Where it is practised, it is a socially upheld behavioural rule. Social control is 
exerted, as almost always is the case, by derision, marginalization and loss of status. The 
tradition is a self-enforcing social convention.  Although the intervention is very 
violent, the family and community consider it a necessary step in the transition from 
girlhood to womanhood.  
The medicalization of FGM will be paid particular attention in the following section. 
Furthermore, the most efficient methods that could possibly counter this widespread 
and ingrained, but harmful, social habit are also discussed.  
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5.8.2 Definitions 
Female genital mutilation is defined by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as follows: 
‘Female genital mutilation (FGM) comprises all procedures that involve partial or total 
removal of the external female genitalia, or other injury to the female organs for non-
medical reasons.’835  
There are different types of female genital mutilation836 (See the images ‘Types of 
FGM/C’) 
Type 1: partial or total removal of the clitoris and/or the prepuce (clitoridectomy). 
Type 2: partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora, with or without 
excision of the labia majora (excision). 
Type 3: narrowing of the vaginal orifice with creation of a covering seal by cutting 
and repositioning the labia minora and/or the labia majora, with of without 
excision of the clitoris (infibulation). 
Type 4: all other procedures harmful to the female genitalia performed for non-
medical purposes, for instance: pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and 
cauterization. 
 
The ‘‛medicalization“ of FGM refers to situations in which FGM is practised by any 
category of health-care provider, whether in a public or a private clinic, at home or 
elsewhere. This also includes re-infibulation at any point during a woman’s lifetime.’837 
More than ninety million girls and women have undergone FGM/C Africa, where the 
phenomenon is most prevalent. It is also practiced in some Asian lands, as well as the 
Middle East, and other parts of the world, mainly the as the result of international 
migration838. 
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5.8.3 Medicalization of FGM: Analysis of the problem 
The medicalization of FGM was chosen as focus of this ethical investigation because it is, 
to some extent, more controversial, and thus more suited to illustrate scientific 
applications in ethics. This easily enables a discussion of the pros and cons, the cultural 
intuitions, the propositions, observations, value judgments and presumptions. 
Two extreme positions can be taken regarding FGM/C in general: on one side there are 
the proponents of non-interference in cultural settings and, on the other side, those 
who wish to see its prohibition and punishment. Medicalization is situated somewhere 
in between these poles. What are the motivations of these health-care providers and 
who are they? Very near to the non-interference position, are health workers who are 
part of the community and are aware of the immediate consequences of traditional 
methods of performing FGM/C. They think that it is better to help their fellow citizens 
rather than to let them perform the cutting in   unhygienic conditions. Their motivation 
is twofold. They accept the given cultural practice of their community but they are also 
concerned about medical care. Thus, their method is a little more human than that of 
traditional practitioners. And it is true that the risks of the procedure can be reduced, 
the extent of the damage can be limited and the pain associated with it mitigated. 
However, medical complications remain in a procedure like infibulation, which can 
result in a difficult accouchement later. Nor are the other types of intervention 
unproblematic, either on the psychological or the physical level, not to mention the 
secondary social implications. The after effects can prevent women from normal 
participation in society. 
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Types of FGM/C 
 
 
 
File from Wikimedia Commons. Released into the public domain (by the author). 
 
Parents’ demands for this procedure to be carried out by health care providers reveals 
an awareness on their part that FGM/C is not without danger. Possibly the information 
campaigns in their communities have not been without effect. Parents appear to prefer 
placing their children in the hands of professionals, rather than traditional 
practitioners, who use less caution and perform more dangerous interventions – to the 
increased detriment of girls and women.   
Studies have shown that in certain countries some health care providers consider 
FGM to be medically indicated for most women, while others see the practice as 
harmless839. These opinions are medically incorrect. There are no medical reasons 
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requiring the performance of FGM on healthy women and the practice is far from 
harmless, even when the operation is carried out in the best of circumstances. 
Moreover, the long-term adverse effects remain unaddressed. Other community health 
care providers, who do not support FGM, nevertheless respect the cultural traditions of 
their society. This attitude closely resembles that of the health-care providers first 
described. A final category of health-care providers who carry out such procedures are 
simply motivated by financial gain.  
Re-infibulation demonstrates the unnecessary and harmful nature of FGM perfectly. 
This procedure is carried out when an infibulation is opened to facilitate childbirth. A 
restorative re-infibulation is then performed. Healthcare providers justify the 
procedure by claiming that it does not constitute increased harm, because the woman 
already had an infibulation. Medically speaking, this not the case. The performance of 
such an unnecessary and invasive procedure carries risks such as infection, and will 
require repeating the next time the woman comes to term. 
FGM affects all aspects of development goals: the improvement of maternal health; 
the reduction of child mortality; the fight against HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 
the achievement of universal primary education; the promotion of gender equality and 
the empowerment of women. Above all, sexual and reproductive health is affected. For 
instance, for every 100 births, one or two perinatal deaths occur among children born to 
women who have undergone FGM840. 
The value judgment made in almost all cases is that the physician has to safeguard 
the health of the patient. The error made by some healthcare providers is that they do 
not consider the whole picture. In order to meet traditional expectations halfway, they 
fail to take into account the medical counter-indications.  
Invoking Human Rights is, of course, argumentation based on authority, but there is 
more to it than that. Human Rights are not pie in the sky idealizations; they stand for 
real human complaints. FGM is a violation of the Human Rights of women and girls on 
several grounds. Firstly, they have the right to live, and these interventions can result in 
death. Secondly, they should not be discriminated against on the basis of their gender. 
Thirdly, they must not be subjected to cruel and degrading treatment. FGM is an attack 
on the integrity of the person. By damaging healthy genital tissue, their mental and 
physical health is also damaged.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Medicalization of female genital cutting in Egypt. Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal, 2009, 
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5.8.4 Medicalization of FGM. Strategies. 
Simply legislating against or sanctioning FGM does not appear to work. For instance, 
parents merely had their daughters undergo the procedures at a younger age in order to 
circumvent possible opposition. It is quite difficult to change tradition from the outside 
if it is rooted in firm conviction - even when the underlying reasoning is erroneous. 
The principles at stake are personal autonomy, informed consent and non-violence 
against the person. All three are related to liberty841. It has been medically proven that 
FGM/C is an assault upon the body’s integrity. Autonomy is closely related to informed 
consent. If a woman about to undergo such a procedure had all the information 
available – if she could see ‘the whole problem’ - would she still agree to it?  
By ‘the whole problem’ I mean the initial and long-term physical and psychological 
harm as well as the way in which the practice is socially maintained. If the social control 
aspect vanished, would she chose to do it? If the internalized psychological 
accountability was unmasked? However, it is difficult to arm women with enough 
information to change their minds. Moreover, an internalized and positive cultural 
attitude towards FGM is difficult to fight, as is the element of social control.  
According to WHO: ‘Where large-scale abandonment of FGM has been achieved, it has 
been the result of an approach that reinforces the human rights values and social 
support that are shared by communities. This has enabled the communities to 
collectively explore and agree on better ways to fulfil these values, and led to 
sustainable large-scale abandonment of FGM as well as other harmful practices. The 
health professionals, who typically have status in communities, can play a key role in 
supporting this process by providing correct information on the consequences of FGM 
and on the benefits of abandoning the practice.’842  
The condemnations of FGM predicated on Human Rights are official statements and 
belong to the legal sphere. They do not belong to the realm of ethics unless they are 
viewed as the legal articulation of a moral fact, or unless they are used as a means to 
promote moral conduct. It is this later aspect of Human Rights arguments that informs 
strategies used to combat FGM.  
  
 
                                                     
841 See the chapter ‘Mill’s defence of Liberty’. 
842 WHO, 2010: 2. 
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OFFICIAL CONDEMNATIONS OF THE MEDACALIZATION OF FGM 
 
1979: WHO first condemned the medicalization of FGM, in the first international 
conference on FGM, held in Khartoum, Sudan. 
1982: The condemnation of 1979 was reiterated in a formal statement on WHO’s position 
to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights843. 
1993: Medicalization was condemned by the World Medical Association, and later by 
numerous other professional medical associations, including the International 
Federation of Gynaecology and Obstetrics (FIGO), as well as by international agencies, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and governments. 
1997: This condemnation of FGM was both highlighted and reiterated in a joint 
WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA844. 
2008: The World Health Assembly adopted the WHA61.16 resolution on the elimination 
of FGM, in which all member states agreed to work towards the abandonment of the 
practice, including ensuring that health professionals do not perform it. 
 
Source: WHO, 2010. 
 
According to an interagency statement: ‘Stopping medicalization of FGM is an essential 
component of the holistic, human rights-based approach for the elimination of FGM (…) 
By taking a stand in favour of abandonment of the practice and by refraining from 
performing it, health-care providers will contribute to increased debate and questioning 
of the practice by communities.’845 It is also necessary that every individual or group 
that can contribute to the effort is involved: policy-makers, parliamentarians, 
international agencies, professional associations, community leaders, religious leaders 
and NGOs. 
 
                                                     
843 Female genital mutilation. An overview. Geneva, World Health Organization, 1998 (mentioned in 
WHO, 2010: 17). 
844 Female genital mutilation: a joint WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA statement. Geneva, World Health Organization, 
1997 (mentioned in WHO, 2010: 17). 
845 WHO, 2010: 5. Eliminating female genital mutilation: an interagency statement. UNAIDS, UNDP, UNECA, 
UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM, WHO. Geneva, World Health Organization, 2008, 
The Donors Working Group on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting). Platform for action towards the 
abandonment of female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C). New York, UNICEF, 2008. 
http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/ Platform_for_Action_FGM-C_English.pdf (accessed 
26 April 2010). (Mentioned in WHO: 2010: 5, 17). 
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Some have argued that medicalization is a first step towards full abandonment of the 
practise846, but this line of reasoning ignores the steadfastness of cultural practices. In 
effect, medicalization actually consolidates and even promotes FGM by making it safer. 
5.8.5 Conclusion 
The scientificity of the ethical treatment of FGM/C is based on the medical finding that 
it harms physical, psychological and social functioning. Legal prohibition of the 
practice, applicable to both traditional practitioners as well as health-care providers, 
has not been sufficient to realise a reversal in behaviour. Hidden practices still occur. 
Therefore, an effort has been made to change the mentality of the people concerned. 
The opposition to change comes from traditional views, enhanced by religious 
prejudices and the social control exercised by the community. Paternalistic attitudes 
and the resultant subjugation of women are also important factors. To increase the 
chances of successfully altering the custom, the health organisations involved have 
made use of the existing infrastructure, namely the health-care providers because 
people in this profession enjoy some prestige in these communities and can exert some 
influence over the behaviour of their members. Moreover, the same health 
organisations have carried out research on the effectiveness of their programs. This 
research has shown that in those communities where, religious leaders have been 
persuaded that their beliefs did not prescribe the practice of FGM/C, change has been 
more effective. Their contribution is of course very important, especially considering 
the great esteem they enjoy in these areas.  
As to personal autonomy, it is clear that the women and girls concerned are not 
entirely free to chose, being the hostages of a social system that they cannot flee. Yet, 
even in small communities, where the social control is highly effective, attempts are 
made by some women to evade FGM procedures, in spite of the sanctions by the 
community, which are to be expected and which must not be underestimated. Besides 
this, the fact that parents call upon the aid of health-care providers is additional 
evidence that the practice is seen as dangerous. FGM is an example of the necessity to 
counteract certain harmful practices, preferably with the aid of people in authority 
from the community.  
 
                                                     
846 Shell-Duncan B. ‛The medicalization of female ‛circumcision“: harm reduction or promotion of a 
dangerous practice?“ in: Social Science and Medicine, 2001, 52(7):1013–1028 (mentioned in WHO, 2010: 
17). 
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5.9 Case study 3: The globalized ecology 
Our Choice. A Plan to Solve the Climate Crisis847 by Al Gore is a perfect example of a factual 
application of scientific ethics, but one made without claiming that status. In a constant, 
rational dialogue between nature and human interests, making use of achievements in 
subordinate sciences such as physics, chemistry, geography, geology, thermodynamics, 
etc.; but also sociology, social psychology, anthropology, etc. a far reaching plan to save 
the earth is developed, taking into account every aspect of the problem. The enormity 
of this work makes its complete summarization here impractical, therefore only some 
aspects in function of its scientificity will be discussed.  
The book presents itself as a handbook to the climate crisis and it has all the 
favourable characteristics of such a guide, namely clarity, completeness, step-by-step 
argumentation and arrangement complete with charts, graphs and illustrations to 
support its points. All facets of the problem are dealt with; both pollutive energy 
production as well as alternative power sources such as solar and wind power and 
geothermal energy. An in depth analysis is made of the impact of overpopulation on 
ecosystems. Too often, arguments are made in favour of larger families in Western 
countries because of falling reproduction rates.  
In fact, no one is spared from criticism - all come under fire: various multinationals, 
the political classes and even the media. For example, Gore points out that in 1989, 
Amoco, the American Forest & Paper Association, the American Petroleum Institute, 
Chevron, Chrysler, Cyprus AMAX Minerals, Exxon, Ford, General Motors, Shell Oil, 
Texaco, and the US Chamber of Commerce, all important economic actors in the United 
States, founded the Global Climate Coalition (GCC). Their goal was to start a massive 
disinformation to campaign to deny the reality of global warming and the relationship 
between climate change and the human activities848. They even went so far as to doctor 
reports from their own scientists when they came to the conclusion that the reality of 
the scientific evidence could not be denied. One of many instances of political 
intervention mentioned by Gore involves Philip Cooney, a member of staff in President 
George W. Bush’s administration. He edited government reports concerning the global 
warming in order to paint a rosier picture than was warranted. When he left the White 
House, Cooney received a very lucrative job at Exxon Mobil.  
All is not negativity, however. Realistic, practical and well thought-out suggestions 
are made throughout the book for turning the tide of ignorance and malevolent short-
 
                                                     
847 Gore, 2009. 
848 Gore, 2009: 363.  
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term thinking. Our Choice is addressed to everybody because everybody is concerned, 
and because everybody can and must intervene each on his own level for the plan to 
succeed. The alternatives and options are elaborately analyzed: nuclear power-stations, 
solar energy, geothermal energy, coaling stations, biomass, natural gas, hydroelectric 
stations, or windmills? The choice is ours. Even industrialists need more information. 
Too often it has been demonstrated that industrial circles not only lack interest, but 
good information regarding more efficient and cheaper methods. Ecological is no longer 
entirely synonymous with more expensive. 
That everything is considered in this study is evident from the attention paid to the 
how people process and make use of information. Gore makes it clear that short-term 
thinking is inhibiting long-term prospects. He also demonstrates how the difficulty in 
explaining complex processes in a simple and comprehensive manner is being used by 
certain parties in order to spread confusion and misinformation. Furthermore, he shows 
how business and political practices that are continually repeated despite their negative 
impacts antagonize common sense. This brief oversight of Gore’s book demonstrates an 
instance in which an ethical problem is handled in an entirely scientific way, without 
paying heed to taboos, and by making use of many scientific fields. 
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General conclusion 
Although Lotze defended the achievements of science, albeit in its 19th century 
mechanical form, his anthropological theorizing was not scientific, because it was a 
speculative attempt to integrate the knowledge of the other sciences into a religious 
world-view supported by philosophical reasoning. Therefore, the contemporary 
significance of his work cannot be situated in that for which he was renowned during 
his life time, namely microcosms. However, he did put forth some ideas that are still 
important in one form or another.  
His variant of anthropology is still present in some religions of today, particularly in 
Methodism. But here too his world-view is out of date and must be considered in the 
idealistic framework of his time. Also outdated is his linear conception of the 
cumulative achievements of man, which restricts progress to the West and posits that 
other cultures are in lower stages of development. This point of view is no longer the 
norm in anthropology. Moreover, from an ethical point of view, it is irrelevant because 
a so-called higher stage of development may be more efficient in harmonizing social 
diversity, but that resulting harmony is not necessary morally better. Science, however, 
deserves special attention because its achievements can yield better living standards. 
The progress in medical science is a striking example of this. And yet, some scientific 
discoveries can be used for the betterment of mankind, as well as to its detriment.  
If Lotze’s anthropology is historical significant, it is perhaps his related psychology 
that is more meaningful for the present time. But again, the idealistic and religious 
aspects are no longer acceptable. Nevertheless, his approach to feelings can be useful. 
The importance of feelings for human appreciation and valuation is still quite 
important. By recognizing the role that feelings play in perception, Lotze concluded 
that the appreciative capacity of man forms the basis for moral judgement. However, in 
analysing moral judgements it becomes evident that not only feelings are important, 
but rationality and evidence as well. Yet, feelings remain crucial in moral judgements 
and empathic knowledge regarding the existence and content of these feelings allows 
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for the induction of normative premises in ethics. Moreover, in analysing an ethical 
problem, distinctions are made, but in the end, when making moral judgements, the 
different human capacities come together in a whole, forming and directing an attitude 
towards such issues. They are merely different facets of the same activity, and this is 
similar Lotze’s conception. 
Epistemology is of paramount significance in Lotze’s thinking. Although he did not 
adhere to the extreme position of pure idealism as represented by Fichte, he can be 
considered a realist-idealist. Lotze drew on Kant’s hypothetical dualism between reality 
and representations of reality, although in a neo-Kantian way. That is, interpreting 
reality as immaterial while at the same time retaining the factual from the sciences as 
appearances of the immaterial. A further, pragmatic, step is made by James, by which 
the speculative ontology of Lotze is replaced by a more practical ‛rule of success“. Here, 
the immediate and fluctuating nature of life as pure experience forms the basis of 
knowledge and reflections. This is then discussed further by Rorty.  
The link between Lotze’s thinking and pragmatism is but one example of the ways in 
which Lotze influenced the history of philosophy and the appreciation of sciences. 
Despite the oblivion to which he felt consigned, he had a huge impact on his 
contemporaries and on the development of thought in different directions. This is 
evident from the many translations and reprints of his works which continued to 
appear until about 1930, but also from the renewed interest in his work from around 
1980 onwards. A qualitative analysis reveals that his influence was primarily felt in the 
developments within the Neo-Kantian schools of which he was a prominent 
representative. Two of Lotze’s concepts in particular are worth mentioning here, 
namely that of holding (gelten) and of value. These were picked up in the Southwest 
German School, whereas the Marbuger School emphasized the logical unity of thinking. 
‘Holding’ in the social sciences becomes the counterpart of the natural sciences’ ‘fact’, 
and ‘valuation’ serves as a fundament in ethics.   
Via the Anglo-Saxon Neo-Hegelian movement, he also influenced non-continental 
philosophy. As previously discussed, in America one of his students, James, developed 
pragmatism. Although this is opposed to the immaterial ontology of Lotze, it is 
nevertheless rooted in Lotze’s contradictory approach to the sciences on the one hand 
and metaphysics on the other. This despite the fact that the North-American 
interpretation of philosophy in general had been characterized by pragmatism since the 
time of the Pilgrims. Lotze also influenced Husserl, the father of phenomenology. He 
completed his doctorate under Carl Stumpf, one of Lotze’s students. There are even 
some strands of thought in Heidegger’s work that are reminiscent of Lotze.  
Despite Russell’s derogatory remarks and analytic philosophers’ conviction that their 
brand of philosophy was an entirely new one, they too were influenced by Lotze, mostly 
via Frege. Some of his influence was expressed in problems concerning logic (for 
instance: anti-psychologism, objectivity, concepts as functions) and the close 
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relationship between logic and mathematics. Personalism also has its origin in Lotze’s 
work. Both the Methodist branch as well as the Catholic one, can be traced back to him. 
Catholic Personalism developed in France, the United States and Poland, where Karol 
Wojtila, the later Pope John Paul II, was a prominent representative. The Catholic 
university of Leuven has a personalistic school, made possible by the work of this 
extraordinary philosopher. 
Although Lotze was not preoccupied with ethics, apart from basing his metaphysics 
on the ultimate Good, his sentimental doctrine of value was of paramount importance 
for this field. The theologian Ritschl, who partially took over Lotze’s metaphysics, also 
employed his value theory. Valuation is also connected to the notion of ‘aesthetic 
sympathy’, which Lotze introduced to aesthetics, and which is situated in the conflict 
between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’. Thus, his theory of value was one of the most 
striking concepts he introduced. Its influence has been felt in two ways: feelings and a 
priori forms. The notion of value is present in ethics, social sciences and the value 
debate - despite the general opposition to the intrinsic value theory. For Lotze valuation 
can only take place through human will and feelings. It is never ‛present“ as such in the 
things being valuated. Von Bertalanffy’s system theory can be traced back to Lotze via 
Pester.  
Because Lotze’s ideas became so common that they became detached from their 
author; because after the World War II anti-German feelings caused a devaluation of 
German cultural achievements; because Lotze did not found a school; because his pupils 
inherited his critical independence; because realism repressed idealism; because 
phenomenology undermined neo-Kantianism; because Lotze was often misinterpreted; 
because theology was banned from philosophy; because the anti-metaphysic attitude of 
positivism led no room for Lotze’s speculations; because, generally speaking, the history 
of philosophy was neglected; because of all these reasons Lotze disappeared from the 
foreground. Paradoxically, Lotze has experienced both great influence and obscurity. 
Yet, at this time, a critical rehabilitation of his work is necessary, both for posterity’s 
sake, as well as for the future of scientific development in ethics. 
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Appendix 
APPENDIX 1: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HERMANN LOTZE 
[Grouping according to Max Wentscher (1925)] 
Microfiches are not included. 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HERMANN LOTZE 
 
First works 
 
1838 – De futurae biologiae principiis philosphicis, Diss., Leipzig. 
1840 –  Gedichte, Leipzing. 
1840 – De summis continuorum, Diss. Leipzig 
(1840 – Gedichte) 
1841 – Methapysik, Leipzig, Hirzel. (To distinguis from the edition of 1879, also called: ‘Kleine 
Methaphysik’). 
1842 – Allgemeine Pathologie und Therapie als mechanische Naturwissenschaften, Leipzig 
1843 – Logik, Leipzig, Hirzel. 
1843 - Leben und Lebenskraft (in Rud. Wagners Handwörterbuch der Physiologie, Bd. I) 
1844 - Instinkt (in Rud. Wagners Handwörterbuch der Physiologie, Bd. II) 
 
First  period 
 
1845 – Über den Begriff der Schönheit (Gött. Studien) 
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1846 - Seele und Seelenleben (in Rud. Wagners Handwörterbuch der Physiologie, Bd. III) 
1847 – Über Bedingungen der Kunstschönheit (Gött. Studien) 
1851 - Allgemeine Physiologie des körperlichen Lebens, Leipzig 
1852 - Medizinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele, Leipzig 
1853 – ‚Quaestiones Lucretianae’ 
(1857 –Translation of Sophokle’s Antigone into Latin). 
1845 - Über den Begriff der Schönheit 
1847 - Über die Bedingungen der Kunstschönheit 
 
Second Period 
 
1856 Mikrokosmos: Ideeen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit, Versuch einer 
AnthropoligieI: Der Leib, die Seele, das Leben, Leipzig, Hirzel. 
1858 Mikrokosmos: Ideeen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit, Versuch einer 
Anthropoligie II: Der Mensch, der Geist, der Welt-Lauf, Leipzig, Hirzel. 
1864 Mikrokosmos: Ideeen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit, Versuch einer 
Anthropoligie III: Die Geschichte, der Fortschritt, der Zusammenhang der Dinge, Leipzig, 
Hirzel. 
1857 Streitschriften. Erstes Heft: In Bezug auf Prof. I. H. Fichtes Anthropologie, Leipzig. 
1868: Geschichte der Ästhetik in Deutschland, München, J. G. Cotta. 
 
Third period 
 
1874 – System d. Philos.: I.Logik: Drei Bücher vom Denken, vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen 
(herziene uitgave van 1843). 
1879 – System d. Philos.: II.Metaphysik: Drei Bücher der Ontologie, Kosmologie und Psychologie 
(more exentsive than in 1841) 
 
 
 
 
Third period (sequel) 
 
1881-84 Diktate aus der Vorlesungen (8dln)n Leipzig, Hirzel 
 1881 – Grundzüge der Psychologie 
 1882 – Grundzüge der Praktischen Philosophie 
 1882 – Grundzüge der Religionsphilosofie 
 1882 – Grundzüge der Naturphilosofie 
 1882 - Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Kant. 
 1883 – Grundzüge der Logik und Encyklopädie der Philosofie 
 1883 – Grundzüge der Metaphysik 
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 1884 – Grundzüge der Ästhetiek 
1882 – Die Prinzipien der Ethik, in: Nord und Süd. 
1885- 1886 - 1891: Kleine Schriften, I-III (III in 2 boekdelen), uitg. D. Peipers, Leipzig. 
 - Herbarts Ontologie - Über die Bedingungen der Kunstschönheit 
- Leben und Lebenskraft 
- Instinkt 
- Über den Begriff der Schönheit 
- Über die Bedingungen der Kunstschönheit 
 
Letters and documents 
 
2003 – Briefe und Dokumente ( Zusammengestellt, eingeleitet und kommentiert von Reinhardt 
Pester, mit einem Vorwort herausgegeben von Ernst Wolfgang Orth), Würzburg, 
Köningshausen & Neumann. 
 
1873 – Mittheilung an C. Stumpf in Betreff der Lehre von den Localzeichen. 
 
 
 
First works 
 
1838 – De futurae biologiae principiis philosphicis, Diss., Leipzig. 
 
1838 : Lotze, Hermann, De futurae biologiae principiis philosophicis. (Dissertatio 
principiis philosophicis : Dissertation Inauguralis Medica : Rudolphus Hermannus 
Lotze) (Leipzig, Univ., Diss., 1838), 22 p. 
 
1840 –  Gedichte, Leipzing. 
 
1840: Gedichte. Leipzig, s.n., VI, 244 p. 
 
1840 – De summis continuorum, Diss. Leipzig 
 
1840: Lotze, Hermann, De summis continuorum. (publice defendet Hermanus 
Lotze…assumpto socio Gustavo Schilling...) (Leipzig, Univ., Diss., 1840), Leipzig, 
Breitkopf und Härtel, 21 p. 
 
1841 – Methapysik, Leipzig, Hirzel. (Ook ‘Kleine Methaphysik’ genoemd in tegenstelling tot de 
uitgave van 1879). 
 
1841: Lotze, Hermann, Metaphysik. Leipzig, Weidmann, 329 p. 
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Translation in French: 
 
1883: Lotze, Hermann, Métaphysique, Paris, Firmin Didot et cie, 630 p. 
 
1842 – Allgemeine Pathologie und Therapie als mechanische Naturwissenschaften, Leipzig 
 
1842: Lotze, Hermann, Allgemeine Pathologie und Therapie als mechanische 
Naturwissenschaften. Leipzig, Weidmann, VIII, 528 p. 
 
1848: Lotze, Hermann, Allgemeine Pathologie und Therapie als mechanische 
Naturwissenschaften, (Zweite verbesserte Auflage), Leipzig, Weidmann, VIII, 594 p. 
 
1843 – Logik, Leipzig, Hirzel. 
 
1843: Lotze, Hermann, Logik. Leipzig, Weidmann, 236 p. 
 
1843 - Leben und Lebenskraft (in Rud. Wagners Handwörterbuch der Physiologie, Bd. I) 
 
1844 - Instinkt (in Rud. Wagners Handwörterbuch der Physiologie, Bd. II) 
 
1919: Lotze, Hermann, Der Instinkt: Eine psychologische Analyse. (Phil. Bibl. 
Taschenausgabe), Leipzig, Meiner, 33 p. 
 
1845 – Über den Begriff der Schönheit (Gött. Studien) 
 
1845: Lotze, Hermann, Über den Begriff der Schönheit. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und 
Ruprecht, 60 p. 
 
 
First period 
 
1846 - Seele und Seelenleben (in Rud. Wagners Handwörterbuch der Physiologie, Bd. III) 
 
1847 – Über Bedingungen der Kunstschönheit (Gött. Studien) 
 
1847: Lotze, Hermann, Über die Bedingungen der Kunstschönheit. Göttingen, 
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 80 p. 
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1851 - Allgemeine Physiologie des körperlichen Lebens, Leipzig 
 
1851: Lotze, Hermann, Allgemeine Physiologie der körperlichen Lebens. Leipzig, 
Weidmann, VIII, 636 p. 
 
1852 - Medizinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele, Leipzig 
 
1852: Lotze, Hermann, Medicinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele. Leipzig, 
Weidmann, VIII, 632 p. 
 
1896: Lotze, Hermann, Medizinische Psychologie: Physiologie der Seele, Leipzig 
 
1966: Lotze, Hermann, Medicinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele. (Nachdr. 
der Ausg. Leipzig, 1852), Amsterdam, Bonset, VIII, 632 p. 
 
 
Translation in French: 
 
1876: Lotze, Hermann, Principes généraux de psychologie physiologique. (Trad. de 
l’allemand par A. Penjon), Paris, Baillière, XVI, 168 p. 
 
1853 – ‚Quaestiones Lucretianae’ 
 
1857 –Translation of Sophokle’s Antigone in Latin. 
 
Second Period 
 
1856 Mikrokosmos: Ideeen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit, Versuch einer 
AnthropoligieI: Der Leib, die Seele, das Leben, Leipzig, Hirzel. 
1858 Mikrokosmos: Ideeen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit, Versuch einer 
Anthropoligie II: Der Mensch, der Geist, der Welt-Lauf, Leipzig, Hirzel. 
1864 Mikrokosmos: Ideeen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit, Versuch einer 
Anthropoligie III: Die Geschichte, der Fortschritt, der Zusammenhang der Dinge, Leipzig, 
Hirzel. 
 
1856-1864: Lotze, Hermann, Mikrokosmos: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte 
der Menschheit: Versuch einer Antropologie, (3 Bd.) Leipzig, Hirzel. 
(1856): I: Der Leib, die Seele, das Leben. 
 (1858): II: Der Mensch, der Geist, der Welt-Lauf. 
The Anthropology of Hermann Lotze 
300 
 (1864): III: Die Geschichte, der Fortschritt, der Zusammenhang der Dinge.  
 
1869–1872: Lotze, Hermann, Mikrokosmos: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte 
der Menschheit: Versuch einer Antropologie, (2. Aufl, 3 Bd.) Leipzig, Hirzel. 
 (1869): I: Der Leib, die Seele, das Leben. XXII, 453 p. 
 (1869): II: Der Mensch, der Geist, der Welt-Lauf. XI, 
 (1872): III: Die Geschichte, der Fortschritt, der Zusammenhang der Dinge. VI, 616 p. 
 
1876-1880: Lotze, Hermann, Mikrokosmos: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte 
der Menschheit: Versuch einer Antropologie, (3. Aufl, 3 Bd.) Leipzig, Hirzel. 
 (1876): I: Der Leib, die Seele, das Leben, XXII, 453 p. 
 (1878): II: Der Mensch, der Geist, der Welt-Lauf, VI, 466 p. 
 (1880): III: Die Geschichte, der Fortschritt, der Zusammenhang der Dinge, VI, 623 p. 
 
1884-1888: Lotze, Hermann, Mikrokosmos: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte 
der Menschheit: Versuch einer Antropologie, (3. Aufl, 3 Bd.) Leipzig, Hirzel. 
(1884): I: Der Leib, die Seele, das Leben, XXII, 453 p. 
 (1885): II: Der Mensch, der Geist, der Welt-Lauf, VI, 466 p. 
 (1888): III: Die Geschichte, der Fortschritt, der Zusammenhang der Dinge, VI, 623 p. 
 
1896-1909: Lotze, Hermann, Mikrokosmos: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte 
der Menschheit: Versuch einer Anthropologie. (5. Aufl, 3v.), Leipzig, Hirzel. 
 (1896): 1. Der Leib, die Seele, das Leben. XXII, 453 p. 
 (1905): 2. Der Mensch, der Geist, der Welt Lauf. VI, 466 p. 
(1909): 3. Die Geschichte, der Fortschritt, der Zusammenhang der Dinge. VI, 623 p. 
 
ca.1900: Lotze, Hermann, Der Zusammenhang der Dinge. Berlin, Deutsche Bibliothek, IX, 
201 p. 
 
1913: Lotze, Hermann, Zusammenhang der Dinge. Für die deutsche Bibliothek 
herausgegeven von Max Frischeisen-Köhler, Deutsche Bibliothek in Berlin, IX, 201 p. 
 
1923: Lotze, Hermann, Mikrokosmos: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der 
Mensheit: Versuch einer Anthropologie. (mit einer Einl. hrsg. Von Raymund 
Schmidt), (3 v.), (6. Aufl.), Leipzig, Meiner. 
1929 (?) Lotze, Hermann, Das Dasein der Seele, Leipzing, F. Meiner. (Sonderausgabe aus: 
Lotze, Hermann, Mikrokosmos). 
  
 
Translations in English: 
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1885-1886: Lotze, Hermann, Microcosmos: An Essay Concerning Man and his Relation to 
the World. (2 v. in 1), (translated from the German by Elisabeth Hamilton en E. E. 
Constance), New York, Scribner& Welford, (vol. 1) XXIV, 714 p., (vol. 2) X, 740 p., 
(The translation by Miss Hamilton, was completed, after her death, by Miss Jones 
who also revised the whole.) 
 
1887: Lotze, Hermann, Microcosmos: An Essay Concerning Man and his Relation to the 
World. (2 v. in 1), (2d ed.), (Translated from the German by Elizabeth Hamilton and E. 
E. Constance Jones), New York, Scribner & Welford, XXIV, 714, 740 p.  
 
1888: Lotze, Hermann, Microcosmos: An Essay Concerning Man and his Relation to the 
World. (2 v.), (3rd ed.), (Translated from the German by Elizabeth Hamilton and E. E. 
Constance Jones), Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark. 
 
1897: Lotze, Hermann, Microcosmos: An Essay Concerning Man and his Relation to the 
World. (Translated from the German by Elizabeth Hamilton and E. E. Constance 
Jones), NewYork City, Charles Scriber’s Sons. 
 
Translations in Italian: 
 
1988: Lotze, Hermann, Microcosmo: Idee sulla storia naturale e sulla storia della 
umanità: Saggio di antropologia. (A cura di Luigi Marino, con la collaborazione di 
Gian Stefano Villa), Torino, UTET, 920 p., ill. 
 
1988: Lotze, Hermann, Microcosmo: Idee sulla storia naturale e sulla storia della 
umanità: Saggio di antropologia. (2 v.), (Versione, prefazione e appendici di 
Francesco Bonetelli), Pavia, Mattei, Speroni & c. 
 
1911-1916: Lotze, Hermann, Mocrocosmo: Idee sulla storia naturale e sulla storia 
dell’umanità: Saggio d’antropologia. (2 vol.), (versione, prefazione e appendici di 
Francesco Bon atelli), Pavia, Mattei, Speroni & c. 
 
1919: Lotze, Herman, Microcosmo: Idee sulla storia naturale e sulla storia dell’umanità: 
Saggio d’antropologie. Milano, Facchi, 427 p. 
 
Translation in Russian : 
 
1870: Микрокосм. Т. 1-3. [Microcosm] 
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1857 Streitschriften. Erstes Heft: In Bezug auf Prof. I. H. Fichtes Anthropologie, Leipzig. 
 
1857: Lotze, Hermann, Streitschriften 1: In Bezug auf Prof. I. H. Fichte’s Anthropologie. 
Leipzig, 151 p. (Geen verdere publicaties). 
 
 
1868: Geschichte der Ästhetik in Deutschland, München, J. G. Cotta. 
 
1868: Lotze, Hermann, Geschichte der Ästhetik in Deutschland, München, Literarisch-
Artistische Anstalt der J. G. Cotta’schen Buchhandlung, VIII, 672 p. 
 
1913: Lotze, Hermann, Geschichte der Ästhetik in Deutschland. (Reprod. (met oorspr. 
titelbl.) van de uitg. München, Cotta, 1868),  (mit Register) Leipzig, Meiner, VIII, 689 
p. 
 
1965: Lotze, Hermann, Geschichte der Ästhetik in Deutschland, New Yrok (N.Y.), 
Johnson Reprint, (zonder register), VIII, 672 p. (Fotemech. herdruk van de uitg. 
Herdruk van Cotta, 1868) 
 
1871 – Das Evangelium der armen Seele, in welchem dem Menschen sein wahrer Beruf auf Erden 
gewiesen, der ewige Grund der Religion gezeigt und aller Hader von Glauben und Wissen 
und Glauben und Glauben für immer gestillet wird.: Miet einem Vorwort von Hermann 
Lotze – Leipzig, S. Hirzel.  
 
1871: Das Evangelium der armen Seele, in welchem dem Menschen sein wahrer Beruf 
auf Erden gewiesen, der ewige Grund der Religion gezeigt und aller Hader von 
Glauben und Wissen und Glauben und Glauben für immer gestillet wird.: Miet einem 
Vorwort von Hermann Lotze – Leipzig, S. Hirzel, XII, 197 p. 
 
Third period 
 
1874 – System d. Philos.: I.Logik: Drei Bücher vom Denken, vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen 
(herziene uitgave van 1843). 
1879 – System d. Philos.: II.Metaphysik: Drei Bücher der Ontologie, Kosmologie und Psychologie 
(uitgebreider dan in 1841) 
 
1874-1879: Lotze, Hermann, System der Philosophie, (2. Aufl.) Leipzig, Hirzel. 
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(1874): 1: Logik: drei Bücher vom Denken, vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen, VIII, 
597 p. 
(1879): 2: Metaphysik: Drei Bücher der Ontologie, Kosmologie und Psychologie, VII, 
604 p. 
 
1880-1884: Lotze, Hermann, System der Philosophie, (2. Aufl.) Leipzig, Hirzel. 
(1880)849: Lotze, Hermann, System der Philosophie 1: Logik: Drei Bücher vom Denken, 
vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen; 2: Metaphysik: Drei Bücher der Ontologie, 
Kosmologie and Psychologie , (2. Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, 608 p. 
 (1884): Lotze, Hermann, System d. Philos.: II.Metaphysik: Drei Bücher der Ontologie, 
Kosmologie und Psychologie. (2. Aufl.) 
 
1912: Lotze, Hermann, System der Philosophie, (2. Aufl.) Leipzig, Meiner. 
(1912): Lotze, Hermann, System der Philosophie 1: Logik: drei Bücher vom Denken, 
vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen, (3. Aufl.), (Namen- und Sachreg. Hrsg. und 
Einl. v. Georg Misch), (2 v), Leipzig, Meiner, CXXVIII, 632 p, 24 p, Ill. 
(1912): Lotze, Hermann, System der Philosophie 2: Metaphysik. Drei Bücher der 
Ontologie, Kosmologie und Psychologie, (System d. Phil.1.), (Namen- und Sachreg. 
Hrsg. und Einl. v. Georg Misch),  Leipzig, F. Meiner, 644 p., 32 p. 
 
1912: Lotze, Hermann, ‚Die Prinzipien der Ethik.’ In: Misch (Hrsg.), System der 
Philosophie: Zweiter Teil, Leipzig, 607-626. 
 
1928: Lotze, Hermann, Logik: Drei Bücher vom Denken, vom Erkennen. (Hrsg. Und 
eingel. von Georg Misch), (2. Aufl.), mit der Übersetzung des Aufsatzes: Philosophy in 
the last forty years, einem Namen-und Sachregister) Leipzig, Meiner, CXXVIII, 632 
p., III. 
 
1928: Lotze, Hermann, System der Philosophie: 1: Logik: drei Bücher vom Denken, vom 
Untersuchen und vom Erkennen; 2: Metaphysik: Drei Bücher der Ontologie, 
Kosmologie und Psychologie. (2. Aufl.) Leipzig, Hirzel, VII, 604 p. (idem als 1928?) 
 
1946: Lotze, Hermann, Die Ideeenwelt: Apriorismus und Empirismus. (Aus: Lotze, Logik), 
Leipzig, Meiner 
 
 
                                                     
849 In this second edition is included a critical appraisal of the algebraic treatment of logical 
problems developed by Boole, de Morgan and Schröder (Hauser, 2003:158). 
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The two following editons were edited by G. Misch and are reprints of de editions of 
1912 and 1928. This partial reprint is restricted to the two most important en relatively 
independent books 1 (vom Denken) and 3 ‘vom Erkennen) Part 2 was not reprinted. There 
is also an introduction about the influence of Lotze on modern Logic, especially the 
influence on Frege. 
 
1989: Lotze, Hermann, Logik: 1. Vom Denken (Reine Logik). (Mit einer Einl. ”Lotze und 
die Entstehung der modernen Logik bei Frege‛, met dem Text der Ausg. von Georg 
Misch; neu hersg. von Gottfried Gabriel.) Hamburg, Meiner, XLIII, 4, 196 p. 
1989: Lotze, Hermann, Logik: 3. Vom Erkennen (Methodologie). (Mit einer Einl. ”Lotze 
und die Entstehung der modernen Logik bei Frege‛, met dem Text der Ausg. von 
Georg Misch; neu hersg. von Gottfried Gabriel.) Hamburg, Meiner, XXXIV, 149 p. 
 
1989: Lotze, Hermann, Logik: drittes Buch: Vom Erkennen (Methodologie). (Mit einer 
Einleitung ”Objektivität: Logik und Erkenntnistheorie bei Lotze und Frege‛ mit dem 
Text der Ausgabe von George Misch; neu herausgegeben von Gottfried Gabriel), 
Hamburg, F. Meiner, WWWIV, 149 p. 
 
2004: Lotze, Hermann, System der Philosophie: 1: Logik: drei Bücher vom Denken, vom 
Untersuchen und vom Erkennen; 2: Metaphysik: Drei Bücher der Ontologie, 
Kosmologie und Psychologie. (Nachdr. der Ausg. Leipzig 1874/1879), Hildesheim, 
Olms. 
 
Translations in English: 
 
1880: Lotze, Hermann, Lotze’s System of Philosophy, I-II 
 
1884: Lotze, Hermann, Lotze’s System of Philosophy, Part I, Logic in Three Books: Of 
Thought, of Investigation and of Knowledge. (English translations from Metaphysik, 
1879, and ed. By Bernard Bosanquet), Oxford, Clarendon Press, XXIII, 538 p. 
 
1884: Lotze, Hermann, Lotze’s System of Philosophy, Part II, Metaphysic in Three Books: 
Of Ontology, of Cosmology and of Psychology. (English translations from 
Metaphysik, 1879, and ed. By Bernard Bosanquet), Oxford, Clarendon Press, XVI, 539 
p. 
 
1887: Lotze, Hermann, Lotze’s System of Philosophy, Part II, Metaphysic in Three Books: 
Ontology, Cosmology, and Psychology. 2 vol., Oxford, Clarendon Press, (Reprint of 
the translation by B. Bosanquet of 1884) 
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1888: Lotze, Hermann, Lotze’s System of Philosophy, Part I, Logic in Three Books: Of 
Thought, of Investigation and of Knowledge. (2d ed.), (2 vol.), Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, (Reprint of the translation by B. Bosanquet of 1884), (2d ed.), (see also1980). 
 
1980: Lotze, Hermann, Logic, V. 2, New York (N.Y.), Garland, repr. Van: Oxford, Claredon 
Press, 1888, XII, 338 p. 
 
Translation in French: 
 
1989: Lotze, Hermann, Logique. Livre I & II, aux éditions Felix Meiner850. 
 
 
1881-84 Diktate aus der Vorlesungen (8dln)n Leipzig, Hirzel851 
 1881 – Grundzüge der Psychologie 
 1882 – Grundzüge der Praktischen Philosophie 
 1882 – Grundzüge der Religionsphilosofie 
 1882 – Grundzüge der Naturphilosofie 
 1882 - Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Kant. 
 1883 – Grundzüge der Logik und Encyklopädie der Philosofie 
 1883 – Grundzüge der Metaphysik 
 1884 – Grundzüge der Ästhetiek 
 
1881: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Psychologie: Diktate aus den Vorlesungen, 
Leipzig, Hirzel, VIII, 100 p. 
 
1882: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Psychologie: Diktate aus der Vorlesungen, (2. 
Aufl.)  Leipzig, Hirzel, VIII, 100 p. 
 
1882: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der praktischen Philosophie: Diktate aus den 
Vorlesungen. Leipzing, Hirzel, III, 84 p.  
 
1882: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie: Diktate aus den 
Vorlesungen, Leipzig, S. Hirzel, III, 102 p.  
 
 
                                                     
850 Mentioned in Dastur, 1994 :38. 
851 The re-editions and translations of the outlines are sometimes completely different from each 
other, whether they are made from student notes or Lotze’s own written lectures. (Pierson, 
1988:122.) 
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1882: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Naturphilosophie: Diktate aus den Vorlesungen, 
Leipzig, Hirzel, III, 112 p. 
 
1882: Lotze, Hermann, Geschichte der deutschen Philosphie seit Kant: Diktate aus den 
Vorlesungen. Leipzig, S. Hirzel, 111 p.  
 
1883: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Logik und Encyclopädie der Phylosophie: Diktate 
aus den Vorlesungen. (2. Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, IV, 120 p.  
 
1883: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Metaphysik: Diktate aus den Vorlesungen, 
Leipzig, Hirzel, III, 94 p.  
 
1884: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Psychologie: Diktate aus den Vorlesungen, (3. 
Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, 95 p.  
 
1884: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der praktischen Philosophie: Diktate aus den 
Vorlesungen. (2. Aufl.), Leipzing, Hirzel, 97 p. 
 
1884: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie: Diktate aus den 
Vorlesungen, (2. Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, 102 p.  
 
1884: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Ästhetik: Diktate aus den Vorlesungen, Leipzig, 
Hirzel, 113 p.  
 
1885: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Logik und Encyclopädie der Phylosophie: Diktate 
aus den Vorlesungen, (2. Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, 120 p.  
 
1887: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Metaphysik: Diktate aus den Vorlesungen, (2. 
Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, 100 p.  
 
1888: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Ästhetik: Diktate aus den Vorlesungen, (2 Aufl.), 
Leipzig, Hirzel, 128 p. 
 
1888: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Ästhetiek. (2. Aufl.), Luzern, Stocker, 128 p., Ill.. 
(id. Als 1888?) 
 
1889: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Psychologie: Diktate aus den Vorlesungen, (4. 
Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, 95 p. 
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1889: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Naturphilosophie: Diktate aus den Vorlesungen, 
(2. Aufl.), Leipzig, S. Hirzel, 98 p. 
 
1891:Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Logik und und Encyclopädie der Phylosophie: 
Diktate aus den Vorlesungen, (3. Aufl.), Leipzig, S. Hirzel, 123 p. 
 
1893: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Logik und Encyclopädie der Phylosophie: Diktate 
aus den Vorlesungen, (3. Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, 120 p.  
 
1894: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Psychologie: Diktate aus den Vorlesungen. (5. 
Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, 95 p.  
 
1894: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie: Diktate aus den 
Verlesungen. (3. Aufl.), Leipzig, S. Hirzel, 98 p. 
 
1894: Lotze, Hermann, Geschichte der deutschen Philosphie seit Kant: Diktate aus den 
Vorlesungen. (2. Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, 104 p. 
 
1899: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der praktischen Philosophie: Diktate aus den 
Vorlesungen. (3. Aufl.), Leipzing, Hirzel, 97 p. 
 
1901: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Metaphysik: Diktate aus den Vorlesungen. (3 
Aufl.), (Ed. E. Rehnisch), Leipzig, Hirzel, 100 p. 
 
1902: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Logik und Encyclopädie der Phylosophie: Diktate 
aus den Vorlesungen, (4. Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, 123 p.  
 
1904: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Psychologie: Diktate aus den Vorlesungen, (6. 
Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, 95 p.  
 
1906: Lotze, hermann, Grundzüge der Ästhetik: Diktate aus den Vorlesungen. (3. Aufl.), 
Leipzig, Hirzel, 128 p. 
 
1912: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Psychogologie: Diktate aus den Vorlesungen. (7. 
Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, 95 p. 
 
1912: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Logik und Encyclopädie der Phylosophie: Diktate 
aus den Vorlesungen, (5. Aufl.) Leipzig. 
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1922: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Logik und Encyclopädie der Phylosophie: Diktate 
aus den Vorlesungen, Leipzig, Hirzel, 128 p.  
 
1969: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der praktischen Philosophie: Diktate aus den 
Vorlesungen. Amsterdam, Rodopi, 84 p. 
 
1990: Lotze, Hermann, Grundzüge der Ästhetik: Diktate aus den Vorlesungen. Berlin, 
Alexander, 77 p. 
 
Translations in English: 
 
1884-87: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of Logic and of Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: Dictated 
Portions of the Lectures of Hermann Lotze, Boston (Mass.), Ginn.(English translation 
by G. T. Ladd from the Diktate aus der Vorlesungen van 1881-84) 
 
1977: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of Psychology. Boston, Ginn. 
 
1884(?): Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of Psychology: Dactations from Lectures. (Translated, 
with a chapter on the anatomy of the brain by C. L. Herrick), Minneapolis, Minn., IX, 
150 p., 2 plates, Ill.. 
 
1884: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of Metaphysic: Dictated Portions of the Lectures of 
Hermann Lotze. (Translated and edited by George T. Ladd), Boston, Ginn, Heath & 
Co., XII, 166 p. 
 
1884: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion: Dictated Portions of the 
Lectures of Hermann Lotze. London. 
 
1885: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion: Dictated Portions of the 
Lectures of Hermann Lotze. (Translated end edited by Georg T. Ladd), Boston, Ginn, 
VIII, 162 p.  
 
1885: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of Practical Philosophy: Dictated Portions of the 
Lectures of Hermann Lotze. (Translated and edited by George T. Ladd), Boston, Ginn, 
IX, 156 p. 
 
1885: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of Aesthetics: Dictated Portions of the Lectures of 
Hermann Lotze. (Translated and edited by George T. Ladd), Boston, Ginn & Company, 
VIII, 113 p. 
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1886: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of Psychology: Dictated Portions of the Lectures of 
Hermann Lotze. (Translated end edited by Georg T. Ladd), Boston, Ginn. 
 
1886: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of metaphysic: Dictated Portions of the Lectures of 
Hermann Lotze. (Translated and edited by Georg T. Ladd), Boston, Ginn & Co, XII, 166 
p. 
 
1886: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of Aesthetics: Dictated Portions of the Lectures of 
Hermann Lotze. (Translated and edited by Georg T. Ladd), Boston, Ginn, VIII, 113 p. 
 
1887: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of Logic of Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: Dictated 
Portions of the Lectures of Hermann Lotze. (Transl. and ed. by George T. Ladd) 
Boston (Mass.), Ginn, VI, 184 p. 
 
1892: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion. (3rd. ed.), (Ed. by Frederick 
Cornwallis Conybeare), London, Swan Sonnenschein & co, XX, 176 p. 
 
1892: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of Logic and of Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: Dictated 
Portions of the Lectures of Hermann Lotze. (Translated en edited by George T. Ladd), 
Boston, Ginn & Company, VI, 190 p. 
 
1893: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of Metaphysic: Dictated Portions of the Lectures of 
Hermann Lotze. (Translated and edited by George T. Ladd), Boston (U.S.A.), Ginn.  
 
1911: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion. (Edited by F.C. Conybeare), 
London, G. Allen & Unwin, XX, 176 p. 
 
1916: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion, London, G. Allen & Unwin, 
XX, 176 p.  
 
1970: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion: Dictated Portions of the 
Lectures of Hermann Lotze. (Transl. and ed. by George T. Ladd) (Repr. ed. Boston, 
1885) New York (N.Y.), Kraus, VIII, 162 p. 
 
1977: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of Psychology. (Edited and with prefaces by Daniel N. 
Robinson) (translated from German) (reprint of 1886), Washington, D. C., University 
Publications of America. 
 
1998: Lotze, Hermann, Outlines of Psychology. Bristol, Thoemmes Press, IX, 157 p. 
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Translation in Italian: 
 
1984: Lotze, Hermann, Elementi di psicologia speculativa. (Gründzüge der Psychologie), 
(Traduzione ialiana di Bertrando Spaventa, edizione critica a cura di Domenico 
d’Orsi), (In appendice: Momenti della vicenda del manoscritto sulla Psicologia 
attraverso lettere di F. Fiorentino, A. C. De Meis, D. Jaja e S. Maturi a Silvio Spaventa 
con l’aggiunta di una lettera di B. Croce a V. Vecchi.), Messina, G. D’Anna, 338 p., Ill. 
 
Translation in Danish: 
 
1886: Gundträk af religionsfilosofien. (Pä dansk ved Edv. Lehman, med et forard af K. 
Kroman), Kobenhavn.  
 
Translation in Russian: 
 
1882: в рсском перводе – Основания практической философии, СПБ [Outlines of 
Practical Philosophy. ] 
 
1884: Основания психологии, СПБ. [Outlines of Psychology, Saint-Petersburg]. 
 
1882 – Die Prinzipien der Ethik, in: Nord und Süd. 
1885- 1886 - 1891: Kleine Schriften, I-III (III in 2 boekdelen), uitg. D. Peipers, Leipzig. 
 - Herbarts Ontologie - Über die Bedingungen der Kunstschönheit 
- Leben und Lebenskraft 
- Instinkt 
- Über den Begriff der Schönheit 
- Über die Bedingungen der Kunstschönheit 
 
1885-1891: Lotze, Hermann, Kleine Schriften. (3 Bde..), Leipzig, Hirzel. 
(1885): Lotze, Hermann, Kleine Schriften 1. XVIII, 397 p. 
(1886): Lotze, Hermann, Kleine Schriften 2. XVIII, 530 p. 
(1891): Lotze, Hermann, Kleine Schriften 3. Leipzing, Hirzel, LXIX, 450 p. 
(Sachregister) 
 
1891: Lotze, Hermann, Kleine Schriften: 3,1. Leipzig, Hirzel, LXIX, 450 p. 
 
Z.d.: Lotze, Hermann, Kleine Schriften: 3,2. Leipzig, Hirzel, LXIX, p. 450-960. 
 
1989: Lotze, Hermann, Kleine Schriften zur Psychologie. (Engel. Und mit Mat. Zur 
Rezeptionsgeschichte vers. von Reinhardt Pester), Berlin, Dt. Verl. d. Wiss., 256 p., Ill. 
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Lettres and documents 
 
2003: Lotze, Hermann, Briefe und Dokumente (Zusammengestellt, eingeleitet und kommentiert 
von Reinhardt Pester; mit einem Vorwort herausgegeven von Ernst Wolfgang Orth), Würzburg, 
Köningshausen & Neumann, 826 p. 
 
2003: Lotze, Hermann, Briefe und Dokumente (Zusammengestellt, eingeleitet und 
kommentiert von Reinhardt Pester; mit einem Vorwort herausgegeven von Ernst 
Wolfgang Orth), Würzburg, Köningshausen & Neumann, 826 p. 
 
 
Other: 
 
1867 – Lotze, Hermann, Der Brief Jakobus: In wendischer Übersetzung aus der Berliner 
Handschrift vom Jahre 1548 zum ersten male mitgetheilt, Leipzig, F. A. 
Brockhaus. (Located in the ‘Öffentliche Bibliothek der Universität Basel’, also in 
Harvard) 
 
1880 – Lotze, Hermann, ‘Philosophy in the Last Forty Years’. In: The Contemporary 
Review, Vol/ XXXVII, January-June, 1880, London, Strahan, pp. 134-155. 
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APPENDIX 2: SECUNDARY LITERATURE 
Chronologically 
Only works found in bibliographies and catalogues of libraries. 
Not all sources are controlled. 
Dissertations can be found in appendix 4, if they could be identified as such. 
 
(1820 ?) Sommer, Hugo, Die Lotze’sche Philosphie. 
(        ) Erdmann, J.E., Lotze’. In: Grundriss der Geschichte der Philos. Ueberweg-Heinze, 
vol. IV, 13e ed. , pp. 891-913. 
(        ) Sommer, Hugo / Baumann, ‚Zum Gedächtnis H. Lotze’s’. In: Preusische 
Jahrbücher, Göttingen,  57. Bd, p. 613-624. 
(s.d.) Baumann, J., Persönliche Erinnerungen an Hermann Lotze. Leipzig, Veit. 
(1856) Czolbe, Heinrich, Entstehung des Selbstbewusstseins: Eine Antwort an Herrn 
Professor Lotze. Leipzig, Purfürst, 58 p. 
(1869) Grundlegung van Ästhetik, Moral und Erziehung vom empirischen Standpunkt: 
Mit Rücksicht auf Herbart, R. Zimmermann, Lotze, J. H. v. Fichte, Fechner, L. 
Büchner u. Trendelenburg. Halle, Pfeffer, VIII, 115 p. 
(1875) Schmidt, Johannes, Leibnitz und Baumgarten: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der 
deutschen Ästhetik. (Hierin eine ausführliche Kritik ästhetischer 
Grundanschauungen Lotze’s und Zimmermann’s), Halle a. S., Niemyer (of 
Lippert?), VIII, 122 p. 
(1876) Lindsay, T.M., ‚Hermann Lotze’. In: Mind, 363-382. 
(1881) Sommer, Hugo, Dem Andenken Hermann Lotze’s. Leipzig, Hirzel, 16 p. 
(1882) Achiles, Thomas, ‚Lotze’s Philosophie’. In: Vierteljahrschr. Für wissenschaftl. 
Philosophie, 6, 1-27. 
(1882) Pfleiderer, Edmund, Lotze’s philosophische Weltanschauung nach ihren 
Grundzügen: Zur Erinnerung an den Verstorbenen, (2. Aufl.), Berlin, Reimer, 81 p. 
(Zie ook: 1884) 
(1882) Krohn, A., ‚Zur Erinnerung an Hermann Lotze’. In: Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Bd. 
81, 1. H., (38 p.) 
(1882) Foster, F. H., The Doctrine of the Transcendent Use of the Principle of Causality in 
Kant, Herbart and Lotze. Leipzig, Ackermann & Glaser. 
(1883) Caspari, O., Hermann Lotze in seiner Stellung zu der durch Kant begründete 
neuesten Geschichte der Philosphie und die philosoph. Aufgabe der Ggw.: eine 
kritisch-historische Studie. Breslau, Trewendt, VI, 122 p. (Zie ook 1895) 
(1884) Pfleiderer, Edmund, Lotze’s philosophische Weltanschauung nach ihren 
Grundzügen: Zur Erinnerung an den Verstorbenen. (2. durchges. Aufl.) Berlin, 
Reimer, 81 p. (Bijgewerkte heruitgave van 1882) 
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(1885a) Adamson, R., ‚Lotze’s Logic’. In: Mind, 10:100-115. 
(1885b) Adamson, R., ‚Lotze’s Metaphysics’. In: Mind, 10:573-588. 
(1885) Gercken, Wilhelm, ‚Beitrag zur Würdigung der Erkenntnistheorie Lotze’s’. In: 
Programmschr. der Real-Gymansiums zu Perleberg.  
(1885) Zschau, Friedrich Ernst, ‚Lotze’s Ethik’. In: Programmschr. der Real-Schule zu 
Meerane i. S. 
(1886) Fonsegrive, G., ‚La logique de Lotze’. In: Revue philosophique de la France et de 
l’Etranger 21, 618-634. 
(1886) Kögel, Fritz, Lotze’s Ästhetik. Göttingen, 138 p.. 
(1886) Nath, Max, Die Psychologie Hermann Lotzes in ihrem Verhältnis zu Herbart. 
(Sonderdruck 1887 als Programmschr. der Ritter-Akademie, Halle, 1892 – 2. Aufl.), 
Brandenburg a.d.H., Dr. V. Gustav Matthes,  37 p. 
(1886) Penjon, A., ‚La métaphysique de Lotze’. In: Revue Philosophique de la France et de 
l’Etranger 21, 348-366. 
(1887) Geijer, Karl-Reinhold, Hermann Lotzes tankar om tid och timlighet i kritisk 
belysning. Ett forsök till det filosofiska tidsproblements utredning. Lund. (Lund = 
zuiden van Zweden) 
(1887) Tocco, Felice, Lo spiritualismo del Lotze. Neapel. 
(1888) Hartmann, Edouard von, Lotze’s Philosophie, Leipzig, Wilhelm Freidrich, XII, 183 
p. 
(1888) Rehnisch, Eduard, ‚Zur Biographie Lotze’s’. In: R. H. Lotze, Grundzüge der 
Ästhetik, (2. Aful.), 86-128 (Anhang). 
(1888) Stählin, Leonhard, Kant, Lotze, Albrecht Ritschl: Eine kritische Studie. Leipzig, 
Dörffling & Franke, X, 253 p. 
(1888) Thieme, Karl, Glaube und Wissen bei Lotze. Leipzig, Dörffling & Franke, 48 p. 
(1889) L. Stählin, Kant, Lotze and Ritschl: A Critical Examination. (Translated by D. W. 
Simon), Edinburg, T. T. Clark, XXXII, 327 p. (English translations of 1888) 
(1889) Boksch, Rudolf, Zur Raumtheorie Hermann Lotzes. (Document Rapport, met 
bibliografische gegevens), Greifswald, J. Abel, 62 p. 
(1890) Erdmann, J.E., History of Philosophy, Vol. III (Engelse vertaling) 
(1890) Klein, M., Lotzes Lehre vom Sein und Geschehen in ihrem Verhältnis zur Lehre 
Herbart. Berlin, Breitkreuz, 93 p. 
(1890) Santayana, G., ‚Lotze’s Moral Idealism’. In: Mind 15, 191-212. 
(1890) Bartels, Friedrich, Pädagogische Psychologie nach Hermann Lotze in ihrer 
Anwendung auf die Schulpraxis und auf die Erziehung. Jena, Mauke, IV, 176 p.  
(1890) Nörreg°ard, Jens, Studier over Spencer, Lotze og Grundtvig. Köbenhavn. 
(1891) Vorbrodt, Gustav, Prinzipien der Ethik und der Religionsphilosophie Lotze’s. 
Dessau. 
(1891-1892) Wolff, Johann, ‚Lotze’s Metaphysik’. In: Philos. Jb. 4 (1891), 138-160; 5 (1892), 
26-41, 133-151, 285-315; (auch als Sonderdr., Fulda, 1892). 
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(1891) Bartels, Friedrich, Pädagogische Psychologie nach Hermann Lotze in ihrer 
Anwendung auf die Schulpraxis und auf die Erziehung I-II. Jena, Mauke, IV, 222 p. 
(1892) Eastwood, A., ‚Lotze’s Antithesis Between Thought and Things’. In: Mind N.S. 1 
(1892), 305-324, 470-488. 
(1892) Veck, Otto, ‚Zu Lotze’s Religionsphilosophie’. In: Protest. Kirchen-Zeitung, Nr. 24-
27.  
(1894) Simon, Theodor, Leib und Seel bei Fechner und Lotze als Vertretern zweier 
ma gebender Weltanschauungen. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 118 p. 
(1895) Caspari, O., Hermann Lotze in seiner Stellung zu der durch Kant begründeten 
neuesten Geschichte der Philosophie und die philosophische Aufgabe der 
Gegenwart. (2. Aufl.), Breslau, 160 p. (Reprint of 1883) 
(1895) Jones, Henry, Sir, Critical Examination of Lotze’s Philosophy: The doctrine of 
Thought. Glasgow, J. Maclehose and Sons, XVI, 375 p.  
 A vehement apology of Hegelianism against the heyday of Lotze’s influence in 
England. 
(1895) Jones, H., A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Lotze: The Doctrine of Thought. 
Glasgow, J. MacLehose, XVI, 375 p.  
(1895) Geijer, Karl-Reinhold, ‘Einige Bemerkungen zu Falckenbergs Abhandlung über die 
Entwicklung der Lotzeschen Zietlehre’. In: Zeitschr. für Philosophie 106, 90. 
(1895) Ritschl, Otto, Über Werthurtheile. Freiburg i. B., Mohr, VI, 35 p. 
(1895) Schäfer, Lotze’s Lehre vom Absoluten. Erlangen. 
(1896) Schiller, F.C.S., ‚Lotze’s Monism’. In The Philosophical Review. 
(1896) Merz, T.J., History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century. London, 
Blackwood & Sons. (herdrukt in 1907-14) 
(1896) Tines, Alfred, Lotze’s Gedanken zu den Prinzipienfragen der Ethik. Heidelberg. 
(1896) Ohse, Jacob, [Personalism and projectivism in Lotze’s metaphysics], (Russian), 
Jurjew. – (Estonia?) 
(1896) Lange, Paul, Die Lehre vom Instinkte bie Lotze und Darwin. S.i. 
(1897) Pöhlman, Hans, Die Erkenntnistheorie Lotze’s. Erlangen. 
(1897) Tuch, Ernst, Lotze’s Stellung zum Occasionalismus. Hamburg. 
(1898) Hübener, J., Das Gefühl in seiner Eigenart und Selbständigkeit mit bes. Beziehung 
auf Herbart und Lotze. Dresden, Bleyl und Kaemmerer, VIII, 139 p. 
(1899) Kronenberg, Moritz, Moderne Philosophen: Porträts und Charakteristiken. 
(Hermann Lotze, F. Alb. Lange, Victor Cousin, Ludwig Feuerbach, Max Stirner), 
München, Beck, IX, 221 p. 
(1899) Pape, Georg, Lotze’s rel. Weltanschauung. Berlin. 
(        ) Ueberweg, Friedrich, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie 
(1900) Wartenberg, Mscislaw, Das Problem des Wirkens und die monistische 
Weltanschauung mit besonderer Beziehung auf Lotze: Eine historisch-kritische 
Untersuchung zur Metaphysik. Leipzig, Haacke, 256 p. 
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(1900) Matagrin, A., Essai sur l’esthétique de Lotze. Paris. 
(1900) Robbins, E. P., Some Problems of Lotze’s Theory of Knowledge. (ed. and intr. By 
J.E. Creighton), New York. 
(1900) Seibert, E., Lotze als Anthropologe. Wiesbaden. 
(1901) Falkenberg, Richard, Hermann Lotze: Sein Verhältnis zu Kant und Hegel und zu 
den Problemen der Gegenwart. (Vortrag), Leipzig, Barht, 22 p. 
(1901) Falckenberg, Richard Friedrich Otto, (hrsg. von), Hermann Lotze: Teil 1; Das 
Leben und die Entstehung der Schriften nach den Briefen, (Frommanns Klassiker 
der Philosophie, 12), Stuttgart, Frommann, 206 p., 1 portr. (Er is geen tweede deel 
meer verschenen.) 
(1901) Matagrin, Amédée, Essai sur l’esthetique de Lotze. Paris, Félix Alcan, 166 p. 
(1902) Wentscher, Max, ‚Das Problem der Willensfreiheit bei Lotze’. In: Philosophische 
Abhandlungen: Gedenkschrift für Rudolf Haym, Halle, a. S., Niemeyer, p. 158-202. 
(1903) Wentscher, Esle, Das Kausalproblem in Lotzes Philosphie. Halle/Saale, Wiemeyer, 
VII, 66 p. 
(1903) Adamson, Robert, The Development of Modern Philosophy.  
Edinburgh, Blackwood. 
(1906) Wiedel, Karl, ‚’. In: Archiv Für die Geschichte der Philosophie, Band XIX, pp. 1-98, 
Berlin. 
(1907) Prosenc, Franz, Eine vergleichende Darstellung der psychologischen Hauptlehren 
bei Herbart und Lotze. S.i. 
(1907-14) Merz, J. T., History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century. (Herdruk 
van 1896), New York (NY), Dover. 
(1911) Wiedenmann, H., Grundzüge der Lotzeschen Psychologie und ihre Bewertung. 
Bielefeld. 
(1911) Valentine, Charles Wilfred, The Philosophy of Lotze in its Theological Aspects. 
(St. Andrews Univ. Celebration of the 500th anniversary of foundation. Publ. of 
the depts of phil. and divinity), Glasgow. 
(1911) Adamson, R., A Short History of Logic. (contains a reprint of ‘Lotze’s ' Logic’, 
Mind, 1885a), Edinburgh, Blackwood. 
(1912) Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott, Humanism: Philosophical Essays. (2d ed., enl.), 
London, MacMillan and co; XXXI, 382 p. (contains an article about Lotze's 
monism. 
(1912) Ambrosi, L., Lotze e la sua filosofia. Roma. 
(1912) Hall, Granville Stanley, Founders of Modern Psychology. New York, Appleton, VII, 
470 p. (Translation from German, 1914). 
(1913) Wentscher, Max, Hermann Lotze: Band I: Lotzes Leben und Werken. Heidelberg, 
Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, IV, 376 p., ill. (Slechts één deel 
verschenen). 
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(1913) Falckenberg, Richard, ‚Hermann Lotze: Sein Verhältnis zu Kant und Hegel und zu 
den Problemen der Gegenwart’. (Vortrag gehalten auf der Generalversammlung 
der Kant-Gesellschaft am 19. April 1913 in Halle), in: Zeitschrift für Philosophie 
und philosophische Kritik, Bd. 150, Leipzig, Barth, p. 37-56. 
(1913) Külpe, O., The Philosophy of the Present in Germany. New York (NY), MacMillan. 
(1914) Hall, Granville Stanley, Die Begründer der modernen Psychologie: Lotze, Fechner, 
Helmholtz, Wundt. (Aus d. Amerikan. übers. von Raymund Schmidt, durch 
Vorwort eingef. von Max Brahn), Leipzig, Meiner, XXVIII, 392 p. (Zie Engelse 
versie, 1912) 
(1914) Мирто Д. П., Ученце Лотце о духе человеческом и духе абсолютном, СПБ 
[Mirtov, D. P., De leer van Lotze over de menselijke en absolute Geest, Sint 
Petersburg.] 
(1914) Phalén, Adolf, Zur Bestimmunjg des Begriffs des Phsychischen. Uppsala, 
Akademiska Bokhandeln, II, 617 p. 
(1915) Thomas, Evan Edward, Rev., Lotze’s Theory of Reality. London, Longmans, Green 
and Co., 217 p. 
(1916) Gese, Paul, Lotzes Religionsphilosophie: Dargestellt und beurteilt von Paul Gese. 
Leipzig, Deichert, 107 p. 
(1917) Cuming, Agnes, ‚Lotze, Bradley and Bosanquet’. In: Mind 
(1918) Stumpf, C., ‚Zum Gedachtnis Lotzes’. In: Kantstudien, Bd. 22, 1-26 p., ill. 
(1918-1919) Bauch, Bruno, ‚Lotzes Logik und ihre Bedeutung in deutschen Idealismus’. 
In: Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, 1 Band 2. Heft, 1918 und 1 
Band 3/4. Heft, 1919, Erfurt, Keyser. 
(1919) Deussen, Paul, (ed.), Anthologie der neueren Philosophie. Berlin, 403-423. 
(1921) Thomas, E.E., Lotze’s Theory of Reality. London, Longmans. 
(1922) van der Vaart Smith, H.W. & Hendrik Willem, Hermann Lotze. Baarn, Hollandia-
drukk., 48 p. 
(1923) Cassirer, E., Substance and Function. Chicago (Il.), Open Court. 
(1924) Rosendahl, Fridrich / Rudolf Hermann Lotze, Aus der Philosophie Lotzes. 
Paderborn, Schöningh, 104 p. 
(1924) Bamberger, Fritz, Untersuchungen zur Entstehung des Wertproblems in 19. 
Jahrhundert. Halle a. S., Niemeyer, 91 p. 
(1925) Wentscher, Max, Fechner und Lotze. (Mit Bildnissen v. Fechner und Lotze nach 
Originalaufnahmen), München, E. Reinhardt, 207 p., III. (Zie ook 1973) 
(1925) Hahn, Gustav, Der Allbeseelungsgedanke bei Lotze. Stuttgart. 
(1925) Schmidt-Japing, Johann-Wilhelm, Lotze’s Religionsphylosophie in ihrer 
Entwicklung: Dargest. im Zusammenhang mit Lotze’s philos. Gesamtanschauung. 
Göttingen, Vandenhoeck u. Rupprecht, 122 p. 
(1926) Braham, E. G., Personality and Immortality in Post-Kantian Thought. London, 
George Allen & Unwin. 
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(1928) Weiss, Georg, Herbart und seine Schule. (Wentscher, Fechner en Lotze), 
Munchen, Reinhardt. (zie ook: 1973) 
(1928) Doering, Oskar, (hrsg.) Aus deutscher Kunstphilosophie: Kant, Schiller, Schelling, 
Hegel, Vischer, Schopenhauer, von Hartmann, Lotze, Wundt. Bielefeld, Velhagen 
und Klasing, IV, 101 p. 
(1929) An, Hosang, Hermann Lotzes Bedeutung für das Problem der Beziehung. Jena (zie 
ook 1967). 
(1929) Becher, Erich, ‚Lotze’. In: Becher, Erich & Aloys Fischer, Deutsche Philosophen 1: 
Lebensgang und Lehrgebäude von Kant, Schelling, Fechner, Lotze, Lange, 
Erdmann, Mach, Stumpf, Bäumker, Eucken, Siegfried Becher. (Mit einem Abriss 
über die Philosophie der Gegenwart van Erich Becher und einer Einl. Erich 
Bechers Entwicklung und Stellung in der Philosophie der Gegenwart von Aloys 
Fischer), München, Duncker und Humblot, XXXI, 313 p., Ill. 
(1931) Lehman, Gerhard, Geschichte der Nachkantischen Philosophie. Berlin, 139-146. 
(1931) Apel, Max, Die Weltanschauungen der grossen Denker. (2. verm. Aufl.), Leipzig, 
Reclam. (Plato, Aristiteles, Bruno, Galilei, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, 
Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Herbart, Schopenhauer, Fechner, Lotze, Nietzsche). 
(1932) Devaux, P., Lotze et son Influence sur la Philosophie anglo-saxonne. Bruxelles, 
Maurice Lamertin. 
(1934) Malantschuk, G., Die Kategorienfrage bei Lotze. Berlin, Funk. 
(1937) Kraus, O., Die Werttheorien: Geschichte und Kritik. Wien, Rohrer, XVIII, 515 p. 
(1937) Jaeger, E., Kritische Studien zu Lotzes Weltbegriff. Würzberg, Triltsch, V, 62 p. 
(1938) Kraushaar, Otto F., ‘What James’s Philosophical Orientation Owed to Lotze’. In: 
Philosophical Review,  47, 517-525. 
(1940) Kraushaar, Otto F., ‘Lotze’s Influence on the Pragmatism and Practical Philosophy 
of William James’. In: Journal of the History of Ideas: An International Quarterly 
Devoted to Intellectual History, Philadelphia (Pa.), p. 439-458.(These text is also 
in Wiener, ?) 
(?) Kraushaar, Otto F., ‘Lotze’s Influence on the Pragmatism and Practical Philosophy 
of William James’. In: Wiener & Noland, ed., Ideas in Cultrural Perspective, p. 643. 
(The same text as in Kraushaar (1940)). 
(1948) Sanz, Hilario Rodríguez (1948) ‘El concepto de valor en la filosofia de Lotze’. In : 
Philosophie (Mendoza), 5, 88-103. 
(1949) Morris, Charles (1949) ‛Axiology as the Science of Preferential Behavior“. In: 
Lepley, Ray, (Ed.), Value: A Cooperative Inquiry. New York, Columbia University 
Press, p. 211-222. 
(1950) Ziegenfuss, Hubert und Gertrud Jung, ‘Lotze’. In: Ziegenfuss, Hubert und Gertrud 
Jung, Philosophen-Lex., II, Berlin. (See also: 1966) 
(1954) Miller, T. E., ‘An Evaluation of Lotze’s Theism’. In: Anglican Theological Review, 
36, 292-298. 
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(1965) Russell, B., An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry. New York, Dover. 
(1957) Fischer, Hubert, ‘Die psycho-physischen Korrelationen bei Lotze’. In: Philosophie 
Naturalis, 4, 151-157. 
(1962) Ribot, Théodule, La psychologie allemande contemporaine. (Reprod. en fac-sim.), 
Serge Nicolas (ed.), Paris, L’Harmattin, LXI, XXXIV, 368 p., (bevat biografische 
gegevens over Herbart, Lotze, Fechner, Wundt). 
(1966) Ziegenfuss, Hubert und Gertrud Jung, ‘Lotze’. In: Ziegenfuss, Hubert und Gertrud 
Jung, Philosophen-Lex., II, Berlin. (Zie ook: 1950) 
(1967) Gotesky, R., ‘Lotze’. In: Enc. Ph. V, 87-89. 
(1967) An, Hosang, Hermann Lotzes Bedeutung für das Problem der Beziehung. (reprint 
of 1929),Bonn, Bouvier, 76 p. 
(1968) Reardon, B. (ed.) Liberal Protestantism. Stanford (CA), Stanford University Press. 
(1968) Passmore, John A Hundred Years of Philosophy. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 
640 p. 
(1971) Santayana, George, Lotze’s System of Philosophy. (Ed. and intr. by Paul Grimley 
Kuntz), London, Bloomington, X, 274 p. 
(1972) Kuntz, Paul Grimley, ,Santayana and Lotze’. In: The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy, (Memphis), 10, 109-113. 
(1973) Rothschuch, K.E. ‚Lotze’. In: DSB VIII, 513-516. 
(1973) Weiss, Georg, Herbart und seine Schule. Max Wentscher, Fechner und Lotze), 
Nendeln, Kraus, 262 p. [Facs. herdr.: Munchen, Reinhardt, 1928] 
(1973) Wentscher, Max Fechner und Lotze. Nendeln, Kraus, 207 p., Ill. (herdruk van 
München, 1925). 
(1973) Weiss, Georg, Herbart und seine Schule. (Facs. Herdr., Munchen, Reinhardt, 1928), 
Nendeln, Kraus, 262 p. 
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(1977) Morgan, M. J., Molyneaux’s Question: Vision, Touch, and the Philosophy of 
Perception. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
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APPENDIX 5: SOME TESTIMONIES ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
H. LOTZE 
Two negative testimonies of Bertrand Russel are mentioned first. 
 
 ‘The philosophers have been more conservative (than the theologians, H.V.); in Hegel, Lotze, 
and Bradley arguments of the metaphysical sort persist, in spite of the fact that Kant 
professed to have demolished such arguments once for all’ (Russell, 1995:567) 
 
  ‘The writers who carried on the academic tradition – John Stuart Mill on the empiricist side, 
Lotze, Sigwart, Bradley, and Bosanquet on the side of German idealism – were none of them 
quite in the front rank among philosophers, that is to say, they were not the equals of the men 
whose systems they, on the whole, adopted.’(Russell, 1995:693) 
 
Positive testimonies. 
 
 ‘Noch in den zwanziger Jahren des soeben vergangenen Jahrhunderts war Rudolf Hermann 
Lotze (1817-1881) einer der bekanntesten Philosophen Deutschlands, der spätestens seit 1870 
weltweit höchstens Ansehen geno  und dessen Werk auf vielfache Weise nachhaltige 
Wirkungen ausgeübt hatte.’ (Orth, 1986:7) 
 
 ‘Lotze was indeed a central figure in the whole intellectual scene before the unfortunate 
separation of continental and analytic philosophy.’ (Gabriel, 2002:40) 
 
 ‘Few philosophers have been so pillaged – in what follows, his name will constantly recur – yet 
in a sense he had no disciples.’ (Passmore, 1968:51) 
 
 ‚The example of Rudolf Hermann Lotze comes to mind – a thinker who dominated Western 
philosophy for half a century, to a degree perhaps equalling even Kant or Hegel, but whose 
thought is now almost completely unknown.’ (Randall, 2000) 
 
  ‘Lotze became a German philosopher of repute comparable to that of Kant or Hegel’ (Kuntz 
in: Santayana, 1971:6) 
 
 ‘Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817-1881) can without exaggeration be regarded as the most 
influential German philosopher in the second half of the nineteenth century. The impact of his 
thought extends from the neo-Kantian school (Rickert, Windelband) and Anglo-Saxon 
Hegelianism (Bosanquet, Bradley) to the American pragmatists Dewey and James. It was also 
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acknowledged by Husserl as well as his teacher Stumpf (who had received his doctorate under 
Lotze) and later figures in the phenomenological tradition up to Heidegger. In addition a 
number of Lotze’s ideas have resurfaced with added significance in modern approaches to the 
foundations of the life sciences, psychology and mathematics.’ (Hauser, 2003:152) 
 
 Kuntz called the period from 1880 till 1920 the Lotzean period and considered him as 
a figure of transition (1971:49). 
 
 ‘Lotze gehorte bis zum 1. Weltkrieg zu den am meisten diskutierten Philosphen Deutschlands. 
Überzetzungen seiner Werke in die wichtigsten Sprachen erschienen in zalreichen Auflagen.’ 
(Kettern, 2003:1) 
 
 ‘(…) Hermann Lotze, who (…) seems to me to have impressed upon many of the prominent 
thinkers of Germany, England, and France of to-day the tone of their thought, and suggested 
the attitude they have taken up to the great philosophical problems.’ (Merz, 1976, vol. 3:6-7) 
 
 Kuno Fischer in his history of philosophy (9 volumes) thinks that only Lotze can 
present a promising development of the Hegelian scheme and that he is of 
extraordinary importance among the German philosophers. Erdmann gives in his 
history en even more elaborated appreciation of Lotze, whilst Zeller is his history 
only gives a hasty reference to Lotze. (Merz, 1976, vol. 3:39-40) 
 
 ‘There lived at that time only one thinker of the first order who, trough education and 
individual taste and sympathy, possessed both the universal knowledge and the high mental 
qualifications necessary for this task’; and this task was ‘to combine the common-sense 
aspect of Britain with the metaphysical of Germany; the physiological of the Continental 
naturalists with the spiritualistic of the religious thinker; and lastly, the mathematical with 
the poetical spirit.’ And who was this thinker? ‘This was Hermann Lotze (1817-81), who for 
this reason stands, as it were, in the centre of the philosophical, and especially the 
psychological, thought of the century.’ (Merz, 1976, Vol. 3:264). 
 
 ‘After modernism, philosophy changed. But the change was slow in coming and, well before 
the full impact of high modernism, Hermann Lotze reigned as the single most influential 
philosopher in Germany, perhaps even the world.’ (Sullivan, 2005). 
 
 ‘Hermann Lotze (1817-81) is a key figure in the history of philosophy in the nineteenth 
century. His significance extends far beyond that of being the founder of the philosophy of 
value. ‘ (Schnädelbach, 1984:169). 
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 ‘In Germany, the Hegelian impetus had spent itself, and, apart from historical scholarship, 
nothing but the materialistic controversy remained, with such men as Büchner and Ulrici as 
its champions. Lotze and Fechner were the sole original thinkers, and Fechner was not a 
professional philosopher at all.’ (James, 1977:8). 
 
 ‘The translation of the volumes in which Lotze, towards the close of his long career as thinker 
and teacher, began to arrange in systematic form the ripest fruits of his reflection, is a 
contribution of the highest value to English philosophical literature.’ (Adamson, 1885a:100) 
 
 ‘Clearly during the 1870s Lotze was the German academic philosopher who was best known to 
the outside world and who proved peculiarly attractive to young Anglo-Americans’ 
(Santayana, 1971:48) 
 
 Heidegger called Lotze’s ‘Logic’ the ‛fundamental book [Grundbuch]“ of modern 
Logic. He also recommended to beginners in philosophy to read Lotze’s Logic. One of 
the reasons was that they should realise that he too had to go through hard work. 
(Cited in: Gabriel, 2002:44). 
 
 ‘Men like Trendelburg and Lotze who influenced Frege’s ideas are hardly known today, though 
they were once famous.’ (Sluga, 1980:xi) 
 
 ‘Of everything that has followed in the area from Hegel to the present day, there is nothing 
that has surpassed Lotze’s logical achievements in value … His influence reveals itself in every 
important figure in the area of logic no matter what philosophical direction he might belong 
to. If he has any claim to significance in logic, he cannot have remained uninfluenced by 
Lotze.’ (Bauch, 1918; cited in Sluga, 1980:53.) 
 
 Husserl labels Lotze’s Logic as one of the most important works of the 19th century 
on the theory of knowledge and says that his investigations on the subject owns a lot 
to him. (Cited in Dastur, 1994:37). He ranks Lotze among the most important 
researchers of his time and in a letter to Flora Darkow (August 15, 1911) he calls 
Lotze one of the greatest German philosophers since Kant. (Hauser, 2003:161n41). 
 
 ‘Lotze a été le philosophe allemande le plus célèbre de son époque en Allemagne comme à 
l’étranger; Il a influencé non seulement la phenomenology, mais aussi le néo-kantisme de 
l’école badoise de la théorie des valeurs fondée par Rickert et Windelband, et aujourd’hui on 
s’interroge beaucoup sur l’influence qu’il aurait eu sur Frege qui fut son élève. La tradition 
anglaise de sa Logique et de sa Métaphysique a étendu son influence au néo-héhélianisme 
anglais de Bradley et au pragmatisme américain de James et Dewey.’ (Dastur, 1994 :37-38). 
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 ‘Beide (F.A. Lange und R. H. Lotze, H.V.) vertraten Strömungen des idealistischen 
Neuakntianismus, allerdings mit naturwissenschaftslicher Orientierung. Ihre Bedeutung für 
die werdende Psychologie kann nicht bestritten werden.’ (Hiebsch, 1980:491). 
 
 ‚(…) that Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817-1881) was not just one among many other powerful 
German philosophers from about 1880-1920. He was clearly the leading figure, especially in 
logic. Incidentally, around 1910s this was well-known in Europe. So in 1912 Heidegger called 
Lotze’s Logic ‘the basic book in modern logic’ (Heidegger 1978, 23N). A few years later Bruno 
Bauch wrote: ‘Of everything that has followed in the area of logic from Hegel to the present 
day, there is nothing that has surpassed Lotze’s logical achievements in value.’ (Bauch 
1918:45)’ (Milkov, 2000:134). 
 
 ‘Historical philosophy has its most promising support in the greatest thinker whom German 
latter day nineteenth century thought has produced, in Lotze’ (Mertz, 1976:408,n1). 
 
 ‘(…) durch zien Werk und Schaffen jedoch den Stil des Denkens und Forschens sowie das 
geistige Profil des Gelehrtenlebens im Deutschland des zweiten Drittels des 19. Jh. Massgeblich 
mitbestimmt hat. Es handelt sich um dem Mediziner, Psychologen und Philosophen 
Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1871-1881).(…). Sein Wort wurde von Vertretern vieler 
Fachgebiete und im akademischen Leben des In- und Auslandes hoch geschätzt. (…) Hörer aus 
ganz Deutschland, aus Frankreich, England, Russland, aus Ländern Nord-europas und aus den 
USA besuchten seine berühmten Vorlesungen und Übungen.Lotzes Philosophieren regte die 
Um- und Neugestaltung ganzer Wissenschaftsdisziplinen an(…).’  (Pester, 1987:806). 
 
 ‚Es bleibt lediglich das historische Faktum, dass Lotze in der Zeit vont etwa 1875 bis in die 
Jahre des Ersten Weltkrieges einder der meist diskutierten Philosphen in Deutschland war, ja, 
eine internationale Berühmtheit darstellte, dessen Werke z.B. in England, Frankreich und den 
Vereinigten Staaten ein grosses Echo fanden. Eine russische Übersetzung seines dreibändigen 
magnum opus ”Mikrokosmus‛ von 1856/67 – von den zahlreichen englischprachigen 
Ausgaben nicht zu reden, die zwischen 1885 und 1899 in vier Auflagen verfügbar waren. Selbst 
seine Vorlesungsdiktate, die zu den unterschiedlichsten philosphischen Disziplinen seit 1881 
jeweils gesondert als ”Grundzüge..‛ erschienen – insgesamt neun an der Zahl -, erreichen noch 
bis in die neunziger Jahre des 19; Jhdts. Mehrere Auflagen und Übersetzungen in fremde 
Sprachen. Bis in die frühen zwanziger Jahre fliesst ein breiter Strom von Sekundärliteratur zu 
Lotze – darunter ausserordentlich viele Dissertationen -, um dann allmählich zu versiegen. 
Immerhin erscheint eine sechste Auflage des Mikrokosmus noch 1923 erstmals in der 
Philosophischen Bibliothek des Felix Meiner Verlags in Leipzig. (Orth, 1986:9) 
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APPENDIX 6: SPECIAL EDITIONS 
Some works, found accidentally, but worth mentioning, because these are editions for 
the blind. 
 
1896: Lotze, Hermann, Mikrokosmos I: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der 
Menschheit: Versuch einer Anthropologie. (5. Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, XVI, 453 p. 
- Marburg: Deutsche Blindenstudienanstalt, [s.a.] – k-h. – 6 Bände 
 
 
1896: Lotze, Hermann, Mikrokosmos I: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der 
Menschheit: Versuch einer Anthropologie. (5. Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, XVI, 453 p. 
- Marburg: Deutsche Blindenstudienanstalt, [s.a.] – k-h. – 6 Bände 
 
 
1905: Lotze, Hermann, Mikrokosmos II: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der 
Menschheit: Versuch einer Anthropologie. (5. Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, XVI, 466 p. 
- Marburg: Deutsche Blindenstudienanstalt, [s.a.] – k-h. – 7 Bände + 7 Halbbände 
 
1905: Lotze, Hermann, Mikrokosmos II: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der 
Menschheit: Versuch einer Anthropologie. (5. Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, XVI, 466 p. 
- Marburg: Deutsche Blindenstudienanstalt, [s.a.] – k-h. – 7 Bände + 7 Halbbände 
 
1909: Lotze, Hermann, Mikrokosmos III: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der 
Menschheit: Versuch einer Anthropologie. (5. Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, XVI, 623 p. 
- Marburg: Deutsche Blindenstudienanstalt, [s.a.] – k-h. – 8 Bände + 7 Halbbände 
 
1909: Lotze, Hermann, Mikrokosmos III: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der 
Menschheit: Versuch einer Anthropologie. (5. Aufl.), Leipzig, Hirzel, XVI, 623 p. 
- Marburg: Deutsche Blindenstudienanstalt, [s.a.] – k-h. – 8 Bände + 7 Halbbände 
 
 
By Dietrich Scheglmann Reprintverlag (Jena) some facsimiles of Lotze’s works were 
edited on CD: 
- Aesthetik, 1884; 
- Logik und Encyklopädie der Philosophie, 1885; 
- Metaphysik, 1887; 
- Naturphilosophie, 1882; 
- Psychologie, 1904; 
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- Praktische Philosophie, 1884; 
- Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Kant, 1882; 
- Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland, 1868; 
- De futurae biologiae principiis philosophicis, 1838; 
- De summis continuorum, 1840. 
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APPENDIX 7: CONSULTED ARCHIVES 
 
Humboldt Universität zu Berlin: http://opac.hu-berlin.de/F  
 
Die Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Münster: http://www.ulb.uni-
muenster.de/recherche/kataloge 
 
Système universitaire de documentation : French universities : 
http://www.sudoc.abes.fr/DB=2.1/  
 
Die Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig: http://www.ub.uni-leipzig.de  
 
Libis (61 libraries unter which the library of the de Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and 
the Husserl archive): http://opac.libis.be/F/ 
 
Universidad de Navarra : http://www.unav.es/catalogobiblioteca/ 
 
Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek (ThULB) Jena: 
http://jenopc4.thulb.uni.de:8080/DB=1/LNG=DU/ 
 
IDS-Verband - Universität Bern – Universität Basel: 
http://www.biko.unibe/ch/bibliotheken.htm 
 
Der Katalog der Scheizerischen Landesbibliothek – Helveticat: 
http://topaz.snl.ch/cgi.bin/gw/chameleon 
 
Hollis Catalog, Harvard University: http://lms01.harvard.edu/ 
 
Oxford University: http://library.ox.ac.uk/  
 
Cambridge University: http://lib.cam.ac.uk 
 
Uiversità di Bologna: http://opac.sbn.it 
 
Università di Roma: http://www.sba.uniroma3.it/ricerca/ALEPH   
 
Universitat de Barcelona: http://eclipsi.bib.ub.es/virtua/catalan/index.html  
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Universidad Autónoma de Madrid: http://biblioteca.uam.es/catalogo.html  
 
Uppsala Universitet: http://www.libris.kb.se/index.jsp  
 
Universitätsbibliothek Marburg: http://www.ub.uni-marburg.de 
 
Ghent University: http://catserv.ugent.be:8505/ALEPH/7392ACF94347B3 
 
Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Université Libre de Bruxelles: 
http://www.vub.ac.be/biblio  
 
Koninklijke Bibliotheek van België: http://opac.kbr.be  
 
Koninklijke Bibliotheek Nederland: http://www.kb.nl   
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APPENDIX 8: WORKS OF LOTZE IN THE LIBRARY OF WILLIAM 
JAMES854 
1884: Lotze’s System of Philosophy, Part II, Metaphysic in Three Books: Of Ontology, of 
Cosmology and of Psychology. (English translations from Metaphysik, 1879, and ed. 
By Bernard Bosanquet), Oxford, Clarendon Press, XVI, 539 p. 
1874: 1: Logik: drei Bücher vom Denken, vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen, (2. Aufl.) 
Leipzig, Hirzel. VIII, 597 p. 
1884: Lotze’s System of Philosophy, Part I, Logic in Three Books: Of Thought, of 
Investigation and of Knowledge. (English translations from Metaphysik, 1879, and 
ed. By Bernard Bosanquet), Oxford, Clarendon Press, XXIII, 538 p. 
1869–1872: Mikrokosmos: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit: 
Versuch einer Antropologie, (2. Aufl, 3 Bd.) Leipzig, Hirzel. 
 (1869): I: Der Leib, die Seele, das Leben. XXII, 453 p. 
 (1869): II: Der Mensch, der Geist, der Welt-Lauf. XI, 
 (1872): III: Die Geschichte, der Fortschritt, der Zusammenhang der Dinge. VI, 616 p. 
1885: Microcosmos: An Essay Concerning Man and his Relation to the World. (Vol. 1), 
(translated from the German by Elisabeth Hamilton en E. E. Constance), New York, 
Scribner& Welford, XXIV, 714 p. 
1885 (?): Microcosmos: An Essay Concerning Man and his Relation to the World. (Vol. 2.), 
(3rd ed.), (Translated from the German by Elizabeth Hamilton and E. E. Constance 
Jones), Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark. 
 
  
 
                                                     
854 James, 1977:165, note 8.5. 
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APPENDIX 9: FREGE’S KEY SENTENCES ON LOGIC 
 
[17 Kernsätze zur Logik] 855 
 
[Vor 1892] 
 
 
1. Die Verknüpfungen, die das Wesen des Denkens ausmachen sind eigentümlich 
verschieden von den Vorstellungsassoziationen. 
 
2. Der Unterscheid besteht nicht bloss in einem Nebengedanken, der den Rechtsgrund 
für die Verknüpfung hinzüfugt. 
 
3. Beim Denken werden nicht eigentlich Vorstellungen verknüpft, sondern Dinge, 
Eigenschaften, Begriffe, Beziehungen. 
 
4. Der Gedanke enthält immer etwas über den besondern Fall Hinübergreifendes, 
wodurch dieser als fallend unter etwas Allgemeines zum Bewusstsein kommt. 
 
5. Der sprachliche Ausdruck für die Eigentülichkeit des Gedankens ist die Kopula oder 
die Personalendung des Verbums. 
 
6. Als äusseres Kennzeichen für die denkende Verknüpfung kann dienen, dass bei ihr die 
Fage, ob sie wahr oder unwahr sei, einem Sinn hat. Vorstellungsassoziationen sind 
weder wahr nog unwahr. 
 
7. Was wahr sei, halte ich für nicht erklärbar. 
 
8. Der Sprachliche Ausdruck eines Gedankens ist der Satz. Man spricht im übertragende 
Sinne auch von Wahrheit enies Satzes. 
 
9. Ein Satz kann nur dann waht of unwaht sein, wenn er Ausdtuck eines Gedanken ist. 
 
 
                                                     
855 Frege, 1971 :23-24. 
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10. Der Satz ”Leo Sachse ist ein Mensch‛ ist nur dann Ausdruck eines Gedankens, wenn 
”Leo Sachse‛ etwas bezeichnet. Ebenso ist der Satz ”dieser Tisch ist rund‛ nur dann 
Ausdruck eines Gedankens, wenn die Worte ”dieser Tisch‛ mir etwas Bestimmtes 
bezeichnen, nicht leere Worte sind. 
 
11. ”2 mal 2 ist 4‛ bleilt wahr, auch wenn infolge darwinscher Entwicklung alle 
Menschen dahin kämen zu behaupten 2 mal 2 sei 5. Jede Wahrheit ist ewig und 
unabhängig davon, ob sie gedacht werde, und von der psychologischen 
Beschaffenheit dessen, der sie denkt. 
 
12. Die Logik beginnt erst mit der Überzugung, dass ein Unterschied zwischen Wahrheit 
und Unwarheit bestehe. 
 
13. Man rechtfertigt ein Urteil entweder durch Zurückgehen aur schon anerkannte 
Wahrheiten oder ohne Benutzung andrer Urteile. Nur der erstere Fall, das Folgern, 
ist Gegenstand der Logik. 
 
14. Die Lehren vom Begriff und vom Urtail dienen nur als Vorbereitung für die Lehre 
vom Folgern. 
 
15. Die Aufgabe der Logik ist die Aufstellung der Gesetze, nach denen ein Urteil durch 
andere gerechtfertigt wird, einerlei, ob jene selbst wahr sind. 
16. Die Befolgung der logischen Gesetze kann die Wahrheit eines Urteils nur insoweit 
verb¨rgen, als die Urteile wahr sind, aur die man zur Rechtfertigung Zurückgeht. 
 
17. Die Gesetze der Logik können nicht durch psychologische Untersuchung 
gerechtfertigt werden. 
 
 
TRANSLATION856: 
 
 
1. The combinations that constitute the essence of thinking are characteristically 
different from associations of ideas. 
 
 
                                                     
856 (’17 Key Sentences on Logic’. In: Posthumous Writings, pp. 174-175), Borrowed from: Dummett, 
1981 : 444-447. 
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2. The distinction does not consist merely in auxiliary thoughts, which add the ground 
of justification for the combination. 
 
3. In thinking it is not properly ideas that are combined, but things, properties, 
concepts, relations. 
 
4. A thought always contains something that reaches out beyond the particular case, 
whereby the latter comes into consciousness as falling under something general. 
 
5. The linguistic expression for what is characteristic of a thought is the copula or the 
personal inflection of the verb. 
 
6. It may serve  as an external criterion for a combination that constitutes a thought 
that, for it, the question whether it is true or untrue has a sense. Associations of 
ideas are neither true nor untrue. 
 
7. What truth is, I hold to be indefinable. 
 
8. The linguistic expression of a thought is a sentence. One also speaks in a transferred 
sense of the truth of a sentence. 
 
9. A sentence can be true or untrue only when it is the expression of a thought. 
 
10. The sentence ‘Leo Sachse is a man’ is the expression of a thought only when ‘Leo 
Sachse’ designates something. In the same way the sentence ‘This table is round’ is 
the expression of a thought only when the words ‘this table’ designate something 
definite for me, and are not empty words. 
 
11. ‛ 2 times 2 is 4“ remains true even if, as a result of Darwinian evolution, all men 
came to assert that 2 times 2 was 5. Every truth is eternal and independent of 
whether or not anyone thinks it and of the psychological constitution of one who 
thinks it. 
 
12. Logic first begins with the conviction that a distinction holds between truth and 
untruth. 
 
13. One justifies a judgment either by going back to already known truths or by 
withholding the use other judgments. Only the first case, inference, is the subject-
matter of logic. 
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14. The theories of the concept and of the judgment serve only as a preparation for the 
theory of inference. 
 
15. The task of logic is the formulation of laws in accordance with which a judgment is  
justified by means of others, independently  of whether or not they are themselves true. 
 
16. Conformity with logical laws can guarantee the truth of a judgment only in so fat as 
the judgments to which one refers justify it are true. 
 
17. The laws of logic cannot be justified by means of a psychological investigation. 
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APPENDIX 10: QUOTES FROM THE QUR’AN IN RELATION TO 
ISLAM BANKING857 
Sura 2: 219. They ask you about liquor and gambling. Say: ‘Major sin lies in both of them 
and also some (worldly) profit for the people but their sin is greater than their profit.’ 
And they also ask you about what they should spend. Say: ‘(Spend) whatever is surplus 
to your needs.’ Thus does Allah make His Commandments clear to you so that you may 
meditate. 
 
Sura 2: 275. Those who live on usury will not be able to stand (on the Day of Judgment) 
but like the one whom Satan has made insane with his touch (damnation). This is 
because they used to say that trade (buying and selling) is similar to usury whereas 
Allah has declared trading (buying and selling) lawful and usury unlawful. So, if 
someone refrained (from usury) on receiving admonition from his Lord, then he can 
keep whatever he took in the past and his case is with Allah. But those who continued 
with usury (despite the admonition) would be the inmates of Hell. There will they stay 
permanently. 
 
Sura 2: 276. Allah eliminates usury (i.e. deprives usurious profits of prosperous growth) 
and multiplies alms gifts (i.e. increases blessings of clean wealth manifold through 
charity donations). And Allah does not like anyone who is ungrateful and disobedient. 
 
Sura 2: 278. O Believers! Fear Allah and write off whatever balance remains of usury if 
you are believers (true to the core of your hearts). 
 
Sura 3: 130. O Believers! Do not live on usury doubled and redoubled and keep fearing 
Allah so that you may prosper. 
 
 
                                                     
857 Source: http://www.irfan-ul-quran.com (2010-07-24) ‘Irfan ul Quran (2009) is a new translation by 
prominent Pakistani scholar Muhammad Tabir-ul-Qadri released in conjugation with and Urdu 
translation of the same name. It is published by Minhaj-ul-Quran and it is regarded as one of the 
most modern and scientifically correct translations and interpretations to date. It is available free to 
read on their website.’ (‘English Translations of the Quran’. In: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_translations_of_the_Quran (2010-07-24), p. 8.) 
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Sura 5: 90. O Believers! Wine and gambling and idols mounted (for worship) and divining 
arrows (for seeking luck, all) are filthy works of Satan. So turn away from them 
(completely) so that you may prosper. 
 
Sura 5: 91. Satan seeks only to breed enmity and spite among you by means of wine and 
gambling and hinder you from remembering Allah and observing Prayer. Will you 
abstain (from these evil-generating temptations)? 
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APPENDIX 11: QUOTES FROM THE BIBLE IN RELATION TO 
USURY858 
Exodus 22: 25: If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee, thou shalt 
not be to him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury. 
  
Leviticus 25 : 35 : 35: And if thy brother be waxen poor, and fallen in decay with thee; 
then thou shalt relieve him: yea, though he be a stranger, or a sojourner; that he may 
live with thee. 
  
Leviticus 25 : 35 : 36: Take thou no usury of him, or increase: but fear thy God; that thy 
brother may live with thee. 
 
Deuteronomy 23: 19: Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother; usury of money, 
usury of victuals, usury of any thing that is lent upon usury: 
  
Deuteronomy 23: 20: Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother 
thou shalt not lend upon usury: that the LORD thy God may bless thee in all that thou 
settest thine hand to in the land whither thou goest to possess it. 
 
Ezekiel 18 : 5: But if a man be just, and do that which is lawful and right, 
  
Ezekiel 18 : 8: He that hath not given forth upon usury, neither hath taken any increase, 
that hath withdrawn his hand from iniquity, hath executed true judgment between man 
and man, 
 
Matthew 25: 27: Thou oughtest therefore to have put my money to the exchangers, and 
then at my coming I should have received mine own with usury. 
 
Luke 6: 24: But woe unto you that are rich! for ye have received your consolation. 
 
 
                                                     
858 Source: The Holy Bible: Authorized King James Version [Oxford Standard Text (1769)]. In: 
http://www.lafeuilledolivier.com/Ecritures/KJV.htm  
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Luke 6: 35: But love ye your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing again; 
and your reward shall be great, and ye shall be the children of the Highest: for he is kind 
unto the unthankful and to the evil. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
